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Abstract 
 
This study explores the marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of 
political parties. More specifically, it attempts to provide a systematic understanding of the 
structural conditions and factors that determine such developments in a new democracy. 
The following propositions commence this study. In new democracies that are indicated 
by a set of conditions postulated by Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), political parties are likely to adopt marketing principles, 
procedures and techniques to advance not only market-orientation, but also campaign 
structure and strategies. However, none of these parties is likely to turn into either market-
oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented parties. To evaluate such 
propositions, this study selected the new democracy of Indonesia as a case study, 
adopted critical realism as a research philosophy, formulated a holistic conceptual 
framework and applied a pure-mix of qualitative and the quantitative research 
methodology. Survey data were collected from marketers/campaigners of 10 Indonesian 
political parties during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The in-depth 
interview data were derived from these parties’ leaders/secretaries, senior editors of the 
Indonesian media and political consultants and pollsters. These data were combined with 
reports released by these media and pollsters, the Indonesian research centres and the 
Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions.  
This study reveals that there were ‘structural conditions’, which stimulated the 
Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order to develop such practices. In facing 
these elections, these parties realized the importance of political market arenas and 
political sub-markets and advanced such practices strategically. None of these parties 
however, turned into either market-oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented 
parties. The main finding of this study is that in the emerging democratic countries, which 
have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the 
candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party orientations related to such 
practices seem to be matters of mode and degree rather than of type. The following 
factors determined such orientations. They include: a) perceptions of the party leaders, 
candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal 
party, the media and electoral arenas; b) the party-specific factors, especially, party 
ideology, size, campaign resources and position in the government and experiences with 
internal and external shocks; c) the party’s competitive chances to fulfil the minimum 
number of the presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate 
a pair of presidential candidates; and d) the party presidential candidate-specific factors. 
This study offers the following novelty theoretical and prescriptive models. The first 
theoretical model conceptualises the structural conditions and factors that determine 
developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of political parties 
in such countries within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. The 
second theoretical model underpins formation of the party presidential candidate-specific 
factors and theorises its impacts on such developments systematically; while the third 
theoretical model provides a baseline framework to explore the effects of these 
aforementioned factors on such developments holistically. The second and the third 
theoretical models could be transformed into the prescriptive models to help these parties 
to achieve their goals in these elections effectively. The mainstream centre-right or centre-
left parties in the Western democracy could adopt these models, as they want to tactically 
confront the rises of the radical-right wing populist parties and movements and 
strategically manage the sustainability of the liberal democratic system and society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Background 
The idea for this dissertation comes from following observations. 
Soon after the downfall of the New Order Soeharto regime, 
democratization of politics took place. It has resulted in a new political 
landscape in the Indonesian politics. The old political parties survived. 
However, political and electoral instability and extreme voter volatility led 
to some new political parties evolving as influential political players.  
In addressing these developments, some authors explored 
constitutional changes, democratic transition and consolidation (Hara, 
2001; Abdulbaki, 2008; Webber, 2005; Aspinall, 2010; Mietzner, 2012; 
Horowitz, 2013), the development of press freedom (Ispandriarno, 2008) 
and media policy (Wahyuni, 2006, 2008, 2014; Wiratraman, 2014) and 
performances (Gazali, 2004; Gazali, et al., 2009). The following authors 
also investigated transformations in party systems, competition and 
cartelization (Ambardi, 2008; Ufen, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Tan, 2012; 
Mietzner, 2008; Slater, 2004, 2011, 2014) and executive-legislative 
relations (Hanan, 2012) and examined the increasing roles of political 
pollsters and consultants in the professionalization of campaigning of 
Indonesian political parties, especially during the elections (Mietzner, 
2009; Qodari, 2010; Ufen, 2010a; Trihartono, 2013, 2014). However, 
whilst none of these authors investigated the dynamics that inform 
practices of political marketing and market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning of these parties comprehensively, the 
existing theoretical challenges needed to examine such practices, as 
detailed in the following points, remained unresolved properly.  
 
1.2. Political Marketing and Campaign Transformations. 
A series of changes in modes of political communication and 
campaigning of political parties and parties’ candidates has been taking 
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shape both in the USA since the 1890s and in the UK since the 1930s (O’ 
Shaugnessy, 1990; Kavanagh, 1995; Maarek, 1995; Scammell, 1995; 
Wring, 1996, 2001; Savigny, 2004, 2008). Modern political marketing 
however, took place in the Western democracy since the 1960s (Shama, 
1976; Maarek, 1995; Savigny, 2004, 2008; Lilleker, et al., 2006). As non-
profit organizations practised the marketing techniques extensively (Kotler, 
1975; Kotler and Andreasen, 1991), political parties and politicians, 
especially in facing elections, adopted marketing principles, techniques 
and procedures and developed modern publicity, political public relations 
and packaging strategically (Sharma, 1976; Newman, 1994, 1999a, 
1999b; Kavanagh, 1995; Franklin, 1994). Such practices evolved 
alongside the modernisation and professionalization of campaigning 
carried out by those who run in the elections (Newman, 1994; Maarek, 
1995: 11-21; Farrell, 1996: 161) and were followed by the instalment of 
permanent campaigns advanced by those who ruled the government 
(Blumenthal, 1982; Nimmo, 1999). 
The use of marketing principles, techniques and procedures has 
been widely seen as resulting in sizeable effects on the changing 
behaviours of political parties and parties’ candidates in Western 
democracy (Scammell, 1998, 1999). In US politics, political parties’ 
candidates use market intelligence research to analyse the whole process 
of creating and packaging political messages and deciding what tactics or 
tools can be utilized to develop and manage the campaign strategy, 
budget times and human resources and respond to the transformation of 
political markets and political environments (Newman, 1994; Friedenberg, 
1997; Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Dulio, 2004; Dullio and 
Garrett, 2005). Similarly, in UK politics, political parties and these parties’ 
leaders also adopted modern principles, practices and techniques of 
marketing and campaigning advanced in the US politics. For example, 
since the media age of the 1960s, the Labour Party developed 
marketization strategies and adopted the American campaign techniques 
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and styles (Kavanagh, 1995; Wring, 1996: 92-103; Baines, 2001; Wring, 
2001; Wring, 2005: 65-67). Thatcher—as leader of the Conservative 
Party—and Kinnock—as leader of the Labour Party—also used such 
strategies, techniques and styles when they faced the marketing age of 
the 1980s (Harrop, 1990; Harris, 2000; Wring, 2005; Butler and Harris, 
2009). Since such principles, practices, techniques, procedures and styles 
have been adopted strategically, the logic of political party campaigning 
communication transformed from ‘party/propaganda logic’ to ‘media logic’ 
and then to ‘(political) marketing logic’ (Wring, 2005: 7; Lilleker, 2006: 153; 
Strömbäck, 2007: 52). 
So far, significant attempts have been taken and plenty of concepts 
have been introduced to capture and understand such developments. For 
example, Shama (1976) postulated the concept of ‘political marketing-
orientations’ to explain the adaptation processes and advancement of 
political marketing taken by Presidents Kennedy in the 1960s and Nixon in 
the 1970s when they ran in the presidential elections. In slight contrast, 
Blumenthal (1982) deployed the concept of the ‘permanent campaign’ to 
underpin a model of campaigning advanced by the Carter administration 
(1977-1981). For a couple of decades, this concept has been widely used 
to frame the ‘endless campaigning’ advanced by incumbent politicians 
who attempted to retain their popularity after they were elected and took 
power in government1. However, its innate weaknesses were noticed, 
subsequent authors favoured introducing alternative concepts/models to 
underpin such practices. For example, Wring (2005: 7) introduced 
concepts of ‘propaganda-orientation’, ‘media-orientation’ and ‘marketing-
orientation’ of political parties. Lilleker (2006: 153) formulated concepts of 
‘production-orientation’, ‘sales-orientation’ and ‘market-orientation’ of 
political parties. Lees-Marshment (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 
2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2009, 2010a) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
                                                       
1  Further information related to this issue, see Nimmo (1999), Steger (1999), Ornstein 
and Mann (2000), Needham (2005), Eshbaugh-Shoha and Nicholson-Crocty (2009), 
Doherty (2012), Larsson (2014) and Koliastasis (2014, 2016). 
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(2005a, 2005b) also theorised models of product-orientation, sales-
orientation and market-orientation of political parties. However, whilst such 
concepts still left disputable debates, the following issues prevailed. The 
first one is how to explain and measure the complexity of ‘political market 
orientation manifests’, which take shape within the contexts of either policy 
development or internal parties’ organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 
2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 2006: 4). The second one is how to develop the 
more acceptable and applicable concepts to holistically examine practices 
of political marketing orientation and market orientation of political parties 
(Ormrod, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012; Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy, 
2007; Henneberg, 2008; Harris and Lock, 2010) and capture and explore 
the structural-systemic/country-related, party-specific and micro-individual 
factors that determine the ways of and the degrees to which these parties 
advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-
29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 89; Ormrod, 2009: 90).  
While such issues exist, some authors theorised and/or 
investigated stages of campaign transformations and changes in the 
modes of campaigning of political parties (Farrell, 1996: 170; Blumler and 
Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000: 104; Norris, 2000: 138; Gibson 
and Rommele, 2001: 34; Plasser and Plasser, 2002: 6) and introduced 
other concepts, such as ‘Americanization’ and ‘professionalization 
campaign techniques’ (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Scammell, 1997, 
1998; Plasser, 2000, and Plasser and Plasser 2002; Hallin and Mancini, 
2004). For a couple of decades, ‘Americanization of politics’ and 
‘Americanization of campaign’ have been widely deployed as conceptual 
umbrellas to reveal the ‘Americanization campaigning techniques and 
styles’, which have, presumably, been transmitted and transplanted across 
the UK since the 1970s and worldwide since 19802. These concepts 
                                                       
2 These concepts are widely seen as being closely connected and sharing similarities 
with, but having differences from concepts of ‘modernization’, ‘globalization’ and 
‘hybridization’ of campaigns (Kavanagh, 1996: 61-62; Plasser, 2000: 34; Baines, et al., 
2001: 1100-1103; Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 27-28; Nord, 2006: 66; Uğur, 2012: 2-3). Further 
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however, have been seen as illusive in meaning (Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos, 1996: 45-62) and being less workable to explain the 
campaign transformation and professionalization that took place within 
and across democratic countries (Gurevitch, 1999: 283; Xifra, 2011: 669-
670). 
As such issues were realised, subsequent authors introduced 
concepts of ‘professionalization of politics’ (Mancini, 1999) and 
‘professionalization of political communication and campaigning’ 
(Gurevitch, 1999; Blummer and Gurevitch, 2001; Hotlz-Bacha, 2002, 
2007; Lilleker and Negrine, 2002; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Negrine, et 
al., 2007; Negrine, 2008). As it was considered that the first concept has 
too broad a sense and has not yet been theorised satisfactorily, some 
authors preferred using the second concept to explain the processes of 
adaptation and changes in the practices of communication and 
campaigning of political parties when they addressed the political system 
and media system and the relationships between these systems and the 
changing campaign-environments and communication technology (Gibson 
and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Holtz-Bacha, 2002, 2007; Negrine, et al., 
2007; Negrine, 2008; Strömbäck, 2009). However, the second concept 
entails vague meaning and subjective interpretations (Negrine and 
Lilleker, 2002: 102; Lilleker and Negrine, 2002: 309-311). Since this issue 
has not been resolved properly, a workable conceptual framework to 
holistically capture, understand and measure the degrees of ‘campaign 
professionalism’ and modes of ‘professionalization of political 
communication and campaigning’ of political parties, either during the 
elections or in between the elections and, more importantly, diverse 
factors that determined such practices has not been developed 
comprehensively either (Strömbäck, 2007: 53; Strömbäck, 2009: 111; 
                                                                                                                                                       
discussion related to this issue, see Elebash (1984), Scammell (1997, 1998), Farrell, 
(1996), Farrell et al. (2001), Baines (2001), Baines and Egan (2001), Baines (et al., 
2001), Plasser et al. (1999), Plasser (2000), Plasser and Plasser (2001), Plasser and 
Plasser, (2002), Sussman and Galizio (2003), Wring (2005), Nolan (2005), Nord (2006) 
and Doolan (2009). 
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Tenscher, et al., 2012:145; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013: 173; 
Tenscher, 2013: 243; Mykkanen and Tenscher, 2014: 23; Tenscher, et al., 
2016: 4). 
So far, such aforementioned issues remained unresolved. Plenty of 
observers however, simply assumed that the relationships between 
practices of political marketing and professionalization of political 
communication and campaigning really existed. For example, as derived 
within the specific context of US politics, Maarek (1995: 11-21) and 
Newman (1994) argued that modern political marketing is likely to take 
shape and/or co-exist within the evolution and modernization of 
presidential campaigning or leads to the professionalization of 
campaigning. Meanwhile, as stemming from the specific context of 
European politics, Strömbäck (2007: 62-64), Nord (2007: 88-92), Brants 
and Praag (2007: 107), Papathanassopoulos (2007: 129-132) and Maarek 
(2007: 146-52) argued that those already acquainted with modern political 
marketing would be more likely to consider professionalization of political 
communication and campaigning.  
Similarly, Farrell (1996: 161) also voiced that modern political 
marketing first came to light in the campaign organizations of parties and 
parties’ candidates when they developed modern campaigning in order to 
maximize electoral gains. Moreover, Scammell (1997: 8-9) and Scammell 
(1998: 255) argued that in order to understand political markets and to 
develop strategies and communication campaigns, campaigners seem 
strongly interested in deploying commercial marketing principles and 
procedures. Furthermore, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 13), Negrine 
(2007: 36) and Mancini (2007: 122) posited that political parties are likely 
to establish a ‘culture of marketing’, as they are engaged in developing a 
more rational and streamlined organizational structure and appropriate set 
of practices of campaigning. In addition, Newman (1994, 1999a: x), Lees-
Marshment (2001a: 22), Lees-Marshment (2008: 13), Lees-Marshment, 
(2010a: 1-2) and Strömbäck (2010: 18) highlighted that political parties 
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and their candidates who used the concepts, principles, techniques and 
procedures of marketing as “an organizational philosophy” would be much 
more professionalized in campaigning.  
As seen, these authors indicated that political marketing and 
market-orientation take place alongside and determine professionalization 
of campaigning. However, whilst such developments were studied 
separately, most of them lacked a proposal of a workable conceptual lens 
to evaluate these developments holistically. In considering this issue, 
Strömbäck (2007: 57-59) posited a set of propositions that underpins the 
relationships between concepts and practices of political marketing, 
market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. He also 
postulated a theory of strategic party goals regarding such practices within 
and across political market arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-64) and a set of 
conditions that determines the ways and the degrees with which political 
parties within and across democratic countries advanced such practices 
within and across such arenas (Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et 
al., 2012: 86). Unfortunately, he lacked offering an integrated conceptual 
framework that can be applied to holistically explore the structural 
conditions and factors that propelled marketization and professionalization 
of campaigning of political parties, especially in new democracies, such as 
Indonesia. 
 
1.3. Research Question 
Based on this background, I consider raising the following question: 
How can we holistically understand and explain the structural conditions 
and factors that determined the development of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post- 
Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections?  
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1.4. Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of the following chapters. As informed by 
the existing literature, Chapter 2 develops an integrated conceptual 
framework to evaluate the question. Chapter 3 highlights the existing 
knowledge gap and delineates the research aim and objectives, spells out 
the research philosophy, methodology, methods and designs and displays 
the proposed baseline structural model to evaluate these research aim 
and objectives. Moreover, Chapter 4 spells out the structural conditions 
that paved the way for such development taking shape. Additionally, 
Chapter 5 discusses nomenclatures of political market arenas and political 
sub-markets that took place in the new democracy of Indonesia and the 
effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions of the Indonesian 
political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these 
political market arenas and political sub-markets.  
Chapter 6 evaluates the structural elements that constitute 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties. 
This chapter not only validates the proposed baseline structural model, but 
also posits an alternative structural model that would be used in 
subsequent chapters 7, 8 and 9 as an analytical framework to holistically 
examine the effects of the following factors on the ways and the degrees 
of which these parties carried out such practices within and across these 
elections. These factors consist of: a) the individual perceptions of the 
party leader, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative 
importance of internal party, the media and electoral arenas; b) party-
specific factors that include party ideology, age category, campaign 
resources, size and position in the government and experiences with 
internal and external shocks; and c) party’ presidential candidate-specific 
factors. These chapters also examine the underlying structures and 
mechanisms, which led to such factors and also some emerging factors 
taking shape.  
 
 
 
 
9 
Chapter 10 summarises the main findings reported in chapters 4-9. 
Using such extracted findings, Chapter 11 proposes three novelty 
theoretical models and spells out the way to transform the second model 
into the prescriptive models. This chapter points out the knowledge, 
practical and managerial contributions of these models. More importantly, 
this chapter highlights the functionalities of the second and third proposed 
models and usefulness of the prescriptive models to help the mainstream 
centre-right or centre-left parties in Western democracy, as dealt with the 
rises of the radical far-right populist parties and movements and secure 
the sustainability of liberal democracy and society. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL MARKETING, MARKET-ORIENTATION AND 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING  
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses and scrutinizes the existing literature on political 
marketing and campaigning to formulate an integrated theoretical 
framework, which is specifically directed to evaluate the research 
question. However, before going onto this point, this chapter will briefly 
discuss the development of political marketing as a field study and 
evaluate the existing perspectives and concepts introduced in the 
literature to develop that framework. 
 
2.1. Political Marketing as an Emanating Field Study. 
Soon after being introduced by Stanley Kelley in 1956, political 
marketing gradually emerged not only as a popular term, but also an 
influential approach (Scammell, 1999: 723; Savigny, 2004: 22; Wring, 
2005: 2). Since the 1960s, political marketing has been widely used 
across the globe to analyse political campaigning (Wring, 1999: 45). As 
the word ‘marketing’ has been transferred and widely applied in politics 
(Moloney, 2004: 2-3), political marketing has been continuously 
recognized as alternative ways of thinking, speaking and practicing 
adopted by political party leaders and politicians in the political sphere 
(Moloney, 2008: 62). Since the 1990s, political marketing has been 
vigorously developed and considered not only as a strategic way to 
manage the internal party organization and its policy development and 
delivery strategy in government, but also as a new field study and 
perspective to explore such developments (Henneberg, 1996: 777; 
Henneberg, 2004a: 6-7; Henneberg, 2008: 154-155; Scammell, 1997, 
1998; Lees-Marshment, 2001c, 2004a, 2004b, 2008).  
So far, plenty of attempts have been made to define the essence of 
political marketing. At first, political marketing has been defined as ‘a 
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process’, which relates to the desire to comprehend dynamic political 
behaviours of political leaders in the political sphere (Scammell, 1999: 
719) and includes all factors related to the political communication 
behaviour of non-profit organizations and political organizations (Shama, 
1976: 766; Maarek, 1995: 2). Secondly, political marketing has been also 
considered as a set of practices which relates to the use of the logics, 
principles and procedures of marketing and the uses of opinion research 
and environmental analysis by political parties, parties’ candidates, 
governments, lobbyists and interest groups, which want to strategically 
advance the management of campaigns, produce and promote a 
competitive offering, satisfy groups of electors in exchange for their votes, 
drive public opinion, win elections, develop organizational aims and 
ideological and policy orientations and pass the legislation and referenda, 
as demanded and expected by societies—in general and electorates—in 
particular (Kavanagh, 1995, 1996; O’ Cass, 1996; Wring, 1997: 653).  
Since the 1990s, many efforts have been undertaken to develop 
political marketing as a new field study. Political marketing has been 
continuously developed and used to capture and understand the 
adaptation of marketing principles and procedures by political 
organizations and actors to fulfil the needs, wants and expectations of 
selected-people and groups in societies (Newman, 1999: xiii); and the 
market intelligence, management, design of the political product by 
political organizations and actors as desired by their markets (Strömbäck, 
2007: 56). Political marketing has been also robustly advanced to explore 
the ways of and the degrees to which political organizations adopted the 
business-marketing and commercial-marketing concepts and techniques 
as an organizational philosophy to help them achieve their goals (Lees-
Marshment, 2001a: 22; 2008: 13); and the marketing tools, concepts and 
principles as an organizational philosophy and strategy to accomplish their 
political goals within the contexts of the policy development or internal 
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parties’ organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 
2006: 4).  
As an emanating field study, political marketing has been widely 
seen as offering new, better and workable perspectives and conceptual 
frameworks to holistically capture and understand following the 
phenomena. The first one relates to the complex processes of political 
exchanges and interactions between political entities/actors and 
organizations and their environment and among themselves in the political 
sphere within contexts of either parliamentary marketing or governmental 
marketing or electoral marketing (Henneberg, 1996: 777; Henneberg, 
2002, 2009; Henneberg and Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg and Ormrod, 
2013; Ormrod, et al., 2013). The second one is associated with 
transformations and modes of political attitudes and behaviours of political 
parties and party leaders and politicians when they dealt with various 
types of political markets and primary political actors in the political market 
arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 59-60; Strömbäck, 2010: 18; Henneberg, 2008: 
159-163; Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013: 98; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 18). The 
last one focuses on the ways of and the degree to which political parties 
and parties’ politicians adopted and used the marketing concepts, 
principles and techniques as an organizational philosophy and strategy to 
address the electorates, competitors and the broad stakeholders that exist 
in the political system (Lock and Harris, 1996: 21; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 
2004a, 2004b, 2008; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Ormrod, 2005, 
2007, 2009) within the contexts of either policy development or internal 
parties’ organizations or campaigning (Lilleker, 2006: 151; Lilleker, et al., 
2006: 4).  
Having considered the ideas of these authors, this work posits the 
following proposition. Political marketing is actually a study and 
perspective form, which is needed to understand the following 
phenomena, which are:  
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• The nature and structure of political exchanges, interaction, 
collaboration and transaction processes between and among political 
actors and organisations that take place in democratic political 
spheres.  
• The nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets 
that take shape and are being addressed by such actors and 
organizations.  
• The structures, mechanisms and elements that underlie the structural 
conditions and factors that determined such processes and shaped up 
such nomenclatures. 
• The consequences of such processes and formations of such 
nomenclatures on developments of marketization and 
professionalization of political communication and campaigning of 
these actors and organisations—in particular—and democracy and the 
political and government systems—in general.  
 
2.2. The Wide and Narrow Interpretations of Political Marketing 
Political marketing phenomena have been understood using wide 
and narrow interpretations (Henneberg, 2002, 2004a, 2008, Ormrod, 
2012; Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy, 2007). As used in the wide 
interpretation, political marketing is deployed to understand the whole 
exchange and interaction processes, structures and political players and 
the existing systemic-political environments wherein political exchanges 
and interactions take place (Hennerberg, 2004a: 16; Henneberg, 2008: 
159-161). Those favoured following this interpretation advocated to adopt 
the existing theories of marketing and political sciences in order to 
holistically understand the complexity of such phenomena (Henneberg 
and O’ Shaughnessy, 2007: 26) and consider the holistic approach and 
the meta-theoretical assumptions of political marketing in order to tackle 
its theoretical challenges and practical problems (Henneberg, 2002: 94-95; 
Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012: 12-13; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 13; 
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Savigny, 2007; Henneberg, 2008: 152). This interpretation is seen as 
being helpful since the existing theories and models of political marketing 
have been developed in various research paradigms spanning from the 
positivist and anti-positivist research traditions and formulated from the 
different assumptions and the contextual conditions (Savigny, 2004, 2007, 
2008, Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 2004a, 2008).  
Meanwhile, the narrow interpretation is specifically developed to 
explore political management activities, attitudes and organizational 
behaviours carried out by political actors and organizations when they deal 
with political markets and environments (Henneberg, 2004: 23; Henneberg 
and O’Shaugnessy, 2007: 12; Henneberg, 2008: 158; Ormrod, 2012: 6). 
As used in this interpretation, political marketing focuses on the ways of 
and the degrees to which such actors and organizations adopted and 
developed the marketing techniques, procedures and tools in the political 
spheres. These include the increasing sophistication of communication 
and ‘spin’, product and image management, candidate positioning and 
policy development, news management (i.e. the use of ‘free’ media), 
establishment of more coherent and planned political marketing and its 
strategy development and the intensified and integrated uses of political 
market researches and developments in political marketing organization 
and professionalization of political management (Hennerberg, 2004a: 6-7; 
Henneberg, 2008: 154-155). Political marketing, in this sense, is seen as 
being closely related to the ways of and the degrees to which such actors 
and organizations understood, selected and used the marketing principles, 
procedures and tools from the marketing literature and adopted such 
principles, procedures and tools to develop workable marketing 
management strategies and activities in political spheres (Henneberg and 
O’Shaugnessy, 2007: 12-13; Ormrod, 2012: 6).  
Since there is no consensus regarding the border and crosscutting 
lines between these wide and narrow interpretations, models of political 
marketing have been continuously formulated using diverse perspectives. 
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For example, Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001d, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 
2004b, 2008) proposed the ‘comprehensive political marketing’ (CPM) 
perspective and claimed that this perspective would be invaluable in 
understanding the complete behaviour of political marketing of public 
organizations (such as interest groups, policy, the public sector, the media, 
parliament and local government as well as parties). Having explored the 
transformation of political attitudes and behaviours of political parties in UK 
politics, she proposed three models of political marketing of political 
parties, which are: the product-oriented party, the sales-oriented party and 
the market-oriented party (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-
702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 
207-208, 2010: 4-9). In a slightly dissimilar approach, O’ Cass (2009: 195-
197) formulated a resource-based view of the political marketing 
perspective and outlined a normative model of the triadic interaction 
processes of political marketing between the primary actors and political 
market place in competitive environments. Following this perspective, O’ 
Cass and Voola (2011: 633-638) postulated three types of political 
marketing orientations, which are a proactive political market orientation 
(PPMO), a reactive political market orientation (RPMO), and a political 
brand orientation (PBO) and visualized the relationships between and 
among these orientations with political markets (voters and stakeholders) 
and political market-environments. Henneberg (2002, 2009) proposed a 
slightly different dyadic model of political marketing management (PMM), 
developed concepts of ‘selling-orientated of PMM’, ‘instrumentally-oriented 
of PMM’ and ‘relational PMM’ and claimed that these concepts would be 
useful to understand the political marketing management of political 
organisations. Since considering that this model lacks capture of the 
complex processes of the exchanges and interactions in the political 
sphere, Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 93-94) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 
18) posited a triadic, an interdependent-based view of political marketing, 
which underpins the whole political exchanges and interactions processes 
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between and among voters/citizens, political parties/parties’ candidates 
and parliament/government.  
Theoretically speaking, these authors offered invaluable theoretical 
models that allow us to explore diverse aspects and dimensions of political 
marketing phenomena. They also considered the multidimensional 
processes of political marketing and diverse aspects and contexts of 
marketization of political actors and organisations. However, while these 
formulated models are primarily based on Western established democratic 
countries that have been ruled primarily under the parliamentary 
government system as indicated by the party-centred system, these 
authors considered less variability of the structural-systemic conditions of 
the new/young democratic countries, which have been ruled under the 
presidential government system and are characterized by the candidate-
centred system, such as Indonesia. Validities and applicability of their 
models in such countries therefore remained indefinite. 
As regards to this condition, this work favours adopting both the 
wide and the narrow interpretations due to the following reasons. The first 
one entails multi-perspectives in understanding the essence of political 
marketing phenomena. However, it takes into account the positivist and 
anti-positive paradigms, as we want to systematically explore the diverse 
ontological dimensions of such phenomena (Savigny, 2007; Henneberg, 
2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013). In considering such 
paradigms, it would be possible for us to explore the underlying structures, 
mechanisms and elements that determine not only the processes of 
political exchange, interaction and interaction between and among these 
actors and organizations, but also the natures and formations of models of 
the political marketing-orientations of political parties, which took place 
within and across democratic countries (Henneberg and O’ Shauhnessy, 
2007; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013).  
Like the first one, the second one also has intrinsic weaknesses. 
Such weaknesses include: a) the inherent subjective views in theorising 
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practices of political marketing and market orientation of political parties; 
b) the unresolved criticisms related to the innate weakness of the existing 
theories and models that underpin such practices; and c) the continuing 
theoretical and empirical debates related to such practices3. However, the 
second one offers robust conceptual frameworks that can be deployed to 
systematically explore practices of political marketing-orientation and 
market-orientation carried out by political actors and organizations within 
and across democratic countries, regardless of the given structural and 
cultural conditions of these countries (Henneberg and O’ Shauhnessy, 
2007; Henneberg, 2008; Ormrod, 2012; Ormrod, et al., 2013).  
This work argues that adopting wide and narrow interpretations 
allows us to adopt and develop the existing models of political marketing 
orientation and market-orientation of political parties introduced in the 
political marketing literature in a proper way. Such interpretations also give 
us more workable ways to evaluate the applicability and validity of these 
models. In considering these interpretations holistically, we could 
systematically examine the relationships between concepts and practices 
of political marketing orientation and market-orientation and explore 
diverse factors that constitute such concepts and practices and determine 
such relationships as well.  
 
2.3. Political Marketing-Orientation and Market-Orientation 
There have been disputable debates regarding the understanding 
of and the relationships between practices of ‘political marketing-
orientation’ and ‘market-orientation’. Such issues are spelled out as 
follows. Hennerberg (2002), Strömbäck (2010: 23-27), Strömbäck et al. 
(2012: 83-85), Ormrod (2005, 2007, 2009: 82) and O’ Shaughnessy et al. 
(2012) suggested deploying concept ‘market orientation’, as we want to 
explain the use of marketing intelligence by political parties and explore 
                                                       
3 Further debates related to such issues, see Lees-Marshment (2006a, 2006b, 2008), 
Henneberg (2008), Ormrod (2006, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012), Savigny (2004, 
2008) and Ormrod and Savigny (2012). 
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the ways these parties identify latent wants and needs of targeted-groups 
of electorates, inform the market intelligence data of these parties’ 
members, design political products in order to meet with later wants and 
needs of these groups and build a long term relationship with stakeholders 
and establish the relational exchange processes with political markets. 
Though hinting that these concepts and practices are ontologically 
dissimilar, O’ Cass (1996, 2001a, 2001b), Henneberg (2002), Lees-
Marshment (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
(2005), Strömbäck (2007, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012) explained the 
differentiations between these concepts and practices and validated the 
relationships between such concepts and practices less.  
Lees-Marshment (2006a: 121, 2006b: 6; 2008: 37) intentionally 
made no attempt to differentiate these concepts and practices. From a 
slightly different stance, Ormrod (2005: 51; 2007: 70-72, 2009: 82-83, 
2011: 5-7) and O’ Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355) shed light on the 
differentiations between these concepts and practices and delineated the 
relationships between these concepts and practices as well. In this 
respect, Ormrod (2005: 51; 2009: 82-83) considered ‘political market 
orientation’ as the ‘party organizational philosophy and behaviour’ and 
defined ‘political marketing orientation’ as the ‘party’s marketing function’. 
Moreover, as informed by the ideas of Kohli and Jaworski (1990), Narver 
and Slater (1990), Harrison-Walker (2001) and Lafferty and Hult (2001), 
Ormrod (2007, 2009) postulated that political market orientation (PMO) 
more likely exists when “all members of a party are sensitive to internal 
and external stakeholders’ attitudes, needs and wants and synthesize 
these within a framework of constraints imposed by all stakeholders to 
develop policies and programs with which to reach the party’s objectives”.  
Following this definition, Ormrod and his colleagues qualitatively 
examined political market-orientation and strategic postures of political 
parties in UK politics based on the three UK parties’ manifestos (Ormrod 
and Henenberg, 2006, 2009; Ormrod, et al., 2007) and quantitatively 
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explored political market-orientation and strategic postures of political 
parties in Danish and UK politics based on the survey data derived from 
these parties’ members (Ormrod, 2005, 2007, 2009; Henneberg and 
Ormrod, 2008; Ormrod and Henneberg, 2011). However, since the nature 
of the political sphere cannot be seen as being precisely similar to the 
nature of business and commercial spheres, this conceptual definition 
seems only suitable for capturing and describing a ‘perfectly market 
oriented party’ that is too ideal and unlikely exist in real politics (Ormrod, 
2009: 188). This definition is also less applicable within the specific 
context of the young democracies, such as Indonesia, wherein political 
parties’ organizations have not yet been fully established (Ufen, 2008b; 
and memberships of these parties have been under-developed as well 
(Mujani and Liddle, 2007, 2010; Ufen, 2008a). 
As regards to such conditions, this work formulates the following 
propositions. At first, this work, in considering ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 
62-63), Ormrod (2005: 51; 2007: 82, 2009: 82-83, 2011: 5-7) and O’ 
Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355), favours placing ‘political marketing-
orientation’ and ‘political market-orientation’ as two separate concepts and 
positioned them as equal concepts that are not superior to each other. 
This work also considered them as two different practices that more likely 
exist as sequential processes within the contexts of either during the 
elections or in between the elections. This proposition is slightly contrasted 
with the ideas of Ormrod (2006: 113, 2007: 82: 2009: 70) and O’ 
Shaughnessy et al. (2012: 355, 362) that highlight ‘political marketing 
orientation’ as party’ marketing function and hint that ‘political market 
orientation’ is much more superior rather than ‘political marketing 
orientation’. Unlike these authors, this work argues that since the nature of 
the political sphere is obviously dissimilar to the nature of business and 
commercial spheres, and as the nature of political parties’ organizations is 
also clearly distinct from the nature of business and commercial 
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organizations, such propositions seem less workable within the specific 
context of the new democracies.  
Secondly, this work favours using the concept of ‘(political) 
marketization’ to capture and explore following phenomena, which are:  
a) Political exchange, interaction, collaboration and transaction processes 
between and among political organizations (such as parties, 
parliaments and government offices, presidential offices, state 
agencies), political actors (such as parties’ leaders, candidates, 
politicians, officials, activists and members), and political markets (such 
as electorates/voters, party members and constituents, the media, 
competitors, political lobbyists and campaign donors) that existed in 
the ‘democratic countries’ and took shape within and across political 
market arenas (the media, electoral, internal party and the 
parliamentary/governmental arenas). 
b) Models of ‘political marketing-orientation’ and ‘market-orientation’ 
developed by political actors and organizations in the ‘democratic 
spheres’, when they have to deal with these political markets and 
political market arenas either during the elections or in between the 
elections. 
The ‘democratic countries’ and ‘democratic political sphere’, in this sense, 
are seen as ‘essential and principal conditions’, that allow practices of 
‘marketization of these actors and organizations’ to take shape. Such 
practices would not possibly take place in authoritarian political regimes 
and undemocratic political spheres. Instead, they are only likely to emerge 
in countries that have been ruled under democratic political regimes 
wherein the democratic media, election and political and government 
systems have been established, a group of people has freedom to freely 
set up a political party and more importantly, political parties’ politicians 
and candidates have had the possibility of and are capable of running in 
the democratic/direct election system. 
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Thirdly, this work defines ‘political marketing-orientation’ and 
‘market-orientation’ as follows.  
• ‘Political marketing-orientation’ refers to the attitudes and behaviour 
orientations of political organizations and actors regarding the 
adaptations and uses of business-marketing concepts, principles, 
procedures and techniques as ‘an organizational philosophy’ and/or 
‘organisational strategy’ to form workable ways to strategically manage 
and address these political market arenas and deal with and prioritize 
these political sub-markets in order to accomplish their short-term or 
the long-term goals in elections and/or in between these elections.  
• ‘Market-orientation’ relates to the attitudinal and behavioural 
orientations performed by these actors and organisations when they 
responded, prioritized and dealt with these political sub-markets and 
attempted to meet and fulfil the latent and expressive needs, wants, 
desires and expectations of these political sub-markets in order to 
accomplish their short or long-term political objectives in elections 
and/or in between these elections.  
Such definitions indicate that ‘political marketing-orientation’ and 
market-orientation’ are actually two-fold concepts and sequential 
practices. As practices, ‘political marketing-orientation’ and ‘political 
market-orientation’ can be developed not only by political parties, parties’ 
leaders, politicians, candidates, activists and members, but also by 
marketers/campaigners employed by these parties and these parties’ 
leaders, politicians, candidates to achieve their goals in either one specific 
time/condition/election or more than specific times/conditions/elections. 
‘Political marketing-orientation’, in this sense, needs to be seen as a 
necessary condition for political parties when these parties want to 
develop ‘market-orientation’. The rationale is, it seems, unachievable for 
these parties to follow and develop ‘market-orientation’ if they will not 
follow ‘political marketing-orientation’. Indeed, political parties, which 
already adopted ‘political marketing-orientation’, would not automatically 
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be strongly interested in developing ‘market-orientation’ in strategic and 
effective ways. However, as they want to properly carry out ‘market-
orientation’, they need to adopt ‘political marketing-orientation’ as an 
essential condition.  
 
2.4. Professionalization of Political Communication and 
Campaigning. 
Professionalization of political communication has been seen as 
being related to the Americanization, globalization and modernization of 
campaigning (Kavagh, 1995: 219; Sculz, 1998 in Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 24; 
Papathanassoulos, et al., 2007: 13). However, some argued that it could 
not be simply associated with the ‘Americanization’ of campaigning (Holtz-
Bacha, 2002: 28-29; Lilleker, 2006: 30). While ‘Americanization’ has been 
widely criticized due to its inherent weaknesses (Negrine and 
Papathanassoulos, 1996: 45-62; Xifra, 2011: 669-670), 
‘professionalization’ has been gradually acknowledged to explore 
campaign transformations (Holtz-Bacha, 2002, 2007; Negrine, et al., 2007; 
Negrine, 2008) and evaluate the increasing trend and changing form of 
campaign strategies and personalisation (Lilleker, 2006: 32) and political 
packaging (Lilleker, 2006: 139-141).  
So far, ‘professionalization’ has been widely used in diverse 
contexts and scales and seen as a highly contested concept as well 
(Lilleker and Negrine, 2002: 308; Strömbäck, 2007: 53; Tenscher, et al., 
2012: 145; Tenscher, 2013: 243). For example, Gurevitch (1999), 
Blummer and Gurevitch (2001), Holtz-Bacha (2002), Negrine and Lilleker 
(2002), Lilleker (2006), Holtz-Bacha (2007), Negrine et al. (2007) and 
Negrine (2008) deployed the concept of ‘professionalization of political 
communication’ to explain the adaptation processes and changes in 
practices of communication and campaigning and advancements in the 
packaging of political messages, policies and personalities taken by 
political actors and organizations when such actors and organizations 
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addressed transformations of political, government and media systems 
and changing communication technology and political environments. 
Mancini (1999) deployed a slightly different concept of ‘professionalization 
of politics’ to evaluate: a) phenomena of globalizations and 
homogenizations, which have also been closely associated with the highly 
contested concepts of Americanization and modernizations; and b) 
changes in the systems of attitudes and values of political organizations 
and parties toward politics and the very structure of the political system 
(Mancini 1999: 242). Moreover, he proposed following concepts of ‘new 
political professionalism’ and ‘professionalization of politics’ to analyse: a) 
transformation of party bureaucracy into the ‘electoral-professional party’; 
and b) the increasing employment of ‘political professionals’ by political 
parties when these parties attempt to respond to the development of 
communication technology and transformations of electorates behaviours 
and political environments (Mancini, 1999: 231). Additionally, he also 
introduced the concept of ‘professionalism in campaigning’ to explain: a) 
the self-improvements in skills of campaign management in regard of 
changes in media environments and development of ICT; and b) the 
increasing roles of political consultants and pollsters in developing 
campaign organization of political parties and parties’ politicians (Mancini, 
1999: 237-240).  
While lacking clarification of the differentiation between such 
concepts, Mancini (1999: 232) as well as Negrine, (2007: 35), as informed 
by idea of Panebianco (1982), suggested using the concept of the 
‘professional-electoral party’ to capture transformation of party 
organization, communication and campaigning wherein the non-party 
professional strategists (such as pollsters, marketing specialists, media 
advisers) and ‘political professionals’ (such as professional consultants, 
media producers, buyers and press agents, spin doctors and media 
professionals) have presumably displaced the roles of party machines, 
leader, apparatuses, strategist and bureaucrats. Though the 
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nomenclatures and characteristics of the ‘professional-electoral party’ 
remained debatable, this concept, surprisingly, has been used by Jackson 
(2011) to explain the transformation of party organization of the Green 
Australian Party and adopted by Lamprinakou (2010: 4-5) to formulate a 
concept ‘encompassing professionalization’, which is defined as the latest 
stage of parties’ evolution that has become the ‘election campaign 
communicators’. 
The other observers used slightly different concepts of ‘campaign 
professional(s)’ and ‘campaign professionalism’ to chronicle the increasing 
employment of political consultants hired either permanently or temporarily 
by political parties and party leaders and politicians, especially during 
campaigns and elections (Farrell, et al., 2001; Plasser, 2000, 2002; Abbe 
and Herrnson, 2003; Dulio and Garrett, 2005; Esser and Tenscher, 2005a, 
2005b). Plasser et al. (1999: 101), as led by the idea of Althaus (1998), 
introduced the concept of ‘professionalization of political consultants’, 
while Weismel-Manor (2005, 2011) formulated concepts of 
‘professionalization of campaign consultancy’ and ‘campaign consultants’ 
professionalization’. The first concept was specifically utilized to explore 
the essential criteria of political consultants as an independent profession, 
which had professional roles, a separate professional association, an 
academic career path and a codex of professional and ethical guidelines 
and offered special services to clients. In slightly contrast, the second and 
third concepts were used to investigate development and changes in the 
nature of work of political consultancies carried out by political consultants, 
which have been described of being evolved from an art to a science.  
As seen, there have been divergent interpretations regarding the 
essence of professionalization that took shape in the fields of politics, 
political communication and campaigning. Having considered the ideas of 
Gurevitch (1999), Blummer and Gurevitch (2001), Holtz-Bacha (2002), 
Negrine and Lilleker (2002), Lilleker (2006: 32), Holtz-Bacha (2007), 
Negrine et al. (2007) and Negrine (2008), this work favours deploying the 
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concept of ‘professionalization of political communication’, rather than 
‘professionalization of politics’ as posited by Mancini (1999). The main 
reason is this concept has been widely acknowledged and used by a 
number of authors to explain professionalization in the fields of political 
communication and campaigning (Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Lilleker, 
2006: 32; Negrine, et al., 2007; Negrine, 2008). The subsequent reason is 
this concept being slightly straightforward in capturing modes of 
professionalization of political communication and campaigning and the 
degrees of campaign professionalism of political parties. 
Though being widely acceptable, this concept has been adopted to 
explore diverse forms and dimensions of professionalization. For example, 
Holtz-Bacha (2002: 23) deployed this concept to underpin ‘a process by 
which the political actors adapt their strategies to changes in society and 
in the political system as well as to changes in the media system’. She 
also employed this concept to capture ‘a process of adaptation to, and as 
such a necessary consequence of, changes in the political system on the 
one side, and the media system on the other, and in the relationship of the 
two systems’ (Holtz-Bacha, 2007: 63). Slightly different, Lilleker (2006: 30) 
suggested using this concept to evaluate ‘the way in which political 
communication has become better, or more strategic’ and ‘the way in 
which it has become more professional or been professionalized’. He also 
defined ‘electoral professionalism’ as ‘the strategy developed by a party 
whose main aim is electoral success’ and wherein ‘all elements of the 
design of the parties’ electoral offering are conducted to suit the electoral 
terrain, particularly voter opinion formation’ (Lilleker, 2006: 84). He also 
voiced that professionalization related with: a) the ways in which politics is 
performed to the public in democratic societies, either directly or through 
the mass media; and b) a set of efforts carried out by political parties’ 
leaders and politicians when they attempted presenting the right image, 
policies and personalities using the media and narrowcasting tools 
(Lilleker, 2006: 139-140).  
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Like these authors, Negrine (2007: 29) also advocated using this 
concept to capture and assess ‘a process of change in the field of politics 
and communication that, either explicitly or implicitly, brings about better 
and more efficient – and more reflective–organizations of resources and 
skills in order to achieve desired objectives, whatever they might be’. More 
importantly, he also highlighted following phenomena that indicate 
professionalization of political communication of political parties (Negrine, 
2007: 33). They include: a) a transition or even a transformation of the 
parties and other political bodies in the way they communicate with their 
particular constituencies; and b) a transformation of the nature and 
structure of the campaign organization and party communication activities 
which are undertaken by employing experts or ‘professionals’ to support or 
direct the communication, persuasion and mobilization. He also proposed 
following proposition: ‘from the perspective of the political party, 
professionalization of political communication can be deemed to be the 
process of adaptation by which they change their structures and practices 
in order to meet new and continually changing circumstances and their 
use of experts in order to achieve their goals’ (Negrine, 2007: 34).  
Meanwhile, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 10-11) formulated 
the following indicators of professionalization of political communication 
and campaigning. They include: a) a more ‘rational’ and more streamlined 
organizational structure or a more ‘appropriate’ set of practices; b) the 
growth of a plurality of sources of information in regard to modernization of 
societies; c) the reasons and goals of communications in changing 
practices of sets of appropriate skills and communication technology of 
political actors and political organizations in order to look better within the 
processes of persuasion and mobilization of electorates, get more media 
attention and influence the public agenda for government and interest 
groups; d) the self-improvement of performances and the ways of 
communication and media management  of political actors and political 
organizations when dealing with the increased ‘logic’ of ‘mediatisation of 
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politics’; and e) the advancement of sets of specialisms and special skills 
utilized to persuade and mobilize citizens, voters and consumers.  
Despite that, Papathanassopoulos et al. (2007: 13) and Negrine 
(2007: 35) discussed the internal and external dimensions and the 
interplays between such dimensions that led to professionalization taking 
shape. The first author argued that the internal dimension relates to the 
following questions: a) what is happening from within; and b) how and the 
extent to which the changing roles, authority and responsibility to control 
and run the whole dimensions and processes of professionalization of 
campaigning have taken shape? Meanwhile, the external dimension is 
associated with the following questions: who is being employed to do what 
and how, in which way and to what extent they are hired? Such 
dimensions, according to the second author, are closely associated with 
processes and levels of ‘specialization’, on one hand, and ‘displacement’, 
on the other (Negrine, 2007: 35). ‘Specialization’ refers to the changing 
management of campaigning by hiring expertise and adopting technology 
to respond to transformation of political environments and to accomplish 
particular goals, while ‘displacement’ relates to the presence of non-party 
‘professional strategists’ who had expertise and took over campaign 
management.  
Theoretically speaking, these authors offered invaluable definitions 
that underpin the phenomena of professionalization of political 
communication advanced by political actors and organizations. Most of 
them however, defined these phenomena in a very abstract manner and 
lacked clarification of the differentiation between professionalization of 
campaigning and campaign professionalisms. More importantly, they 
lacked spelling out the universal measurable indicators that constitute 
such phenomena. Attempting to resolve such issues, Tenscher et al. 
(2012: 147-149), Tenscher (2013: 244) and Tenscher and Mykkanen, 
(2013: 174; 2014: 23) posited the concept of ‘campaign 
professionalization’. This concept is specifically directed to explore what 
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they called ‘processes of professionalization’. It refers to the long-term 
processes of changes in the structures and strategies of modern-related 
communication and campaigning that occur in between the elections and 
during the elections. Further, they also introduced the concept of 
‘campaign professionalism’ to specifically describe and analyse how and 
the extent to which political parties develop sets of professional campaign 
structure and strategy within the specific context/time/election. More 
importantly, as they considered that the validity of these concepts has left 
disputable debates, Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-26) and Tenscher 
et al. (2015: 8-9) suggested evaluating the underlying indicators/variables 
of these concepts. 
As accounted for in the ideas of these authors, this work ultimately 
highlights the following propositions. Firstly, this work voices that 
‘professionalization of political communication’ refers to the adaptation and 
evolution processes and modes of political communication—in general—
and necessary consequences of changes in the practices, structures and 
strategies of political campaigning and packaging—in particular—(that 
have to be) advanced by political actors and organizations when they have 
to address and deal with transformations of political markets, arenas and 
environments. Secondly, this work also argues that in addressing 
professionalization that take place within the specific context of 
campaigning, the concept of ‘professionalization of campaigning’ seems to 
be much more workable. It refers to strategic efforts taken by political 
actors and organizations when they attempt to accomplish their goals in 
campaigning in one specific time/condition/context or more than one 
specific time/condition/context. Such efforts include the engagement of 
having a professional-campaign and advancements of a ‘professionalized-
campaign’. In this respect, ‘professional-campaign engagement’ is 
associated with the degree to which political actors and organizations 
engaged in developing a professional-campaign. Meanwhile, 
‘professionalized-campaign’ includes ‘professionalized-campaign 
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structure’ and ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’ and relates to a set or 
combination of material practices, techniques and strategies advanced by 
these actors and organisations, based on their resources and skills, to 
improve a better and more efficient campaign management, organization 
and tools in order to maximize their electoral goals and objectives.  
Following these definitions, this work favours placing the concept of 
‘professional-campaign engagement’ as the first essential element and 
‘professionalized-campaign’ as the second element.  The rationale is it 
seems impossible to see how political actors and organizations, which 
lacked engagement with having a professional-campaign, could develop a 
‘professionalized-campaign’ properly. Following this argument, this work 
proposes the following propositions. Firstly, the ways political parties 
developed ‘professional-campaign engagement’, ‘professionalized-
campaign structure’ and professionalized-campaign strategy’ in a specific 
time or short-term or special condition that took shape during the elections 
or in between the elections indicate modes of ‘professionalization of 
campaigning’ of these parties. Secondly, the degrees to which these 
parties advanced ‘professional-campaign engagement’, ‘professionalized-
campaign structure’ and ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’ within the 
long-term or more than one specific times/conditions constitute the levels 
of ‘campaign professionalism’ of these parties and indicates whether such 
parties run professionalization (that also lead them to be much more 
professionalized) or turned into de-professionalization (that make them 
less professionalized). 
 
2.5. An Integrated Theoretical Framework 
Points 2.2-2.4, respectively, already discussed the existing 
perspectives, models and concepts introduced in the political marketing 
and campaigning literature to capture and understand practices of political 
marketing and market-orientation and professionalization of political 
communications of political parties. Having considered such perspectives, 
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models and concepts, the subsequent point would formulate an integrated 
conceptual framework to evaluate the structural conditions and factors that 
determined marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the 
Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. To this end, the 
ideas of the following authors would be scrutinized, adopted and 
refashioned as follows. 
Firstly, Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) highlighted ‘conditions’ that stimulate political 
parties in democratic countries to use marketing techniques, follow 
market-orientation and run professionalization of campaigning. Such 
‘conditions’ include the low level of party ID and party membership, little 
trust in political parties, high electorate volatility and commercial media 
system, the presence of candidate-centred over party-centred systems. 
The left-right ideological dimension and cleavage associations have been 
less important and only a few parties have competitive chances to win the 
elections. This work would adopt his proposition to identify and explore the 
structural conditions that propelled developments of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties in the new 
democracy of Indonesia. 
Secondly, Strömbäck (2007, 2009, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. 
(2012) proposed four types of political market arenas, which are the 
internal party, electoral, the media and parliamentary arenas. Slightly 
differently from this author, Johansen (2012: 139-168), delineated the 
nature, structures and characteristics of political markets that commonly 
took shape in the party-centred democracies, while Lock and Harris (1996: 
14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5-6), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 
1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) identified various types 
of political markets which have been usually addressed by political parties 
and these parties’ candidates. While they followed different perspectives, 
these authors posited nomenclatures of political market arenas and 
political sub-markets, which commonly took place in Western 
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democracies. However, they lacked exploration of political market arenas 
and political sub-markets that took shape and are considered and 
addressed by political parties in the new democracies, which have been 
ruled under the presidential government system, such as Indonesia. As 
focused on the new democracy of Indonesia, this work would adopt and 
reformulate the ideas of these authors to evaluate such issues. 
Thirdly, Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 
1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 
2010: 4-9) postulated three models of political marketing of party. As she 
considered the propaganda model, she outlined the ‘product-oriented 
party’ (POP). The main principle of this party is how to efficiently or 
effectively use political products to attract voters by ignoring the utilization 
of communication techniques and market intelligences. As followed in this 
model, the party tends to refuse to change political product and its design, 
even if it failed in the electoral arena. This party has to develop the 
following five steps, which are product design, communication, campaign, 
election, and delivery (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 9). Moreover, she also 
posited the ‘sales-oriented party’ (SOP). This party uses effective political 
marketing communication techniques and emphasizes the selling of the 
political product. What this party decides to sell is reliant on what is best 
for the voters. This party has to advance the following six steps, which are: 
product design, market intelligence, communication, campaign, election 
and delivery and formulate the best rational option using the marketing to 
present its most effective argument to the electorate segments that have 
been most open to persuasion (Lees-Marshment, 2010: 9). She also 
postulated the ‘market-oriented party’ (MOP) whereby a political party has 
to develop the following nine steps, which are market intelligence, product 
design, product adjustment, implementation, communication, campaign, 
election, delivery and maintaining4 and consider market-orientation as the 
                                                       
4 These steps are then transformed into eight steps, see Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
(2005a: 8)—and being added to with the last step, which is keeping the market-
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main party views and political judgments to design its behaviours and 
respond to and satisfy voter demands and meet the needs and wants of 
groups of citizens/electorates. In following this model, the party has to 
decide the best view and judgement in order to design and re-design its 
behaviour—as well as design and re-design its political products, which 
are directed to respond to and satisfy voters’ demands—as informed by 
the market intelligences—in a way that meets voters’ needs and wants, 
whereby it would be implemented and supported by the internal 
organization in order to be deliverable in government (Lees-Marshment, 
2010: 4-5).  
Savigny (2004, 2007b, 2008) argued that Lees-Marshment (2001a, 
2001b, 2003a) clarified less whether these models should be placed as 
normative or prescriptive or predictive models of political marketing. Lees-
Marshment (2006a: 121-124, 2006b: 3-6; 2008: 35-42) already addressed 
and discussed those issues. But, Savigny and Temple (2010) perceived 
that she did not yet fully weigh up the ideal positions and roles of media in 
a democratic system. Strömbäck (2010: 18) also argued that she 
accounted less for the characteristics and conditions that determine 
parties to follow one of those models. Ormrod (2006, 2007, 2011a, 2011b) 
also pointed out that she considered the marketing theories less and 
under-clarifies the differentiations between political marketing-
orientation(s) and political market-orientation. Due to such issues, her 
models have been seen to account less for the ideal conditions of political 
realm and democracy (Savigny, 2008; Savigny and Wring, 2009). More 
specifically, the MOP model of Lees-Marshment has been widely criticized 
due to: a) its broad sense of the application of marketing principles and 
techniques in the political sphere; b) offering less of the conceptual clarity 
between marketing orientation and market orientation; c) mainly 
addressing the voters/electorates, but a lack of sufficiently addressing the 
                                                                                                                                                       
orientation, see Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 225-226) and Lees-Marshment 
(2006a: 122). 
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competitors; and c) lack of properly exploring the internal activities of 
parties’ organization in relation to the broader stakeholders and various 
political arenas. She also simply placed this model as a superior model 
over POP and SOP (Strömbäck, 2010: 17-18; Ormrod, 2006, 2007; 
Ormrod, 2009: 80; Ormrod, 2011a: 5-7; Ormrod, 2011b: 396-402).  
Regardless of its inherent weaknesses, MOP has been seen as 
being useful. MOP considers the degree to which a political party used the 
marketing concepts, principles and tools as ‘an organizational philosophy’ 
within contexts of the long-term or the short-term as a crucial element in 
understanding the political marketing orientation of the party. MOP also 
accounts for the marketing attitudes, behaviours and activities of parties 
as a whole and includes the strategies, stages and processes of political 
marketing and market-orientation of party (Lees-Marshment, 2008: 41; 
Strömbäck, 2010: 16). More importantly, MOP has been widely accepted 
as being much more workable to evaluate political parties in the 
democratic countries that are indicated with: a) a low degree of party ID, 
high volatility of electorates; b) a high commercial media system; c) a low 
trust in these parties; d) the candidate-centred over the party-centred 
systems; e) the left-right ideological dimension is less important; and f) 
only a few political parties have competitive chances to win the elections 
(Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Lees-Marshment, 2008: 42). 
Though offering invaluable theoretical frameworks, Lees-
Marshment is, however, still left the following controversial debates. The 
first one is how can we really understand the ways of and the degrees to 
which political parties’ leaders understood marketing concepts and 
philosophy and their real impacts on market orientation of these parties as 
an organization? The second one is how to properly define a set of 
indicators to measure and analyse market orientation of political parties? 
O’ Cass (1996) and O’ Cass (2001: 1010-1012) postulated 13 indicators to 
evaluate such issues and used them to run in-depth interviews with party 
executive managers, candidates, the branch chairman and electoral 
 
 
 
 
34 
campaign directors. Moreover, Maier et al. (2010: 34-51) proposed five 
indicators and measurements of the market orientation of a political party. 
Additionally, Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) developed a set of 
variables, indicators and measurements of market orientation and 
generated these variables, indicators and measurements to formulate a 
baseline structural model that underpins political market orientation and 
the strategic posture of political party.  
This work ultimately favours adopting and modifying the ideas of 
Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 
2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9), O 
Cass (2001: 1010-1012) and Maier et al. (2010: 34-51) to evaluate 
‘political marketing-orientation’. However, ‘political marketing-orientation’, 
in this sense, is not deployed to achieve the perfect model of a market-
oriented party, as Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 
2008, 2009, 2010) did. Instead, it is used a variable that constitutes an 
integrated model of marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
of a political party. In the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, table 3.3 would 
display a set of indicators and measurements of this variable.  
Due to this, this work also prefers adopting the ideas of Hughes and 
Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) 
to develop variable ‘market-orientation’. This variable would be placed as 
a second variable that constitutes this model. This variable is placed as a 
high-level variable to capture and evaluate the ways of and the degree to 
which the Indonesian political parties considered, addressed, prioritized 
and dealt with political sub-markets they targeted. In a slightly difference 
from Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009), this work operationalizes this 
variable using five lower-order variables/constructs, which are internal-
orientation, voter-orientation, competitor-orientation, campaign contributor-
orientation and media-orientation. The first variable is formulated as a 
single-item-construct, while the second, third, fourth and fifth variables are 
constructed as a multi-item-construct. The fourth and fifth variables are 
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developed from variable ‘external/societal orientation’, which was originally 
directed to capture and understand the attitudinal orientations of a political 
party to stakeholders that exist in the wider political system, which are not 
included as either voters or competitors (Ormrod, 2005: 60; Ormrod, 2009: 
208). Ormrod (2009: 209) suggested that this variable could be divided 
into three components, which are the micro- (citizens), meso (lobby and 
interest groups) and macro-level stakeholders (media). The first 
component is theoretically different from voter-orientation, but it is likely to 
be seen as being similar to voter-orientation. Regarding this condition, this 
work excluded this component and replaced it with ‘voter-orientation’5. 
Since the second and third components seem workable within the specific 
context of Indonesian politics, this work uses media-orientation as a 
variable of market-orientation and transforms the second component to 
formulate a new variable, which is campaign contributor-orientation6. In 
the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, table 3.4 would exhibit a set of 
indicators and measurements of these variables. 
Meanwhile, Gibson and Rommele (2001: 39, 2009: 269) postulated 
a Campaign Professional Index approach. This approach was directed to 
evaluate campaign structures of political parties and incorporates 
campaign resources, staff, finances and infrastructure set up by this party. 
                                                       
5 This work fully considers that the Indonesian political parties probably use various forms 
of clientelistic transaction approach to address and mobilize electorates—in general—and 
constituents and voters—in particular. This approach is commonly framed as political 
clientelism, which refers to ‘the individualized exchanges of goods or services for political 
supports’ (Withz-Shapiro, 2012: 568) in which patrons and clients were tied to durable 
relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty’ (Hopkin, 2006: 2). This approach 
may appears as ‘pork-barrelling transaction strategy’ to secure the constituents, ‘vote 
buying transaction strategy’ to induce those inclined to vote and ‘turnout buying 
transaction strategy’ to persuade those inclined not to vote (undecided/voters) (Gans-
Morse, et al., 2014: 418; Hidalgo and Nitcher, 2016: 437). 
6 This work also conjectures that the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ 
leaders and candidates might adopt a tactical populism strategy and style (Canovan, 
1999: 5-6; Moffitt and Tormey, 2004: 386-394), strategically exploit on what Canovan 
(1999: 8-9) labelled as the ‘politics of faith' and `the politics of scepticism'. Some of them 
also probably select the main elements of Machiavellianism, such as manipulative and 
the unethical and pragmatic morality values (Hunt and Chonko, 1984: 32; John and 
Paulhus, 2009: 97) for addressing not only these electorates/voters and the media 
strategically, but also these campaign-contributors/donators effectively. 
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This index was slightly modified by Strömbäck (2009: 101-104). Slightly 
differently from these authors, Tenscher et al. (2012: 147), Tenscher 
(2013: 245-246), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 173-176, 2014: 23-24) 
and Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 8-10) proposed a set of indicators 
and measurements of a professionalization-index and used these 
indicators and measurements to formulate two variables/constructs, which 
are: campaign structure and campaign strategy. The first one is also called 
as ‘campaign hardware’. It relates to the development of the organizational 
dimension of political parties, such as sizes of the election campaign 
budget and campaign staff, degrees of centralization of campaign 
organization, degree of externalization, differentiation of internal 
communication structures and duration of the campaign. The second one 
is named as ‘campaign software’. It includes a set of activities, such as the 
degree of audience targeting, event and news management, 
narrowcasting activities and personalization and the relevance of paid 
media, the free media and the relevance of talk shows.  
This work would adopt and refashion the ideas of such authors as 
follows. Professionalization of campaigning would be placed as a high-
level variable. This variable would be investigated through evaluating three 
following lower-level/order variables, which are ‘professional-campaign 
engagement’, ‘professionalized-campaign structure’ and ‘professionalized-
campaign strategy’. ‘Professional-campaign engagement’, in this sense, is 
interpreted as the extent to which a political party engaged in developing 
elements that constitute a ‘professionalized-campaign’. ‘Professionalized-
campaign’ relates to the presence of the strategies and structures, 
composed from a set or combination of material practices and techniques, 
which are directed to improve a better and more efficient organization of 
resources and skills and to maximize their electoral goals and objectives in 
a specific time or short-term or special condition. ‘Professionalized-
campaign’ includes ‘professionalized-campaign structure’ and 
‘professionalized-campaign strategies’. The first one is formulated as a 
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formative variable, while the second one is used as a reflective variable. 
The second one consists of 4 lower-level/order reflective variables, which 
are professionalized-news and event management strategy, 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy, 
professionalized-narrowcasting strategy and professionalized-campaign 
personalization strategy. In the following Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, tables 3.5-
3.7 would display a set of indicators and measurements of these variables. 
This work would use a set of variables displayed by tables 3.3-3.7 
to formulate the baseline structural model. In Chapter 3, point 3.6.3, figure 
3.2 would chart this model. This model would be specifically deployed to 
validate the relationships between the structural elements that constitute 
concepts and practices of political marketing orientation, market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning. The evaluation result 
of the structural components of this model would also be used to formulate 
the more parsimonious and workable structural model, which is called as 
the alternative structural model. 
Finally, the following observations also proposed and uncovered 
diverse factors that determined such practices. Ormrod (2009: 102-105) 
revealed the impacts of the political activity levels of the elected politicians, 
party professionals, members with a position of responsibility, as well as 
rank-and-file party members on market orientation of the UK and Danish 
political parties. Slightly differently, Gibson and Rommele (2001, 2009) 
formulated party resources, internal structure, ideological outlook and 
electoral targets—as independent variables—and the presence of external 
shock and internal shock/leadership change—as the intervening 
variables—and suggested exploring the effects of these variables on the 
professionalization of campaigning of the political party. As a modified idea 
of Gibson and Rommelle (2001, 2007, 2009), Strömbäck (2009: 101-104) 
posited the degree of grassroots organization, types of ideological outlook, 
the electoral targets, the internal and external shocks and the changing 
leadership as intervening variables and discussed the effects of these 
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variables on the levels of professionalization of campaigning of Swedish 
political parties. Having considered the ideas of these authors, Tenscher 
et al (2012), Tenscher (2013) and Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013, 2014) 
and Tenscher et al. (2015) also deployed these factors to evaluate modes 
of professionalization of campaigning and the degrees of campaign 
professionalisms of political parties in some European countries. 
From a slightly dissimilar stance, Strömbäck (2007: 59-60) 
presumed that the degree to which a political party accounted for the 
relative importance and relevance of political market arenas (the internal 
party, the electorates, the media and the parliamentary arenas) would 
determine a choice that has to be made by this party either to advance 
market-orientation or run professionalization of campaigning. Strömbäck 
(2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) also pointed out the 
country-specific and party-specific factors and suggested evaluating the 
effects of these factors on the ways in which political parties within and 
across democratic countries developed models of political marketing 
orientation and market-orientation. The party-specific factors encompass 
internal organizational culture of party, the electorates’ support of the party 
and party’ ideology, membership and position in the government and 
experience with electoral defeats in the elections.  
Having adopted the ideas of these authors, this work formulates the 
following set of exploratory/categorical variables. Firstly, this work favours 
adopting and modifying the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 60-62), Strömbäck 
(2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) to evaluate the individual 
perception of the Indonesian political parties’ leaders, candidates and 
marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal 
party, the media and the electoral arenas7. Secondly, this work also 
formulates party-specific factors. These variables consist of party ideology, 
                                                       
7 This work does not take into account political activity levels of the elected-politicians and 
party’ professionals and members to explain market orientation of party, as Ormrod 
(2009) did. The main reason is party’ memberships in the Indonesian politics has been in 
low level and under-developed (Uffen, 2010a, 2010b; Mujani, 2003; Mujani and Liddle, 
2007). 
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age category, size, campaign resources and position in the government 
and experiences with internal and external shocks. These variables are 
modified regarding the given structural condition of the new democracy of 
Indonesia.  
Finally, this work, in considering such given structural condition, 
also develops party’ presidential candidate-specific factors. These factors 
refer to the degree of the success of a political party in nominating its top-
leader as a presidential candidate, promoting its top-leader/public figure as 
a pair of presidential candidates and having an influential presidential 
candidate. The following Chapter 3, point 3.6.4, table 3.8 would detail 
formulations of these factors and use of such factors as exploratory 
variables to explore marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
2.6. Summary 
This chapter has scrutinized, adopted and refashioned the existing 
literature of political marketing and campaigning to formulate an integrated 
conceptual framework. This framework is directed to capture and explore 
the structural conditions and factors that determined developments of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian 
political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential elections.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY, METHOD AND 
DESIGN 
 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter 2 hinted that those who followed either the positivist or the 
anti-positivist paradigms develop the perspectives, models and concepts 
used to formulate the integrated conceptual framework. The existing 
controversial debates regarding the uses of such paradigms in the field 
study of political marketing, however, have been unresolved properly 
(Savigny, 2007b; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy, 2007; Henneberg, 
2008). As regards this condition, I adopted the critical realism perspective 
of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) and deployed the pure-mix of 
methodological research approach, methods and designs. However, 
before going into such points, I would highlight the current knowledge gap.  
 
3.1. The Current Knowledge Gap 
Ufen (2010a: 11) argued that the following factors paved the way 
for the development of professionalization of campaigning of the 
Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. These factors 
consist of: a) the instalment of new elections systems to directly vote for a 
pair of presidential candidates and the head and vice-head of the local 
government; b) changing technology; c) decline of political partisanship; 
and d) development of political pollsters and consultants. However, whilst 
he claimed that these parties have become increasingly market-oriented 
(Ufen, 2010a: 32), he failed to explore structural-systemic conditions and 
factors that stimulate political parties in the new democracy of Indonesia to 
develop such practices holistically. 
While many things related to these points remain unknown, the 
following issues were unresolved. Firstly, Strömbäck (2007: 63), 
Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al (2012: 86) proposed 
‘conditions’ that stimulate political parties to use marketing techniques and 
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principles, follow market-orientation and run professionalization of 
campaigning. However, the validity and applicability of his proposition, 
within the specific context of the new democracies that have been ruled 
under a presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-
centred system, such as Indonesia, have not yet been evaluated 
holistically.  
Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) also identified four types of political market 
arenas, while Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Johansen (2012: 139-168), 
Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5-6), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) 
and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009) delineated various types of 
political markets. These authors argued that political parties that run 
political marketing and market-orientation commonly addressed these 
political market arenas and political markets strategically. A holistic 
research that evaluates the applicability and validity of the ideas of these 
authors, within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia, 
remained under-developed however.  
Thirdly, Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 2003a, 2004a, 
2008, 2009, 2010) proposed models of political marketing of political 
parties. Some observers also evaluated her models (Lilleker and Lees-
Marshment, 2005a, 2005b; Lilleker, et al., 2006; Lees-Marshment, et al., 
2012). However, as displayed previously in Chapter 2, point 2.5, the 
applicability and validity of her models, especially the market-oriented 
party, has still left controversial debates. Moreover, Ormrod (2005, 2007) 
formulated a baseline structural model that underpins the political market 
orientation of a political party and deployed this model to evaluate modes 
of market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties in UK and 
Danish politics (Ormrod and Henneberg, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; 
Ormrod, et al., 2015). The applicability and validity of variables that 
constitute this model, especially the attitudinal dimensions of market-
orientation of political parties, within the specific context of the new 
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democratic countries, such as Indonesia, have been untested yet 
however. Additionally, the other authors posited a campaign professional 
index and the country and party-related factors that determine the 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties (Gibson and 
Rommele, 2001) and used them to evaluate the levels of campaign 
professionalism of political parties in German politics (Gibson and 
Rommele, 2009) and Swedish politics (Strömbäck, 2009). Subsequent 
authors also advanced indicators and measurements of a 
professionalization-index (Tenscher, 2007), applied such indicators and 
measurements to investigate the effects of these factors on the 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties in European 
countries (Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and 
Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Mykkanen and Tenscher, 2014) and validated 
these indicators and measurements as well (Tenscher, et al., 2015). 
However, further evaluation regarding the applicability and validity of these 
indicators and measurements using the survey data collected from 
marketers/campaigners of political parties in the new democracies, such 
as Indonesia, have not yet been conducted.  
Finally, Strömbäck (2007: 59-63) theorized the relationships 
between concepts and practices of political marketing and market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning. He also 
conceptualized diverse factors that determine the ways and the degree to 
which political parties advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 64, 
2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86). However, he lacked the 
proposal of an integrated conceptual framework needed to holistically 
evaluate such issues, more specifically within the specific context of the 
new democracy of Indonesia. 
Based on this background, this work ultimately proposes the 
following research aim and objectives. 
 
3.2. Research Aim and Objectives. 
 
 
 
 
43 
3.2.1. Research Aim 
The main aim of this work is ‘to holistically understand and explore 
the structural conditions and factors that determined the development of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian 
political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential elections’.  
 
3.2.2. Research Objectives. 
Based on that research aim, this work proposes the following 
research objectives (ROs). 
1. To map out the structural conditions that propelled developments of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian 
political parties Post-Soeharto New Order (RO 1). 
2. To investigate nomenclatures of political market arenas and political 
sub-markets in the new democracy of Indonesia and the effects of the 
party-specific factors on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of 
these parties regarding the importance of these political market arenas 
and political sub-markets (RO 2). 
3. To validate structural elements which constitute practices of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties 
(RO 3). 
4. To evaluate the effects of perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates regarding the relative 
importance of the internal, the media and the electoral arenas on the 
ways and the extent to which these parties developed such practices 
within and across these elections (RO 4). 
5. To examine the effects of the party-specific factors—party ideology, 
ages category, size, campaign resources, position in the government 
and experiences with internal and external shocks—on the ways and 
the degree to which these parties carried out such practices within and 
across these elections (RO 5).  
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6. To explore elements that constituted the party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors and the effects of these factors on the ways and the 
degrees to which these parties performed such practices within and 
across these elections (RO 6). 
 
3.3. Research Philosophy 
To evaluate such research objectives, this work adopted the critical 
realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) as a philosophical 
standpoint8. This perspective is innovated based on an argument that 
sees that there have been ‘two-sides of knowledge’, which are the 
‘structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena’, on the one hand, 
and the ‘knowledge’ produced in the ‘social activity of science’, on the 
other. These ‘two-sides of knowledge’ cannot be simply captured and 
understood using either the naturalist or the anti-naturalist perspectives 
(Bhaskar, 1998: 16-18, 2008: 11-14). The main reason is each of these 
perspectives entailed inherent weaknesses in defining, approaching, 
interpreting and understanding these ‘two-sides of knowledge’.  
As regards this condition, Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) developed a 
critical realism perspective as an alternative point of view based on the 
following premises. Firstly, humans cannot directly observe and capture 
the reality to gain new knowledge. The main reason is that reality exists 
incessantly outside the human mind and is not dependable on either the 
human mind or the existing knowledge produced by the human mind. 
Humans, therefore, cannot simply see and define the existence of reality 
based on the existing knowledge they already have.  
Secondly, the reality constantly exists with its own multi-layered 
dimensions. It is composed from what Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008) called 
the ‘real’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’. The ‘real’ and the ‘actual’ 
                                                       
8 This perspective so far has been coined using various terms, such as ‘transcendental 
realism’ ‘scientific realism’, ‘relational realism’, and ‘empirical realism’ perspectives. 
Further discussion related to this issue, see Sayer (1992, 2000), Danermark et al. (1997) 
and Moses and Knutsen (2012). 
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continuously take shape outside the human mind and the ways they exist 
are also undependable on the human mind and knowledge. In order to 
sense the ‘real’, humans should delve deeper into the ‘structures’ and 
‘mechanisms’ underlying the ‘real’. The ‘actual’ takes shape as ‘events’, 
while the ‘empirical’ presents as the ‘experiences’ which have been 
produced by humans, individually or collectively, based on the ways they 
realized and discerned the existence the ‘structures’ and ‘mechanisms’ 
that generated the ‘real’. Humans can sense the ‘real’, locate and reveal 
the ‘actual’ and recognize the ‘empirical’, but they would not be capable of 
directly capturing and understanding reality and the ways reality has been 
unceasingly existing in the world.  
Thirdly, in order to produce the new knowledge, humans should 
consider not only ‘existing knowledge’ produced in the ‘social activity of 
science’, but also the ‘structures and mechanisms that generate the ‘real’, 
the ‘actual’ (events) and the ‘empirical’ (experiences). The main reason is 
modes of production of the body of knowledge of science, in essence, are 
not merely being determined by the existing knowledge produced in the 
social activity of science. Rather, according to Bhaskar (2008: 15-16), ‘it is 
the real structures, mechanisms and events that eternally exist and evolve 
independently outside our knowledge and experience, on the one hand, 
and how our minds address, define and comprehend these structures, 
mechanisms and events, on the other, which really generate the body 
knowledge of science’. Based on such conditions, we could no longer be 
reliant on either the positivist or the anti-positivist paradigms in producing 
a new body knowledge of science (Bhaskar, 2008: 16).  
Going beyond such paradigms, this perspective offers a new insight 
to understand multidimensional and multi-layered structures and 
mechanisms underlying social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1975, 1998, 2008; 
Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998: 6-8; Hartwig, 2008: xi-xv; Moses and Nutsen, 
2012: 12-14). It ontologically and epistemologically accounts for the 
complexity of the relationships between these ‘two-sides of knowledge’. 
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For realists, such knowledge cannot be simply seen as either the reality of 
being separable from the human mind (following empiricism) nor the 
reality that is constructed by the human mind (following idealism). Rather, 
they have to be ontologically and epistemologically considered as being 
‘dialectically’ existing and ‘eternally’ transformed within the whole 
processes of the ‘social construction’ of the body knowledge of science 
(Hartwig, 2008: xi).  
Using this perspective allows us to be much more capable of 
resolving a fundamental ontological mistake, which Bhaskar (1975, 1997: 
40, 2008: 30) called as the ‘epistemic fallacy’ and go further into what 
Bhaskar (1998: xii; 2008: 32) named as the ‘trans-factuality (universality) 
of laws’, regardless of the complexity and differentiation of the world we 
recognized and encountered. Accomplishment is possible due to the 
existence of what Bhaskar (1998: xix) named as the ‘ceteris paribus 
condition’. It is ‘a condition for moving from fact to fact in the open-
systemic world to which the laws of nature trans-factually apply as much 
as it is to moving from fact to value in the practical social world of belief, 
judgment and action’ (Bhaskar, 1998: xix). Those who stand for 
philosophical orthodoxy, either the ‘naturalist’/’positivist’ or the ‘anti-
naturalist’/’anti-positivist’, tend to understand the nature of ‘trans-factuality 
of laws’, on the one hand, and the ‘values in the practical social world of 
belief, judgment and action’, on the other, as ‘radical dichotomies’. 
Instead, the realists recognized them as the ‘exact parallels’ (Bhaskar, 
1998: xix).  
This perspective is needed due to the following reason. The fact 
that sciences have been commonly created based on the ‘imaginative’ and 
‘disciplined work’ of scientists, has been determined by what theories and 
concepts are given to them, on the one hand, and the ways in which they 
understood the real, the actual and the empirical of levels and forms of 
reality, on the other (Baskhar, 2008: 176-177). Pavitt (1999) suggested 
using this perspective as the third way to develop theories and concepts in 
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the field of communication science. Savigny (2007: 36-37) echoed that this 
perspective would be useful to develop theories, concepts and models of 
political marketing.  
Since holistically accounting for social phenomena using 
methodological approaches of the natural science, on the one hand, and 
the interpretative and constructivist approaches, on the other  (Sayer, 
2000: 2-3), this perspective allows us to leverage a research paradigm 
that goes beyond the naturalism, interpretative and constructivism 
paradigms (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 12) and explore complex 
processes and multi-layered dimensions of political marketing and 
campaigning phenomena, which cannot be simply understood using either 
the positivist or the interpretative paradigms (Henneberg, 2002, 2008; 
Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy, 2007, 2009; Butler, et al., 2007; Butler 
and Harris, 2009). This perspective seems to be useful to resolve the 
controversial debates between and among those following the positivist 
paradigm and those staying with the anti-
positivist/constructivists/interpretative paradigms (Savingy, 2007: 36-37). 
This perspective is also of utmost importance when we want to scrutinize 
how far the existing political marketing, communication and campaigning 
theories and concepts can be employed and adopted to generate new 
knowledge (Henneberg, 2008: 161). Based on such arguments, I 
ultimately adopted the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 
2008) as a research philosophy.  
The ways I applied this perspective are detailed as follows. I kept 
capturing and realizing the ‘reality’ of marketization and professionalization 
of campaigning of political parties Post-Soeharto New Order. I strived for 
exploring the ‘structures’ and ‘mechanisms’ that underlie this reality, 
evaluated the ‘events’ that constituted this reality, investigated the ‘real’ 
appearances of this reality and selected these elections as a ‘primary 
event’. Within the last couple of years, I have been sensing these 
‘structures’, ‘mechanisms’ and ‘real’ appearances and recognizing the 
 
 
 
 
48 
‘empirical’ dimensions of these ‘events’. I then extracted my ‘experiences’ 
and deployed a set of ‘knowledge’ I learned from political marketing and 
campaigning literature and extracted and reflected on the data collected 
during the fieldwork to accomplish the research aim and objectives.  
 
3.4. ‘Pure Mixed’ Methodology 
As I followed critical realism as a research philosophy, I adopt the 
pure mix of qualitative and qualitative methods as a research 
methodology9. I employed this research methodology due to the following 
reasons. The measurement processes used in the quantitative method 
have spurious senses of precision and accuracy. The instruments and 
procedures offered by this method lack the capability to describe the 
connection between the research theme and everyday life. The complexity 
of human life cannot be understood using particular constructs/variables, 
which strongly indicate ‘a static view of social life’ (Burn, 2000: 9-10; 
Bryman, 2008: 159-160). Meanwhile, the qualitative method entails the 
immanent problem in the whole processes of generalization. The nature of 
qualitative data is commonly derived from particular contexts and can 
sometimes be too subjective and difficult to be replicated (Burn, 2000: 14; 
Bryman, 2008: 391-392).  
In adopting this methodology, we could complementarily and/or 
comparatively use both qualitative and quantitative data collections, 
procedures and analyses. We could also develop the appropriate scheme 
and sampling size, choose appropriate and adequate sampling 
procedures, tackle the intrinsic biases of each single-method, generate 
specific strengths and minimize the inherent weaknesses of the qualitative 
and quantitative methods. We could also discover more complementarily 
                                                       
9 It is a type of research methodology in which researchers could blend or unify both 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques into a single study (Denscombe, 2008) 
and holistically account for the following logic of inquiries, which are the deduction, the 
induction; and the abduction (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 17-18; Johnson, et al., 
2007: 123). Further discussion related to the adaptation of critical realism as a research 
philosophy to inform the mixed-methods methodology, see Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010) 
and Shannon-Baker (2016). 
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types of data and sources of information, advance more comprehensive 
quantitative and qualitative data analyses and get a much more 
comprehensive finding (Denscombe, 2008: 272-273; Johnson, et al., 
2007: 125).  
This methodology can be operationalized using the following 
methods. The first one is the ‘parallel use’ of qualitative and quantitative 
methods in which both these methods have an equal status (the ‘pure-
mixed’). The second one is the ‘mixed of qualitative methods’. The third 
one is the ‘mixed of quantitative methods’. The fourth one is the 
‘qualitative dominant method’. The last one is the ‘quantitative dominant 
method’ (Johnson, et al., 2007: 123-124). Such methods have been widely 
seen as being useful to enhance the quality of instruments used for data 
collections and obtain much better, comprehensive and holistic 
quantitative and qualitative data findings and analyses (Mertens, 2010: 5; 
Tashakkori, 2009; Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007b; Creswell and Clark, 
2007, 2011, Lunde, et al., 2013). 
As I followed ideas of Neuman (2000) Denzin and Lincoln, (2005), 
Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) Johnson et al. (2007), Guest (2013: 144), 
Luyt (2012: 296), Creswell and Clark (2007, 2011) and Sandelowski et al. 
(2012), I operationalized this methodology using the following methods 
and designs to evaluate the research objectives (ROs 1-6). Pure-mixed of 
the qualitative and quantitative methods and convergence (triangulation) 
research design were deployed to evaluate RO 1, while pure-mixed of the 
quantitative methods and exploratory research design were conducted to 
assess RO 3. Pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and 
sequential-exploratory research design were adopted to accomplish RO 2, 
while pure-mixed of the qualitative and quantitative methods and 
sequential-explanatory research design was undertaken to examine ROs 
4-6. Figure 3.1 and table 3.2, respectively, chart the adaptations and 
applications of these methods and designs, and spell out the data 
collections and analyses, research syntheses and findings presentations. 
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Figure 3.1: Research Philosophy, Methodology, Method and Design10. 
                                                       
10 Formulated based on ideas of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008), Neuman (2000) Denzin 
and Lincoln, (2005), Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) Creswell and Clark (2007, 2011), 
Johnson et al. (2007), Guest (2013), (Luyt, 2012) and Sandelowski et al. (2012). 
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Chapter 5 
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Collection: 
The primary survey 
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marketers/campaign
ers of 10 Indonesian 
political parties 
collected using the 
face-to-face panel 
survey procedure 
during the 2014 
Parliamentary and 
Presidential 
Elections 
Statistical 
descriptive 
analyses, 
ANOVA, 
Pearson and 
Kendall-tau B 
correlations 
analyses using 
SPSS 23 
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Chapters 
7, 8 and 9 
Quantitative Data 
Collection: 
Reports released by 
the Indonesian 
political 
pollsters/consultants 
and research 
centres, the 
Indonesian General 
Election and 
Broadcasting 
Commissions 
 
Statistic 
Descriptive 
Analysis 
                                                       
11 These data were derived from 10 Indonesian political parties’ leaders/secretaries and 
professionals, senior editors of the Indonesian media and political pollsters/consultants. 
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Qualitative Data 
Collection: 
Political, media and 
election laws and the 
in-depth interviews 
data12 
 
The qualitative 
content and 
thematic content 
analyses 
Table 3.1: Research Objectives and Research Methods and Designs Used 
to Evaluate These Research Objectives and Their Link with Data 
Collections and Analyses, Research Syntheses and Chapter 
Presentations13 
 
3.5. Sampling Procedures and Data Collections. 
There were 12 national political parties and 3 local political parties 
that took part as political contestants during the 2014 parliamentary 
election. Two national political parties (PKPI and PBB) and three local 
political parties (The Aceh Peace Party, the Aceh National Party and the 
Aceh Party) were excluded since these parties failed to collect a 
substantial number of popular votes and the national parliamentary seats 
in this election. Moreover, 10 national political parties, which are Golkar 
Party, PDIP, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party, Hanura 
Party, PAN, PKB, PPP and PKS, obtained numbers of these seats in this 
election, which range from large, medium and small. Together with Golkar 
Party, Democratic Party, PAN, PPP and PKS, Gerindra Party set up the 
first political block. As supported by Nasdem party, PKB and Hanura 
Party, PDIP established the second political block. Each of these blocks 
nominates a pair of presidential candidates to run in the 2014 presidential 
election. I selected these parties as samples in the unit level. 
                                                       
12 The extracted in-depth interview data collected from: a) 10 Indonesian political parties’ 
leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals, senior editors of the Indonesian media 
and political pollsters/consultants were used to fulfil RO 4; b) these parties’ 
leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals and pollsters/consultants and 
campaign-volunteers and members of campaign teams of the presidential candidates 
were deployed to evaluate RO 5; and c) these parties’ leaders/secretaries, candidates 
and  professionals and pollsters/consultants, senior editors of the Indonesian media and 
campaign-volunteers and members of campaign teams of and political lobbyists who 
worked for the presidential candidates were utilized to achieve RO 6. 
13 ROs is an acronym of research objectives. RM & D is an acronym of research method 
and design. DC is an acronym of data collections. DA is an acronym of data analyses. RS 
is an acronym of research syntheses by aggregation and combination. CP is an acronym 
of chapter presentations.  
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I deployed purposive and cluster sampling procedures as follows. 
The first one was employed to collect information from four groups of the 
key-respondents. They include these parties’ leaders/secretaries, senior 
editors/producers of the Indonesian media and political 
consultants/pollsters and also campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists 
who worked for each of two pairs of presidential candidates (Joko Widodo-
M.Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa). Appendix A will 
detail the list of these key-respondents, while Appendix D will exhibit the 
interview guides for interviewing these respondents. Most of these in-
depth interviews were conducted within two months before the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections and four months after these 
elections were being held. Further, survey data released by the 
Indonesian political pollsters/ consultants and research centres were used 
as the secondary data. Political, media and election laws, reports 
published by the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting 
Commissions and news reports produced Indonesian media outlets were 
included as well as the secondary data.  
Meanwhile, the second one was used to gather information from 
marketers/campaigners of these parties. The term 
‘marketers/campaigners’ was intentionally used due to party membership 
in the Indonesian politics being still under-developed (Uffen, 2010a, 
2010b). Marketers/campaigners, in this sense, refers to a group of 
individuals employed by these parties to shore up the marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of these parties in facing these 
elections. This group not only include party members, staff and activists, 
but also consists of professionals who are not officially associated with 
each of these parties, but who were employed by each of these parties 
and /or these parties’ candidates during these elections. 
During these elections, there were thousands of 
marketers/campaigners employed by these parties and parties’ 
candidates. I took them as a sample population of sample at the individual 
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level. As a population, they were structured and clustered based on 
groups of political parties and types of election contexts wherein they were 
employed. Since the exact total number of these marketers/campaigners 
was undetectable, I sampled them as follows. I clustered them based on 
the individual party that hired them during these elections. As I used the 
baseline structural model, which is constructed from 12 variables with 30 
arrows directed to 7 endogenous variables (see figure 3.2), I attempted to 
collect more than 3000 respondents employed by these parties within and 
across these elections to evaluate this model. This procedure is imposed 
by the rule of thumb of PLS-SEM highlighted by Hair et al. (2014: 20). To 
this end, I proportionally sampled 300 marketers/campaigners who had 
been hired by each of these parties during the 2014 parliamentary and the 
2014 presidential elections. A screening process was taken to make sure 
that each of these parties truly recruited them during these elections. 
A series of surveys was taken using the face-to-face panel-survey 
procedure. The first survey was conducted within four months before and 
after the Parliamentary Election Day (9 April 2014). The second survey 
was undertaken in between the fourth and sixth month after the 
Presidential Election Day (9 July 2014). 5 researchers who had expertise 
and professional experiences were employed to conduct these surveys14.  
Political Parties  Total respondents included 
in the first data set 
collected during the 2014 
Parliamentary Election 
Total cases/respondent 
included in the second data 
set gathered during the 
2014 Presidential Election 
Total 
PDIP 75 75 150 
Golkar Party 77 77 154 
Democratic Party 81 81 162 
Gerindra Party 83 83 186 
Hanura Party 25 25 50 
Nasdem Party 72 72 144 
PAN 74 74 148 
PKB 77 77 154 
PPP 87 87 174 
PKS 66 66 132 
Total 717 717 1434 
                                                       
14 At the beginning, I actually attempted running the web-survey. But, since this effort 
completely failed, I finally turned to the face-to-face survey method.   
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Table 3.2: Total Respondents Included in the Survey Data Set Collected 
Using the Panel-Survey Procedure During the 2014 Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections, Respectively 
 
Since being constrained by the limitation of times and financial 
resources, I was only being capable of collecting the survey data derived 
from 765 respondents. 44 respondents with incomplete survey data were 
excluded from the survey data set. Those who answered more or less 
95% of all items of the questioners totalled only 721 respondents. 4 of 
these respondents with the survey data with a lack of variability were 
removed from the survey data set. Table 3.2 displays the total 
respondents included in the survey data set. 
 
3.6.  The Qualitative and Quantitative Data Analyses and Chapters 
Presentations 
3.6.1. Structural Conditions that Propelled Developments of 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the 
Indonesian Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order (RO 1). 
In order to evaluate the first research objective, I complementarily 
ran the qualitative and thematic contents and the quantitative analyses. 
Political and election laws, the in-depth interviews data and reports 
released by the Indonesian media were analysed using the qualitative and 
thematic contents analyses. Meanwhile, the secondary survey reports 
published by the Indonesian political pollsters/consultants and research 
centres and general election commission were analysed using the 
statistical descriptive analysis and Pearson’ correlation. Such analyses 
were directed to evaluate this research objective. Chapter 4 displays such 
analyses and findings. 
 
3.6.2. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-
Markets in the New Democracy of Indonesia and the Effects of 
the Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the Indonesian 
Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the 
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Relative Importance of these Political Market Arenas and 
Political Sub-Markets (RO 2). 
The following data analyses were carried out to evaluate the 
second research objective. Firstly, the in-depth interviews data derived 
from the Indonesian parties’ leaders/secretaries and senior editors of the 
Indonesian media and political pollsters/consultants were extracted and 
examined using the qualitative content and thematic content analyses. 
Such analyses were directed to examine formations of political market 
arenas and political sub-markets in the new democracy of Indonesia.  
No Indicators and Measurements  Scales  
I Political Market Arenas 
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 1. The Importance of the internal party organisation as a political 
market arena 
2 The Importance of the media as a political market arena 
3 The Importance of the electorates as a political market arena 
4 The Importance of the parliament as a political market arena 
5 The Importance of the government as a political market arena 
II Political Sub-Markets  
1 The importance of party’ members as a political sub-market 
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2 The importance of the electorates/voters as a political sub-market 
3 The importance of the media as a political sub-market 
4 The importance of competitors as a political sub-market 
5 The importance of campaign-contributors as a political sub-market 
Table 3.3: Proposed Indicators and Measurements Used to Evaluate RO 2 
 
Secondly, these parties’ marketers/campaigners were surveyed 
using a set of indicators and measurements charted in table 3.3. This set 
of indicators and measurements were transformed into two sets of 
questionnaires, which were written in Bahasa Indonesia and utilized to 
interview these parties’ marketers/campaigners during the 2014 
parliamentary and the presidential elections, respectively. The survey data 
were imported in SPSS 23 and analysed using the statistic descriptive 
procedure and the following inferential statistical approaches, which are 
Pearson’ and Kendall tau-B correlations and ANOVA. Such efforts were 
directed to evaluate the effects of the party-specific factors on perceptions 
of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these 
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political market arenas and political sub-markets. The following table 3.8 
details formulations of these party-specific factors. 
Chapter 5 displays these quantitative and qualitative analyses and 
findings. 
 
3.6.3. Structural Elements that Constitute Practices of Marketization 
and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian 
Political Parties (RO 3). 
 As I imported the primary survey data in SPSS 23, this work 
deployed the following statistical analyses to evaluate the third research 
objective. Firstly, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) were carried out to evaluate indicators of the 
variables, which compose the baseline structural model. Secondly, the 
second-generation of statistical analysis using Partial Least Squares-
Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) of Smart-PLS 3.0 was used to 
validate these indicators and find the alternative and better solutions 
regarding the latent/unobserved variables that construct this model.  
 The reason for using PLS-SEM is spelled out as follows. PLS-SEM 
has been widely acknowledged as being useful to explore: a) the 
relationships between and among variables that constitute the structural 
model; and b) chains of the structural effects of the exogenous variables 
on the indigenous variables that construct this model (Hair et al., 2014: 14-
18; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014: 213). PLS-SEM has been recognized as the 
most appropriate statistical approach to understand the patterns of 
correlation/covariance among a set of variables and explain as much of 
their variance as possible with the structural model, which has been 
specified in the study (Kline, 1998; Hair et al., 2012; Hair, et al., 2013; Hair 
et al., 2014; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). PLS-SEM has also been seen to 
have a set of statistical analyses procedures, which are statistically robust 
to a relatively small sample size and non-normal data distribution and 
practically useful to handle the missing value, workable with metric, quasi-
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metric and categorical scaled data and compatible with the complex 
structural model, as long as the minimum sample size used in the study 
met with the rule of thumb of PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2013: 2-3; Hair, 2014: 
23-24). Further, PLS-SEM has been claimed to be suitable to either 
evaluate the existing established theories and concepts or develop (new) 
theories and concepts (Hair et al., 2014: 4).  
 Taking into account that the existing theoretical challenges to define 
the connections and relationships between concepts and practices of 
political marketing, market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning has been unresolved properly (Strömbäck, 2007: 50), I 
favoured using PLS-SEM rather than employing the Covariance-Based 
Structural Equation Modelling (CB-SEM). The main reason was PLS-SEM 
generates a greater statistical power than CB-SEM. Hair et al. (2014: 15) 
stated that ‘PLS-SEM is more likely to render a specific significant 
relationship when it is in fact significant in the population’. This approach 
holistically considers the underlying factors that compose the concepts 
(the measurement models) and the concepts that constitute the model (the 
structural model) (Hair et al., 2014: 13-14) and allows us to take into 
account both the theory and the data driven within whole processes of the 
assessment and specification of the structural and measurement models 
(Hair et al., 2014: 32-35).  
As I deployed PLS-SEM, I expected to be much more capable in 
developing an appropriate holistic framework that underpins the structural 
relationships between such concepts and practices and, more specifically, 
in evaluating the existences and the relationships between the structural 
elements that constituted such concepts and practices. In order to achieve 
these expectations, I ran a set of procedures of PLS-SEM suggested by 
Lowry and Gaskin (2014: 135-140) and Hair (et al., 2014: 25). These 
procedures include estimations and specifications of the structural and 
measurements models, data collection and examination, (re) estimations 
and (re) specifications of path model, tests for the moderation and 
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mediation effects and assessments of the predictive power of the baseline 
structural and alternative structural models and interpretations of the final 
statistical findings.  
As informed by the existing literature charted previously by point 2.5 
of Chapter 2, and also considering ideas of the following authors, I 
developed a baseline structural model as follows. This model includes 
both formative and reflective variables. A formative variable is a type of 
variable formulated based on theoretical and logical assumptions that see 
indicators of the variable cause the measurement of this variable. A slight 
differently, a reflective variable is a type of variable developed based on 
theoretical and logical assumptions, which see that the constructed 
variable causes the measurement of the indicator of this variable (Hair et 
al., 2014: 42-44). As I adopted the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 45), this work 
favoured deploying ‘political marketing-orientation’ as ‘a first-order 
formative variable’ and ‘market-orientation’ as a ‘second/higher-order 
formative variable’. The second one was evaluated using the following five 
‘lower-order reflective variables’, which are: a) internal-orientation; b) 
voter-orientation; c) competitor-orientation; d) media-orientation; and e) 
campaign contributor/donator-orientation. Moreover, this work used 
‘professional-campaign engagement’ as a first-order reflective variable, 
‘professionalized-campaign structure’ as ‘a first-order formative variable 
and ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’ as a second/higher-order 
formative variable. The last one was examined using the following lower-
order reflective variables, which are: a) professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy; b) professionalized-
narrowcasting strategy; c) professionalized-news and event management 
strategy; and d) professionalized-campaign personalization strategy.  
Figure 3.2 displays the ways this work deployed these variables to 
construct the baseline structural model. As seen from this figure, ‘political 
marketing-orientation’, ‘internal-orientation’, voter-orientation, competitor-
orientation, media-orientation and campaign contributor/donator-
 
 
 
 
60 
orientation are positioned as exogenous variables (ξ 1-6), while 
‘professional-campaign engagement’, professionalized-campaign 
structure’ and professionalized-campaign strategy (‘professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy’, ‘professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy’, ‘professionalized-news and event management strategy’ and 
‘professionalized-campaign personalization strategy’) as endogenous 
variables (ŋ1-6).  
 
Figure 3.2: A Proposed Baseline Structural Model 
 
The following tables 3.4-3.8, respectively, detail a set of indicators 
and measurements of these variables. These indicators and 
measurements were transformed into two sets of questionnaires, which 
were written in Bahasa Indonesia. These questioners were used to 
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explore practices of ‘political marketing-orientation’, ‘market-orientation’ 
and ‘professionalization of campaigning’ carried out by 10 Indonesian 
political parties during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, 
respectively. 
No Indicators and Measurements  Scales  
1 The importance of understanding marketing concepts, principles and 
procedures 
1 
as
 n
ot
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
t a
ll 
-5
 a
s 
ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 
2 The importance of applying of marketing concepts, principles and 
procedures 
3 The importance of developing the market intelligences using 
surveys/polling and focus group discussion 
4 The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop 
strategies of positioning political products of political party and party’ 
candidates 
5 The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop 
strategies of positioning political policies of political party and party’ 
candidates 
6 The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop and 
deliver political policies and products and adjust these policies and 
products in order to accomplish political goals 
7 The importance of using the market intelligences data to develop 
communication and campaign programs and to shore up the delivering 
processes of these political policies and products in facing the 
elections  
8 The importance of implementing of these communication and 
campaign programs in facing the elections  
Table 3.4: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Marketing-
Orientation As A First-Order Formative Variable 
 
No Indicators and Measurements  Scales 
I Internal-Orientation 
1 
as
 n
ot
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
t a
ll 
-5
 a
s 
ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 1 The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying party’s 
members and/or activists as a political sub-market 
II Voter-Orientation 
1 The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the loyal 
voters as a political sub-market 
2 The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the targeted-
volatile voters as a political sub-market 
3 The importance of responding, prioritizing and satisfying the young 
voters/new electorates as a political sub-market 
III Competitor-Orientation 
1 The importance of responding and prioritizing the primary competitors 
(those who have been seen of being much more potential to attack the 
party and or its candidates) as a political sub-market 
2 The importance of responding and prioritizing the secondary 
competitors (those who have been seen of being less potential to 
attack the party and or its candidates) as a political sub-market 
IV Media-Orientation 
1 The importance of responding and prioritizing the commercial news TV 
channels, as a political sub-market  
2 The importance of responding and prioritizing the non-news 
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commercial TV channels as a political sub-market 
3 The importance of responding and prioritizing the commercial radio 
channels as a political sub-market 
4 The importance of responding and prioritizing the national newspaper 
as a political sub-market 
5 The importance of responding and prioritizing the local newspaper as a 
political sub-market 
6 The importance of responding and prioritizing the yellow newspaper as 
a political sub-market 
7 The importance of responding and prioritizing magazines as a political 
sub-market 
8 The importance of responding and prioritizing public radio channels as 
a political sub-market 
9 The importance of responding and prioritizing public TV channels as a 
political sub-market 
V Campaign Contributor/Donator-Orientation 
1 The importance of addressing the internal party’ members as a 
campaign-contributor 
2 The importance of addressing the non-party’ members as a campaign-
contributor 
3 The importance of addressing the domestic business owners as a 
campaign-contributor 
4 The importance of addressing the domestic corporations as a 
campaign-contributor 
Table 3.5: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Political Market-
Orientation As A Second-Order Formative Variable Constructed from 5 
First-Order Reflective Variables 
 
No Indicators and Measurements  Scales 
1 The importance of having professionalized-campaign structure 
1 
as
 n
ot
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
t a
ll 
-5
 a
s 
ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 2 The importance of having professionalized-campaign strategy 
3 The importance of developing professionalized-campaign structure 
4 The importance of developing professionalized-campaign strategy 
5 The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign structure to 
persuade the targeted-audiences/voters  
6 The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign strategy to 
persuade the targeted-audiences/voters  
7 The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign structure to 
mobilize the targeted-audiences/voters  
8 The importance of advancing professionalized-campaign strategy to 
mobilize the targeted-audiences/voters  
9 The importance of developing professionalization of campaign’s 
structure and strategy within the specific context of the ground war 
campaign 
10 The importance of developing professionalization of campaign’s 
structure and strategy within the specific context of the air war 
campaign 
11 The importance of developing professionalization of campaign’s 
structure and strategy within the specific context of the online war 
campaign 
Table 3.6: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professional-
Campaign Engagement As A First-Order Reflective Variable 
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No Indicators and Measurements  Scales 
1 The importance of having a large number of campaign staffs 
1 
as
 n
ot
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
t a
ll 
-5
 a
s 
ve
ry
 
im
po
rta
nt
 
2 The importance of developing centralized-campaign organization 
(rather than decentralized-campaign organization) 
3 The importance of hiring professional political consultants/agencies 
4 The importance of setting up an appointed separated-campaign team 
5 The importance of using and developing the research to evaluate the 
competitors (the opposition research) 
6 The importance of developing the differentiation of internal 
communication campaign structure 
7 The importance of developing of an appointed-team to conduct survey 
and/or focus group to analyse the feedback from targeted-electorates 
8 The importance of having long-term campaign duration 
9 The importance of establishing and running research to evaluate the 
own party/candidate’ campaigning 
10 The importance of creating “war room” 
11 The importance of using and developing rapid rebuttal-unit 
Table 3.7: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-
Campaign Structure As A First-Order Formative Variable 
 
No Indicators and Measurements Scales 
I The Professionalized-Audience/Electorates Targeting Strategy 
1 
as
 n
ot
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
t a
ll 
-5
 a
s 
ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 
1 The importance of targeting and mobilizing the loyal voters using 
professionalized strategy 
2 The importance of targeting and mobilizing the volatile voters using 
professionalized strategy 
3 The importance of targeting and mobilizing the young voters/new 
electorates using professionalized strategy 
II The Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy 
1 The importance of developing narrowcasting strategy using e-mail and 
direct mail 
2 The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using the direct 
calling/mobile phone 
3 The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using SMS 
4 The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using Black Berry 
Messengers. 
5 The importance of running narrowcasting strategy using canvasing 
method 
III The Professionalized-News and Events Management Strategy 
1 The importance of using paid media (billboard, TV, cinemas, radio, 
newspapers and magazines) to deliver and broadcast campaign 
messages 
2 The importance of using free media (national daily or weekly 
newspapers, regional/local print media, yellow press/tabloids radio, 
television and internet including Weblogs and forums) to deliver and 
broadcast campaign messages 
3 The importance of developing talk show and of reality show programs 
to deliver and broadcast campaign messages 
4 The importance of developing the news and events management 
strategy to get positive publication from the media 
IV Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy 
1 The importance of developing campaign-personalization strategy 
focusing on party’ candidates 
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2 The importance of developing campaign-personalization strategy 
focusing on party’ leader 
Table 3.8: Proposed Indicators and Measurements of Professionalized-
Campaign Strategy As A Second/Higher-Order Formative Variable 
Composed from 4 First-Order Reflective Variables 
 
Chapter 6 details the applications of EFA, PCA and algorithm, 
bootstrapping and blindfolding procedures of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 
to evaluate the measurement and structural components of the baseline 
structural model and formulate and examine the structural component of 
the alternative structural model, respectively. This chapter also chronicles 
the use of the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) of PLS-
SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 to further explore the structural ingredients of these 
models. Based on reports resulting from such statistical approaches, this 
chapter will discuss the structural elements that constitute practices of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties. 
This chapter will also assess the statistical powers and applicability of 
these models to evaluate subsequent research objectives (ROs 4, 5 and 
6). 
 
3.6.4. The Effects of: a) Perceptions of the Indonesian Political 
Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners, Leader and Candidates 
Regarding the Relative Importance of Political Market Arenas; 
b) Party-Specific Factors; and c) Party’ Presidential Candidate-
specific factors on Marketization and Professionalization of 
Campaigning of these Parties Within and Across these 
Elections (ROs 4, 5 and 6). 
Having validated the statistical power of the structural models, I 
then discuss ROs 4, 5 and 6, respectively. To this end, I ran the following 
procedures. I adopted a multilevel modelling approach to evaluate these 
research objectives. This approach was run using Partial Least Squares-
Multi Group Analyses (PLS-MGA) of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0. It is a 
non-parametric statistical approach, which was innovated by Henseler et 
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al. (2009) and developed by Sarstedt et al. (2011) based on the statistical 
logic used in a Mann-Whitney-U-test. This approach was deployed for the 
following reasons. The primary reason was that this approach is workable 
in handling the survey data set which was actually composed from the 
heterogenic and the clustered-data structure. The subsequent reason was 
that this approach is helpful to identify and analyse the observed and 
unobserved factors, which are not incorporated in the structural model.  
This approach was organized through following steps. Firstly, the 
alternative structural model visualized in the following Chapter 6, figure 
6.2, was used to evaluate the effects of the individual perceptions of party 
marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal 
party, the media and the electoral arena on the ways of and the degree to 
which these parties advanced structural elements that constitute this 
model in facing these elections (RO 4). Secondly, this model was also 
deployed to explore the effects of party-specific factors on the ways of and 
the extent to which these parties carried out and selected such structural 
elements in facing these elections (RO 5). Thirdly, this model was also 
employed to explore the effects of party’ presidential candidate-specific 
factors on the ways of and the degree to which these parties performed 
and prioritized such structural elements in facing these elections (RO 6). 
Table 3.9 summarises the connections between these variables and these 
parties. Chapter 7 details the way in which this range of perceptions, 
which are originally measured through Likert’ scale 1-5, was transformed 
into categorical moderator/grouping variables, while Chapters 8 and 9 
chart the ways in which these factors were operationalized as categorical 
moderators/grouping variables.  
The following formulas were used to evaluate such effects. Firstly, 
formulae 1a-1a-1a and 1b-1b-1b were deployed to evaluate RO 4. The 
first formula exhibits the categorical moderator-grouping variables and a 
set of variables that compose this model were deployed in the first-level 
within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; while the 
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second formula indicates that the categorical moderator-grouping 
variables and a set of variables that compose this model were deployed in 
the first-level within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. 
Secondly, formulae 2a-1a-1a and 2b-1b-1b were employed in the second 
step to evaluate ROs 5 and 6, respectively. The first formula describes 
that the categorical moderator-grouping variables were placed in the 
second-level, while variables that compose this model were deployed in 
the first-level within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. 
The second formula illustrates that the categorical moderator-grouping 
variables were placed in the second-level, while variables that compose 
this model were deployed in the first-level within the specific context of the 
2014 presidential election. Table 3.10 summarizes such formulae and their 
link with the research objectives (ROs) and findings presentations. 
Categorical Moderator/Grouping Variables  Political Parties 
PD
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PP
P 
PK
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P
ar
ty
-S
pe
ci
fic
 F
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Party ideology/ 
Ideological 
orientation 
Nationalist Parties X X X X X X - - - - 
Islamic Parties - - - - - - X X - - 
Islamist Parties - - - - - - - - X X 
Party age 
category 
Political Parties 
Established during the 
New Order Soeharto  
X X - - - - - - X - 
Political Parties 
Established Post-
Soeharto New Order  
- - X X X X X X - X 
Party size (based 
on total number of 
parliamentary 
seats collected in 
the 2009 
parliamentary 
election) 
The Big-Size Political 
Parties 
X X X - - - - - - - 
The Medium-Size Political 
Parties 
- - - - - - X X X X 
The Small-Size Political 
Parties 
- - - X X X - - - - 
Party experience 
with internal 
shock/leadership 
change before the 
2014 
parliamentary and 
presidential 
election  
Political Parties 
experienced with internal 
shock 
- - - X - - X - - X 
Political Parties lacked of 
experiences with internal 
shock 
X X X - X X - - X - 
Party experience 
with external 
Political Parties, which 
lost more than 5 % of the 
- X - - - - - X - - 
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shock during the 
2009/the last 
parliamentary 
election 
votes in this election 
Political Parties, which 
lost in between 5 % and 1 
% of the votes this 
election 
X - - - - - X - X - 
Political Parties, which 
have not encountered 
external shock 
- - X - - - - - - X 
New or Young Political 
Parties, which lacked of 
experience with external 
shock 
- - - X X X - - - - 
Party position in 
the government 
during the 
second-term of 
SBY’ government 
Political Parties, which 
took position as 
opposition parties  
X - - X X - - - - - 
Political Parties, which 
ruled or shored up this 
government 
- X X - - - X X X X 
Party campaign 
resource, as 
reported by the 
Indonesian 
General Election 
Commission 
Political Parties with a 
large amount of campaign 
budget 
X X X X X X - - - - 
Political Parties with a 
medium amount of 
campaign budget 
- - - - - - X X - - 
Political Parties with a 
small amount of campaign 
budget 
- - - - - - - - X X 
P
ar
ty
’ P
re
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 F
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to
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The degrees of 
success of the 
party in 
nominating its 
top-leader as a 
presidential 
candidate 
Political Parties, which 
succeeded nominating 
their top-leaders as a 
presidential candidate 
X - - X - - - - - - 
Political Parties, which 
failed nominating their 
top-leaders as a 
presidential candidate 
- X X - X X X X X X 
The degrees of 
success of the 
party in 
nominating its 
top-leader/public 
figure as a pair of 
presidential 
candidate 
Political Parties, which 
succeeded nominating 
their top-leaders/public 
figures as a pair of 
presidential candidates 
X - - X - - X - - - 
Political Parties, which 
failed nominating their 
top-leaders/public figures 
as a pair of presidential 
candidates 
- X X - X X - X X X 
The degrees of 
success of the 
party in having an 
influential 
presidential 
candidate 
Political Parties, which 
had an influential 
presidential candidate 
X - - - X X - X  - 
Political Parties, which did 
not have an influential 
presidential candidate 
- X X X - - X  X X 
Table 3.9: Party- and Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as 
Categorical Moderator-Groping Variables and Their Link with the 
Indonesian Political Parties 
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R
O
s 
Level of Analyses 
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Categorical Moderator/Grouping 
Variables 
Exogenous and Endogenous 
Variables of the Alternative 
Structural Model and the 
Election Contexts  
The 2014 
Parliamentary 
Election 
The 2014 
Presidential 
Election 
R
O
 4
 
The Second-Level 
(Marketers/campaigners of 
political parties grouped based on 
their assessments regarding the 
relative importance of the internal 
party, the media and the electoral 
arenas) 
 
 
 
 
 
The First-Level 
 2a
-1
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1a
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1b
-1
b 
C
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R
O
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 6
 The First-Level 
(Political parties grouped based 
on indicators of the party-specific 
factors and party’ presidential 
candidate-specific factors charted 
previously by table 3.9) 1
a-
1a
-1
a 
an
d 
1b
-1
b-
1b
 
 
C
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s 
8 
an
d 
9 
Table 3.10: Multilevel Modelling Approach and Proposed Formulae to 
Evaluate ROs 4, 5 and 615 
 
Secondly, having considered the PLS-MGA results, I then carried 
out subsequent analyses. The existing political, media and election laws 
and the in-depth interview data16 were extracted and analysed using the 
qualitative and thematic contents analyses. Such analyses were carried 
out to examine PLS-MGA results, explore the underlying structures, 
mechanisms and elements, which determined the structural conditions of 
political market arenas and political sub-markets and led to the party-
specific and the party’ presidential candidate-specific factors to take place 
                                                       
15  The first-number of the formulae belongs to the level analyses of categorical 
moderator-grouping variables; the second and the third-numbers of the formulae, 
respectively, refers to the level analyses of the exogenous and endogenous variables that 
constitute the model; latters ‘a’ and ‘b’, respectively, relates with the election contexts: the 
2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
16  The in-depth interviews data derived from the Indonesian political parties’ 
leaders/secretaries were collected through a semi-structured in-depth interview 
procedure. A set of indicators charted previously by tables 3.3-3.7 was deployed to get 
these data. These data were extracted and triangulated with the in-depth interview data 
collected from senior editors of the Indonesian media, political pollsters/consultants to 
formulate the findings, as expected by ROs 4 and 5. These aforementioned in-depth 
interview data were also combined with the in-depth interview data gathered from 
campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists who worked for each of pairs of presidential 
candidates to get the findings as imposed by RO 6. Appendix D details the interview 
guides for interviewing these respondents. 
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and examine the ways of and the extent to which such conditions and 
factors influenced modes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections. 
Reports released by the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting 
Commissions and the Indonesian political pollsters, consultants and 
research centres were also extracted to evaluate such issues.  
The first parts of Chapters 7, 8 and 9, respectively, detail 
applications of these multilevel modelling approach and formulae as an 
analytical framework and PLS-MGA of Smart-PLS 3.0 as a statistical 
approach and displayed statistical reports resulted by this approach. 
Based on these reports, these chapters also spelled out variability and 
magnitudes of significant effects of these variables on the ways and the 
degree to which these parties in facing these elections advanced and 
prioritized structural elements that constitute this model. Subsequent parts 
of these chapters display the ways this work ran the qualitative and 
thematic contents analyses and reported the findings and conclusions. 
 
3.7. Research Synthesis 
As regards research syntheses, Sandelowski et al. (2012: 324-326) 
outlined the following points. Firstly, research synthesis by aggregation 
should take into account not only the objects of research, but also the 
research objectives. Secondly, research syntheses by configuration 
should be conducted by employing the bottom-up (following the 
deductivism logic) and top-down (following the inductivism logic) 
approaches.  
Following her ideas, I ran the following research syntheses 
procedures, as charted previously by table 3.1. Firstly, the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches were complementarily used to accomplish RO 1. 
Secondly, the bottom-up approach, which was followed by the top-down 
approach, was conducted to evaluated RO 2. Thirdly, the top-down 
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approach was undertaken to assess RO 3. Finally, the top-down 
approach, which was followed by the bottom-up approach, was carried out 
to examine ROs 4, 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
3.8. Reliability and Validity. 
As I used the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 
2008) and pure-mixed of the quantitative and qualitative methodology, I 
realized that the reliability and validity issues were not only theoretical and 
methodological issues, but also epistemological and ontological issues. I 
strived for holistically managing such issues within the whole stages and 
processes of formulation, reformulation, finalisation and presentation of 
this dissertation. I also attempted to manage the validity issues, which are 
related to the application of the qualitative method and the reliability and 
validity issues that are associated with the use of quantitative methods. 
Such efforts are summarized as follows. 
Firstly, as I adopted the idea of Tenscher et al. (2015), I took the 
following first-generation of statistical analyses. I deployed the Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal Component Analyses (PCA) to 
determine whether and to what extent a set of indicators and 
measurements charted previously by tables 3.4-3.8 possessed sufficient 
divergent and criterion validities and appropriate representative and 
internally reliabilities to capture the latent variables of the baseline 
structural model. Moreover, as I used the second-generation of statistical 
technique using PLS-SEM in Smart-PLS 3.0, I deployed Fornell-Larker 
criterion and the cross factor loading and cross weight and the heterotrait-
monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT)—as a new criterion of discriminant 
validity suggested by Henseller et al. (2015: 128) to determine the 
discriminant validities of the reflective variables that constitute this model. 
Additionally, I also utilized the composite reliability of Chronbach’s Alpha 
(α > 0.70) to determine the internal validity of indicators that compose the 
reflective variables. Finally, I assessed the convergence validity, 
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collinearity issues and the significance and relevance of the indicators that 
constitute the formative variables. Appendix B details the ways I managed 
such efforts. 
Secondly, as suggested by Torrence (2012), I verified the 
qualitative in-depth interview data derived from the Indonesian political 
parties’ leaders/secretaries and triangulated them with the in-depth 
interview data collected from: a) senior editors/journalists of the 
Indonesian media and political consultants/pollsters for producing the 
findings as expected by ROs 1, 3, 4 and 5; and b) these editors/journalists 
and consultants/pollsters and campaign-volunteers who worked for each 
of pairs of presidential candidates for composing the findings as imposed 
by RO 6. I then systematically sorted out, rendered and saturated them to 
obtain the most trustable and relevant data to meet these research 
objectives.  
As I followed the BU research ethics procedure (See point 3.7), I 
ran the data and respondent validations within the whole processes of the 
field research. As regards to the first and second research objectives, 
such validations were less difficult. However, as regards the subsequent 
research objectives (ROs 3, 4, 5 and 6), these validations encountered the 
following challenges. The first challenge was how to systematically 
capture the structural elements that constituted practices of marketization 
and professionalization of campaigning performed by these parties during 
these elections. The second challenge was how to appropriately measure 
(and differentiate between) what the Indonesian political parties really 
thought and planned and what these parties have actually run when they 
have carried out such practices during these elections. The third challenge 
was how to fairly evaluate the differentiations of the attitudes and 
behaviours they carried out when they advanced such practices in facing 
the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively.  
As regards to the first and second challenges, I undertook the 
following strategies. Firstly, I intentionally formulated the baseline 
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structural model that includes both formative and reflective variables. As I 
followed the fundamental principles of the nature and characteristics of the 
reflective and formative variables (Hair, et al., 2014: 42-45), I developed 
questionnaires that represent indicators of these variables and used them 
to systematically capture what these parties’ marketers/campaigners 
thought and planned and what they carried out when they developed and 
prioritized these structural elements in facing these elections. Moreover, I 
also conducted two kinds of pre-tests, which were undertaken within two 
months before these questions were sent to these respondents. The first 
pre-test was conducted to evaluate the contents of these questionnaires. 
During this pre-test, 5 senior researchers/experts employed by prominent 
Indonesian political pollsters/consultants were asked to scrutinize the 
contents of these questionnaires. Having considered their suggestions, the 
questions, which were listed in these questionnaires and directed to 
evaluate the variables that constitute this model were refined to improve 
the reliability of indicators and measurements of these variables. The 
second pre-test was taken to evaluate the format and structure of the 
questions used in these questionnaires. 10 marketers/campaigners 
employed by the big and medium sized Indonesian political parties (PDIP, 
Golkar Party, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party, PKB, PAN 
and PPP) during these elections were asked to scrutinize the 
appropriateness of the format and structure of these questions. Having 
considered their advice, I then refined these questions to make them much 
more readable, discernible and answerable. These efforts were slightly 
helpful in dealing with the reliability and content, criterion, and construct 
validities issues. 
With regard to the third challenge, I created two sets of 
questionnaires. The first one was directed to evaluate the ways and the 
extent to which these parties advanced and selected structural elements 
that constitute this model in facing the 2014 parliamentary election, while 
the second one was directed to explore the ways and the degrees of 
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which these parties upgraded and prioritized these structural elements in 
facing the 2014 presidential election. The format and structure of these 
questionnaires were tailored regarding the nature of these elections and 
the individual conditions of marketers/campaigners employed by these 
parties during these elections.  
 
3.9. Research Strengths and Limitations 
This work is the first study that holistically explores the structural 
conditions and factors that determined the developments of marketization 
and professionalization of campaigning of political parties in the new 
democratic countries, especially Indonesia. It offers not only an integrated 
conceptual framework and a nested workable baseline structural model, 
but also a new understanding of the applications of the critical realism 
perspective and mixed methodological approach and design to evaluate 
such developments within the specific context of the new democracy of 
Indonesia.  
Regardless of its strengths, this work has the following inherent 
weaknesses. As I considered potential non-sampling and sampling and 
statistical errors, I undertook the following steps. Firstly, the basic 
assumptions of the first and the second-generations of the statistical 
approaches were considered not only to tackle the potential statistical 
errors (types of error I, II and III), but also to manage the validity and 
reliability issues and the model estimation, assessments and specification 
biases. Secondly, five professional researchers/surveyors who had 
expertise and professional experiences in conducting the face-to-face 
survey interviews were deployed to collect the survey data. Overall, such 
efforts were quite workable in handling such issues. 
I also fully recognized the inherent weaknesses of the application of 
the in-depth elite interview data collection procedure. Lilleker (2003) 
highlighted that such weaknesses relate to following questions, which are: 
a) how to precisely seek, locate and make contact with elites as key 
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respondents in conducting in-depth interviews (Lilleker, 2003: 208-210; b) 
how to encourage respondents to answer openly, truthfully and naturally 
under fair conditions in order to obtain unbiased information (Lilleker, 
2003: 210-211); c) how to properly fit the qualitative data analysis in 
regard to the research questions and objectives; d) how to come up with a 
general conclusion regarding the existing various perceptions and 
perspectives among respondents (Lilleker, 2003: 212-213); and e) how to 
make sure that the qualitative analysis was properly conducted and met 
with the standard of research ethics when respondents preferred to 
provide “off the record” data and keep their anonymities (Lilleker, 2003: 
212-213).  
With regards to the first and second issues, I maintained personal 
and professional relationships and personal trust with the key- 
respondents and strived to interview them as naturally as possible by 
seeking convenient places and times. As regards to the third issue, I ran 
the qualitative and thematic content analyses using the most relevant, 
credible and trustable data and information. With regard to the fourth 
issue, I systematically identified and evaluated divergent, subjective and 
inter-subjective views of these respondents when I conducted the field 
research and analysed these data and information. I also ran triangulation 
of the in-depth interview data and managed my subjective views when I 
formulated the findings and conclusions. Additionally, with regards to the 
research ethical issue, I carefully considered following research ethics.  
 
3.10. Research Ethics 
This study was guided by the Research Ethics Code of Practice of 
Bournemouth University and approved by the University Research Ethic 
Committee (UREC) in 2013. The key principles of the research ethics, as 
stated by point 3.1, sub section 8a of UREC (2013), were used as the 
guidance of this work. When I undertook the fieldwork, there were no 
vulnerable participants who were requested as (key) respondents of this 
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study. With respect to UREC (2013), all of the respondents were 
sufficiently informed of the entire research activities and objectives. The 
most essential aspect emerging during the fieldwork was related to the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents (as stated by point 4.1 
and 4.5 of UREC, 2013). Regarding this issue, the official letter was sent 
to these respondents and on-going consultations were held with these 
respondents to ensure that the research was being conducted based on 
the mutual agreement of ethical standards, as imposed by point 4.3 of 
UREC, 2013). 
 
3.11. Summary 
This chapter has adopted a critical realism perspective as a 
research philosophy and ‘pure-mixed’ of the qualitative and quantitative 
methods was considered as a research methodology. The pure-mixed of 
the qualitative and quantitative methods and the convergence 
(triangulation) research design was employed to evaluate RO 1 and the 
sequential-exploratory research designs were deployed to accomplish 
ROs 2, 4, 5 and 6. The pure-mixed of the quantitative methods and 
exploratory research design were conducted to assess RO 3. The uses of 
these research methods and designs and processes of the quantitative 
and qualitative data collections and analyses and research syntheses 
were spelled out. Reliability and validity issues related to this work were 
discussed and the strengths and limitations of this work were displayed as 
well.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS THAT PROPELLED 
DEVELOPMENTS OF MARKETIZATION AND 
PROFESSIONALISATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES POST-SOEHARTO NEW 
ORDER  
 
Chapter Overview 
Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et 
al. (2012: 86) proposed ‘structural conditions’ that stimulate political 
parties to use marketing techniques, follow market-orientation and run 
professionalization of campaigning. Such ‘conditions’ include the low level 
of party ID and party membership, little trust in political parties, highly 
electorate volatility and commercial media system, the presence of 
candidate-centred over the party-centred systems, the left-right ideological 
dimension; and cleavages associations have been less important and only 
few parties who have a competitive chance to win the elections. Using 
analysed reports released by the Indonesian general election commission, 
political pollsters, consultants and research centres and the media, the 
political and election laws and in-depth interviews data derived from the 
Indonesian political parties’ leaders/secretaries and professionals, senior 
editors/producers of the media and political consultants/pollsters, this 
chapter discussed how and to what extent such ‘conditions’ took shape 
and paved the way for developments of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian Political Parties Post-
Soeharto New Order (RO 1).  
 
4.1. Democratization of Politics and Structural-Systemic 
Transformations Post-Soeharto New Order  
During the New Order Soeharto regime (1966-1998), Indonesian 
politics had been ruled under an iron law. At that time, there had been 
undemocratic political spheres. Domination of the state/government 
propaganda and the presence of undemocratic political exchanges and 
 
 
 
 
77 
interactions had been much more prominent since this regime fully 
controlled the media, constrained ideological orientation of the existing 
political parties and restricted the freedom to express public and political 
opinion and establishment of new political parties. However, in the 
aftermath the downfall of this regime in May 21 1998, democratization of 
politics gradually took shape. Soon after this regime collapsed, 
B.J.Habibie replaced Soeharto in being appointed as an Indonesian 
president. He assigned Minister of the Home Affairs, Let. General (ret) 
Syarwan Hamid, to restore the structure and function of the People 
Consultative Assembly as a democratic political institution and set up 
democratic political and election laws.  
As imposed by these laws, the first democratic general election was 
conducted on 7 June 1999. There were 48 Indonesian parties, which took 
part as political contestants during this election, but only 20 of these 
parties obtained parliamentary seats. As they were elected in this election, 
the elected-politicians of these parties took position as (new) members of 
the Indonesian House of Representative/the Indonesian Parliament (MPs), 
1999-2004. The most fundamental political policy carried out by these 
MPs was the amendment of the Indonesian National Constitution 1945 
(Liddle, 1999, 2000; Ambardi, 2008; Bunte and Ufen, 2010; Horowitz, 
2013). New political, election and media regulations were redrafted in this 
constitution. The first one was the repositioning of the political authority 
and organizational structure of the Indonesian People Consultative 
Assembly. The resulting role of this institution as the Highest State Agency 
to select the Indonesian president and vice-president ceased since 2002. 
The second one was changing the authority of the Indonesian president-
vice president and of the Indonesian House of Representative. The third 
one was changes in the election systems to vote for president and vice-
president, members of the Indonesian House of Representative, the 
Indonesian Regional Representative Council, the Local Parliaments and 
the head and vice-head of the Indonesian Local Governments. The last 
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one was the establishment of press freedom and the instalment of a 
democratic media system.  
Reformulations of the parliamentary and presidential election laws 
Post-Soeharto New Order gradually transformed mechanisms to vote for 
MPs and president and vice-president, restored the rights and roles of the 
Indonesian voters in casting their votes during these elections and 
changed the roles of political parties’ leaders on nominating candidates 
and determining these parties’ candidates who took position as MPs. 
Following article No. 39 point 3 of Law No. 3/1999, the 1999 general 
election was carried out based on the proportional election system (PR) 
with the close-list party candidates. Based on this system, a political party 
registered by the Indonesian General Election Commission as a political 
contestant would be granted parliamentary seats when this party gathered 
2 % of popular votes during this election.   
The 2004 parliamentary election was held based on Law No. 
12/2003. The 2009 parliamentary election was conducted following Law 
No.10/2008. Slightly differently from the 1999 general election, the 2004 
and the 2009 parliamentary elections were carried out using the 
proportional election system (PR) with the open-list party candidates. As 
imposed by Law No. 12/2003, the Indonesian parties’ candidates who 
were listed in the ‘top-list’ ballot card would be appointed as MPs when 
these parties passed the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold, 
which was 2 % of total votes, in the 2004 parliamentary election. As 
imposed by Law No No.10/2008, however, there were only MP candidates 
of the Indonesian political parties who passed the minimum amount of the 
‘division of voters’ in each of the parliamentary election districts and also 
obtained the higher numbers of popular votes in this district who would be 
granted parliamentary seats in the 2009 parliamentary election; even if 
they were being nominated by their parties in the ‘lower-list’ ballot card. 
The following table 4.1 charts transformations of the parliamentary election 
regulations and their consequences on Indonesian politics. 
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 The 1999 
Parliamentary 
Election 
The 2004 
Parliamentary 
Election 
The 2009 Parliamentary 
Election 
The Election 
Laws  
Law No. 3/1999  Law No 
12/2003  
Law No.10/2008  
The election 
system model 
PR system with 
the close-list 
party’ candidates  
PR system with the open-list party’ candidates  
The 
parliamentary 
threshold (PT) 
2 % of popular 
votes  
2 % of popular 
votes  
2.5 % of popular votes  
The elected-
party’ 
candidates (as 
the party 
passed PT 
and got seats 
in the 
parliamentary 
election 
districts) 
The elected-
party’ candidates 
were appointed 
by the party’ 
leader  
The elected-
party’ 
candidates 
were selected 
based on their 
ranks printed in 
the ballot card. 
The elected-party’ candidates 
were selected based on their 
abilities to collect popular 
votes in the parliamentary 
election district they nominated 
as MPs. Those who passed 
the minimum amount of the 
‘division of popular voters’ in 
this district and obtained the 
higher number of votes would 
be appointed as MPs. 
The right of 
voters during 
the elections 
Voters were only 
allowed to vote 
names of 
political parties 
listed in the 
ballot card 
Voters were allowed to chose names of political 
parties or these parties’ candidates printed in the 
ballot card 
The roles and 
powers of 
political 
parties’ 
leaders 
Top party’ leader has an absolute 
authority to nominate candidates 
who run in the parliamentary 
election, determine the elected-
candidates and appointed them as 
MPs, as this party passed the 
minimum number of the 
parliamentary threshold (PT) 
Top party’ leader has an 
absolute authority to nominate 
candidates, but he or she has 
no longer an absolute authority 
to determine the elected-
candidates and appoint them 
as MPs, as this party passed 
the minimum number of the 
parliamentary threshold (PT) 
Table 4.1: Changes in the Parliamentary Election Laws and Their 
Consequences on Indonesian Politics 
 
Despite decreeing Law No. 12/2003, the Indonesian Parliament, as 
imposed by Article No.6A of the amended-National Constitution of 1945, 
also proposed a new Bill that regulates the presidential election. Soon 
after being approved by the Indonesian President, this parliament decreed 
this Bill as Law No. 23/2003. Implementation of this law instantly 
transformed the Indonesian presidential election system from ‘the indirect 
election system’ to ‘the direct election system’. Following this law, a 
political party and its coalitions that gathered 5 % of popular votes in the 
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2004 parliamentary election were allowed to nominate a pair of 
presidential candidates to run in the 2004 presidential election (Article No. 
5, point 5 of Law No. 23/2003) and the elected president and vice-
president have to gather the highest number of popular votes in this 
election.  
Meanwhile, the 2009 direct election of the president and vice-
president was run one year after the Indonesian parliament decreed Law 
No.42/2008. Based on Article No.9 of Law No. 42/2008, only the 
Indonesian political party and its coalitions that obtained 20 % of 
parliamentary seats or 25 % of popular votes in the 2009 parliamentary 
election were allowed to nominate a pair of presidential candidates for 
running in the 2009 presidential election. Following this law, those 
gathering the highest numbers of popular votes, representing the diverse 
districts, were elected as the Indonesian president and vice president. 
Table 4.2 displays transformations of the presidential election regulations 
and their consequences on Indonesian politics. 
 The 1999 and 2001 
Presidential Elections 
The 2004 
Presidential 
Election 
The 2009 
Presidential 
Election 
The election 
laws 
Laws No. 3 and No.4/1999 Law No. 23/ 
2003 
Law No.42/2008 
The election 
system 
The indirect election 
system wherein members 
of the Indonesian People 
Consultative Assembly had 
exclusive privilege to elect 
a pair of presidential 
candidate  
The direct election system to vote a 
pair of presidential candidate 
nominated by a coalition of political 
parties 
The presidential 
electoral 
threshold 
There was no presidential 
electoral threshold. 
5 % of popular 
votes (Article 
No. 5, point 5 of 
Law No. 
23/2003) 
20 % of 
parliament seats 
or 25 % of 
popular votes 
(Article No.9 of 
Law No. 42/2008) 
The elected 
president and 
vice president 
A pair of presidential 
candidate those who 
obtained the higher 
numbers of votes of 
members of the Indonesian 
People Assembly  
A pair of presidential candidate those 
who gathered the higher numbers of 
popular votes, which represent the 
diverse districts of the Indonesian 
provinces 
The voter’s right Voters have no right to 
directly vote a pair of 
Voters have an absolute right to 
directly cast their votes to a pair of 
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presidential candidate presidential candidate 
The roles of 
political parties’ 
leaders 
Leaders of political parties 
who assembled a political 
coalition in the parliament 
have an absolute authority 
to nominate president and 
vice president candidates 
and forcefully ask MPs as 
members of the Indonesian 
People Assembly to vote a 
particular pair of 
presidential candidate. 
Leader of political parties who set up 
a political coalition still have an 
authority to nominate either a 
president or a vice president 
candidates. But, they have no longer 
absolute authority and powers in 
determining the elected-president 
and vice president. It was the 
Indonesian voters who absolutely 
determine the elected president-vice 
president in the presidential election. 
Table 4.2: Changes in the Presidential Election Laws and Their 
Consequences on Indonesian Politics 
 
Since these laws were implemented, political participation evolved 
and voters’ turn-out gradually decreased17. In the 1999 parliamentary 
election, the total number of voters’ turn-out was still 92.4 %. However, in 
the 2004 parliamentary election, it declined slightly to 84.10 %. It then 
dropped substantially since the 2009 parliamentary election was carried 
out, as imposed by Law No.10/2008 and the 2009 presidential election 
was conducted, as constituted by Law No. 42/2008. It dropped to 70.90 % 
in the 2009 parliamentary election. The total number of voters’ turn-out in 
the presidential election also plummeted from 79.76 % in the first round of 
the 2004 presidential election to 77.44 % in the second-round of the 2004 
presidential election and to 72.57 % in the 2009 presidential election.  
Alongside this, alignment of the Indonesian electorate to the 
Indonesian political parties also changed dramatically due to the following 
conditions. Law No.42/2008 followed the open-list candidate, as a new 
mechanism to vote and select MPs. Based on this mechanism, those who 
passed the minimum amount of the ‘division of voters’ in the parliamentary 
election district and obtained the higher numbers of popular votes in this 
district would be granted parliamentary seats in the 2009 parliamentary 
election. This mechanism led to most of those who had backgrounds as 
                                                       
17 In the last decade of the New Order Soeharto regime, the total voters who turned out in 
the elections had been higher. Those who voted in these elections were more than 90 % 
of total registered-voters. The primary reason was this regime intensively mobilized the 
voters to cast their votes in the elections. Those who disfavoured casting their votes in 
these elections were labelled as the unfaithful citizens. 
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local leaders and rich persons nominated by political parties, who have 
been politically influential within and across parliamentary constituencies, 
successfully obtaining these seats in this election. Since most of the 
Indonesian voters were more interested in developing direct associations 
with such leaders and persons, substantial numbers of top leaders and 
prominent activists who controlled the central offices of these parties failed 
in winning seats in this election (Ufen, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Mietzner, 
2008).  
While the total number of the voter turn-out has been declining, the 
total number of the non-voters has been increasing. Yet the total number 
of voter turn-out in such elections has been still higher, as compared with 
the total number of voters that turned out during the parliamentary 
elections in Western democracies. However, it was obvious that those 
who cast their ballots in these elections declined substantially from 92.4 % 
in the 1999 general election to 70.90 % in the 2009 parliamentary election 
and 72.57 % in the 2009 presidential election. More importantly, as the 
total electorates that turned out in these elections declined, the total 
electorates, which turned into non-voters in these elections, increased 
substantially. Under the Indonesian (extreme) multiparty system, such 
conditions have been politically significant.  
Whilst the total number of voters’ turn-out dropped substantially, 
political partisanship of the Indonesian electorates, which is indicated by 
the level of party identification (Party ID), gradually diminished. Since the 
election system to vote for MPs was carried out based on the open-list 
candidates and the election system to vote for presidential candidates was 
conducted directly by the Indonesian electorates in 2004, the level of Party 
ID, as seen from figure 4.1, has been constantly shrinking. The level of 
political alignment was strongly and significantly associated with the total 
number of voters who turned out in the 2004 and the 2009 parliamentary 
elections reported by the Indonesian Election Commission (Spearman rho 
correlation is 0.990 and ρ value = 0.001, with the 2-tailed significant at the 
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level 0.01). Levels of Party ID seemed to be strongly and positively 
correlated with the total number of those who have decided to be the non-
voters across these elections (Spearman rho correlation is 0.956 and ρ 
value = 0.001, with the 2-tailed significant at the level 0.05).  
 
Source: The Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) and Saiful Mujani 
Research and Consulting (SMRC). Survey has been taken using the multistage random 
sampling derived from 2.400 respondents represented all of the Indonesian populations. 
 
A number of commentators pointed out structural-systemic factors, 
which propelled the decline of political participation and partisanship of the 
Indonesian electorates. Such factors include: a) shifting social and 
demographic of the Indonesian people; b) transformations of social and 
political cleavages that paved the way for an increasing number of volatile 
electorates; and c) the implementation of direct election systems of the 
Indonesian president and vice-president in 2004, the direct election 
systems of MPs using a PR system with the open-list candidates and the 
direct election system of the head and vice-head of the Indonesian Local 
Government in 2005 (Mujani, 2003; Mujani and Liddle, 2004: 122; Mujani 
and Liddle, 2007: 45; Uffen, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). These factors have 
been seen to have further impacts not only on the inter-party competition 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
Nov-03 Nov-04 Nov-05 Nov-06 Nov-07 Nov-08 Nov-09 Nov-10 Nov-11 Nov-12 
Figure 4.1 
Levels of Party ID of the Indonesian Electorates in 
Between November 2003 and September 2013 (in %) 
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during the elections (Mietzner, 2008), but also on the inter-party 
interactions and collaborations within and across the electoral, 
parliamentary and governmental arenas (Ambardi, 2008). 
 
Note: The data were being extracted from the exit poll data of Lembaga Penelitian, 
Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES), 9 April 2009, as reported by 
Daniel Dhakidae (2009). 
 
In line with such developments, there were also a substantial 
number of voters who turned into disloyal voters in the 2009 parliamentary 
election. In addressing this issue, one of the Indonesian research 
institutes, LP3ES, conducted the exit poll research soon after this election 
was held. This research was undertaken by interviewing 7.541 voters who 
cast their votes for 7 Indonesian political parties during the 2004 and 2009 
parliamentary elections (Dhakidae, 2009). As visualized by figure 4.2, this 
pollster uncovered that the total number of loyal voters of the main 
Indonesian political parties was significantly small. This pollster also 
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% of Total Votes Collected by the Main Indonesian Political 
Parties in the 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary Election and 
% of Their Loyal Voters and Non-Voters in the 2014 
Parliamentary Election 
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revealed there were substantial numbers of disloyal voters and non-voters. 
Having evaluated the aggregate exit poll data of this pollster, this work 
confirmed that the total number of loyal voters was negatively correlated 
with the total number of disloyal voters. These relationships were visible 
and statistically significant (Spearman rho correlation is -0.857 and ρ value 
= 0.014, with the 2-tailed significant at the level 0.05).  
Further to this, a ticket-splitting phenomenon has also gradually 
emerged in Indonesian politics since the direct election system to vote for 
the president and vice-president was implemented in 2004. These 
phenomena were much more obvious before the 2009 presidential 
election was held (Ali, 2006). In specifically addressing this issue, LP3ES 
conducted the exit poll research undertaken using the multistage stage 
random sampling and face-to-face interviews derived from 5.141 
respondents representing all of the Indonesian electorate when the 2009 
presidential election was being held in 8 July 2009. This pollster revealed 
the following reports. There were only 73.30 % of voters who voted PDIP 
in the 2009 parliamentary election and favoured casting their vote for 
Megawati Soekarnoputri-Prabowo Subiyanto. Meanwhile, there were 
80.60 % of voters who voted Democratic Party in the 2009 parliamentary 
election and preferred casting their votes for SBY-Boediono. This pollster 
also uncovered that the Indonesian voters who cast their votes for the 
main Indonesian political parties, that took part as political contestants 
during the 2009 parliamentary election, likely favoured casting their votes 
to SBY-Boediono once they ran in the 2009 presidential election. 
Nonetheless, as recorded by the exit poll data reported by the Indonesian 
Circle Survey one week after the 2009 parliamentary election was run-off, 
most of those who cast their votes for these political parties in the 2009 
parliamentary election strongly preferred voting SBY once the Democratic 
Party nominated him as a presidential candidate for running in the 2009 
presidential election. 
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These trends took place alongside the increasing number of young 
voters. They are 17-22 or under 17 years old Indonesian voters who were 
already married. The total numbers of these voters/electorates is 27 
million (18.5 % of the total Indonesian voters) in the 2004 parliamentary 
and presidential elections and 36 Million (21 % of the total Indonesian 
voters) in the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections (KOMPAS, 8 
April, 2014). 
 
Source: The Survey Data of the Indonesian Circle Survey, December 2006-December 
2008 collected using the multistage random sampling derived from 1.200 respondents 
represented all Indonesian population. 
 
Alongside such developments, the rational voters and voting 
behaviour have been visibly taking shape in Indonesian politics 18 . 
                                                       
18 Following the idea of Downs (1957), it refers to how and the extent to which the 
electorates and voters considered the outcomes, incentive and social and private benefits 
as they favoured casting their votes to a particular political party during the elections 
(Downs, 1957: 138). Taking into account that the natures of the ‘rationality’ and the 
‘irrationality’ of voters still became the most essential issue in the field of political 
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Regardless of the existing disputable debates regarding whether the 
rational voters already existed or had not yet fully taken shape, and to 
what extent they have taken place in the new democracy of Indonesia, 
most of the Indonesian pollsters pointed out that they gradually emerged 
in the new democracy of Indonesia. One of these pollsters is the 
Indonesian Circle Survey. This pollster ran parallel surveys in between 
December 2006 and December 2008 and revealed the findings, which are 
charted by figure 4.3.  
Further to this, political consumerism and political activism also 
gradually took shape in Indonesian politics. Some observers outlined that 
the increasing ‘new middle class’ in the last decade of the New-Order 
Soeharto regime gradually appeared alongside the development of 
lifestyle images (Gerke, 2000: 146; Anshori, 2009: 91-94). Since the 
education levels and housing and lifestyle consumptions increased, the 
roles of the Indonesian middle class in Indonesian politics have been 
much more prevalent (Gerke, 2000: 152). During the last decade of this 
regime, most of them enjoyed less political power (Lev, 1990: 35) and 
strongly rebutted the undemocratic political and election systems 
established by this regime (Haryanto, 2006: 149). Some of them even took 
part in supporting the democratic political movement, which took shape in 
between 1994 and 1997 (see Uhlin, 1997: 85-127) and became the 
prominent actors who vociferously called for the instalment of new 
democratic political and election systems (Ishadi SK, 2002; Hill and Sen, 
2005: 5).  
Post-Soeharto New Order, various groups of the Indonesian middle 
class not only turned into heavy Internet and social media users, but also 
became the main consumers of the Indonesian mass media outlets. They 
strongly engaged in influencing political processes in the parliament and 
government and critically scrutinized wider social and cultural issues 
                                                                                                                                                       
marketing (see Savigny, 2004, 2008), this work favours defining the rational voters based 
on such indicators, as suggested by Downs (1957: 138). 
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related to the public interest and the quality, accountability and 
transparencies of public services (Nugroho, et al., 2012; Lim, 2013a; 
Ambardi, et al., 2014). As the use of the Internet among these middle 
classes increased significantly, political activism escalated substantially 
(Hill and Sen, 2005; Lim, 2003c, 2011, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief, 2012; 
Nugroho, et al., 2012; Ambardi, et al., 2014). ICT developments and the 
adaptations and uses of the Internet and social media transformed political 
engagement and activism of Indonesian non-government organizations 
(Nugroho, 2007), enlarged cyber–urban spaces (Lim, 2002, 2003a) and 
political resistances (Lim, 2003b) and led to cyber-urban activism (Lim, 
2006) and social media activism (Parahita, 2012; Lim, 2013; Ambardi, et 
al., 2014).  
Post-Soeharto New Order, the autonomy and self-rule of the 
Indonesian media also escalated substantially (Gazali, 2004, Gazali, et al., 
2009; Ishadi, SK, 2002). Since the New Order Soeharto regime collapsed, 
most of the Indonesian media enjoyed press freedom and new democratic 
political environments much more (Gazali, 2004; Gazali, et al., 2009; 
Ispandriarno, 2008). Being ruled under the new press law (Law 
No.40/1999) and media broadcasting law (Law No.32/2002), the 
liberalization and commercialization of media industries rocketed rapidly 
(Armando, 2014) and a number of the groups and networks of the 
Indonesian media increased dramatically, followed by an increasing 
number of viewers, readers and users of the media (see Lim, 2011: 11; 
Lim, 2012: 12-17; Lim, 2013; Nugroho and Syarief, 2012: 32-36; Nugroho, 
et al., 2012b: 45-48; Ambardi, et al., 2014: 64-65).  
These conditions comprised structural impacts on political 
journalism styles—in general—and modes of construction of political 
media agenda, packaging and dissemination of the contents of political 
news and programmes of the Indonesian media—in particular. A systemic 
change in management of the media organizations and the production of 
news programs took place after the highly commercialized media system 
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took shape in Indonesian politics. This change paved the way for the 
crucial roles of the spin-doctors/media strategists in Indonesian politics. 
AK, a former editor-in-chief of Antara (the Indonesian News Agency) 
described these phenomena as follows.  
“Post-Soeharto New Order, the titles and headings of songs, names 
of the singers and the settings and stages on which these singers 
have to sing these songs have been much more easily crafted, 
packaged and delivered. The Indonesian media, especially the 
commercial media, seem to more easily direct the formation of 
agenda setting and constructions of political discourses. As the 
commercial and political interests of these media have been much 
more prevalent, there has been much room for spin-doctors and 
media strategists to intervene in the media agenda, package 
political agenda and determine the public agenda. Indeed these 
conditions would determine not only the most important political 
issues that have been released and mediated by these media, but 
also how political actors and organizations have to deal with this 
issue on the one hand and how people think about this issue and 
consider these actors and organizations on the other”19. 
At the same time, the Indonesian pollsters and political consultants 
gradually took their place as important political actors in the new 
democracy of Indonesia. The infancy period took shape after the last 
decade of the New Order Soeharto regime (1991-1998). The domestic 
and internal research institution, the Indonesian media outlets, 
professional communities and the Indonesian social and political 
scientists, alongside the arrangement of the 1999 General Election and 
the 2004 presidential and parliamentary election, conducted polling 
programmes. Though polling programmes have mushroomed since 1999, 
political pollsters have, however, still been under-developed (Mietzner, 
2009; Ufen, 2010; Qodari, 2010; Trihartono, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
One year before the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections 
were held, Indonesian pollsters began taking their place in Indonesian 
politics. It was Deny JA, with Saiful Mujani, and M.Qodari who founded the 
first Indonesian pollster in June 2003, which is called the Indonesian 
                                                       
19 Personal Interview with AK, 21 September 2013 
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Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey Indonesia) (Qodari, 2010: 123). The 
success story of Deny JA and his associates has been widely 
acknowledged since they succeeded in supervising the campaign 
management of SBY as a presidential candidate nominated by the 
Democratic Party (at that time it was a new and small party) to run in the 
2004 presidential election. Soon after this election, Deny JA resigned from 
this institute and favoured establishing the Indonesian Circle Survey at the 
end of 2005 and set it up as a pollster and political consultancy firm. One 
year later, M.Qodari took a similar step and founded the Indo Barometer in 
2006 as a new political pollster and consultancy firm. These pollsters and 
political consultants conducted various kinds of political polling (such as 
benchmark poll, brushfire poll, exploratory poll, tracking poll and panel 
survey) and offered these survey data to the Indonesian parties and these 
parties’ candidates. The survey data released by these pollsters have 
been gradually recognized not only as the product of scientific research, 
but also as the crucial tool to achieve political power in parliament and 
government (Qodari, 2010: 125).  
As the ‘poll-fever’ took place in 2005s (Mietzner, 2008), political 
pollsters/consultants, which offered market intelligence data and 
consultancy services, mushroomed dramatically (Trihartono, 2013: 923; 
Qodari, 2010: 125; Ufen, 2010a: 23). The total number of political 
pollsters/consultants has increased from 6 in 1998 to more than 60 at the 
end of 2013 (Trihartono, 2013: 931). This number does not include the 
local and new political pollsters/consultants, which have not been 
associated yet with these associations20. Most of the Indonesian parties 
and candidates favoured employing these pollsters/consultants to obtain 
survey data and then publish the most positive aspects of these through 
                                                       
20  Slightly different from the establishment of pollsters, the development of political 
consultants has been triggered by the soaring demand for political consultancies services 
from the Indonesian political parties and parties’ candidates in order to tackle the 
weaknesses of their internal parties’ machines and campaign organizations (Qodari, 
2010: 125-132; Trihartono, 2014: 163-179). 
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various media outlets to attract more political support from political 
markets 21.  
These aforementioned conditions elicited changes in the attitudes 
and behaviours of Indonesian political parties and parties’ 
leaders/politicians in the political sphere. The following points detail such 
changes. 
 
4.2. The Indonesian Political Parties and Adaptations of Political 
Marketing and Market-Orientation and Professionalization of 
Political Campaigning 
Soon after the new regulations of the 2004 and the 2009 
parliamentary and presidential elections were being implemented, the 
level of political participation of the Indonesian electorate gradually 
declined. Political alignment of these electorates to the Indonesian political 
parties substantially diminished, while the ticket-splitting phenomenon 
consistently emerged. The total number of loyal voters of these parties 
also obviously shrunk, while the total number of disloyal voters of these 
parties and non-voters visibly increased.  
Most of the Indonesian political parties considered such issues 
intensely. They gradually adopted modern principles of political marketing 
and engaged in developing professional communication and campaign 
methods. VYM, a leader of the National Mandatory Party (PAN) spelled 
out following testimonies.  
“There were transformations of political and electoral regulations 
Post-Soeharto New Order. These regulations not only changed the 
inter-party competition in political (market) arenas during elections 
and post-elections, but also transformed political partisanship of the 
Indonesian electorates. We got some reports released by the 
Indonesian pollsters that Party ID has been in low level and most of 
the Indonesian electorates have been much more volatile and 
politically more rational. Since these regulations have been set up 
and the volatile electorates have been much more prominent, we 
indeed gradually accounted for the modern principle of marketing 
                                                       
21  Personal interview with AB, an executive director of the Nusantara Survey 
Institute/Lembaga Survey Nusantara/LSN, 11 May 2014. 
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as an organisation strategy and set up professional campaign. 
Selling political parties’ ideology has been quite difficult during the 
elections. This party and party’ candidates could no longer be 
reliant on the social and political cleavage they associated with. We 
have to keep improving the whole aspect of the party management 
and organizational strategy. We have to develop more appropriate 
communication methods and tools, especially in facing the 
elections”22.   
 
The increasing number of volatile voters and the emergence and 
development of the rational voters and voting behaviours stimulated most 
of these parties and these parties’ leaders to develop better organisational 
principles based on the marketing procedure and set up professional 
communication and campaign. In addressing such issues, SM, a leader of 
PPP and one of the former ministers of the second-term of SBY’ 
government, stated as follows. 
“The increasing levels of education of electorates, urbanization 
processes and the rise of the middle class Post-Soeharto New 
Order triggered the escalating numbers of rational voters and, more 
importantly, the rational voting behaviours. Since these voters are 
getting bigger in terms of numbers and much more critical in terms 
of political views they addressed to political parties and 
government, we need to adopt the marketing principle to holistically 
understand their attitudes and behaviours. We also need to develop 
some professional communication and campaign strategies and 
techniques to address them properly. We could no longer ignore 
them when we want to get elected during the elections or if we took 
a position in the parliament or run the government”23. 
 
Most of the political leaders recognized that such conditions carried 
consequences for the political parties they affiliated with. Some of them 
realized that it is still possible to adopt the marketing principles, techniques 
and procedures as an organizational strategy of party. However, it is quite 
hard to adopt such principles, techniques and procedures as an 
organizational philosophy of the party. In addressing such issues, YC, a 
leader of Hanura Party stated as follows. 
                                                       
22 Personal Interview, 25 July 2014 
23 Personal interview, 18 May 2014 
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“It is really difficult to fully adopt the marketing principles, 
techniques and procedures used in business and commercial 
organizations as an organizational philosophy of our political party. 
But, regardless of the limitation of resources of our party, it is still 
possible for us to generate them as an organizational strategy. We 
realized that such principles, techniques and procedures are helpful 
to identify the strength and the unique selling point of our party, 
party leaders and candidates (on the one hand) and to deal with the 
volatile and rational voters and, more importantly, to leverage the 
electorates’ support to our party (on the other) when we run in the 
elections. We realized that having had a party leader that strongly 
shored up the whole processes of adaptations and developments of 
such principles, techniques and procedures as an organizational 
strategy and developed professional campaigning is not enough. 
But, establishment of a collective enterprise of party leaders, 
politicians, members and activists in the national and local levels to 
carry out such efforts and develop a professional campaign is 
actually much more important” 24. 
 
The decline of political partisanship of the Indonesian electorates 
and the increasing numbers of volatile and rational voters also 
transformed the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ 
leaders and candidates (re) formulated political products and policies and 
delivered these products and policies to these voters. Some of them 
believed that the volatile and rational voters demanded the better political 
programmes and policies, which carried out the ‘real political and 
economic benefits’, much more. In addressing this issue, IJP, a leader of 
Golkar Party voiced as follows. 
“Politicians who run in the elections could no longer be reliant on 
the electorates’ partisanships to the political party they affiliated 
with. The relationships between political parties and electorates 
changed substantially Post-Soeharto New Order. Voters are now 
much more volatile and rational. They are interested less in the 
ideological platforms of political parties. These platforms seem to 
be less workable. What they are mostly interested in is the ‘real 
political and economic benefit’ offered by the parties’ leaders and 
politicians during the elections and delivered by these parties’ 
leaders and politicians post-elections”25. 
 
                                                       
24 Personal interview, 10 May, 2014 
25 Personal interview, 28 October 2014 
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 The Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and 
candidates who considered the low level of Party ID, the increasing 
numbers of non-voters and disloyal voters favoured developing the 
following strategies. The first one is leveraging both the brand image of the 
party and workability of the party as a political organisation. The second 
one is hunting the benevolent, rich, smart and professional politicians and 
national and local leaders who were potentially capable of capturing these 
voters during the parliamentary and presidential elections. In addressing 
these issues, PL, a leader of Gerindra Party stated as follows. 
“We realized that having a high standard of organizational structure 
and influential party leaders are not enough for a political party to 
win the elections. (More than that) We have to ensure that the 
party’s organizational structure has been workable to connect with 
various groups of voters and to attract the non-voters and disloyal 
voters. We need to generate the ideology, values and policies 
advocated by the political party to develop an outstanding political 
party brand. We also need party ambassadors who can be 
expected to secure a political party brand and co-brand this party 
brand with his or her personal brand. Hunting and selecting 
‘benevolent, ‘rich’, ‘smart’ and ‘professional’ politicians and local 
leaders who have been understood and are capable of 
accomplishing such efforts is much more crucial for the political 
party and party leader to win the elections”26. 
 
With slight differences, some of these parties and these parties’ 
leaders and candidates much preferred developing the capacity of the 
party organisation and transforming its communication and campaign 
structure and strategies to keep securing loyal voters and capturing the 
volatile voters. Such efforts have been seen as being essential, especially 
for political parties, which have been, associated less with the social and 
political cleavages that exist in the Indonesian politics. Supported less by 
these cleavages, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), in facing the 
elections, favoured advancing the capacity and capability of its members 
to secure loyal voters and capture political support from the volatile voters. 
TR, a former secretary general of PKS spelled out such efforts as follows. 
                                                       
26 Personal interview, 22 November 2014 
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“We realized that the success of the party, especially during the 
elections, is strongly determined by the capacity and capability of its 
members to keep securing the loyal voters and to get political 
support from the volatile voters. We conducted our own survey 
programmes and accounted for the survey reports released by the 
Indonesian pollsters as well. These reports are quite important and 
are helpful not only to identify the demands and expectations of 
these voters, but also to find a better strategy regarding how to deal 
with such demands and expectations of these voters. When we 
interacted with them, we asked our party candidates and activists to 
consider such demands and expectations of these voters. We also 
took into account the most important social and cultural aspects of 
these voters to develop the appropriate political communication and 
campaigning style in order to touch their hearts and minds 
properly”27. 
 
The older and more established Indonesian political parties and 
these parties’ leaders and candidates commonly perceived the low level of 
Party ID, the increasing numbers of non-voters and disloyal voters as a 
‘real and hard political challenge’. However, the younger and less 
established political parties, such as Gerindra Party and Nasdem Party 
otherwise, accounted for such developments as a ‘lucrative political 
opportunity’ that allowed them to achieve a substantial number of 
parliamentary seats during the parliamentary election and to possibly run 
in the presidential election. Leaders and founding fathers of these parties 
carried out what they called ‘a scientific research’ and hired political 
pollsters to identify what factors really triggered the low level of Party ID 
and what values, policies and themes were really expected by the non-
voters and disloyal voters. This research produced the market intelligence 
data, which were generated as a guidance to formulate these parties’ 
ideology and policies and decide the parties’ names, logos, and colours in 
order to attract these voters. In addressing these issues, AM, a general 
secretary of Gerindra Party stated as follows. 
“Political pollsters we hired a couple of years ago assured us that 
there were large numbers of the Indonesian electorates who were 
still dissatisfied with the work performances of the existing political 
                                                       
27 Personal interview, 18 May 2014 
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parties and told us that most of these electorates expected a new 
nationalist political party, which is non-identical to the existing 
nationalist political parties. A report produced by this pollster 
indicates that these electorates dreamed of having ‘a great 
Indonesia’. As regards to such conditions, we established this party 
in 2008 and named it the ‘great Indonesian-movement party’, and 
developed its political positioning and branding to make it being 
dissimilar to the existing nationalist parties. We gradually set up its 
organizational structure and developed a set of marketing and 
campaigning strategies to connect with these electorates and also 
formulated policies and products, as expected by these electorates. 
This pollster informed us that these electorates were much more 
familiar with the ‘head of eagle’ and ‘red’ as a symbol of ‘a great 
Indonesia’. We ultimately decided to select them as the main 
components of the party’ logo and flag”28.  
 
In addressing such issues, WA, a deputy general secretary of Nasdem 
Party voiced the following. 
“The low level of party ID and increasing numbers of non-voters 
and disloyal voters indicate that the existing political parties have 
not yet fully translated the people’s voices into political policies and 
products and delivered these policies and products, as they 
expected. The founding father of this party realized such issues and 
then asked one of prominent Indonesian political pollsters to run 
survey researches to dig up various aspects underlying such 
issues. Based on this pollster’s reports, we designed a new political 
party. This pollster data indicate that most of these voters need a 
‘change’. Thus, we highlighted the word ‘change’ as a main theme 
of this party. This pollster data told us that most of them favour 
having a democratic Indonesian society with more equal social, 
economic and political structures. We then named this party as 
‘National Democrat’ and decided ‘Nationalist-Social Democracy’ as 
an ideology that comprised the name of this party. This pollster data 
also informed us that most of them are much more interested in 
‘blue’ rather than on red, yellow or other colours. Thus, we decided 
using ‘blue’ as the main colour of this party’s logo and flag”29.  
 
The Indonesian political parties, which have been strongly 
associated with the existing social and political cleavages, also engaged in 
developing some strategies to understand the characteristics of the 
Indonesian electorate. These parties and these parties’ leaders and 
                                                       
28 Personal interview, 5 November, 2014 
29 Personal interview, 29 October, 2014 
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politicians set up an appropriate political campaign style to address 
various groups of the electorate, which are grouped as a non-captive 
electoral market. One of these parties is the Nation Awakening Party 
(PKB). This party strongly accounted for the ‘unexpressed need and 
expectations’ of these electorates and developed what this party called ‘an 
unordinary political campaign style’. In addressing this issue, IN, a former 
general secretary of PKB has voiced the following. 
“We can no longer rely on the core voters of the party. We need to 
address various types of voters. To do so, we need an unordinary 
political campaign style. We need to know precisely the 
characteristics of these voters. We have to know how to get closely 
connected to these voters. We have to use this campaigning style 
to keep them in touch with the party always. We have to address 
them properly not only as an individual electorate, but more 
importantly as an individual citizen. We have to treat them as 
friends, listen to what they voiced and serve them as citizens. We 
realized that most of the Indonesian people are now more likely to 
be treated personally as our fellow citizens and friends and more 
importantly as our family. Likewise, as to a member of our family, 
we have to be much more capable not only to understand what they 
implicitly and explicitly expected and wanted, but also to fulfil what 
they need and want during the elections and post-elections“30.  
 
The Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and 
politicians also considered the rise of political consumerism and political 
activism. They engaged in developing a more innovative and strategic 
political marketing management to manage such trends. SM, a leader of 
PPP has articulated his assessments regarding such issues as follows. 
“The development of communication technology, especially social 
media, amplified political consumerism and political activism, 
organized primarily by the Indonesian middle class. They are only 
more or less 35 % of total population. They, however, are groups of 
the opinion leaders. What they voiced in the political sphere 
determined the patterns and degree of electorates’ support for the 
ruling party and its coalition as well as the opposition parties. Since 
the ways they behaved in the political sphere could carry impacts 
on how people perceived a political party and its leaders and 
politicians, we have to develop more innovative and strategic 
                                                       
30 Personal Interview, 14 May 2014 
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political (marketing) management of party organization and its 
communication structure and strategy”31. 
 
Such trends also gradually carried impacts on the formulations of political 
agenda setting of the Indonesian media32. Political issues advocated by 
political activists and amplified by the media determined the ways the 
parties’ leaders and parties’ politicians managed parties’ organization, 
especially when they took position in the government. As regards to this 
issue, RP, a leader of Democratic Party that shored up SBY’ government 
(2004-2014), voiced the following. 
“Those ruling in the government have been always in the public 
spotlight and scrutinized by the media and the Internet and social 
media users. It is not easy to handle such issues once we are in the 
government. We need to develop much more innovative party 
organization and offer better political policies and products not only 
to deal with various forms of political activism, but also advocate 
some policies and formulate political products demanded by diverse 
groups of political activists. For those who ruled in the government, 
it was really hard to handle the stream of public opinion they 
induced and its impacts on the peoples’ perception to trust in the 
government”33.  
 
Most of these parties and these parties’ leaders and politicians also 
gradually developed management of media relations and advanced more 
appropriate professional skills to handle organizational changes in political 
journalism and political agenda setting carried out by the Indonesian 
media outlets34. Since the private media, especially TV channels, have 
been seen to be much more influential in the new democracy of Indonesia, 
most of them considered the power of the commercial media logic. 
Gradually, they have become interested in hiring (former) senior 
editors/journalist as professional spin-doctors, regardless of their positions 
in government. This effort is directed to develop media and public relations 
                                                       
31 Personal interview, 18 May 2014 
32 Personal interviews with RK, an Editor-in-Chief of Viva News.com, 23 September, 2014 
and SR, an Editor-in-Chief of Okezone.com, 10 October 2014 
33 Personal interview, 13 May 2014 
34 Personal Interviews with UK, an Editor-in-Chief of Media Indonesia, 20 October 2014; 
VYM of PAN, 25 July, 2014; YC of Hanura Party, 22 May 2014 
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programmes, handle the increasing power of media logic, deal with an 
increasing personalization of political news and address the rolling news 
and horserace style of political news and programmes produced by the 
Indonesian commercial media, especially TV Channels35.  
Those who took positions in the government were much more 
engaged in hiring the spin-doctors and developing media relations and 
public relations programmes. For example, as they won the 2004 
parliamentary and presidential elections, the Democratic Party particularly 
considered developing such programmes and employing political 
consultants, pollsters and spin-doctors. These efforts were directed to 
secure the political image and leadership style of SBY, as a top-leader of 
this party, and to attract and gather the electorates’ support for this party. 
Such efforts were also carried out soon after this party won the 2009 
parliamentary election and since SBY was re-elected for second time in 
the 2009 presidential election36. 
The development of political consultants and pollsters in the new 
democracy of Indonesia not only triggered professionalization of 
campaigning of political parties, but also transformed the ways these 
parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates thought about politics and 
addressed political sub-markets (especially the electorates and the 
media). Market intelligence data offered by these consultants and pollsters 
have been commonly used to portray the actual conditions of political sub-
markets and to formulate better strategies for these parties and parties’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates. In addressing such issues, EK, a 
former director of the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey 
                                                       
35 Personal interviews with T, a political consultant and researcher of Saiful Mujani 
Research and Consulting/SMRC, 24 October 2014, PS, a senior producer of Trans TV 
Corporation, 10 Septembers, 2013 and ADG, a former senior producer of TV ONE and 
now is a senior journalist of CNN Indonesia, 15 September, 2013 
36 Personal interviews with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 and T, a former 
researcher and consultant of Fox Indonesia and now a researcher and consultant of 
SMRC who ever employed as political consultant of Democratic Party in between 2007 
and 2013, 24 October 2014 
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Indonesia) and the Indonesian Voices Network (Jaringan Suara Indonesia) 
stated as follows. 
“We run our jobs based on scientific research. We used various 
research methods. The strategies we developed to deal with the 
media and target and mobilize voters are run based on the actual 
data we collected using such methods. Most of the Indonesian 
political parties lacked such expertise and professional human 
resources to gather the market intelligence data related to the 
media and electoral markets scientifically. We support them with 
such data and expertise”37. 
 
The Indonesian political parties and parties’ leaders, candidates 
and politicians gradually hired such consultants and pollsters and 
accounted for the professional skills and research they offered. However, 
the ways they carried out such practices varied. Most of them perceived 
that employing political consultants and pollsters whose good 
understanding of the diverse characteristics of voters existed within and 
across the Indonesian local districts, and political knowledge and 
experiences regarding the government and parliamentary affairs and who 
was being nominated as party candidates in the elections, was really 
helpful38. Some of them asked these consultants and pollsters to merely 
evaluate the degree of the electorates’ support they obtained during the 
last parliamentary and presidential elections and to find the best strategy 
to increase the electorates’ support in facing the next parliamentary and 
presidential elections. However, the others hired these consultants and 
pollsters not only to develop proficient campaign structure and strategy to 
capture the volatile voters when they ran in these elections, but also to 
secure the electorates’ support for political policies when they ruled in 
government39.  
 
                                                       
37 Personal interview, 13 October 2014 
38  Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, AM, a General 
Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 
39 Personal interviews, with SC, a director of the Indonesian Circle Survey; 12 September 
2014 and EK, a former director of the Indonesian Circle Survey and the Indonesian 
Voices Network/Jaringan Suara Indonesia, 13 October 2014 
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4.3. Conclusion. 
As stated at the outset Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-
29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), posited structural conditions, which 
are likely to propel political parties in democratic countries to adopt 
political marketing-orientation, advance market-orientation and/or run 
professionalization of campaigning. This chapter has evaluated his 
proposition within the specific context of the new democracy of Indonesia. 
Points of 4.1 and 4.2 of this chapter have revealed the findings. The 
following points and subsequent figure 4.4 will summarize such findings.  
The findings indicated that democratisation of politics, which 
emerged in the aftermath of the downfall of Soeharto regime, led to 
amendment of the National Constitution of 1945 taking place. This 
amendment, as exhibited previously by point 4.1, carried out structural-
systemic changes that paved the way for the establishment of democratic-
liberal media and political party and election systems. These systems 
determined the development of the candidate-centred electoral system 
and transformed mechanisms to vote for MPs, president and vice -
president and the rights and roles of the Indonesian electorate, political 
parties’ leaders and candidates. Soon after such systems were being 
installed, levels of political ID gradually declined. Total numbers of disloyal 
voters and the non-voters gradually increased. The ticket-splitting 
phenomenon and substantial number of the new electorates took shape in 
the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. The rational 
voters who favoured scrutinizing work performances of the Indonesian 
political parties and parties’ leaders and politicians, especially those took 
position in parliament and government, emerged robustly. Such 
circumstances, as displayed previously by point 4.2, stimulated most of 
these parties and parties’ leaders and politicians and candidates to use 
marketing principles, techniques and procedures to address various 
groups of political markets. 
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Figure 4.4: Structural Conditions that Paved the Way for Developments of 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian 
Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order 
Democratization of Politics and Establisment of Democratic 
System Post-Soeharto New Order (1998-2002) 
- Democratic Political Sphere 
- The Amendment of the National Constitution (1999-2002) 
- Reformulations of the Political, Government, Media and 
Election Regulations 
 
Political de-alignment, low level Party ID and 
the increasing disloyal voters and volatile 
electorates 
The emergence of the new 
voters/electorates 
The emergences of rational voters, rational 
voting behaviours and the rises of political 
consumerism and political activism 
The increasing roles of private/commercial media 
in the Indonesian politics 
The increasing roles of spin-doctors, pollsters and 
political consultants in the Indonesian politics 
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The findings also exhibited that establishment of such systems also 
led to organizational changes in political journalism taking shape. Such 
changes, as demonstrated previously by point 4.1, paved the way for the 
increasing influence of the media logic in productions of political news 
programmes and ascendancy of domination of the media agenda over the 
political agenda. Such changes also led to spin-doctors, media strategists, 
political consultants and pollsters having prominent roles in Indonesian 
politics. Such changes took place alongside ICT development, a soaring 
number of media consumers and the Internet and social media users who 
strongly engaged in political consumerism and activism and the 
emergence of rational voters and voting behaviours. As demonstrated 
previously by point 4.2, these developments stimulated the Indonesian 
political parties and parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates to robustly 
develop proficient campaign structures and strategies when they 
attempted to manage, persuade and mobilize diverse political sub-
markets, especially the electorates and the media. Those who had plenty 
of resources and/or ruled in government favoured hiring these spin-
doctors, media strategists, political consultants and pollsters when they 
advanced such practices.  
Overall, the findings meet with and substantiate the ideas of this 
author. Despite validating that the ‘structural conditions’ posited by this 
author really exist in the new democracy of Indonesia. The findings 
evidenced the structural-systemic changes that lead to diverse elements, 
which underlie such conditions. Such elements include items that have not 
been accounted for by this author, but were proposed by Lees-Marshment 
(2004: 5-7) and Lees-Marshment (2008: 6-9) and highlighted by Negrine 
(2008: 69) and Ufen (2010a: 32).  
The findings also displayed new components, which have not yet 
been identified by these authors, such as a soaring number of non-voters 
and increasing use of the Internet and social media networks in the 
political spheres. The findings exhibited the ways these elements 
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systematically propelled developments of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-
Soeharto New Order and shored up the existences of the democratic-
liberal political exchanges, interactions and transactions in the new 
democracy of Indonesia. The findings hinted that formations of such 
elements likely determined characteristics of political market arenas and 
political sub-markets in the Indonesian politics Post-Soeharto New Order.  
 
4.2. Summary 
This chapter has evaluated ‘structural conditions’ that paved the 
way for developments of marketization and professionalization of political 
communication and campaigning of the Indonesian political parties Post-
Soeharto New Order. Ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 
28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) were adopted to evaluate such 
conditions. The ways such conditions took shape and stimulated these 
parties to carry out such practices were displayed and discussed. The 
knowledge contributions of this chapter were highlighted as well.  
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CHAPTER 5 
NOMENCLATURES OF POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS AND 
POLITICAL SUB-MARKETS AND THE EFFECTS OF PARTY-
SPECIFIC FACTORS ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES’ 
MARKETERS/CAMPAIGNERS REGARDING THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THESE POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS 
AND POLITICAL SUB-MARKETS 
  
Chapter Overview 
Strömbäck (2007: 63-64; 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 
86) proposed four types of political market arenas, while Johansen (2012: 
160-163), Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes 
and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) 
postulated diverse forms of political sub-markets. These authors argued 
that political parties in democratic countries commonly considered the 
relative importance of these political market arenas and political sub-
markets. We, however, still lacked knowledge regarding the 
nomenclatures of political market arenas and political sub-markets that 
took place in the new democracy of Indonesia; and the effects of the party-
specific factors on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market 
arenas and political sub-markets (RO 2). In focusing on such issues, this 
chapter extracted the in-depth interview data derived from these parties’ 
leaders and senior editors of the Indonesian media and pollsters and the 
survey data collected from these parties’ marketers/campaigners during 
the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. This chapter reports the 
following findings. 
 
5.1. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas Post-Soeharto New 
Order. 
There have been five types of political market arenas, which took 
shape in Indonesian politics Post-Soeharto New Order. The first one is the 
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internal party arena wherein the Indonesian political parties’ leaders, 
members, activities and politicians, as primary actors in this arena, carry 
out political exchanges, interactions and transactions during the elections 
and in between the elections. The second one is the electoral arena 
wherein the electorates, as primary actors in this arena, are addressed by 
these parties and parties’ leaders, activists and politicians during the 
elections and in between the elections. The third one is the media arena 
wherein the media, journalists and the online and social media users, as 
primary actors in this arena, are engaged in taking part in such exchanges, 
interactions and transactions during the elections and in between the 
elections. The fourth one is the governmental arena, wherein those who 
rule in the executive body of government, as primary actors, run such 
exchanges, interactions and transactions with primary political actors and 
organizations of the internal party, the electoral, the media and 
parliamentary arenas during the elections and in between the elections. 
The last one is the parliamentary arena wherein those who took position in 
the legislative body of government/parliament, as primary actors, carry out 
such exchanges, interactions and transactions with primary actors and 
organizations of the internal party, the electoral, the media and 
governmental arenas during the elections and in between the elections.  
Since Indonesia has been ruled under the presidential government 
system, the governmental arena has been widely seen as much more 
important than the parliamentary arena. The president, vice-president, 
ministers and senior officials take their places as primary actors in the 
governmental arena. They formulate regulations, political policies and 
products and attempt to deliver these political policies and products to the 
Indonesian electorates. Meanwhile, MPs, as primary actors in the 
parliamentary arena, propose, evaluate and scrutinize the political policies 
and products carried out by primary actors in the governmental arena. The 
parliamentary arena is widely seen as the secondary political market 
arena. Though concerned with what has been happening in this arena, 
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MPs as primary actors in this arena and political parties’ leaders, members, 
activities and politicians, as primary political actors in the internal party 
arena, favoured evaluating the whole political processes in the 
governmental arena as well40.  
Due to the following conditions, such political actors also 
considered the media, especially TV channels, as an important political 
market arena as well. The total number of the Indonesian electorate who 
used the Internet and social media platforms in the political sphere 
increased substantially. However, the Internet and social media platforms 
have been seen as being less workable in persuading and mobilizing large 
numbers of these electorates, especially those who settled in the non-
cosmopolitan areas. As regards such conditions, most of these actors 
have been reliant on the mainstream media. They needed these media to 
address and persuade the electorates, especially once they had limited 
capabilities, times and resources to directly address these electorates 
using communication and campaign method41.  
The media organization and journalists who worked in these media 
also become important political actors. The ways they covered and framed 
each of the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders, MPs 
and presidential candidates likely determined modes of perceptions of the 
electorates to the attitudes and behaviours of these parties and parties’ 
candidates. Such perceptions have been seen as having carried out 
visible effects on developments of levels of individual trust and support of 
these electorates of each of these parties and these parties’ candidates42.  
Those who ran in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections 
commonly considered the commercial TV channels as the primary 
                                                       
40 The primary reason is most of these electorates much more favoured regarding the 
primary actors in the governmental arena rather than the primary actors in the 
parliamentary arena. Personal interviews with AT of PPP, 19 June 2014 and PL of 
Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014. 
41 Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, DS of PKS, 12 
November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 
42 Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, DS of PKS, 12 
November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 
 
 
 
 
108 
medium to communicate with the Indonesian electorates. In addressing 
this issue, SP, a former editor-in-chief of KOMPAS and Metro TV stated as 
follows. 
“The socio-geographical condition of the Indonesian 
electorates/voters populated in 34 of the Indonesian provinces 
located in thousands of Islands led to the pivotal roles of the 
Indonesian media, especially News TV Channels, as the most 
strategic medium and significant intermediary actor. Most of the 
Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians 
and candidates need these TV Channels not only to communicate 
with these electorates/voters, but also to point out the main political 
products and policies they designed to address political actors in 
the internal party, the parliamentary and the governmental 
arenas”43. 
 
As compared to the media arena, the electoral arena has been 
widely seen as being much more important due to the following conditions. 
The total votes cast by the electorates inhabiting the parliamentary 
constituencies for the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ MPs 
candidates in the 2014 parliamentary election determined the chances of 
these parties in getting parliamentary seats in this election and fulfilling the 
minimum numbers of the presidential election threshold to nominate a pair 
of presidential candidates for running in the 2014 presidential election. The 
degree of support of these electorates for these parties’ MPs and 
presidential candidates and the inclination of these electorates to vote for 
each of these parties’ MPs and presidential candidates’ parties influenced 
the degree of success of these parties in achieving their goals in these 
elections44. 
Despite realizing the importance of such political market arenas, the 
Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders and politicians 
considered the internal party arena as an important arena as well. As 
primary actors in this arena, these parties’ activists, members and officials 
had been encouraged to improve the organisational capabilities of these 
                                                       
43 Personal interview, 31 October 2014 
44 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, WA of Nasdem Party, 
29 October 2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 
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parties in addressing, persuading and mobilizing the electorates, 
constituents and the targeted swing-voters. In addressing this issue, AM of 
Gerindra Party voiced the following. 
“It seemed impossible for this party to achieve success in the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections if its activists, members 
and officials have been politically fragmented. This party leader 
really needed them to improve the organizational capability of this 
party to effectively approach diverse groups of electorates and 
proficiently advance the campaign structure and strategies in order 
to persuade and mobilize the voters/electorates, especially the 
volatile electorates/swing voters”45. 
 
Within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections, marketers/campaigners of these parties realized the importance 
of these political market arenas. However, as detailed by following point, 
the degree to which they regarded the importance of these political market 
arenas were determined by the party-specific factors.  
 
5.2. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the 
Indonesian Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners 
Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas during 
the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. 
The survey data indicated that, within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political market 
arenas. Party-specific factors generate visible effects on such perceptions. 
However, only party position in the government and experiences with 
internal and external shocks, showed clear results regarding significant 
effects on such perceptions. As seen from figures 5.1-5.4, party ideology, 
age category, size and campaign resources generated visible effects on 
perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners 
regarding the importance of political market arenas; but, the differences of 
                                                       
45 Personal interview, 5 November 2014 
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magnitude of such effects between these parties are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.660; ρ = 0.257), the media arena (F= 0.238; ρ = 
0.794), the internal party arena (F= 1.809; ρ = 0.233), the governmental arena (F= 1.239; 
ρ = 0.346) and the parliamentary arena (F= 1.958; ρ = 0.211). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.994; ρ = 0.348), the media arena (F= 0.601; ρ = 
0.461), the internal party arena (F= 0.103; ρ = 0.756), the governmental arena (F= 0.028; 
ρ = 0.872) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.235; ρ = 0.640). 
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Figure 5.1: The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions of 
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ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.349; ρ = 0.319), the media arena (F= 0.723; ρ 
= 0.514), the internal party arena (F= 0.821; ρ = 0.472), the governmental arena (F= 
0.912; ρ = 0.445) and the parliamentary arena (F= 2.853; ρ = 0.124). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.660; ρ = 0.257), the media arena (F= 0.238; ρ = 
0.794), the internal party arena (F= 1.809; ρ = 0.233), the governmental arena (F= 1.239; 
ρ = 0.346) and the parliamentary arena (F= 1.958; ρ = 0.211). 
 
Compared to these factors, the following factors generated much 
greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market 
arenas. As seen from figure 5.5, party experience with internal shock 
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resulted in significant effects on perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the media arena (F= 4.235; ρ = 0.04). 
However, this factor produced insignificant effects on perceptions of these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electoral, 
internal party, governmental and parliamentary arenas. Party position in 
the government, as displayed by figure 5.6, created significant effects on 
perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of the electoral (F= 4.898; ρ = 0.04), the governmental (F= 
4.713; ρ = 0.04) and the parliamentary arenas (F= 7.344; ρ = 0.03). Party 
experience with external shock, as charted by figure 5.7, also lead to 
significant effects on the perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the governmental 
arena (F= 4.245; ρ = 0.053) and the parliamentary arena (F= 4.575; ρ = 
0.04). These factors also produced visible effects on perceptions of these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal 
party and the media arenas. The differences of magnitude of such effects 
between these parties, however, are statistically insignificant 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 0.898; ρ = 0.371), the media arena (F= 4.354; ρ = 
0.04), the internal party arena (F= 0.170; ρ = 0.691), the governmental arena (F= 0.501; ρ 
= 0.499) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.107; ρ = 0.752). 
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Regarding the Importance of Political Market Arenas 
during the 2014 Parliamentary Election 
The electoral arena 
is important and 
very important 
The media arena is 
important and very 
important 
The Internal party 
arena is important 
and very important 
The governmental 
arena is important 
and very important 
The parliamentary 
arena is important 
and very important 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 4.898; ρ = 0.04), the media arena (F= 1.797; ρ = 
0.217), the internal party arena (F= 2.356; ρ = 0.163), the governmental arena (F= 4.713; 
ρ = 0.04) and the parliamentary arena (F= 7.344; ρ = 0.03). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.279; ρ = 0.364), the media arena (F= 3.015; ρ = 
0.116), the internal party arena (F= 1.954; ρ = 0.222), the governmental arena (F= 4.245; 
ρ = 0.053) and the parliamentary arena (F= 4.575; ρ = 0.04). 
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Figure 5.6: The Effects of Party Position in the 
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The survey data also demonstrated that, within the specific context 
of the 2014 presidential election, the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarded the importance of these political market 
arenas. Party-specific factors generate visible effects on such perceptions 
but only party ideology, campaign resources and experience of external 
shock generated significant effects on such perceptions. As seen from 
figures 5.8-5.11, party size, age category, experience with internal shock 
and position in the government generated visible effects on perceptions of 
the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of political market arenas; but, the differences of magnitude of 
such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant.  
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 2.062; ρ = 0.207), the media arena (F= 0.641; ρ = 
0.616), the internal party arena (F= 0.662; ρ = 0.605), the governmental arena (F= 1.351; 
ρ = 0.344) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.486; ρ = 0.704). 
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Figure 5.8: The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of 
Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties 
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ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.128; ρ = 0.319), the media arena (F= 0.163; ρ = 
0.697), the internal party arena (F= 0.021; ρ = 0.890), the governmental arena (F= 0.578; 
ρ = 0.469) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.551; ρ = 0.479). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 2.612; ρ = 0.145), the media arena (F= 2.319; ρ = 
0.166), the internal party arena (F= 0.372; ρ = 0.559), the governmental arena (F= 0.019; 
ρ = 0.893) and the parliamentary arena (F= 1.247; ρ = 0.297). 
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ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 0.731; ρ = 0.417), the media arena (F= 2.959; ρ = 
0.124), the internal party arena (F= 1.357; ρ = 0.278), the governmental arena (F= 0.694; 
ρ = 0.429) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.304; ρ = 0.597). 
 
As compared to these factors, the following factors generated much 
greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market 
arenas. As seen from figure 5.12, party ideology produced significant 
effects on perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding 
the importance of the parliamentary arena (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048). Party 
campaign resources, as charted by figure 5.13, produced significant 
effects on perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding 
the importance of this arena (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048). These factors resulted 
in noticeable effects on perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party, the 
media, the electoral and the governmental arenas. The differences of 
magnitude of such effects between these parties however, are statistically 
insignificant. 
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Figure 5.11: The Effects of Party Position in the 
Government on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners of 
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ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.063; ρ = 0.395), the media arena (F= 1.022; ρ = 
0.408), the internal party arena (F= 1.146; ρ = 0.371), the governmental arena (F= 1.213; 
ρ = 0.353) and the parliamentary arena (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048) 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 1.063; ρ = 0.395), the media arena (F= 1.022; ρ = 
0.408), the internal party arena (F= 1.146; ρ = 0.371), the governmental arena (F= 1.213; 
ρ = 0.353) and the parliamentary arena (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048). 
0.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
30.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
The Nationalist 
Parties 
The Islamic 
Parties 
The Islamist 
Parties 
Figure 5.12: The Effects of Party Ideology on Perceptions 
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In a slightly different mode, party experience with external shock, 
created significant effects on perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the governmental 
arena (F= 7.521; ρ = 0.019). As seen from figure 5.14, the magnitude of 
the differences of such effects is clearly obvious between political parties 
which lost more than 5 % of the popular votes and the new and young 
political parties, which lacked experience of external shock in the 2009 
parliamentary election (F= 8.867; ρ = 0.032) and between political parties 
which lost more than 5 % of popular votes and political parties, which lost 
in between 5 % and 1 % of the vote in this election (F= 11.183; ρ = 0.013). 
The effects of this factor on perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the internal party, the 
media, the electoral and the parliamentary arenas are also visible. The 
differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties however, 
are statistically insignificant 
 
ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 0.964; ρ = 0.469), the media arena (F= 0.550; ρ = 
0.667), the internal party arena (F= 1.985; ρ = 0.218), the governmental arena (F= 7.521; 
ρ = 0.019) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.825; ρ = 0.626). 
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ANOVA results: the electoral arena (F= 0.467; ρ = 0.503), the media arena (F= 2.081; ρ = 
0.166), the internal party arena (F= 0.379; ρ = 0.546), the governmental arena (F= 0.222; 
ρ = 0.643) and the parliamentary arena (F= 0.484; ρ = 0.495). 
 
The survey data also confirmed that the differences of numbers of 
these parties’ marketers/campaigners who considered the importance of 
these political market arenas across the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections are visible. However, as seen from figure 5.15, the 
magnitude of such differences is statistically insignificant. The survey data 
also indicate that these parties’ marketers/campaigners who perceived 
that the importance of these political market arenas during the 2014 
parliamentary election also considered the importance of these political 
market arenas during the 2014 presidential election (R = 0.915, ρ < 
0.001). Such perceptions were strongly correlated with the type of the 
election (Kendall’s Tau-b=0.822, ρ < 0.001). Type of the election however, 
generated insignificant effect on such perceptions (F = 2.323, df = 1,9, t = 
1.524, ρ = 0.16). 
 
5.3. Nomenclatures of Political Sub-Markets Post-Soeharto New 
Order 
The following political sub-markets took place in the new 
democracy of Indonesia. The first one is the parliamentary market. It is a 
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political market in which MPs, together with ministers and senior officials 
appointed by the Indonesian president and vice-president proposed, 
discussed, scrutinized and (re) designed political policies and products 
and legislation. The second one is the governmental market, which refers 
to a political market wherein those who manage the executive body of the 
government formulated, implemented and delivered such policies and 
products. The third one is the internal party market, which is created or 
facilitated by the internal organization of the Indonesian political parties 
and parties’ leaders, politicians, candidates, members and activists and 
the association of organizations and stakeholders that are strongly 
affiliated with these parties. The fourth one is the electoral market wherein 
these parties, parties’ leaders, parties’ politicians and candidates, 
members and activists, in order to address the needs and expectations of 
the eligible voters and/or targeted-voters, carried out participatory services 
and/or parliamentary and governmental representations’ functions. The 
fifth one is the media market, which is a political market that includes the 
Indonesian media outlets and the Internet and social media networks 
users. The last one is the non-electoral market that consists of the non-
voters, political consultants, pollsters and commentators—as either a 
community or profession or an individual—and association of 
organisations and stakeholders that had not (yet) affiliated with any 
Indonesian political party and party’ leaders and politicians.  
The governmental and parliamentary markets strongly determine 
the flow and direction of the supply and demand sides of the internal party, 
electoral, the media and non-electoral markets. They are also widely 
considered as important strategic places wherein the state and 
government authorities are constantly shared, defined, regulated and 
generated, as demanded by the public/electorates/voters46. Along with the 
online and social media users, the media took shape as an influential 
                                                       
46 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 25 September 2015, SM of PPP, 18 
May 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 
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political market that shaped public discourses related to political and 
governmental affairs addressed by the Indonesian political’ leaders and 
politicians, on the one hand, and the Indonesian citizens/electorates, on 
the other47. The media are likely to frame such discourses, which have 
been seen as being politically important by the internal party, electoral, 
non-electoral, governmental and parliamentary markets. In addressing 
such issues, YAN, a senior editor of KOMPAS TV spelled out following 
opinions. 
“The media create programmes and stories based on what the most 
interesting events and issues are considered by the Indonesian 
political parties’ leaders and politicians who ruled in either the 
executive or the legislative bodies of governments and accounted 
for by these parties’ members and activists and the people 
(electorates). We always expect to get good news related to these 
events and issues as good news. However, a common trend related 
to such events and issues, which comes up and raises public 
concern, is ‘the bad news is good news’. The media are likely to 
scrutinize the governmental and parliamentary markets, point out 
the opinions of parties’ leaders, politicians, members (the internal 
party market), highlight the perceptions of the people (the electoral 
market) and amplify political evaluations released by political 
commentators, consultants and pollsters (the non-electoral 
market)”48. 
 
The media not only pointed out what happened in the internal party and 
the governmental and parliamentary markets, but also amplified what the 
electoral and non-electoral markets voiced regarding what had been 
taking place in these political markets. In addressing such issues, DBS, a 
former editor-in-chief of Metro TV and now serving as an editor-in-chief of 
Berita Satu TV, voiced the following. 
“We try to highlight the most important research reports released by 
the trustable political consultants and pollsters and critical issues 
voiced by credible political commentators and amplify the voices 
and demands of electorates related to the work performances of the 
Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians who ruled in the 
parliament and government. I believed that that most of those who 
                                                       
47 Personal interviews with SP, a former editor-in-chief of KOMPAS and now as an editor-
in-chief of Metro TV, 31 October 2014 and RB of KOMPAS, 12 November, 2014 
48 Personal interview, 6 November 2014 
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took power in the government and parliament strongly considered 
these research reports, critical issues and voices and demands of 
electorates highlighted by the media, especially News TV 
Channels”49. 
 
Political consultants, pollsters and commentators, as the non-electoral 
market favoured taking part within the whole chain of the supply and 
demand sides of the electoral, the governmental and parliamentary 
markets and accounted for the supply and demand sides of the media 
market as well. In addressing this issue, T, a political consultant/pollster of 
Saiful Mujani Research and Consultants (SMRC) stated as follows. 
“Most of our clients need market intelligence data and consultancy 
services when they want to properly understand the electoral 
conditions and deal with the media agenda and their competitors. 
Some of them need our research and consultancy services to 
address the internal party and parliamentary and governmental 
issues. When we carried out our jobs, we commonly scrutinized not 
only the structural impacts of conditions of and current events that 
took place in the government and parliament on the electorates and 
the media, but also the structural impacts of the current agenda 
formulated by the media agenda and issues highlighted by the 
electorates on the government and parliament”50. 
 
The Indonesian political parties’ leaders, candidates and 
marketers/campaigners either during the elections or post-elections 
attempted to address following political sub-markets strategically51. They 
include the internal party members and activists, the media, campaign 
contributors, competitors and the electorates/voters. Within the specific 
context of the parliamentary and presidential elections, these parties’ 
leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners prioritized voters as the 
primary political sub-market and placed competitors, campaign 
contributors, the media outlets and internal party members/activists as the 
secondary political sub-markets. In addressing this issue, AT, an MP of 
                                                       
49 Personal interview, 15 October 2014 
50 Personal Interview, 21 October 2014 
51 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 25 September 2015 and T, a political 
consultant/pollster of SMRC, 21 October 2014 
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the Indonesian Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan/PPP), stated as follows. 
“During the parliamentary and presidential elections, voters are 
much more important. They need to be considered and addressed 
in a proper way in order for us to get elected during these elections. 
(In spite of addressing these voters) We also have to be aware to 
our competitors as well. During the parliamentary election, the 
others (political sub-markets) have been less crucial. But, during 
the presidential election, they are relatively important”52. 
 
Within and across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential 
elections, these parties’ marketers/campaigners realized the importance of 
these political sub-markets. However, as detailed by following point, the 
degree to which they regarded the importance of these political sub-
markets were determined by party-specific factors.  
 
5.4. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Perceptions of the 
Indonesian Political Parties’ Marketers/Campaigners 
Regarding the Importance of Political Sub-Markets during the 
2014 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 
The survey data indicated that, within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of these political sub-
markets. Party-specific factors generated visible effects on such 
perceptions; but, there were only party ideology, campaign resources, 
experience of internal shock and position in the government that 
generated significant effects on such perceptions. As seen from figures 
5.16-5.19, party size, age category, experience with external shock and 
position in the government generated visible effects on perceptions of the 
Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of political market arenas. The differences of magnitude of 
such effects between these parties are statistically insignificant. 
                                                       
52 Personal Interview, 26 May 2014. 
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ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.329; ρ = 0.582), the media (F= 0.013; ρ = 0.911), 
competitors (F= 0.626; ρ = 0.452), campaign donators (F= 0.698; ρ = 0.428) and party’ 
members (F= 0.050; ρ = 0.828). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.758; ρ = 0.503), the media (F= 0.771; ρ = 0.498), 
competitors (F= 0.321; ρ = 0.735), campaign donators (F= 0.433; ρ = 0.665) and party’ 
members (F= 2.001; ρ = 0.205). 
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 ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 3.246; ρ = 0.101), the media (F= 1.873; ρ = 0.235), 
competitors (F= 0.772; ρ = 0.550), campaign donators (F= 0.848; ρ = 0.516) and party’ 
members (F= 0.266; ρ = 0.848). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.108; ρ = 0.750), the media (F= 0.896; ρ = 0.372), 
competitors (F= 0.088; ρ = 0.775), campaign donators (F= 0.157; ρ = 0.703) and party’ 
members (F= 0.020; ρ = 0.892) 
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Compared to such factors, the following factors resulted in much 
greater visible effects on the perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-
markets. Party ideology generated significant effects on the perceptions of 
these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of 
campaign donors as a political sub-market (F= 6.240; ρ = 0.028). The 
differences of such effects, as seen from figure 5.20, are clearly 
perceivable between nationalist parties and Islamic parties (F= 9.603; ρ = 
0.025) and between nationalist parties and Islamist parties (F= 14.130; ρ = 
0.011). Likewise, this factor, party campaign resources, as displayed by 
figure 5.21, also determined perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of campaign donors as 
a political sub-market (F= 6.240; ρ = 0.028). Such effects are clearly 
visible between political parties with a medium campaign budget and 
political parties with either a large campaign fund (F= 9.603; ρ = 0.025) 
and between political parties with a medium campaign budget and political 
parties with a small amount of campaign finance (F= 14.130; ρ = 0.011). 
These factors also created noticeable effects on the perceptions of these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the 
electorates, the media, political competitors and party members as political 
sub-markets. However, the differences of magnitude of such effects 
between these parties are statistically insignificant. 
Party experience with internal shock, as seen from figure 5.22, 
generated significant effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political 
parties marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of either the 
electorates as a political sub-market (F= 6.520; ρ = 0.034) or the party 
members as a political sub-market (F= 4.963; ρ = 0.047). The effects of 
this factor on perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners 
regarding the importance of the media, competitors and campaign donors 
as political sub-markets, however, are visible. The differences of 
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magnitude of such effects between these parties, however, are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.642; ρ = 0.555), the media (F= 1.960; ρ = 0.211), 
competitors (F= 0.545; ρ = 0.603), campaign donators (F= 6.240; ρ = 0.028) and party’ 
members (F= 2.274; ρ = 0.163). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.642; ρ = 0.555), the media (F= 1.960; ρ = 0.211), 
competitors (F= 0.545; ρ = 0.603), campaign donators (F= 6.240; ρ = 0.028) and party’ 
members (F= 2.374; ρ = 0.163). 
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ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 6.520; ρ = 0.034), the media (F= 0.077; ρ = 0.788), 
competitors (F= 0.016; ρ = 0.901), campaign donators (F= 1.197; ρ = 0.306) and party’ 
members (F= 4.963; ρ = 0.047). 
 
The survey data also demonstrated that, within the specific context 
of the 2014 presidential election, the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners also perceived the importance of these political 
sub-markets. Party-specific factors generated visible effects on such 
perceptions; but, there were only party ideology, campaign resources and 
experiences of internal and external shocks that generated significant 
effects on such perceptions. Such issues are detailed as follows. As seen 
from figures 5.23-5.25, party age category, size and position in the 
government generated visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian 
political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of 
political market arenas. However, the differences of magnitude of such 
effects between these parties are statistically insignificant. 
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ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.945; ρ = 0.360), the media (F= 1.569; ρ = 0.246), 
competitors (F= 0.524; ρ = 0.490), campaign donators (F= 0.002; ρ = 0.969) and party’ 
members (F= 0.509; ρ = 0.496). 
 
 
Note: the electorates (F= 0.278; ρ = 0.765), the media (F= 0.217; ρ = 0.810), competitors 
(F= 0.115; ρ = 0.893), campaign donators (F= 1.606; ρ = 0.267) and party’ members (F= 
0.668; ρ = 0.543). 
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Figure 5.24: The Effects of Party Size on Perceptions of 
Marketers/Campaigners of the Indonesian Political Parties 
Regarding the Importance of Political-Sub Markets during 
the 2014 Presidential Election 
The electorates as a political sub-market is important and very important 
The media as political sub-market is important and very important 
Political competitors as a political submarket is important and very important 
Campaign Donators/Contributors as a political submarket is important and very important 
Party' Members as a political sub-market is important and very important 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.412; ρ = 0.539), the media (F= 0.363; ρ = 0.563), 
competitors (F= 0.960; ρ = 0.356), campaign donators (F= 1.162; ρ = 0.312) and party’ 
members (F= 0.429; ρ = 0.531). 
 
Compared to these factors, the following factors generated much 
greater visible effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-
markets. Party ideology resulted in significant effects on the perceptions of 
these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of 
competitors as a political sub-market (F= 7.082; ρ = 0.021). As seen from 
figure 5.26, significant differences of such effects are clearly noticeable 
between nationalist parties and Islamic parties (F= 9.576; ρ = 0.03) and 
between Islamic parties and Islamist parties (F= 16.075; ρ = 0.007). 
Similarly, party campaign resources, as charted by figure 5.27, generated 
significant effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of competitors as a 
political sub-market (F= 7.082; ρ = 0.021). The differences of such effects 
are much more perceivable between political parties with a medium 
amount of campaign resources and political parties with a small amount of 
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campaign resources. These factors also produced noticeable effects on 
perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners 
regarding the importance of the electorates, the media, campaign 
contributors and party members as political sub-markets, although the 
differences of magnitude of such effects between these parties are 
statistically insignificant. Slightly differently, party experience with external 
shock led to significant effects on the perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media as a 
political sub-market (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048). As displayed by figure 5.28, 
significant differences of such effects are clearly visible between political 
parties, which had no experience with external shock, and political parties, 
which lost in between 5 % or 1 % of votes during the last parliamentary 
election (F= 17.673; ρ = 0.018). This factor also resulted in quite 
noticeable effects on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electorates, 
competitors, campaign donors and party members as political sub-
markets, although the differences of magnitude of such effects between 
these parties are statistically insignificant. 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.286; ρ = 0.760), the media (F= 1.159; ρ = 0.367), 
competitors (F= 7.082; ρ = 0.021), campaign donators (F= 2.790; ρ = 0.128) and party’ 
members (F= 2.229; ρ = 0.178).  
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ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.286; ρ = 0.760), the media (F= 1.159; ρ = 0.367), 
competitors (F= 7.082; ρ = 0.021), campaign donators (F= 2.790; ρ = 0.128) and party’ 
members (F= 2.229; ρ = 0.178). 
 
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 1.747; ρ = 0.257), the media (F= 3.676; ρ = 0.048), 
competitors (F= 0.817; ρ = 0.530), campaign donators (F= 2.282; ρ = 0.179) and party’ 
members (F= 0.098; ρ = 0.958). 
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External Shock on Perceptions of Marketers/Campaigners 
of the Indonesian Political Parties Regarding the 
Importance of Political-Sub Markets during the 2014 
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Party experience with internal shock generated visible effects on 
perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of the electorates as a political sub-market (F= 9.145; ρ = 
0.016). As seen from figure 5.29, this factor also produced perceivable 
effects on the perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners 
regarding the importance of the media, competitors, campaign donors and 
party members as political sub-markets. The differences of magnitude of 
such effects between these parties, however, are statistically insignificant. 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 9.145; ρ = 0.016), the media (F= 0.001; ρ = 0.975), 
competitors (F= 0.763; ρ = 0.408), campaign donators (F= 0.082; ρ = 0.782) and party’ 
members (F= 2.119; ρ = 0.184). 
 
The survey data confirmed that the differences in numbers of 
Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners who considered the 
importance of these political sub-markets across the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential elections, as seen from figure 5.30, are visible. However, 
only the magnitude of the differences of numbers of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners who recognized the importance of the media, 
competitors and campaign donators, respectively, are statistically 
0.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
30.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
Political Parties, which Have no 
Experiences with Leadership 
Changes Before the Elections Being 
Held  
Political Parties, which experienced 
with leadership changes before the 
elections being held  
Figure 5.29: The Effects of Party Experience with the 
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significant (F= 12.938; ρ = 0.002; F= 33.965; ρ < 0.001; F= 36.825; ρ < 
0.001).  
 
ANOVA results: the electorates (F= 0.011; ρ = 0.917), the media (F= 12.938; ρ = 0.002), 
competitors (F= 33.965; ρ < 0.001), campaign donators (F= 36.825; ρ < 0.001) and party’ 
members (F= 0.698; ρ = 0.414). 
 
The survey data also revealed that these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners who realized the importance of these political sub-
markets within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election also 
perceived the importance of these political sub-markets within the specific 
context of the 2014 presidential election (Pearson correlation=0.873, ρ < 
0.001). Such perceptions were strongly related to the type of the election 
(Kendall’s Tau-b = 0.614, ρ = 0.015). Type of election generated 
substantial effects on such perceptions (t = 5.646, ρ < 0.001) and the 
magnitude of such effects are statistically significant (F = 31.877, df = 1, 9, 
with partial eta squared = 0.78). 
 
5.5. Conclusions. 
Points 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, delineated nomenclatures of 
political market arenas that took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia 
and statistical findings regarding the effects of party-specific factors on the 
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degree to which the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners 
perceived the importance of these political market arenas. The findings 
indicated that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary 
election, perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners related to 
the importance of: a) the media arena is significantly determined by party 
experience of internal shock; b) the electoral arena is significantly 
influenced by party position in the government; and c) parliamentary and 
governmental arenas are significantly defined by party position in the 
government and experience of external shock. Meanwhile, within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election, perceptions of these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of: a) the 
parliamentary arena is significantly controlled by party ideology and 
campaign resources; and b) the governmental arena is significantly 
affected by party experience of external shock. These demonstrate that 
party-specific factors generate visible effects on the perceptions of these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the electoral, 
the media and the parliamentary and governmental arenas. However, the 
magnitude of such effects is likely related with, but unlikely to be 
determined by type of the election.  
The findings displayed by these points not only validate, but also 
substantiate the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 63-64 2010: 28-29) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86). Such findings confirmed that the ideas of 
these authors seem quite workable in analysing such issues within the 
specific context of Indonesian politics. However, in a slightly different way 
from what these authors proposed, these findings validated the existence 
of a new type of political market arena, which is the governmental arena, 
in the new democracy of Indonesia. Such findings also exhibited that 
neither party-specific factors nor type of the election produce significant 
effects on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of these parties 
regarding the importance of the internal party arena. This evidences that 
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both party-specific factors and type of the election are unlikely to 
determine such perceptions.  
Meanwhile, points 5.2 and 5.4, respectively, charted nomenclatures 
of political sub-markets that took place Post-Soeharto New Order and 
findings regarding the effects of party-specific factors on the degree to 
which the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners perceived 
the importance of these political sub-markets. The findings demonstrated 
that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, 
perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of: a) campaign donors as a political sub-market is significantly 
determined by party ideology and campaign resources; b) the electorates 
and party members as political sub-markets are significantly influenced by 
party experience of internal shock. Meanwhile, within the specific context 
of the 2014 presidential election, perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of: a) competitors as a 
political sub-market is significantly controlled by party ideology and 
campaign resources; b) the electorate as a political sub-market is 
significantly defined by party experience of internal shock; and c) the 
media as political sub-markets is significantly affected by party experience 
of external shock. These indicate that party-specific factors generate 
perceivable effects on perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-
markets. But, the magnitude of such effects is likely to be determined by 
type of the election.  
The findings chronicled by these points not only validate, but also 
substantiate the ideas of Johansen (2012: 160-163), Lock and Harris 
(1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 
2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009). Though this 
evidenced that the ideas of these authors are quite applicable to analyse 
such issues within the specific context of Indonesian politics, these 
findings exhibited that nomenclatures of political sub-markets, which took 
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shape in the new democracy of Indonesia, and the degree to which these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners considered the importance of these 
political sub-markets and prioritized these political sub-markets within and 
across these elections, are quite different from what these authors 
theorized. These findings revealed that these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners strongly perceived the importance of the media 
and competitors as political sub-markets within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election, and recognized the importance of party 
members and campaign donors as political sub-markets within the specific 
context of the 2014 presidential election. Nonetheless, the degree to which 
they carried out such practices is unlikely to be determined by party-
specific factors.  
The findings reported by points 5.2 and 5.4 also confirmed that the 
degree to which these parties’ marketers/campaigners perceived the 
importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets are 
significantly related to type of the election. However, type of the election 
merely generates visible effects on the perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of political sub-markets. 
These validate that type of the election only generates significant effects 
on the perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners related to the 
importance of these political sub-markets. 
Based on such findings, this work argues that the following trends 
are likely to take shape in democratic countries that share similarities with 
Indonesian politics. Firstly, along with the electoral, internal party, the 
media and parliamentary arenas, the governmental arena is likely to exist 
in such countries. Secondly, characteristics of political sub-markets that 
existed in such countries are obviously different from nomenclatures of 
political sub-markets that took shape in the democratic countries that have 
been ruled under the parliamentary government system and indicated by 
the party-centred system. Thirdly, in such countries, perceptions of 
political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the 
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electoral, the media and the parliamentary and governmental arenas are 
unlikely to be influenced by either party size or party age category. 
Conversely, such perceptions are likely to be determined by party ideology, 
campaign resources, position in the government and experiences with 
internal and external shocks. Fourthly, in such countries, perceptions of 
political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these 
political sub-markets are unlikely to be affected by party size or age 
category. Such perceptions are otherwise likely to be defined by party 
position in the government, party ideology, campaign resources and 
experiences with internal and external shocks. Finally, in such countries, 
the degree to which these parties’ marketers/campaigners perceived the 
importance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets are 
likely to be related to type of the elections. However, type of the election 
merely generates visible effects on the perceptions of these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political sub-
markets. 
 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter chronicled nomenclatures of political market arenas 
and political sub-markets which took shape in the new democracy of 
Indonesia and displayed the effects of party-specific factors and the type 
of the election on perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of these political market 
arenas and political sub-markets. The ideas of Strömbäck (2007, 2010) 
and Strömbäck et al. (2012), Johansen (2012), Lock and Harris (1996), 
Kotler and Kotler (1999), Hughes and Dann (2009, 2012) and Ormrod 
(2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) and Ormrod (2005, 2007, and 2009) were 
adopted to evaluate such issues. The findings were reported and 
discussed and their knowledge contributions were highlighted as well. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE 
PRACTICES OF MARKETIZATION AND 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Chapter Overview 
It has been argued that parties and their candidates who 
strategically used the principles, techniques and procedures of marketing 
as ‘an organizational philosophy’ would be much more professionalized in 
campaigning (Newman, 1994, 1999a: x; Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 22; 
Lees-Marshment, 2008: 13 Lees-Marshment, 2010: 1-2). Having 
considered this proposition, the following authors formulated models of 
political marketing of political parties (Lees-Marshment’, 2001a, 2001b, 
2004, 2008; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Lilleker, et al., 2006; 
Lees-Marshment, et al., 2012), investigated market-orientation of political 
parties (Ormrod, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011; Ormrod and Savigny, 
2012) and market-orientation and strategic postures of political parties 
(Ormrod and Henneberg, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Ormrod, et al., 
2015) and explored the degree and process of professionalization in 
campaigning (Gibson and Römmele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; 
Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher et al., 2012; Tenscher and Mykkänen, 2013, 
2014). Indicators and measurements used to evaluate professionalization 
of campaigning of political parties have not yet been fully validated 
however (Mykkanen and Tenscher, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). 
Similarly, the relationships between marketization and professionalization 
also remained hypothetical (Strömbäck, 2007). Regarding such issues, 
this chapter adopted the ideas of these authors to formulate an integrated 
baseline and alternative structural models. These models were evaluated 
using the survey data gathered during the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections to holistically explore the structural elements that 
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constitute practices of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning of the Indonesian political parties (RO 3). 
 
6.1. Evaluations and Validations of the Measurements and 
Structural Components of the Baseline Structural Model. 
The following efforts were undertaken to evaluate and validate the 
measurements and structural components of the baseline structural 
model. A statistical descriptive approach of SPSS 23 was used to assess 
the normality of the survey data that capture indicators of variables, which 
construct this model. EFA and PCA were conducted to evaluate the 
measurement elements of this model. The algorithm, bootstrapping and 
blindfolding techniques procedures of PLS-SEM of Smart-PLS 3.0 were 
organized to examine indicators and measurements of the reflective and 
formative variables that construct this model and the structural elements of 
this model as well. Table 6.1 charts acronyms of variables applied in the 
statistical reports resulting from such approaches. Operationalization of 
such approaches and the findings generated by such approaches are 
detailed by subsequent points. 
Variables Acronyms 
Political Marketing-Orientation PMO 
Internal-Orientation IO 
Voter-Orientation VO 
Media-Orientation  MO 
Competitor-Orientation  CO 
Campaign Contributor-Orientation  CCO 
Professional-Campaign Engagement  PCE 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure PCS 
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy  PATS 
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy  PNS 
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy  PCPS 
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy  PNEMS 
Table 6.1: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural 
Model53 
                                                       
53 In the Appendix B, Table B.1-B.5, Indicators that construct each of these variables are 
charted as cardinal numbers next to these acronyms following EFA and PCA results. For 
example MO1 is used to represent the first indicator of Media-Orientation, while PCS 2 is 
deployed to represent the second indicator of professionalized-campaign structure.  
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6.1.1. Evaluations and Validations of the Measurement Elements of 
the Baseline Structural Model. 
These evaluations and validations were carried out through the 
following steps. Firstly, a statistical descriptive approach of SPSS 23 was 
deployed to assess the normality of the survey data that measure the 
indicators of variables, which construct this model. As I ran this, the work 
revealed that these data have Skewness values of no more than 1.5 and 
Kurtosis values no more than 2.0. This validates these data as sufficiently 
normal and statistically workable. Thus, they can be evaluated using 
following statistical approaches.  
Secondly, EFA and PCA approaches of SPSS 23 were applied to 
evaluate indicators used to evaluate each of the variables that construct 
this model. In this respect, EFA was conducted using the Maximum 
Likelihood Extraction Method, while PCA was carried out using Direct 
Oblimin Extraction Method with Kaiser Normalization and suppressing 
coefficients value at 0.3054. EFA and PCA results revealed that factors’ 
components of each of these variables overall, have sufficient loadings 
values. IO, as a single-item variable, is statistically workable to evaluate 
this model. Each of the total variances of VO, MO, CO, CCO, PCE, PATS, 
PNS, PCPS and PNEMS, which are explained by their own indicators, is 
statistically sufficient to formulate a reflective variable, but statistically 
insufficient to construct a formative variable. In contrast, each of the total 
variances of PMO and PCS, which are explained by their own indicators, 
is statistically sufficient to form a reflective variable, but statistically 
insufficient to create a formative variable. These results indicate that VO, 
MO, CO, CCO, PCE, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS are likely to take 
shape as reflective variables, while PMO and PCS are likely to take place 
as formative variables. These results also confirm that these variables are 
statistically plausible and practically workable to holistically explain the 
                                                       
54 This method is selected since this work assumed that each of indicators underlying 
these variables seem likely to be correlated with each other. EFA results are considered 
as initial estimations, while the PCA results as the final estimations. 
 
 
 
 
142 
structural elements that constitute practices of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties. Point 2.1 of 
Appendix B details these results.  
Thirdly, subsequent statistical methods of Smart-PLS 3.0 were 
deployed to evaluate the measurement elements of reflective variables 
that construct this model. Following the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 101-
107), this work used Fornell-Larcker criterion approach to evaluate the 
reflective variables that compose this model (VO, MO, CO, CCO, PCE, 
PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS). The statistical finding resulted in by this 
approach indicates that each of these variables is statistically reliable and 
valid. This finding also evidences that each of these variables are 
sufficiently convergent. Moreover, as with the ideas of Hair, et al. (2014: 
116-128), this work also employed the heterotrait-monotrait ratio of 
correlations (HTMT) approach to examine the internal consistency 
reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. The statistical 
finding generated by this approach confirms that each of these variables is 
internally and consistently reliable and convergent and has no substantial 
issue regarding the discriminant validity. This indicates that the set of 
indicators that construct each of these variables is statistically valid and 
convergent and practically reliable to measure and capture the ways 
political parties advanced market-orientation, engaged in having a 
professional-campaign and developing professionalized-campaign 
structure and audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, campaign 
personalisation and news and event management strategies. Appendix B, 
point 2.2, details these statistical findings. 
Fourthly, subsequent statistical methods of Smart-PLS 3.0 were 
also used to examine the measurement elements of formative variables 
that construct this model. Following the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 121-
122), this work deployed the redundancy analytical approach to examine 
the convergence validity of these variables. Moreover, as suggested by 
Hair et al. (2014: 125-127), this work employed the Variance Inflation 
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Factor (VIF) method to assess collinearity issues of indicators that 
constitute these variables. Additionally, based on the ideas of Hair et al. 
(2014: 128-132), this work applied the algorithm and bootstrapping 
methods to evaluate the outer weights significance of the indicators of 
these variables. The statistical results resulting from these methods 
revealed the following evidence. There were no substantial issues 
regarding collinearity and convergence validity of these variables. All 
indicators of PMO have outer weights, which are statistically significant. 
Most of the indicators of PCS have outer weights that are statistically 
significant as well. Such evidence indicates that both variables PMO and 
PCS did not suffer from collinearity and convergence validity issues. 
Indicators that construct PMO and components that constitute PCS are 
statistically plausible and practically workable to measure and capture the 
ways political parties developed practices of political marketing-orientation 
and professionalized-campaign structures. Appendix B, point 2.3, spells 
out these statistical results. 
 
6.1.2. Evaluation and Validation of Structural Elements that 
Construct the Baseline Structural Model  
Such evaluations and validations were conducted through the 
following steps. Firstly, this work, as suggested by Hair et al. (2014: 107-
116) used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method of Smart-PLS 3.0 to 
assess collinearity issues of variables that construct this model. Statistical 
results of this method revealed that this model did not suffer from any 
collinearity issues. This indicates that these variables are statistically 
reasonable and practically workable to evaluate practices of marketization 
and professionalization of political parties. Appendix B, point 2.4 details 
the statistical results resulting from this method.  
Secondly, this work used the algorithm and bootstrapping methods 
of Smart-PLS 3.0 to examine the structural model path coefficients values 
(β) of this model. Table 6.2 visualized by figure 6.1 details the statistical 
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results resulting from such methods. Such results indicate that variable 
‘political marketing-orientation’ is positively correlated with most of the low-
level variables that underlay practices of market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning. Most of the lower-level variables that 
construct variable ‘market-orientation’ are positively related with most of 
the low-level variables that constitute practices of professionalization of 
campaigning. Variables of ‘professional-campaign engagement’ and 
‘professionalized-campaign structure’ are positively associated with almost 
all variables that form practices of professionalized-campaign strategies. 
Having evaluated such evidences and considered the ideas of Chin (1998) 
and Hair et al. (2014: 107-116), this work argues that this model is 
theoretically reasonable and practically workable to capture and explore 
practices of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of 
political parties. 
Structural 
Relationships 
Path 
Coefficients 
(β) Value 
t value SL ρ value 90 % 
Confidence 
Intervals) 
PMOà IO 0.339 12.714 *** <0.001  (0.288, 0.391) 
PMOà VO 0.482 18.314 *** <0.001 (0.432, 0.529)  
PMOà CO 0.453 18.478 *** <0.001 (0.406, 0.498) 
PMOà MO 0.487 21.983 *** <0.001 (0.442, 0.528)  
PMOà CCO 0.162 6.222 *** <0.001 (0.109, 0.213) 
PMOà PCE 0.361 13.263 *** <0.001 (0.307, 0.413) 
PMOà PCS 0.113 4.414 *** <0.001 (0.068, 0.169)  
PMOà PATS 0.198 6.420 *** <0.001 (0.138, 0.253)  
PMOà PCPS 0.089 3.024 *** 0.003 (0.029, 0.143) 
PMOà PNS 0.048 1.467 NS 0.143 (-0.018, 0.116) 
PMOà 
PNEMS 
0.026 1.190 NS 0.235 (-0.020, 0.071)  
IOà PCE -0.075 3.309 *** 0.001 (-0.119, -0.030)  
IOàPCS -0.028 1.238 NS 0.216 (-0.073, 0.015) 
VOà PCE 0.169 6.425 *** <0.001 (0.119, 0.221)  
VOà PCS -0.006 0.325 NS 0.746 (-0.058, 0.040)  
COà PCE 0.077 3.181 *** 0.002 (0.031, 0.123)  
COàPCS 0.074 3.501 *** 0.001 (0.027, 0.113) 
MOà PCE 0.263 11.485 *** <0.001 (0.216, 0.307) 
MOà PCS 0.219 9.107 *** <0.001 (0.173, 0.268)  
CCOà PCE 0.023 1.088 NS 0.279 (-0.019, 0.066) 
CCOà PCS 0.208 10.840 *** <0.001 (0.169, 0.245) 
PCEà PCS 0.474 19.922 *** <0.001 (0.427, 0.520)   
PCEà PATS 0.339 8.657 *** <0.001 (0.264, 0.413)  
PCEà PNS -0.013 0.214 NS 0.831 (-0.096, 0.055)  
PCEà PCPS 0.346 9.916 *** <0.001 (0.271, 0.418)  
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PCEà PNEMS 0.277 7.654 *** <0.001 (0.206, 0.344)  
PCSà PATS 0.234 6.133 *** <0.001 (0.156, 0.305)  
PCSà PNS 0.378 9.630 *** <0.001 (0.311, 0.449)  
PCSà PCPS 0.351 9.427 *** <0.001 (0.280, 0.423)  
PCSà PNEMS 0.469 13.509 *** <0.001 (0.402, 0.536) 
Table 6.2: Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path 
Coefficients of the Baseline Structural Model55 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Evaluation Result that Visualizes The Baseline Structural 
Model with Path Coefficients (β) and R2 values 
                                                       
55 SL = Significance Levels; NS= Not Significant 
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Thirdly, based on the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this work 
assessed the coefficients determination (R2) values of variables that 
construct this model. In running this, this work revealed the following 
statistical results. As a predictor for the lower-level variables that compose 
a higher-level variable ‘market-orientation’, which are IO, VO, CO, MO and 
CCO, variable PMO produced weak R2 values. These values fall below 
the minimum threshold of R2 value highlighted by Hulland (1999), which is 
0.30; but, together with variables of IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO, these 
variables are actually good predictors for PCE and PCS. Moreover, as a 
predictor for PCE, these variables as a whole created R2 of value 0.441. 
Magnitude of this value, according to Hair et al. (2014: 186) is statistically 
moderate. More importantly, as a predictor for PCS, these variables led to 
a substantial R2 value, which is 0.626. These statistical results evidence 
that variables of ‘political marketing-orientation’ and ‘market-orientation’ 
are really relevant to assess ‘professional-campaign engagement’. 
Together with variable ‘professional-campaign engagement’, these 
variables are also really suitable to evaluate ‘professionalized-campaign 
structure’.  
Meanwhile, as a predictor for PNS, variables PMO, IO, VO, CO, 
MO, CCO, PCE and PCS produced low R2, which is 0.158. However, as 
predictors of PNEMS, PCPS and PATS, respectively, these variables 
yielded R2 values of 0.503, 0.494 and 0.451. Such values, according to 
the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), are statistically moderate. These 
indicate that variables of ‘political marketing-orientation’, ‘market-
orientation’, ‘professional-campaign engagement’ and ‘professionalized-
campaign structure’ are really relevant to evaluate professionalized-news 
and event management strategy’, ‘professionalized-campaign 
personalization strategy’ and ‘professionalized-audiences/electorates 
targeting strategy’. Nonetheless, these variables are little bit less feasible 
in explaining ‘professionalized-narrowcasting strategy’. 
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Fourthly, having considered the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this 
work also evaluated the effect size (f2) of variables that compose the 
baseline structural model and uncovered the following findings. As omitted 
from this model, PMO produced substantial effect sizes (f2) for MO, VO 
and CO, as indicated by f2 values of 0.31, 0.30 and 0.26, respectively. 
Moreover, exclusion of PMO from this model resulted in medium effect 
sizes (f2) for PCE and IO, as evidenced by their f2 values of 0.15 and 
0.13, respectively. Furthermore, elimination of PMO from this model 
carried out weak affect sizes (f2) for PCS, PATS, PCPS, PNS and 
PNEMS. These validate that variable ‘political marketing-orientation’ really 
took shape as an influential variable to explain the internal-orientation, 
media-orientation, voter-orientation and competitor-orientation and 
professional-campaign engagement. This variable however, seems being 
little bit less powerful to examine professionalized-campaign structure and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalisation, narrowcasting and news and event management 
strategies.  
Meanwhile, removal of MO from the structural path model resulted 
in slightly medium effect sizes (f2) for PCS and PCE, which are 0.085 and 
0.082, respectively. Moreover, as excluded from this model, CCO 
produced a slightly medium effect size (f2) for PCS and PCE. Additionally, 
elimination of VO, IO and CO from this model generated a quite weak 
effect sizes (f2) for PCE and PCS. This indicates that while variables of 
‘media-orientation’ and ‘campaign contributors-orientation’ take shape as 
quite influential variables, variables of ‘voters-orientation’, ‘internal-
orientation’ and ‘competitor-orientation’ take place as less powerful 
variables to evaluate professional-campaign engagement and campaign 
structures.  
In the meantime, elimination of PCE from this model generated a 
substantial effect size (f2) for PCS, as evidenced by its f2 value of 0.34. 
Moreover, exclusion of PCS from this model carried out a quite substantial 
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effect size (f2) for PNEMS, as validated by its f2 value of 0.21. However, 
removal of PCE from this model entailed quite weak effect sizes (f2) for 
PCPS, PATS, PNEMS and PNS and elimination of PCS from this model 
also entailed weak effect sizes for PCPS, PATS, PNEMS and PNS. These 
indicate that variable ‘professional-campaign engagement’ really takes 
place as a powerful variable to explain professionalized-campaign 
structure. Similarly, variable ‘professionalized-campaign structure’ is likely 
to take shape as an influential variable to explore professionalized-news 
and event management strategy. Variables of ‘professional-campaign 
engagement’ and ‘professionalized-campaign structure’ are a little bit less 
powerful in examining professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, 
narrowcasting, and news and event management and campaign 
personalisation strategies.  
Fifthly, this work also used a blindfolding technique of Smart-PLS 
3.0 to determine the predictive relevancies of the exogenous variables 
used in the baseline structural model to a particular endogenous variable 
(q2). The findings are summarized as follows. Predictive relevancies (q2) 
values assessments indicated that PMO has a slightly medium q2 for 
PATS and PCE. IO, VO, CO and CCO have slightly weak q2 value for 
PCE, PCS, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS, while MO has a slightly 
medium q2 for PCE and PCPS. PCE has a slightly medium q2 value for 
PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, while PCS has slightly medium q2 value 
for PATS, PNS and PCPS and PNEMS. Having evaluated such q2 values 
using the ideas of Hair et al. (2014: 186), this work proposes the following 
propositions. Political marketing-orientation is fairly suitable to predict 
professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy. Similarly, media-orientation is 
really relevant to predict professional-campaign engagement and 
campaign structure. However, internal-orientation, voter-orientation, 
competitor-orientation and campaign contributor-orientation are slightly 
less relevant to predict professionalized-campaign engagement and 
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campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, 
narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event 
management strategies. Professionalized-campaign engagement is quite 
relevant to predict professionalized-campaign structure and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, narrowcasting, 
campaign personalization and news and event management strategies, 
while professionalized-campaign structure are reasonably relevant to 
predict such strategies.  
Finally, this work also deployed that technique to evaluate the 
cross-validated redundancy measurements for each of endogenous 
variables that construct this model (Q2). These measurements resulted in 
Q2 values of more than 0. This evidences that each of these endogenous 
variables has predictive relevance for each of the endogenous variables of 
this model. This hints that the higher the likelihood of political parties to 
adopt political marketing-orientation, the much more likely these parties 
favoured advancing market-orientation. The higher the likelihood of these 
parties advanced market-orientation, the much more likely these parties 
preferred developing professionalization of campaigning. In other words, 
the greater the resources of political parties to adopt political marketing 
orientation and advance market-orientation, the much more likely these 
parties tend to be professionalized in campaigning.  
Further to this, this work also conducted the Importance-
Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) and revealed the subsequent 
findings. As seen from table 6.3, IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO resulted in 
weak total positive significant effects for PATS and PNS. Moreover, CCO, 
CO, IO and VO produced weak total positive significant effects on PCPS 
and created weak total positive significant effects for PCPS and PNEMS. 
Additionally, MO led to slightly moderate total positive significant effects on 
PCS and resulted in quite substantial total positive significant effects for 
PCPS and PNEMS. Overall, the lower-order variables that underlay 
‘market-orientation’ (IO, VO, CO, MO and CCO) had moderate and 
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substantial performances and a range of importance, which is spreading 
from less important to quite important. This indicates that these variables 
in general, are theoretically important to evaluate the ways and the degree 
to which political parties advanced and prioritized the structural elements 
that constitute practices of professionalization of campaigning. This also 
hints that the more political parties succeed in advancing market-
orientation, the much more likely these parties incline to be 
professionalized in campaigning. 
Target Variables  Importance-Performances Matrixes  
Professional-
Campaign 
Engagement 
 
Professionalized-
Campaign Structure 
 
Professionalized-
Audiences/Electorates 
Targeting Strategy 
 
Professionalized-
Narrowcasting 
Strategy 
 
Professionalized-
Campaign 
Personalization 
Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
151 
Professionalized-News 
and Event 
Management Strategy 
 
Table 6.3: Importance-Performance Matrixes of Variables Underlying 
Political Market-Orientation as a First-Order Formative Variable Used as a 
Predictor for Elements Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in 
the Baseline Structural Model 
 
Nonetheless, this work also assessed Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR) Common Factor Model values Composite Model 
of the baseline structural model using Smart-PLS 3.0. The first one is 
SRMR value that does not contain the measurement error variance, while 
the second one is SRMR value with the measurement error variance. 
Henseler et al. (2014) voiced that SRMR values provide estimations 
regarding the ‘average magnitude of the discrepancies between observed 
and expected correlations’. Such estimations need to be undertaken in 
order to get an absolute measure of fit criterion value of the structural 
elements of the structural model and to determine a goodness of fit 
measure of this model. The rule of thumb is ‘SRMR value less than 0.10 is 
considered a good fit’ (Henseler et al., 2014). The work revealed that the 
baseline structural model has SRMR Common Factor Model value of 
0.054 and t value 42.760 with p value < 0.001 and confidence interval of 
90 % (0.052, 0.057). This model possesses SRMR Composite Model 
value of 0.043 and t value 31.968 with p value < 0.001 and confidence 
interval of 90 % (0.041, 0.046). These findings, according to the ideas of 
Henseler et al. (2014), indicate that this model has no substantial reliability 
validity and collinearity issues. These findings also validate that Indicators 
and measurements used to capture and evaluate variables that constitute 
this model seem to be reliable and valid and these variables are 
statistically plausible and relevant and have no crucial validity and 
collinearity issues as well. Such evidence indicates that this model is really 
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a good fit model and as a baseline theoretical model, this model has 
sufficient predictive power and statistical plausibility. We could, therefore, 
deploy this model as a workable and practical baseline conceptual model, 
as we want to holistically evaluate practices of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning carried out by political parties in 
democratic countries, especially those sharing similarities with Indonesian 
politics. 
 
6.2. Preliminary Conclusions and Discussions 
Strömbäck (2007: 50) voiced that ‘the distinction between political 
marketing, market-orientation, and marketing techniques is also often 
blurred, resulting in a conceptual lack of clarity’. He also stated that 
‘political marketing and the professionalization of political campaigning 
should be viewed as two separate concepts, where both have implications 
for the planning and conduct of political campaigning, but where the 
concept of political marketing has much broader implications’ (Strömbäck, 
2007: 63). This work, as seen from figure 6.1 and table 6.2, revealed 
findings that confirmed that political marketing orientation, market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning clearly took place as 
separate concepts and have multi-layered elements. Such findings also 
indicated that political marketing-orientation not only produced significant 
effects on all the variables that constitute market-orientation, but also 
generated significant effects on most of variables that underlay 
professionalization of campaigning. These findings not only clearly 
validated Strömbäck’s (2007: 50) argument, but also obviously 
substantiated Strömbäck’s (2007: 63) proposition. 
Further to this, this work also uncovered that the relationships 
between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation 
and professionalization of campaigning likely exist and solidly manifest. 
Such relationships, as summarised by the subsequent points, however, 
seem to be much more complex rather than what Strömbäck (2007: 50, 
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63) proposed. As showcased previously by table 6.2 and figure 6.1, the 
directions of path coefficient (β) values of structural relationships between 
political marketing-orientation and the elements that underlie market-
orientation are positive and significant. Magnitudes of such values in 
general, are very substantial. However, the directions and magnitude of 
path coefficient (β) values of structural relationships between these 
elements and components that construct practices of professionalization 
of campaigning clearly vary 56 . Moreover, as predictors for these 
components, variables of internal-orientation, voter-orientation, competitor-
orientation and campaign contributors-orientation in general, had quite 
weak coefficients determination (R2) values. However, these variables 
together with variable political marketing-orientation, as predictors for 
these components, had substantial R2 value. Similarly, predictive 
relevancies values of these variables for these components are quite vary. 
Nonetheless, these variables in general, had moderate and substantial 
performances and a range of importance.  
This evidence clearly indicated that such relationships, in essence, 
are quite complex. This complexity is particularly seen from the variability 
of direction and magnitude of the effects of the components that underlay 
market-orientation on the elements that constitute professionalization of 
campaigning. This complexity is also obviously perceived from the 
heterogeneity of statistical powers of these components to predict such 
elements as well. Regarding such conditions, this work formulated an 
                                                       
56 As seen from table 6.2, three of such relationships (IO and PCE, IO and PCS and VO 
and PCE) have negative path coefficient (β) values. But, the rest of these relationships 
(VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and PCS, CCO and PCE 
and CCO and PCS) have positive path coefficient (β) values. Three of these relationships 
(IO and PCS, VO and PCS and CCO and PCS) have insignificant path coefficient (β) 
values. But, the rest of these relationships (IO and PCE, VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO 
and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and PCS, and CCO and PCS) have significant path 
coefficient (β) values. Four of such relationships (IO and PCE, IO and PCS, PCE and 
PNS and VO and PCS) have weak negative path coefficients (β) values. But, the rest of 
such relationships (VO and PCE, CO and PCE, CO and PCS, MO and PCE, MO and 
PCS, CCO and PCE and CCO and PCS) have positive path coefficients (β) values. 
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alternative and more parsimonious structural model and carried out a 
following additional PLS-SEM analysis to evaluate this model.  
 
6.3. Formulation and Evaluation of the Alternative Structural Model 
This work deployed the lower-level reflective variables of IO, VO, 
CO, MO and CCO to formulate a higher-order formative variable of 
political market-orientation. Along with the other variables used in the 
baseline structural model, this variable was deployed to construct the 
alternative structural model. Table 6.4 displays a set of acronyms of these 
variables used in the PLS-SEM reports. Following points report the 
findings. 
Variables Acronyms 
Political Marketing-Orientation PMOa 
Political Market-Orientation PMOb 
Professional-Campaign Engagement PCE 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure PCS 
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy  PATS 
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy  PCS 
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy  PCPS 
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy  PNEMS 
Table 6.4: Acronyms of the Variables that Construct the Alternative 
Structural Model 
 
Firstly, evaluation results of measurement elements of this model 
indicate that this model has no crucial issues related with the internal 
consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity of 
reflective constructs and the convergence validity, collinearity issues and 
the significance and relevance of the indicators of formative constructs. 
Moreover, evaluation results of structural elements of this model 
demonstrate that this model has no significant collinearity issue. 
Additionally, evaluation results of path coefficient (β) values of such 
elements validate the existences of relationships between such elements. 
In this respect, PMOa is significantly correlated with and generates 
substantial effects on PMOb, PCE, PCS, PATS and PCPS. However, as 
displayed by table 6.5 and figure 6.2, PMOa is insignificantly associated 
with and produces less significant effects on PNS and PNEMS. PMOb is 
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significantly related with and carries out substantial effects on PCE and 
PCS. PCE is significantly related with and leads to substantial effects on 
PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, while PCS is significantly related with 
and produces strong significant effects on PATS, PNS, PCPS and 
PNEMS; but, PCE is insignificantly related with and generates insignificant 
effects on PNS. Such findings confirm that reflective variables that 
construct this model did not suffer from the internal consistency reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity issues. Formative variables 
that form this model did not have substantial issues regarding the 
convergence validity, collinearity issues and the significance and 
relevance of their own indicators as well. More importantly, the 
relationships between these variables in general, are positive, strong and 
statistically significant. These validate that this model is theoretically 
reasonable and practically workable to capture and explore practices of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of political parties. 
Structural 
Relationships 
Path 
Coefficients 
(β) Value 
t value SL ρ value 90 % Confidence 
Intervals) 
PMOaà PMOb 0.570 26.994 *** <0.001  (0.526, 0.607) 
PMOaà PCE 0.373 14.332 *** <0.001 (0.318, 0.419) 
PMOaà PCS 0.096 3.821 *** <0.001 (0.046, 0.149)  
PMOaà PATS 0.184 5.742 *** <0.001 (0.113, 0.243)  
PMOaà PCPS 0.092 3.193 *** 0.001 (0.035, 0.144) 
PMOaà PNS 0.035 1.112 NS 0.262 (-0.023, 0.095) 
PMOaà PNEMS 0.024 0.887 NS 0.376 (-0.026, 0.073)  
PMObàPCE 0.373 14.332 *** <0.001 (0.324, 0.427) 
PMObàPCS 0.334 12.317 *** <0.001 (0.284, 0.385) 
PCEà PCS 0.466 17.399 *** <0.001 (0.410, 0.516)   
PCEà PATS 0.330 8.471 *** <0.001 (0.256, 0.408)  
PCEà PNS 0.011 0.366 NS  0.715 (-0.065, 0.087)  
PCEà PCPS 0.327 8.776 *** <0.001 (0.249, 0.404)  
PCEà PNEMS 0.304 8.964 *** <0.001 (0.235, 0.368)  
PCSà PATS 0.260 6.433 *** <0.001 (0.185, 0.337)  
PCSà PNS 0.355 8.706 *** <0.001 (0.279, 0.432)  
PCSà PCPS 0.372 9.952 *** <0.001 (0.296, 0.441)  
PCSà PNEMS 0.500 16.163 *** <0.001 (0.434, 0.556) 
Table 6.5: Significance Testing Results of Structural Model Path 
Coefficients of the Variables of the Alternative Structural Model (Political 
Market-Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable)57 
                                                       
57 SL = Significance Levels NS= Not Significant 
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Figure 6.2: Evaluation Result that Visualizes the Alternative Structural 
Model with Path Coefficients Values (β) and Path Coefficient 
Determinations (R2 values) 
 
Secondly, this work revealed that the use of market-orientation, as 
a second-order variable, to predict the components that underlay 
professionalization of campaigning, led to moderate changes in the 
coefficients determination (R2) values. In this respect, all exogenous 
variables in this model, which predict variable PCS, resulted in R2 value of 
0.608. As compared to its R2 value in the baseline structural model, its R2 
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value in the alternative structural model was little bit smaller. All 
exogenous variables in this model that predict PNS produced R2 value of 
0.145. Similarly, this value was slightly smaller, as compared to R2 value 
of this variable in the baseline structural model; but, PCE, as an 
endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model, 
had R2 value of 437. This value was slightly higher, as compared to R2 
values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PNEMS, as an 
endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model, 
had R2 value of 0.582. This value is quite bigger, as compared to R2 
values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PCPS as an 
endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variables in this model 
also had R2 value of 0.501. This value was slightly larger, as compared to 
R2 values of this variable in the baseline structural model. PATS, as an 
endogenous variable predicted by all exogenous variable in this model, 
had R2 value of 0.456. This value was larger, as compared to R2 value of 
this variable in the baseline structural model. These findings indicate that 
reformulation of market-orientation, as a second-order/higher-level 
formative variable, is likely to reduce the level of its relevancy to predict 
both professionalized-campaign structure and narrowcasting strategies. 
However, this reformulation is likely to elevate the level of its relevancy to 
predict professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalisation and news and 
event management strategies. 
Thirdly, this work also uncovered that market-orientation (PMOb) as 
a set of practices resulted in visible total and indirect effects on the lower-
level variables that construct practices of professionalization of 
campaigning (PCE, PCS, PATS, PNS, PCPS and PNEMS. As seen from 
table 6.6, PMOb generated visible total and indirect effects on these 
variables. Such effects stretch from moderate to very weak. PMOb also 
produced moderate total direct effects on PCE, PCS, PATS, PCPS and 
PNEMS, but weak total direct effects on PNS. PMOb led to moderate total 
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indirect effects on PCS, PATS, PCPS and PNEMS, but weak total indirect 
effects on PNS. These findings indicate that market-orientation, as a 
second-order/higher-level variable, is likely to generate moderate total 
direct and indirect effects on professional-campaign engagement, 
professionalized-campaign structure and developing professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and 
event management strategies. This validates the view that a high 
adaptation of market-orientation really propels political parties in tending to 
be much more professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and such 
campaign strategies. 
 Path 
Coefficients 
(β) Value 
t value SL ρ value 90 % 
Confidence 
Intervals) 
Total Effects      
PMObà PCE 0.373 14.332 *** <0.001  (0.324, 0.427) 
PMObàPCS 0.508 19.460 *** <0.001 (0.458, 0.560) 
PMObàPATS 0.255 12.941 *** <0.001 (0.221, 0.295) 
PMObàPCPS 0.311 14.342 *** <0.001 (0.270, 0.356) 
PMObàPNS 0.185 9.558 *** <0.001 (0.151, 0.225) 
PMObàPNEMS 0.367 17.111 *** <0.001 (0.327, 0.408) 
Indirect Effects      
PMObàPCS 0.174 11.303 *** <0.001 (0.146, 0.204) 
PMObàPATS 0.255 19.941 *** <0.001 (0.221, 0.295) 
PMObàPCPS 0.311 14.342 *** <0.001 (0.270, 0.356) 
PMObàPNS 0.185 9.558 *** <0.001 (0.151, 0.225) 
PMObàPNEMS 0.367 17.111 *** <0.001 (0.327, 0.408) 
Table 6.6: Total and Indirect Effects of Political Market-Orientation (as a 
Second-Order Formative Variable in the Alternative Structural Model) on 
The Low-Level Variables Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning58 
 
Finally, this work also found that all exogenous variables that 
construct this model, as predictors for each of endogenous variable that 
form this model, had Q2 value more than 0. This indicates that these 
endogenous variables have predictive relevance to predict each of these 
endogenous variables. This suggests that the bigger the resources of 
political parties to strategically adopt political marketing-orientation and 
advance market-orientation, the much more likely these parties incline to 
be professionalized in campaigning. 
                                                       
58 SL = Significance Levels 
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This work also conducted the Importance-Performance Matric 
Analysis (IPMA) and found the subsequent findings. Firstly, market-
orientation, as a second-order/higher-level formative variable used to 
predict elements that constitute professionalization of campaigning, has a 
range of importance values, which stretch from less important to quite 
important. As seen from table 6.7, this variable leads to moderate total 
positive significant effects on professional-campaign engagement and 
professionalized-campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, 
campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. 
However, it generates weak total positive significant effects on 
professionalized-narrowcasting strategy. This demonstrates that political 
parties, which favoured advancing market-orientation, are likely to engage 
in having a professional-campaign and prefer developing professionalized-
campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, 
campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. 
This indicates that the higher the likeliness of political parties to 
strategically advance market-orientation, the much more likely these 
parties tend to be professionalized in terms of campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and 
event management strategies.  
Secondly, market-orientation, as a predictive variable for elements 
that underlay professionalization of campaigning, had slightly substantial 
performances. This point is summarized as follows. This variable is less 
powerful and applicable to predict professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy. Nonetheless, this variable is really robust and relevant to assess 
professional-campaign engagement and campaign structure and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalization and news and event management strategies. This 
validates variable market-orientation as quite less relevant and workable 
to evaluate the ways and the degree to which political parties advanced 
professionalized-campaign strategy. However, this variable is reasonably 
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and practically workable to examine the ways and the degree to which 
political parties engaged in having a professional-campaign and advanced 
and prioritized professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting, campaign personalization and news and 
event management strategies. 
Target Variables  The Importance-Performance Matrixes  
Professional-
Campaign 
Engagement 
 
Professionalized-
Campaign Structure 
 
Professionalized-
Audiences/Electorates 
Targeting Strategy 
 
Professionalized-
Narrowcasting 
Strategy 
 
Professionalized-
Campaign 
Personalization 
Strategy 
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Professionalized-News 
and Event 
Management Strategy 
 
Table 6.7: Importance-Performance Matrixes of Political Market-
Orientation as a Second-Order Formative Variable Used as a Predictor for 
Elements Underlying Professionalization of Campaigning in the Alternative 
Structural Model 
 
Nonetheless, this work also assessed Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR) Common Factor Model values Composite Model 
of this model and revealed the following findings. This model has SRMR 
Composite Model value of 0.057 with t value of 35.559 and ρ > 0.001 and 
Common Factor Model value of 0.041 with t value of 25.098 and ρ > 
0.001. Having considered that these SRMR Composite Model and 
Common Factor values of this model are less than 0.10, this work 
confirmed that this model is a good fit model and has statistical plausibility. 
This validates this model as a really a workable model. This model is 
much more parsimonious, powerful and practical, as compared to the 
baseline structural model charted previously by figure 6.1. We could, 
therefore, use this model, as we want to systematically and holistically 
capture and explore practices of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning advanced by political parties within and across democratic 
countries, particularly those that share similarities with Indonesian politics, 
within the specific contexts of the elections.  
 
6.4. Final Conclusions. 
Based on such findings, this work highlighted the following 
conclusions. Strömbäck (2007: 58) argued that ‘under certain 
circumstances, being market oriented might facilitate the efforts of running 
more professionalized campaigns’. The findings indicated that regardless 
of the party-specific factors, political parties in the new democracy of 
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Indonesia in general, favoured adopting the marketing concepts, 
procedures and techniques as an organisational strategy to address 
diverse political sub-markets and to advance practices of 
professionalization of campaigning in facing the parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Though lacking discussing of such ‘certain 
circumstances’, the findings, as showcased by figure 6.1 and table 6.2, 
clearly evidenced that the attitudinal orientations of these parties regarding 
these political sub-markets generated substantial structural effects on the 
ways and the degree to which these parties developed such practices 
strategically. The findings hinted that the more these parties considered 
voters-, competitor-, media- and campaign contributor-orientations, the 
more likely these parties engaged in having a professional-campaign and 
advancing a professionalized-campaign structure. The more these parties 
engaged on having a professional-campaign, the more likely these parties 
upgraded a professionalized-campaign structure. The more these parties 
preferred having a professional-campaign and developing a 
professionalized-campaign structure, the more likely these parties 
established professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalization and news and event management strategies. The more 
these parties favoured establishing a professionalized-campaign structure, 
the more likely these parties set up a professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy. 
The findings also confirmed that the relationships between 
concepts and practices of market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning were likely to exist. Table 6.2 visualized by figure 6.1 clearly 
indicated that adoption of a political marketing-orientation significantly 
influences adoption of the majority of the structural elements of a market-
orientation and professional campaign. Two main components of market-
orientation, a competitor-orientation and a media-orientation, significantly 
determine professional-campaign engagement and having a 
professionalized campaign structure. Voter-orientation shows significant 
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effects on adopting a professional-campaign, while a campaign 
contributors-orientation results in significant effects on professionalized-
campaign structure. Similarly, figure 6.2 and table 6.5 also obviously 
exhibited that adaptation of a professional-campaign is correlated with 
advancements of professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, 
campaign personalization and news and event management strategies. 
Correspondingly, adopting a professionalized-campaign structure is shown 
to be significant for adopting professionalized-audiences/electorates 
targeting, narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and event 
management strategies. In other words, having successfully established a 
professionalized-campaign structure, political parties tend to be 
professionalized in terms of targeting electorates/voters, developing 
narrowcasting messages and a personalized campaign style and 
broadcasting such messages through various media outlets. Therefore, 
adopting a political marketing orientation leads directly to moving towards 
the adoption of a full market-orientation and having a professional 
campaign in terms of structure and strategy.  
These findings evidence that a political marketing orientation really 
emerges as the most influential campaign paradigm (Strömbäck, 2007: 
49) that determines the modes of marketization and professionalization, 
and the degrees of market-orientation and professionalized-campaign 
adopted by political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63). This demonstrates 
that the political marketing orientation, market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning are not, in reality, separate concepts 
and practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 50); rather that there are interdependent 
relationships between structural elements that constitute such concepts 
and practices, as displayed by the baseline structural and the alternative 
structural models. The data substantiates the arguments of Strömbäck 
(2007: 64), Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-26) and Tenscher et al. 
(2015: 113). More importantly, it validates the view that integrating these 
concepts and practices into a single model allows researchers to 
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systematically and holistically capture and understand how political parties 
develop such practices within and across the elections. 
 
6.5. Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the baseline and the alternative 
structural models using the survey data collected during the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections. To evaluate the measurements 
and structural components of these models, this chapter evaluated the 
normality of the survey data and organized EFA and PCA of SPSS 23 and 
algorithm, bootstrapping and blindfolding procedures of PLS-SEM of 
Smart-PLS 3.0. Such efforts were taken to holistically evaluate the 
structural elements that constitute practices of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties and 
explore the relationships between such elements. The research findings 
were displayed and discussed. The research conclusions were highlighted 
as well. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES’ 
MARKETERS/CAMPAIGNERS, LEADERS AND 
CANDIDATES REGARDING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
OF POLITICAL MARKET ARENAS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
ON MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
CAMPAIGNING OF THESE PARTIES 
 
Chapter Overview 
Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 
83-84) argued that the degree to which political parties realized the 
relative importance and relevance of political market arenas determines a 
choice (that has to be) made by such parties to advance market-
orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning. However, since an 
appropriate analytical framework needed to evaluate this proposition has 
been under-developed (Strömbäck, 2007: 64-65), we lacked knowledge 
regarding the effects of perceptions of political parties in the emerging 
democracies regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the 
media and electoral arenas in the ways and the degree to which these 
parties advanced such practices within the specific context of the 
elections. Having regarded such conditions, I formulated this framework 
and deployed the survey data collected from these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners during the 2014 parliamentary and the presidential 
elections and the in-depth interview data gathered from these parties’ 
leaders/secretaries, candidates and professionals and political 
pollsters/consultants to capture and explore this issue within the specific 
context of Indonesian politics during these elections (RO 4). Point 7.1 
spelled out the formulation and evaluation of this framework. Points 7.2-
7.3 displayed operationalization of this framework and reported the 
quantitative and qualitative findings, respectively. Subsequently, point 7.4 
discussed these findings and highlighted the research conclusions and its 
knowledge contributions. 
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7.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An 
Analytical Framework 
This analytical framework was developed as follows. Firstly, this 
work transformed the survey data collected during these elections, which 
measure perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners related to the relative importance of the internal 
party, the media and electoral arenas, into categorical moderator-grouping 
variables through the following procedures. Such perceptions were 
originally coded using Likerts’ scales stretching from 1 (not important at 
all) to 5  (very important). Respondents who responded 1, 2 and 3 are 
grouped into group 1, while respondents who answered 4 and 5, 
respectively, are categorized into groups 2 and 3. These respondents 
were also classified based on the type of the election wherein they were 
being interviewed. Having run such procedures, this work finally generated 
18 groups of samples. As charted by the following table 7.1, these groups 
were used to evaluate the following dummy models 1a-9a and 1b-9b. 
Each of these models incorporates more than 180 cases/samples. This 
condition meets the rule of thumb of the minimum sample size of PLS-
SEM (Hair et al., 2013: 2-3; Hair, 2014: 23-24).  
Perceptions of 
Marketers/Campaigners of Political 
Parties Regarding the Relative 
Importance of the Internal Party, the 
Media and Electoral Arenas as 
Categorical Moderator-Grouping 
variables 
The 2014 
Parliamentary Election 
The 2014 
Presidential Election 
Dummy 
Models 
Total 
Sample 
Dummy 
Models 
Total 
Sample 
Internal party arena is not important 
at all - neither important nor 
unimportant 
Model 1a 233 Model 1b 255 
The internal party arena is important  Model 2a 264 Model 2b 234 
The internal party arena is very 
important 
Model 3a 220 Model 3c 228 
The media arena is not important at 
all - neither important nor 
unimportant 
Model 4a 235 Model 4b 192 
The media arena is important Model 5a 258 Model 5b 219 
The media arena is very important Model 6a 224 Model 6b 306 
The electoral arena is not important 
at all - neither important nor 
unimportant 
Model 7a 191 Model 7b 184 
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The electoral arena is important Model 8a 254 Model 8b 230 
The electoral arena is very important Model 9a 270 Model 9b 303 
Table 7.1: Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b 
 
Secondly, this work evaluated Standard Mean Root Square 
(SRMR) Common Factor Model and Composite Model values of these 
models to ensure that these dummy models have statistical power. Table 
7.2 demonstrates that each of these dummy models, except for Model 3a 
and Model 3b, have SRMR Common Factor Model and SRMR Composite 
less than 0.10. Following Henseler et al.’ (2014) idea, this work confirmed 
that each of these models is a good fit model and has sufficient statistical 
power.  
Model SRMR Common 
Factor Model 
Confidence 
Interval of 95 
% 
SRMR Composite 
Model 
Confidence 
Interval of 95 % 
Model 1a 0.087 (0.079, 0.096) 0.073 (0.066, 0.082) 
Model 1b 0.081 (0.074, 0.090) 0.068 (0.061, 0.076) 
Model 2a 0.086 (0.078, 0.094) 0.070 (0.063, 0.078) 
Model 2b 0.090 (0.080, 0.105) 0.075 (0.065, 0.087) 
Model 3a 0.102 (0.093, 0.115) 0.064 (0.074, 0.095) 
Model 3b 0.103 (0.092, 0.117) 0.083 (0.072, 0.098) 
Model 4a 0.093 (0.084, 0.103) 0.077 (0.069, 0.086) 
Model 4b 0.088 (0.080, 0.101) 0.076 (0.068, 0.087) 
Model 5a 0.088 (0.081, 0.097) 0.072 (0.066, 0.081) 
Model 5b 0.094 (0.084, 0.105) 0.079 (0.070, 0.088) 
Model 6a 0.098 (0.089, 0.109) 0.081 (0.072, 0.091) 
Model 6b 0.094 (0.086, 0.104) 0.075 (0.067, 0.084) 
Model 7a 0.095 (0.085, 0.107) 0.082 (0.073, 0.093) 
Model 7b 0.097 (0.086, 0.111) 0.083 (0.073, 0.096) 
Model 8a 0.093 (0.085, 0.102) 0.075 (0.067, 0.084) 
Model 8b 0.094 (0.084, 0.105) 0.078 (0.068, 0.089) 
Model 9a 0.095 (0.087, 0.105) 0.077 (0.069, 0.087) 
Model 9b 0.093 (0.085, 0.101) 0.075 (0.068, 0.084) 
Table 7.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model 
and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b 
 
The following table 7.3 displays acronyms of variables that 
construct the baseline model and are used in PLS-MGA reports. In these 
reports, β (path coefficients) values differences with ρ < 0.05, and ρ > 0.95 
indicate that such differences are statistically significant59. 
                                                       
59 The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in 
the first dummy model is significantly smaller, as compared to the structural path model 
value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural 
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Variables Acronyms 
Political Marketing-Orientation PMOa 
Political Market-Orientation PMOb 
Professional-Campaign Engagement PCE 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure PCS 
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy PATS 
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy PCS 
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy PCPS 
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy PNEMS 
Table 7.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and 
Used in the PLS-SEM reports of the Dummy Models 1a-9a and 1b-9b 
 
7.2. The Quantitative Findings 
Having evaluated these models using PLS-MGA, this work revealed 
the following findings.  
 
7.2.1. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners 
Regarding the Relative Importance of Internal Party Arena on 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the 
Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections 
These perceptions led to significant effects of professional-
campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure in Models 
2a and 3a. As seen from table 7.4, this effect in Model 2a is significantly 
smaller. Such perceptions also resulted in significant effects of 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event 
management strategy in Models 1a and 3a. This effect in Model 1a is 
significantly smaller. These findings indicate that within the specific context 
of the 2014 parliamentary election: political parties whose 
marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is important are much 
more professionalized, in term of campaign structure, compared to political 
parties whose marketers/campaigners who noticed that this arena is less, 
not and unimportant at all. However, as compared to the first one, political 
parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived that this arena is very 
                                                                                                                                                       
path model value in the first dummy model of is significantly larger as compared to the 
structural path model value in the second dummy model. 
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important are much more professionalized, in terms of campaign structure 
and news and event management strategy. 
Path Models Model 1a Vs. Model 
2a 
Model 1a Vs. Model 
3a 
Model 2a Vs. Model 
3a 
β Values 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β Values 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β Values 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.001 0.508 0.138 0.218 0.137 0.220 
PMOaàPCE 0.002 0.508 0.077 0.218 0.079 0.220 
PMOaàPATS 0.127 0.092 - - 
PMObàPCE 0.129 0.069 0.083 0.177 0.046 0.700 
PMObàPCS 0.097 0.128 0.078 0.221 0.018 0.574 
PCEàPCS 0.098 0.860 0.152 0.077 0.250 0.003 
PCEàPATS 0.133 0.869 0.153 0.882 0.020 0.571 
PCEàPCPS 0.145 0.905 0.075 0.741 0.070 0.263 
PCEàPNEMS 0.110 0.873 0.105 0.842 0.006 0.482 
PCSàPCPS 0.066 0.291 0.105 0.208 0.039 0.382 
PCSàPNS 0.170 0.098 - - 
PCSàPNEMS 0.090 0.152 0.241 0.007 0.151 0.063 
Table 7.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 1a Vs. Model 2a, Model 1a Vs. 
Model 3a and Model 2a Vs. Model 3a 
 
Such perceptions also generated significant effects of political 
market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 1b 
and 2b. As seen from table 7.5, this effect is significantly smaller for Model 
1b. Such perceptions also resulted in significant effects of: a) political 
marketing-orientation on political market-orientation and professional-
campaign engagement; and b) political market-orientation on professional-
campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure in Models 
1b and 3b. Such effects in Model 1b are significantly smaller. Such 
perceptions also created significant effects of: a) political marketing-
orientation on political market-orientation and professional-campaign 
engagement; b) political market-orientation on professional-campaign 
engagement and professionalized-campaign structure; and c) 
professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
structure in Models 2b and 3b. Such effects in Model 2b are significantly 
smaller. These findings indicate that within the specific contexts of the 
2014 presidential election: political parties whose marketers/campaigners 
considered that this arena is important are much more market-orientated 
and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure and news and event 
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management strategy, as compared to political parties whose 
marketers/campaigners who realized that this arena is less, not and 
unimportant at all. However, as compared to these parties, political parties 
whose marketers/campaigners accounted for this arena as very important 
are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms of 
campaign structure and professionalized-news and event management 
and narrowcasting strategies.  
Path Models Model 1b Vs. Model 
2b 
Model 1b Vs. Model 
3b 
Model 2b Vs. Model 
3b 
β Values 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β Values 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.009 0.552 0.136 0.043 0.145 0.033 
PMOaàPCE 0.065 0.735 0.161 0.049 0.226 0.012 
PMOaàPCS - - 0.143 0.918 
PMOaàPATS 0.030 0.607 - - 
PMObàPCE 0.212 0.017 0.087 0.175 0.125 0.912 
PMObàPCS 0.063 0.241 0.189 0.026 0.127 0.096 
PCEàPCS 0.049 0.674 0.138 0.098 0.187 0.017 
PCEàPATS 0.085 0.773 0.087 0.764 0.002 0.507 
PCEàPCPS 0.077 0.738 0.041 0.643 0.036 0.359 
PCEàPNS - - - 
PCEàPNEMS 0.014 0.457 0.023 0.585 0.037 0.650 
PCSàPATS 0.122 0.145 0.071 0.281 0.051 0.674 
PCSàPCPS 0.022 0.421 0.107 0.173 0.084 0.227 
PCSàPNS 0.004 0.480 0.316 0.014 0.312 0.004 
PCSàPNEMS 0.109 0.155 0.214 0.017 0.105 0.150 
Table 7.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 1b Vs. Model 2b, Model 1b Vs. 
Model 3b and Model 2b Vs. Model 3b 
 
7.2.2. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners 
Regarding the Relative Importance of the Media Arena on 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of the 
Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections 
These perceptions led to significant effects of political market-
orientation on professionalized-campaign engagement in Models 4a and 
5a. As seen from table 7.6, this effect in Model 5a is significantly larger. 
They also generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation 
on political market-orientation; b) professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-news and event 
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management strategy; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in Models 4a and 6a. Such effects 
in Model 4a are significantly smaller. They also produced significant 
effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation 
and professional-campaign engagement; b) professional-campaign 
engagement on professionalized-campaign structure; and c) 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy in Models 5a and 6a. Such effects in Model 5a are significantly 
smaller. They also resulted in significant effects of political market-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these models. This 
effect in Model 5a is significantly larger. They also led to significant effects 
of: a) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
structure; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
narrowcasting strategy and professionalized-news and event management 
strategy in Models 4b and 6b. As seen from table 7.7, such effects in 
Model 6b are significantly larger. They also created significant effects of 
political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in 
Models 4b and 5b. This effect in Model 5b is significantly larger. They also 
resulted in significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models; 
but, this effect in Model 5b is significantly smaller. They also generated 
significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 5b and 
6b. This effect in Model 6b is significantly larger. 
Path Models Model 4a Vs. Model 
5a 
Model 4a Vs. Model 
6a 
Model 5a Vs. Model 
6a 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.018 0.603 0.134 0.047 0.152 0.033 
PMOaàPCE 0.141 0.927 0.094 0.178 0.235 0.011 
PMOaàPATS 0.079 0.781 - - 
PMObàPCE 0.237 0.006 0.000 0.498 0.237 0.996 
PMObàPCS 0.055 0.256 0.030 0.378 0.025 0.593 
PCEàPCS 0.057 0.738 0.158 0.046 0.215 0.006 
PCEàPATS 0.009 0.476 0.080 0.723 0.088 0.766 
PCEàPCPS 0.071 0.732 0.005 0.522 0.065 0.253 
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PCEàPNS - - - 
PCEàPNEMS 0.030 0.605 0.155 0.048 0.126 0.899 
PCSàPATS 0.047 0.342 0.143 0.162 0.097 0.243 
PCSàPCPS 0.083 0.232 0.056 0.673 0.140 0.895 
PCSàPNS 0.094 0.767 0.396 0.003 0.490 0.000 
PCSàPNEMS 0.028 0.389 0.076 0.219 0.048 0.308 
Table 7.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 4a Vs. Model 5a, Model 4a Vs. 
Model 6a and Model 5a Vs. Model 6a 
  
Path Models Model 4b Vs. Model 
5b 
Model 4b Vs. Model 
6b 
Model 5b Vs. Model 
6b 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.018 0.403 0.094 0.129 0.076 0.187 
PMOaàPCE 0.032 0.636 0.125 0.097 0.157 0.060 
PMOaàPCS 0.017 0.571 0.129 0.878 0.112 0.837 
PMOaàPATS 0.064 0.267 - - 
PMObàPCE 0.161 0.036 0.209 0.288 0.112 0.878 
PMObàPCS 0.037 0.668 0.049 0.318 0.085 0.219 
PCEàPCS 0.085 0.189 0.048 0.025 0.124 0.124 
PCEàPATS 0.187 0.960 0.072 0.727 0.115 0.155 
PCEàPCPS 0.136 0.902 0.003 0.486 0.138 0.108 
PCEàPNEMS 0.014 0.557 0.006 0.523 0.008 0.468 
PCSàPATS 0.174 0.071 0.014 0.459 0.160 0.890 
PCSàPCPS 0.045 0.340 0.002 0.513 0.048 0.654 
PCSàPNS 0.138 0.156 0.296 0.012 0.158 0.126 
PCSàPNEMS 0.041 0.323 0.296 0.027 0.166 0.049 
Table 7.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 4b Vs. Model 5b, Model 4b Vs. 
Model 6b and Model 5b Vs. Model 6b 
 
These findings indicate that within the specific contexts of either the 
2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, such perceptions 
generated significant effects on the ways and the degree to which these 
parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning. Within these elections, political parties whose 
marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is important are much 
more market-orientated and engaged in having a professional campaign, 
as compared to political parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived 
that this arena is less, not and unimportant at all. However, as compared 
to these parties, political parties whose marketers/campaigners noticed 
that this arena is very important are much more market-orientated and 
professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, news and event 
management and narrowcasting strategies.  
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7.2.3. The Effects of Perceptions of Party Marketers/Campaigners 
Regarding the Relative Importance of the Internal Party Arena 
on Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of 
the Indonesian Political Parties Within the 2014 Parliamentary 
and Presidential Elections 
These perceptions led to significant effects of political market-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 7a and 8a. 
As seen from table 7.8, this effect in Model 7a is significantly smaller. They 
also generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on 
political market-orientation; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-campaign personalization strategy in Models 7a and 9a. 
These effects in Model 7a are significantly smaller. They also resulted in 
significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-narrowcasting strategy in these models. This effect in 
Model 7a is significantly larger. They also produced significant effects of: 
a) political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; b) 
professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
structure; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
news and event management strategy in Models 8a and 9a. Such effects 
in Model 8a are significantly smaller. They also created significant effects 
of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 8a is significantly larger. 
These findings indicate that, within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election, political parties whose marketers/campaigners 
noticed that this arena is important are much more market-orientated and 
engaged in having a professional campaign, as compared to political 
parties whose marketers/campaigners realized that this arena is less, not 
and unimportant at all. However, as compared to these parties, political 
parties whose marketers/campaigners perceived that this arena is very 
important are much more market-orientated and professionalized, in terms 
of campaign structure and campaign personalisation strategy.  
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Such perceptions also generated significant effects of: a) political 
market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement; b) 
professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
structure; and c) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
narrowcasting and professionalized-news and event management 
strategies in Models 7b and 9b. As seen from table 7.9, such effects in 
Model 7b are significantly smaller. They also resulted in significant effects 
of: a) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
structure; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting, professionalized-campaign 
personalization and professionalized-news and event management 
strategies in Models 8b and 9b. Such effects in Model 8b are significantly 
smaller. These findings demonstrate that, within the specific context of the 
2014 presidential election, political parties whose marketers/campaigners 
recognized that this arena is important are much more market-orientated 
and professionalized in terms of campaign structure, narrowcasting and 
news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties 
whose marketers/campaigners accounted for this arena as less and 
unimportant at all. Nonetheless, as compared to these parties, political 
parties whose marketers/campaigners considered that this arena is very 
important are much market-oriented and professionalized in terms of 
campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalization and news and event management strategies.  
Path Models Model 7a Vs. Model 
8a 
Model 7a Vs. Model 
9a 
Model 8a Vs. Model 
9a 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.036 0.683 0.161 0.025 0.197 0.007 
PMOaàPCE 0.079 0.768 0.008 0.528 0.071 0.241 
PMOaàPATS 0.107 0.155 - - 
PMObàPCE 0.219 0.016 0.124 0.096 0.095 0.845 
PMObàPCS 0.134 0.080 0.128 0.089 0.006 0.523 
PCEàPCS 0.096 0.830 0.066 0.261 0.162 0.027 
PCEàPATS 0.028 0.417 0.026 0.579 0.054 0.679 
PCEàPCPS - - 0.059 0.700 
PCEàPNS 0.100 0.795 0.420 0.999 0.320 0.997 
PCEàPNEMS 0.082 0.238 0.135 0.882 0.167 0.938 
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PCSàPATS 0.057 0.653 - - 
PCSàPCPS 0.145 0.115 0.276 0.013 0.131 0.129 
PCSàPNS 0.029 0.395 - - 
PCSàPNEMS 0.059 0.722 0.141 0.093 0.200 0.015 
Table 7.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 7a Vs. Model 8a, Model 7a Vs. 
Model 9a and Model 8a Vs. Model 9a 
 
Path Models Model 7b Vs. Model 
8b 
Model 7b Vs. Model 
9b 
Model 8b Vs. Model 
9b 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences  
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.027 0.372 0.092 0.121 0.065 0.199 
PMOaàPCE 0.051 0.674 0.003 0.486 0.055 0.307 
PMOaàPCS - - 0.070 0.756 
PMObàPCE 0.147 0.078 0.213 0.018 0.066 0.233 
PMObàPCS 0.082 0.209 0.074 0.236 0.008 0.535 
PCEàPCS 0.026 0.401 0.190 0.049 0.164 0.035 
PCEàPATS - - 0.011 0.461 
PCEàPCPS 0.007 0.529 0.038 0.623 0.031 0.611 
PCEàPNS - - - 
PCEàPNEMS 0.035 0.629 0.098 0.811 0.063 0.738 
PCSàPATS 0.069 0.726 0.119 0.167 0.187 0.048 
PCSàPCPS 0.081 0.758 0.095 0.215 0.176 0.047 
PCSàPNS 0.130 0.167 0.298 0.017 0.167 0.087 
PCSàPNEMS 0.008 0.461 0.212 0.021 0.203 0.015 
Table 7.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 7b Vs. Model 8b, Model 7b Vs. 
Model 9b and Model 8b Vs. Model 9b 
 
7.3. The Quantitative Findings 
7.3.1. Political, Media and Election Regulations as Determinant 
Factors 
Enactments of Laws No.40/1999, No.32/2002, No.2/2011, 
No.15/2011, No.8/2012 and No.42/2008 60  gradually generated the 
underlying structures and mechanisms that systematically determined 
perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners, 
leaders and candidates regarding the importance of political market 
arenas and political sub-markets. This point is summarized as follows. 
Implementations of the first and second laws led to formation of the new 
democratic-liberal media system, decreasing roles of the Indonesian 
                                                       
60 The first law was enacted alongside the process of the amendment of the Indonesian 
National Constitution of 1945. Soon after this constitution was amended, the second law 
was constituted. The subsequent laws were actually alterations of the existing democratic 
political, media and election regulations, which were constituted soon after this 
constitution was rewritten completely. 
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public/government media (TVRI and RRI) and increasing roles of the 
Indonesian commercial media taking place in the new democracy of 
Indonesia. The third law ruled the establishment and management of 
political parties in Indonesian politics. The fourth law constituted 
arrangement of the national and local elections. The fifth and sixth laws 
defined the organization of the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections and paved the way for development of the candidate-centre 
electoral system. The fifth law regulated the open-list proportional 
representation system to vote for political parties’ MPs candidates in the 
2014 parliamentary election and constituted the minimum number of this 
election threshold, which is 3.5 % of popular votes collected by each of the 
political parties in this election. The sixth law set up a mechanism to vote 
for a pair of presidential candidates and defined the minimum number of 
the 2014 presidential election threshold that is 25 % of popular votes or 20 
% of parliamentary seats gathered in the 2014 parliamentary election, 
which has to be fulfilled by those who want to nominate this pair of 
presidential candidates for running in this election.  
Establishment of these laws directly and indirectly paved the way 
for development of the multi-party, liberal-democratic media and election 
systems. These systems not only contrived political polarization and 
competition between and among the Indonesian political parties, but also 
shaped the characteristics and structural conditions of political market 
arenas and political sub-markets61. As detailed by the following points, 
perceptions of these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates regarding 
the relative importance of these political market arenas determined the 
ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced market-
orientation and managed professionalization of campaigning within and 
across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.  
 
                                                       
61 Personal interviews with RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May, 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 
November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and IJP of Golkar 
Party, 28 October 2014 
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7.3.2. Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ Leaders and 
Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of the Internal 
Party, Electoral and the Media Arenas and Their Effects on 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of these 
Parties Within the Specific Context of the 2014 Parliamentary 
Election  
Since such systems took place and the open-list proposition 
method to vote for the Indonesian political parties’ MPs candidates were 
implemented, most of these parties’ leaders and MPs candidates 
prioritized promoting himself or herself, and addressing primary actors in 
the electoral arenas as an individual politician rather than his or her party 
and organization, much more 62 . These parties’ MPs candidates 
approached and targeted the electorates populated in his or her 
parliamentary constituency intensively as a primary political sub-market 
and exploited members, activists and officials of political parties to which 
they were affiliated to persuade and mobilize these electorates. Some of 
them tactically approached campaign donors to gain sufficient campaign 
funds to finance their own marketing and campaign programmes. Since 
the mainstream media took shape as a crucial political sub-market those 
who were nominated in the urban parliamentary constituencies 
strategically addressed these media to promote their own personal profiles 
to the targeted electorates63.  
Establishment of such systems and implementation of that method 
also transformed the ways these parties’ MPs candidates perceived their 
competitors. Most of them commonly framed competitors based on types 
of: a) political parties that nominated such competitors as MPs candidates; 
and b) electorates inhabiting the parliamentary constituencies targeted by 
                                                       
62 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 
November 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014. 
63 Personal interviews with AD, a professional employed by an MP candidate of Golkar 
Party, 15 July 2014, PSL of JSI, 12 October 2014. 
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such competitors 64 . Within the specific context of this election, they 
classified their competitors into two camps, which are the internal- and the 
external-competitors. The first one refers to MPs candidates nominated by 
competitors of political parties they associated with. The second one 
relates to their colleagues who were being nominated by their own parties 
as MPs candidates who targeted exactly similar electorates in a 
parliamentary constituency that they approached and mobilized65. 
Having considered the characteristics of the electoral arena in 
parliamentary constituencies they represented, most of these parties’ MPs 
candidates approached and exploited these parties’ members, activists 
and officials who were not being nominated as MPs candidates intensively 
to market and promote their own personal profiles to the targeted 
electorates. In addressing this issue, SM, a leader of PPP voiced as 
follow. 
“Since the total number of these candidates was significantly 
unequal with the total number of parliamentary seats allocated in 
each of 77 parliamentary constituencies, each of these MPs 
candidates favoured addressing his/her party activists, officials and 
members to manage the internal party and electoral arenas and 
deal with the targeted electorates to make sure that these 
electorates strongly recognize his/her personal profile and/or 
political policies and products he/she offered”66. 
 
The ways these parties and these parties’ candidates targeted these 
electorates and addressed such competitors led to immense internal and 
external competition taking place within and across the internal party and 
electoral arenas. In describing such competitions, PL, an incumbent MP of 
Gerindra Party, presents his personal testimony as follows. 
                                                       
64 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 
November 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014. 
65 Most of the non-incumbent MPs candidates of the Indonesian political parties strongly 
reckoned with both the internal- and the external-competitors. But, most of incumbent 
MPs candidates of these parties were much more focused on the external-competitors. 
Some of them also intensively managed the internal-competitors under a ‘condition’ that 
the unmanageable internal-competitor could lead them to losing a chance to get a 
parliamentary seat in this election. Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and 
IN of PKB, 14 May 2014. 
66 Personal interview, 18 May 2014. 
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“Together with my fellows, I was trained by our party leaders and 
political consultants a few years before the 2014 parliamentary 
election was held. The main goal was to improve our skills to be 
outstanding politicians and professional marketers and 
campaigners as well. Our party top-leader expected that most of us 
would get elected in this election. But, since we shared a 
parliamentary constituency, each of us not only had to defeat our 
(external-) competitors, but also had to fight each other (the 
internal-competitor). Like most of the top-leaders of the other 
political parties did, our party top-leader also turned a blind eye to 
this condition. We were actually like gladiators, being trained 
together, but having to kill each other to capture the substantial 
number of voters that can be extracted as parliamentary seats”67. 
 
Generally speaking, the perceptions of these parties’ leaders and 
MPs candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the 
media and electoral arenas, determined the ways and the degree to which 
these parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning in facing this election. However, the following factors also 
influenced the ways of and the degree to which they advanced such 
practice. They include: a) geographical conditions of parliamentary 
constituencies they represent; and b) levels of campaign resources of 
these parties and these parties’ MPs candidates68. In this respect, MPs 
candidates who had plenty or medium amounts of campaign resources, 
and were being nominated in the parliamentary election districts located in 
the urban areas, holistically considered these political market arenas and 
strategically addressed the electorates, the media and competitors as 
political sub-markets. They also strongly favoured hiring political 
consultants and professionals to set up proficient campaign structures and 
strategies. Most of them attempted to establish proficient electorate 
targeting and campaign personalization strategies to persuade and 
mobilize the targeted electorates. In order to run such strategies, they set 
up groups of marketers/campaigners who were labelled as ‘tim sukses’ 
                                                       
67 Personal interview, 22 November 2014. 
68 Personal interview with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 
2014. 
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(the success team) or camouflaged as ‘relawan’ (campaign-volunteers). 
Some of them combined these strategies with the narrowcasting and news 
and event management strategies. This effort was specifically directed to 
capture the ‘swing voters’, the ‘undecided voters’ and ‘apathetic voters 
inhabiting the parliamentary constituencies they represent69.  
Meanwhile, most of these parties’ MPs candidates nominated to 
represent parliamentary constituencies located in rural and remote areas 
commonly had moderate or small amounts of campaign funds70. They 
strongly accounted for the electoral and internal party arenas, but 
considered the media arena less. They approached the electorates and 
competitors robustly as political sub-markets, but engaged less in 
addressing the media as a political sub-market. They also strongly 
favoured investing their resources to run electorate targeting and 
campaign personalization strategies rather than the narrowcasting and 
news and event management strategies. Most of them recruited local 
leaders whose strong political patronages with and understanding of the 
socio-demographic, characteristics and political cultures of voters who 
populated the local districts, employed local leaders who were not officially 
affiliated with any political party and deployed a group of 
marketers/campaigners, which was also called as ‘tim sukses’ (the 
success team)71.  
                                                       
69 These voters are emic categories formulated, recognized and used by most of these 
Indonesian political candidates during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
The first one was the biggest number of voters who occupied the middle ground, settled 
in either the urban or the rural areas and had sufficient knowledge and information, but 
had no preference to any political party and party candidate and have been associated 
less with political parties. The second one was a group of voters populated in both the 
urban and rural areas who had sufficient political knowledge and information, but did not 
yet have political preference to any political party and party candidate. The last one 
commonly came from the middle-class families who were reluctant to cast their votes for 
any political party or party candidates. Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 
November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 
June 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May, 2014 
70 The Indonesian general election commission validated that only some of them that had 
a substantial personal (official) campaign fund. 
71 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May, 
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Regardless of geographical conditions of parliamentary 
constituencies they represent, most of these parties’ MPs candidates 
commonly organized a ‘special-confidential team’. Those who had plenty 
of campaign resources employed professional consultants to train and 
supervise members of this team, strategically manage the internal party 
and the media arenas and target various groups of voters in the electoral 
arena. However, those who disfavoured employing such consultants or 
had limited campaign resources favoured managing this team personally 
much more. Instead of hiring such consultants, they greatly preferred 
developing the clientelistic and vote-buying strategies72. Members of this 
team commonly offered small sums of money and/or provided enjoyments 
to lure the ‘clientelistic voters’ and ‘cash and carry-oriented voters’73. 
A few months before this election was held, most of the Indonesian 
political parties had to deal with the increasing magnitude of internal 
competition between and among their MPs candidates who targeted and 
approached groups of the electorates, media and competitors located in 
                                                                                                                                                       
2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB, a Deputy 
General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014 
72 Law No.8/2012 actually prohibited the Indonesian political parties’ MPs candidates 
from applying the vote-buying strategy. Nonetheless, these MPs candidates commonly 
deployed the ‘special unofficial campaign team’ to execute this strategy. In some cases, 
the election monitoring officials found unacceptable attitudes and behaviours of members 
of the ‘unofficial confidential campaign team’ of some of these MPs candidates who 
carried out this strategy in their parliamentary constituencies. However, these officials 
failed to prosecute these evidences due to the following reasons. Firstly, these officials 
lacked the capability to prove the existence of personal or professional connections 
between those who ran this strategy and MPs candidates who hired them. Secondly, this 
law did not regulate the punishment subjected to the electorates who benefitted from MPs 
candidates who ran this strategy. Thirdly, the electorates who benefitted from these MPs 
candidates disfavoured reporting evidences to these officials. This condition led to these 
officials losing a legal standing position to prosecute these evidences.  
73 These voters are also emic categories introduced and recognized and used by most of 
these Indonesian political candidates during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. These clientelistic voters commonly populated the rural areas and have been 
strongly associated with the traditional, tribal, cultural and religious leaders. The ‘cash 
and carry-oriented voters’ commonly came from the uneducated lower and working-class 
families who favoured accepting some small cash money offered by the confidential 
campaign teams of the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ candidates. The first 
one was strongly visible within and across these elections. But, the last one was much 
more obvious within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. Personal 
interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM 
of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014 and RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014. 
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similar parliamentary constituencies intensively. They organized special 
efforts to handle this issue. In this respect, Golkar Party, Gerindra Party, 
PDIP, Nasdem Party, PAN PKB and PKS established a set of internal 
party regulations to manage this issue tactically74. Hanura Party and PPP 
did not develop such regulations. Instead, these parties merely expected 
each of their MPs candidates could deliberately manage this issue 
properly75. 
The following issues also determined the degree to which these 
parties considered the importance of the internal party, electoral and the 
media arenas, addressed political sub-markets and ran professionalization 
of campaigning in facing this election. Firstly, the top-leader or public 
figure of the party expected to get sufficient numbers of popular votes or 
parliamentary seats to secure a presidential ticket for running in the 2014 
presidential election. Secondly, the internal consolidation of party 
members, activists and officials has been under-developed. Thirdly, the 
internal party arena has been heavily fragmented and less manageable. 
Fourthly, the mainstream media intensively reported crucial cases 
focusing on the party top-leader and public figure and the framing and 
tones of political news produced by these media regarding such cases 
strongly influenced the images of the party top-leader and public figure 
and destroyed the electorates’ trust in and approval of the party. Finally, 
the electorates’ trust and/or approval of the party not only declined 
substantially, but also undermined the party’s chances to pass the 
minimum number of the 2014 parliamentary election threshold and gain a 
                                                       
74 Marketers/campaigners and political consultants/experts hired by these parties’ MPs 
candidates also have to comply with this regulation. Personal interviews with RCA of 
Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 
May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of 
PDIP, 11 June 2014, DS, a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014 and IN of PKB, 14 May 
2014. 
75 Personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 22 
November 2014. 
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substantial number of parliamentary seats in this election 76 . The 
subsequent points detail the consequences of such issues on the ways 
and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices. 
Since dealing with the first issue, Golkar Party, PDIP and Gerindra 
Party called their MPs candidates intensively to collect substantial 
numbers of popular votes and parliamentary seats that met with the 
minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold 77 , while 
Hanura Party prioritized the media and the electoral arenas over the 
internal party arena78. PDIP, Gerindra Party, PAN and PKB encountered 
the second and third issues less, while Nasdem Party and Hanura Party 
faced the second issue. Like Golkar Party, PPP experienced the third 
issue79. However, though they stumbled across these issues, this party 
addressed the media arena less. Although they suffered most from the 
fourth and fifth issues, Democratic Party and PKS intensively addressed 
not only the media arena, but also the electoral and internal party arenas. 
Following short stories delineated this point. 
On 30 May 2011, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
named MN, a general treasurer of the Democratic Party, as a suspect for 
receiving bribes from the construction projects of the homestead for 
athletes and Hambalang sport centre. As they ran a further investigation 
related to such cases, this commission also declared that AS, a deputy 
secretary of this party, had been implicated in the first case and AAU, a 
general chairman of this party and AAM, an influential leader of this party, 
had been involved in the second case. Soon after this commission 
exposed these cases, most of the Indonesian mainstream media were 
                                                       
76 Extracted from personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, WA, a 
Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014 and RP of Democratic 
Party, 13 May 2014. 
77 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, RCA of Golkar 
Party, 13 May 2014 and AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014. 
78 Personal interview with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014. 
79 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 
14 May 2014, WA of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014, AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and IN 
of PKB, 14 May 2014. 
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negatively framing these cases. At the same time, the electorates’ 
approval of this party, as reported by some prominent Indonesian 
pollsters, declined substantially from more or less 20 % in 2011 to more or 
less 8 % in February 2013.  
Such problems led this party as an organisation to lose its 
competitive chances in strategically managing the electorates, the media 
and campaign donor and tackling its competitors as well. This party and its 
MPs candidates actually spent plenty of resources in handling the media 
and the Internet and social media users to restore the image of this party 
and elevate the electorates’ trust and approval of this party. MPs 
candidates of this party also effortlessly developed campaign structure 
and electorate targeting, campaign personalization and news and event 
management strategies to deal with the media and the internal- and the 
external-competitor and persuade and capture various groups of 
electorates populated in the parliamentary constituencies. However, such 
efforts were less workable in upgrading the level of electorate trust and 
support of this party and its MPs candidates80. 
PKS also faced such problems. Since KPK arrested LHI, a 
president of this party on 29 January 2013 for a bribery case, most of the 
Indonesian mainstream media reported this in negative tones. As the 
electorates’ approval of this party gradually declined, this party made the 
following efforts. Firstly, this party constantly monitored the frames and 
contents of these media regarding this case and ran a tracking survey to 
systematically evaluate the structural effects of the media exposure on the 
electorates’ perceptions, trust and approval of this party and its MPs 
candidates. Secondly, this party solidified its members, activists and 
officials and strived for developing media relations, organizing a tour of the 
offices of mainstream media and spinning the agenda setting of the 
mainstream media in reporting this case to manage the media arena; and 
harnessing the Internet and social media to respond to opinions of the 
                                                       
80 Personal interview with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014. 
 
 
 
 
185 
Internet and social media users regarding work performances and images 
of this party, its top-leader and its MPs candidates. Thirdly, this party set 
up a more centralised communication structure, established a war room 
and rapid rebuttal-unit, recruited and trained large numbers of campaign 
staff, organized special professional teams and advanced 
electorates/targeting and narrowcasting strategies to strategically manage 
the internal, electoral and the media arena and address its competitors, 
the internet and social media users, the electorates—in general—and 
targeted voters—in particular. Further to this, MPs candidates of this party 
also continuously upgraded their own campaign structure and campaign 
personalisation strategies and some of them, especially those who were 
nominated in the urban parliamentary constituencies, combined these 
strategies with the narrowcasting and news and event management 
strategies. In taking such efforts, this party succeeded in getting the 
popular voters needed to secure the parliamentary seats they targeted in 
this election81.  
Further to the aforementioned factors, party ideology, campaign 
resources, position in the government and competitive chance to nominate 
its top-leader/public figure for running in the 2014 presidential election 
race also determined the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian 
political parties advanced market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. 
This point is spelled out as follows. Neither secular-Islamic parties (PAN 
and PKB) nor Islamist parties (PKS and PPP) had large amounts of 
campaign resources and each of these parties lacked this chance. 
Conversely, being supported by a substantial amount of campaign 
resources, most of the secular-nationalist parties (Golkar Party, PDIP, 
Democratic Party, Gerindra Party and Hanura Party) had this chance. 
Compared to either of these secular-Islamic or these Islamist parties, 
                                                       
81 Personal interviews with TR, a former general secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and DS, 
a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014. 
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these secular-nationalist parties managed the electoral and the media 
arenas, targeted diverse groups of political sub-markets and placed 
substantial numbers of political advertising programmes in various 
Indonesian mainstream media, especially TV channels, to persuade and 
mobilize the electorates as the primary political sub-market much more 
intensively.  
Being chaired by popular leaders and having this chance, two 
small-sized secular-nationalist opposition parties, which are Gerindra 
Party and Hanura Party, and a big-sized secular-nationalist non-opposition 
party, which is Golkar Party, robustly advanced such efforts. However, 
though led by non-populist leaders and lacking this opportunity, a new 
small-sized secular-nationalist political party, that is Nasdem Party, also 
developed such strategies as well 82 . Slightly differently, a big-sized 
secular-nationalist opposition party, which is PDIP, that had an influential 
top-leader and public figure, favoured prioritizing the internal and electoral 
arenas over the media arena more. This party also placed political 
advertising programmes on these TV channels to address the electorates 
as a primary actor in the electoral arena83. However, compared to Golkar 
Party or Hanura Party or Gerindra Party or Nasdem Party, this party 
invested less of its resources in handling the media arena. Instead, this 
party much preferred allocating its resources to manage the internal party 
and the electoral arenas and encouraging its members, officials and 
activists in dealing with its competitors and developing professional 
campaign structures and strategies to persuade and capture the 
electorates and targeted voters 84. 
Along with these factors, types of parliamentary constituencies, the 
degree of campaign resources and these parties’ MPs candidates also 
took place as important factors. These factors determined the ways of and 
                                                       
82 Personal interviews with AM, General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, 
RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA, a Deputy 
General Secretary of Nasdem Party 29 October 2014 
83 See figure 9.3 of following chapter 9. 
84 Personal interview with AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014 
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the degree to which these parties’ MPs candidates addressed these 
political market arenas and advanced market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election85. MPs candidates nominated by these parties to 
represent the parliamentary constituencies located in rural areas favoured 
developing professionalized-electorates targeting and campaign 
personalization strategies much more rather than running professional 
narrowcasting and the news and event management strategies. In 
contrast, MPs candidates appointed by these parties to represent the 
parliamentary constituencies located in the urban area, and/or to target the 
marginal seats in either the urban or rural parliamentary constituencies, 
were much more interested in combining these strategies with the 
narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. For example, 
FZ of Gerindra party, who were being nominated in a parliamentary 
constituency of the Greater Jakarta, combined professionalized-
electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies with 
professionalized-news and event management strategy. Slightly 
differently, EM of Gerindra party who were nominated to target marginal 
seats that represent Gorontalo Province constituency favoured mixing 
such strategies with narrowcasting strategy 86 . Furthermore, MPs 
candidates of these parties who had substantial campaign resources, such 
as ZH of PAN and PM of PDIP, much preferred hiring political consultants 
to supervise their campaign teams in selecting, formulating and advancing 
campaign strategies proficiently87. In contrast, MPs candidates of these 
parties who lacked such resources, such as EMH of PKB and AHA of 
Nasdem party, were engaged less in taking up such efforts88.  
                                                       
85 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar party, 28 October 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 
May 2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 2014. 
86 Personal interviews with EM of Gerindra Party, 18 December 2014 and AM, a General 
Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014. 
87 Personal interviews with PLG, a political consultant of JSI hired by PAN, 12 October 
2014 and IB, a political consultant hired by PM of PDIP, 30 October 2014. 
88 Personal interviews with T, a political consultant of SMRC hired by PKB, 21 October 
2014 and AHA of a non-incumbent MP candidate of Nasdem Party, 26 October 2014. 
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Nonetheless, the degree of support of the primary actors who had 
been politically powerful within and across the internal party and electoral 
arenas also took shape as an influential factor. In this respect, the 
Indonesian political parties’ MPs candidates who successfully obtained 
and managed such support, much more easily addressed political sub-
markets (especially the electorates, competitors and the media) and 
developed campaign structures and strategies to persuade and mobilize 
the electorates and targeted voters, as compared to the Indonesian 
political parties’ MPs candidates who lacked success in managing such 
support. Above all, the quality of personal relationships between these 
parties’ MPs candidates and such primary actors really took place as the 
most important factor. This factor determined the degree to which these 
parties and these parties’ MPs candidates succeeded not only in running 
such efforts smoothly, but also in getting parliamentary seats in this 
election effectively89.  
 
7.3.3. Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ Leaders and 
Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of these 
Political Market Arenas and Their Effects on Marketization and 
Professionalization of Campaigning of these Parties Within the 
Specific Context of the 2014 Presidential Election. 
Soon after the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, the 
discordances of political interests of the Indonesian political parties’ MPs 
candidates regarding the internal party arena gradually disappeared. 
Some of these parties, however, continued suffering from an internal 
fragmentation. This fragmentation was actually triggered by diverse 
                                                       
89 Personal interviews with AM, General Secretary of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, 
AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 
2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA, a Deputy General Secretary of 
Nasdem Party 29 October 2014. 
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orientations of these parties’ leaders in nominating and supporting a (pair 
of) presidential candidate(s)90.  
In the aftermath this election, the media arena also gradually 
polarized into three groups. The first one was a group of the media, which 
endorsed ARB, a potential presidential candidate of Golkar Party. The 
second one was a group of the media, which supported Jokowi, a potential 
presidential candidate of PDIP. The last one was a group of the media, 
which supported Prabowo Subijanto, a potential presidential candidate of 
Gerindra Party91.  
In a similar vein, the electorates/voters as a primary actor in the 
electoral arena also gradually gravitated to support each of these parties 
and these parties’ presidential candidates. In this respect, the electorates 
remained being seen as a primary political sub-market as they were in the 
2014 parliamentary election. However, the ways these parties and these 
parties’ presidential candidates addressed these electorates as a political 
sub-market were quite different. They grouped these electorates based 
on: a) socio-demographic conditions of the districts, municipalities and 
provinces which they populated; and b) these electorates’ approval of 
each of these parties’ presidential candidates92. These parties and these 
parties’ presidential candidates also realized the importance of political 
activists and officials as political sub-markets. Nonetheless, they much 
favoured addressing the media, competitors and campaign donors as 
prominent political sub-markets93. 
Perceptions of these parties’ leaders and presidential candidates 
regarding the relative importance of these political market-arenas took 
                                                       
90 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 2014. 
91 Personal interviews with DBS of Berita Satu TV, 15 October 2014, YAN of KOMPAS 
TV, 6 November 2014 and RB of KOMPAS, 12 November 2014. 
92 Personal interviews with USB of LSN, 14 May 2014, T of SMRC, 21 October 2014 and 
EK of JSI, 13 October 2014 
93 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014, AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and WA, a Deputy General 
Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014. 
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place as a determinant factor that influenced marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of these parties within the specific 
context of this election. Along with this factor, the following factors also 
determined the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced 
such practices. This point is summarized as follows.  
Soon after the 2014 parliamentary election was held, the 
Indonesian General Election Commission reported that none of these 
parties met the minimum number of this threshold (25 % of popular votes 
and 20 % of parliamentary seats). This election result hinted that Golkar 
Party, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party and PDIP actually had 
competitive chances to assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair 
of presidential candidates; but, as detailed by the subsequent points, only 
PDIP and Gerindra Party, finally succeeded in achieving such goals.  
Having considered the degree to which the mainstream media and 
the electorates intensively supported Joko Widodo (being popularly called 
Jokowi) as a potential presidential candidate, PDIP arranged a coalition 
with PKB, Nasdem Party and Hanura Party and nominated Jokowi. He 
was then paired with Jusuf Kalla who ran as a vice-presidential candidate. 
Having successfully nominated them as a pair of presidential candidates, 
these parties encouraged their members, officials and activists to address 
the media, internal party and electoral arenas and develop workable 
models of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning to get 
this pair of presidential candidate elected in this election. These parties’ 
leaders hired media strategists and political consultants to develop 
professionalized-electorates targeting, campaign personalization, 
narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. They also 
approached some media barons to endorse Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. The main 
reason was that it seemed impossible for this pair of presidential 
candidates to directly address 187.852.992 registered-voters who settled 
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in 33 Indonesian provinces and overseas94. These parties successfully 
managed the media arena and gained substantial support from the 
influential Indonesian media and these media owners. In this respect, 
Media Indonesia and METRO TV owned by SP, a top-leader of Nasdem 
Party, Trans TV and Trans 7 owned by Chairul Tanjung, Berita Satu TV 
established and owned by LIPPO Group and KOMPAS TV owned by 
Jakob Oetama, intensively supported this pair of presidential candidates95.  
These parties and these parties’ marketers/campaigners also got 
substantial support from campaign-volunteers who heavily harnessed the 
Internet and social media networks as campaign platforms96. Most of them 
favoured highlighting his outstanding personal quality and professional 
performance and downgrading the personal quality and professional 
performance of his rival, which was Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party 
(Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 28 July-3 August, 2014; Paraqbueaq, 
2014, TEMPO, 28 July-3 August, 2014). They were being trained to 
develop and protect his personal brand-identity and image and to 
undermine the personal brand-identity and image of his competitor as 
well97.  
Meanwhile, Gerindra Party persuaded PAN, Golkar Party, PKS, 
PAN and Democratic Party to form a subsequent political block and 
nominated Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Rajasa as a pair of presidential 
candidates to run in this election. Having recognized that Prabowo 
Subijanto had been approved of less by the media and electorates, 
Gerindra Party took the following efforts. This party attempted maximising 
the integration of the internal party arena and strongly addressing the 
                                                       
94 Personal interviews with AB, a Deputy General Secretary of PDIP, 11 June 2014, WA, 
a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 and IB, a social media 
strategist of PDIP, 30 October 2014. 
95 Within more or less a half and one month before the 2014 Presidential Election Day (9 
July 2014), METRO TV, Trans TV and Trans 7 allocated substantial number of spot of 
political advertising programs of Jokowi. Further information related with this issue, see 
figure 9.9 of following chapter 9. 
96 Further information related with this issue would be detailed by point 9.4.3 of Chapter 9 
97 Personal interview with WA of a Deputy General Secretary of Nasdem Party, 29 
October 2014 
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electoral arena. In addressing this issue, AM of Gerindra Party, stated as 
follows. 
“We really believed that the degree of success in managing the 
internal party arena is likely to lead to our success in addressing the 
electoral arena”98 
 
This party also intensively deployed its activists, members and officials 
and its elected and unelected MPs to elevate levels of recognition and 
acceptability of this party and its presidential candidate in the electoral 
arenas. This party also robustly managed the media arena and spent 
plenty of financial resources to design and place political advertising 
programmes in various Indonesian mainstream media, especially TV 
channels99. This party also deployed some overseas political consultants 
who have been closely associated with or were personally sympathetic to 
him (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July, 2014). 
Together with its coalition, this party robustly addressed various 
types of political sub-markets and advanced campaign structures and 
strategies to persuade and mobilize large number of electorates and 
voters populated in 33 Indonesian provinces. In addressing this issue, AM 
of Gerindra Party stated as follows. 
“We developed a series of political consolidation and training to 
improve the expertise and skills of our party cadres, officials, 
activists and members in order to be good marketers and 
campaigners. They were deployed to shore up marketing and 
campaigning programmes carried out by our party within and 
across the Indonesian Provinces in order to get Prabowo Subijanto 
elected in the 2014 presidential election”100. 
 
This party itself actually ran such efforts a few years before this election 
was held101.  
                                                       
98 Personal interview, 5 November 2014 
99 Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra 
Party, 22 November 2014 
100 Personal interview, 5 November 2014 
101 Like this party, Golkar party also took similar efforts. Golkar Party expected getting 
success in nominating its top-leader, Aburizal Bakri (widely called as ARB), as a 
presidential candidate. But, this party lacked success in leveraging the electorates’ 
approval to ARB. Since ARB did not see a chance to win this election, this party was 
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In terms of campaign recourses, those who supported Prabowo 
Subianto of Gerindra Party actually had considerably more resources, 
compared to those who endorsed Jokowi of PDIP. For example, Abu 
Rizalbakri (ARB), the chairman of Golkar Party, owned an influential TV 
news channel, which is TV One, and a new entertainment TV channel, 
which is ANTV. Since ARB supported Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa 
as a pair of presidential candidates for running in this election, this TV 
news channel strongly endorsed and promoted them. Further, Hary 
Tanoesudibyo (HT), an owner of MNC Media Groups (RTCI, TPI and 
Global TV), and at that time one of the prominent leaders of Hanura 
Party 102  also supported this pair of presidential candidates. It was 
undeniable that these TV channels placed substantial numbers of spots of 
political advertising programmes for this pair of presidential candidates103.  
As shored up by its coalition, Gerindra Party intensively organized 
the ground, air and online marketing wars and campaign programmes to 
manage the electoral arena strategically. This party also set up a special 
team composed from several units to handle the mainstream media and 
social media104. One of these units was specifically deployed to upgrade 
the personal profile and brand-identity of Prabowo Subijanto and elevate 
the level of the electorates’ approval of him as a presidential candidate105. 
Moreover, this party also asked a top-leader of PKS to specifically set up a 
                                                                                                                                                       
finally inclined to team up with Gerindra party to support Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra 
Party and Hatta Rajasa of PAN as a pair of presidential candidates (Hidayat, et al., 2014, 
TEMPO, 19-25 May 2014, pages 33-36). 
102 Since Hanura Party lost a chance to assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair 
of presidential candidates, HT took a different political path with Wiranto, a founder of the 
top-leader of this party, who favoured endorsing Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla as a presidential 
candidate. Soon after the 2014 presidential election was held, he left this party and 
established a new political party, which is Perindo Party. 
103 Within more or less and a half months before the 2014 Presidential Election Day (9 
July 2014), TV One, ANTV, MNC TV, RCTI and Global TV allocated a substantial number 
of spots of political advertising programmes for Prabowo Subijanto. For further 
information related with this issue, see figure 9.10 of following chapter 9. 
104 Further information related with this issue, see point 9.4.3 of chapter 9. 
105 Personal interview with BP, a media strategist of Prabowo Subijanto, 23 October, 
2014 
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skilful group of buzzers who were familiar with harnessing online and 
social media platforms106. 
This party and its coalition were, to some degree, quite successful 
in managing the media and electoral arenas and upgrading the levels of 
the electorates’ approval and support for Prabowo Subijanto107. However, 
they did not fully succeeded in harnessing their members and activists to 
mobilize their constituents to vote him and his running mate, Hatta 
Radjasa in this election108. PLG, a political consultant of JSI, hired by this 
pair of presidential candidates reflected on this issue as follows. 
“A coalition of political parties that endorsed Prabowo Subijanto-
Hatta Radjasa seemed a little bit flimsy. These parties actually had 
much more organisational resources that can be generated as a 
powerful political machine to persuade and mobilize the electorates. 
But, each of these parties was, individually, quite fragile. Even the 
top-leaders of these parties could not manage internal 
fragmentation that took place in their parties. We knew some 
influential leaders and activists of these parties more likely favoured 
supporting Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla and expected this pair of 
presidential candidate get elected in this election”109. 
 
While this party and its coalition failed to resolve this issue properly, 
the degree of support of political sub-markets for Jokowi increased 
substantially. The total numbers of marketers/campaigners and fanatical 
supporters of Jokowi who had been widely camouflaged as campaign-
volunteers, political lobbyists and campaign-donors who personally 
supported him and his running mate grew substantially110. Supported by 
these lobbyists and donors, these marketers/campaigners successfully 
managed the Indonesian mainstream media and Internet and social media 
users. As directed by professionals appointed by leaders of PDIP and its 
coalitions, they also robustly addressed not only a group of voters who 
                                                       
106 Personal interview with DS of PKS, 12 November 2014. 
107 Further information related with this point, see figure 9.11 and 9.18 of following 
chapter 9. 
108 Further information related with this point, see table 9.10 and figure 9.20 of following 
chapter 9.  
109 Personal interview, 12 October 2014 
110 Further information related with this issue, see figures 9.12, 9.13 and 9.14 of following 
chapter 9. 
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would potentially vote for his rival, but also various groups of voters who 
were unlikely to vote for either him or his rival (the non-voters/swing 
voters). 
Regarding these developments, these parties strategically 
addressed the non-voters/swing voters and intensively upgraded 
campaign structures and strategies to persuade and capture them. They 
nearly succeeded in persuading and capturing these voters111, but this pair 
of presidential candidates finally lost in this election. PDIP and its coalition, 
which were shored up by marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters 
of Jokowi, successfully persuaded and captured large numbers of these 
voters and ultimately won this election112.  
 
7.4. Conclusions and Discussions. 
As stated at the outset Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-84) argued that the degree to which the party 
accounted for the relative importance and relevance of political market 
arenas was likely to determine a choice that has to be made by the party 
to advance market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning. 
This work presented quantitative and the qualitative findings, which 
indicated that, within the specific context of the new democracy of 
Indonesia, this choice is less likely to be determined by the degree to 
which the party as an organization perceived the relative importance of the 
internal party, the media and electoral arenas. This choice is, instead, 
likely to be influenced by individual perceptions of marketers/campaigners, 
leaders and candidates of the party regarding the relative importance of 
these political market arenas. Such perceptions determined not only 
modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these 
parties, but also the degree of market-orientation and campaign 
                                                       
111 Further information related with this point, see figures 9.11 and 9.18 of following 
chapter 9. 
112 Further information related with this point, see figures 9.18 and 9.21 of following 
chapter 9. 
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professionalisms of these parties within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections. These clearly validate and 
substantiate the ideas of this author. 
This author also voiced that ‘even though parties have different 
strategic goals in multiple arenas, their relative importance might vary 
between different parties’ (Strömbäck, 2007: 60) and ‘the degree of 
professionalized political campaigning, and the extent to which political 
parties and campaigns are becoming market oriented…neither can be 
dealt with as being independent from factors such as…the relative 
importance of the parliamentary arena, the media arena, the internal 
arena, and the electoral arena’ (Strömbäck, 2007: 62). Overall, the 
quantitative and the qualitative findings demonstrated that the effects of 
perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners, 
leaders and candidates regarding the importance of the internal arena on 
modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and 
degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these 
parties are less likely to be controlled by the type of the election. However, 
the effects of the perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners, 
leaders and candidates regarding the relative importance of the media and 
electoral arenas on processes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and levels of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalisms of these parties are likely to be determined by the type of 
the elections. These findings indicated that the more these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates perceived the importance 
of the media arena, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-
oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, news and 
event management and narrowcasting strategies within the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The more these parties’ 
marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates realized the importance 
of the electoral and media arenas, the much more likely these parties 
inclined to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) 
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campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event 
management and campaign personalisation strategies within the specific 
context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, 
audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign 
personalization and narrowcasting strategies within the specific context of 
the 2014 presidential election. These clearly validate and substantiate 
Strömbäck’s (2007: 60, 62) propositions. 
The qualitative findings also revealed that the following factors 
resulted in visible effects on the ways of and the degree to which these 
parties advanced such practices within and across these elections. They 
include: a) party-specific factors, which are party ideology, campaign 
resources and position in the government; b) party competitive chances to 
assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figure as a 
presidential candidate to run in this election; and c) development of the 
political marketability level of the party’s presidential candidate. The 
following chapters 8 and 9, respectively, will evaluate those factors 
thoroughly. 
 
7.5. Summary 
Having adopted the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) 
and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 83-84), this chapter formulated an analytical 
framework to evaluate the effects of perceptions of the Indonesian political 
parties’ marketers/campaigner, leaders and candidates regarding the 
relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas on 
modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and 
degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these 
parties within the specific contexts of the 2014 parliamentary and the 
presidential elections. The survey and the in-depth interview data and the 
existing political, media and election regulations were extracted. The 
quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed and discussed. The 
research conclusions and recommendations were highlighted as well.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
PARTY-SPECIFIC FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
MARKETIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
CAMPAIGNING OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Chapter Overview 
It has been argued that the party-specific factors determine modes 
of market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning of political 
parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck et 
al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; 
Tenscher et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 
2014; Tenscher et al., 2015). However, while a workable analytical 
framework needed to evaluate this issue has not been developed properly 
(Strömbäck, 2007: 64-65), a holistic research focusing on this issue within 
the specific context of new democratic countries, such as Indonesia, has 
not been conducted systematically. Having developed this framework, this 
work evaluated the effects of these factors on the ways of and the degree 
to which the Indonesian political parties advanced such practices within 
and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections (RO 5). 
Based on the extracted survey data and in-depth interview data (derived 
from these parties’ leaders, candidates and professionals and campaign-
volunteers and teams of the presidential candidates), the existing political, 
media and election regulations, and the reports released by the 
Indonesian media, especially KOMPAS, GATRA and TEMPO, this work 
reported the quantitative and qualitative findings. Such efforts are detailed 
as follows. 
 
8.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An 
Analytical Framework 
This work developed an analytical framework as follows. Based on 
type of party ideology (PI), this work, as seen from the following table 8.1, 
categorised the Indonesian political parties into three groups, which are 
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the secular-nationalist, secular-Islamic and Islamist parties 113 . Having 
accounted for the party age category (PAC), this work divided these 
parties into two camps, which are those established during the New Order 
Soeharto regime and those founded soon after this regime collapsed mid-
1998. Regarding party experience of internal shock (IS)/leadership 
change, this work grouped these parties into two groups. In considering 
party experience of external shock (ES), this work categorized these 
parties into four categories114, while based on party size (PS) this work 
classified these parties as the big-size, medium-size and small-size 
political parties115. This work formulated such categorisations based on 
reports released by the Indonesian general elections and the regulations 
implemented in the 2009 parliamentary election 116 . In realizing party 
                                                       
113 The social and economic divisions existed in the Indonesian politics. But, the Left-
Right ideological spectrums were not yet prominent since the class division did not fully 
emerge as a central political issue in the new democracy of Indonesia. Instead, it took 
place as a complementary issue alongside the social and religious sentiments (Ambardi, 
2008: 54-58). Golkar Party, PDIP, Democratic Party, Gerindra Party, Nasdem Party and 
Hanura Party strongly upheld the secular ideological foundation of the Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia, which is the Five Principle (Pancasila). PKB and PAN 
accepted Pancasila, as its principle ideology and nationhood value, but strongly 
incorporates the moderate, and tolerant Islamic values as a basic principle. PKB has 
been seen as a secular-traditionalist Islamic party, PAN has been recognized as a 
secular-modernist Islamic party (Liddle and Mujani, 2004) and PPP and PKS have been 
widely considered as the Islamist parties. Categorizations of these secular-nationalist 
parties have been widely used to understand Indonesian politics. But, classifications of 
these Islamic and Islamist parties remained left controversial debates (Ambardi, 2008: 
139-140; Sukmajati, 2011: 13-14; and Hamayotsu, 2011: 136). 
114 The first one is the party that lost more than 5 % of popular votes in the last 
parliamentary election. The second one is a political party that lost in between 5 % and 1 
% of popular votes in this election. The third one is a political party that lacked 
encountering external shock in this election. The last one is a new political party that 
never experienced with external shock. 
115 The first one is a political party that obtained more than 12 % popular votes in the 
2009 parliamentary election. The second one is a political party that obtained in between 
6 and 12 % of popular votes in this election. The last one is a political party that obtained 
no more than 6 % popular votes in this election and a new small political party that run in 
this election as the first-time political contestant.  
116 Law No.10/2008 constituted that only the Indonesian political parties that passed the 
minimum number of the parliamentary threshold (2.5 % of popular votes collected in the 
2009 parliamentary election) would be granted parliamentary seats. Three big-size 
political parties, which are PDIP, Golkar Party and Democratic Party, respectively, got 
14.03 %, 14.45 % and 20.85 % popular votes in this election. Most of the medium-size 
political parties gathered more or less 6.5 % of popular votes and small-size Indonesian 
political parties collated total popular votes in between 2.5 % and 4 % in this election. 
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campaign resources (PCR), this work, based on the report released by the 
Indonesian General Election Commission, classed these parties into three 
groups117. Having assessed party position in the government (PPG), this 
work pigeonholed these parties into two groups118. Having conducted such 
procedures and considered type of the elections wherein the survey data 
were collected; this work finally generated 38 groups, which were used to 
evaluate the following dummy models119.  
Party-Specific Factors as 
Categorical Moderator-
Grouping Variables 
Samples in the 
Group/Unit Level 
Dummy Models and Samples 
in the Individual Level 
The 2014 
Parliamentary 
Election 
The 2014 
Presidential 
Election 
P
I 
The nationalist parties PDIP, Democratic 
Party, Golkar, Nasdem, 
Hanura and Gerindra  
Model 10a 
(388) 
Model 10b 
(388) 
The Islamic parties PKB and PAN Model 11a 
(177) 
Model 11b 
(177) 
The Islamist parties PPP and PKS Model 12a 
(152) 
Model 12b 
(152) 
P
A
C
 
Political parties 
established during the 
New Order Soeharto  
PDIP, Golkar and PPP  Model 13a 
(238) 
Model 13b 
(238) 
Political parties 
established Post-
Soeharto New Order  
Democratic Party, 
Nasdem, Hanura and 
Gerindra, PKB, PAN 
and PKS 
Model 14a 
(479) 
Model 14b 
(479) 
P
S
 
The big-size parties Democratic Party, 
PDIP and Golkar  
Model 15a 
(232) 
Model 15b 
(232) 
The medium-size 
parties 
PKB, PAN, PPP and 
PKS 
Model 16a 
(302) 
Model 16b 
(302) 
The small-size parties Hanura, Gerindra and 
Nasdem Parties 
Model 17a 
(183) 
Model 17b 
(183) 
 IS
 Political parties, which 
experienced with 
internal shock before 
PAN, Gerindra and 
PKS 
Model 18a 
(308) 
Model 18b 
(308) 
                                                                                                                                                       
These conditions indicated that losing a number of popular votes in between 1 % and 5 % 
is politically important, especially for the medium- and the small-sizes political parties. 
117 The first one is a political party that had a substantial campaign budget/more than 200 
Billion IDR. The second one is a political party that had a medium campaign 
budget/between 150 and 200 Billion IDR. The last one is a political party that had a small 
campaign budget/less than 150 Billion IDR. 
118 The first one is a political party and its coalition that took position as opposition parties 
during the second-term of SBY’ government. The second one is a political party and its 
coalition that shored up this government. 
119 This table charts that each of these models incorporates more than 180 cases, except 
for Models 12a, 12b, 20a, 20b, 25a, 25b, 26a and 26b.  But, this condition, according to 
Hair et al. (2013: 2-3) and Hair (2014: 23-24) still meets the rule of thumb of the minimum 
sample size of PLS-SEM.  
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the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential 
elections were 
conducted 
Political parties, which 
lacked of experience 
with internal shock 
before these elections 
were held 
PDIP, Democratic 
Party, Golkar, Nasdem, 
Hanura, PPP and PKB 
Model 19a 
(409) 
Model 19b 
(409) 
E
S
 
Political parties, which 
lost more than 5 % of 
popular votes in the 
last parliamentary 
election 
Golkar and PKB Model 20a 
(153) 
Model 20b 
(153) 
Political parties, which 
lost in between 5 % 
and 1 % of popular 
votes in this election 
PDIP, PAN and PPP Model 21a 
(236) 
Model 21b 
(263) 
Political parties, which 
lacked of encountering 
the external shock in 
this election 
Democratic Party and 
PKS 
Model 22a 
(147) 
Model 22b 
(147) 
Political parties, which 
never experienced 
with the external shock  
Gerindra, Hanura and 
Nasdem  
Model 23a 
(181) 
Model 23b 
(181) 
P
C
R
 
Political parties with a 
substantial amount of 
campaign budget  
PDIP, Democratic 
Party, Golkar, 
Gerindra, Nasdem and 
Hanura  
Model 24a 
(413) 
Model 24b 
(413) 
Political parties with a 
moderate amount of 
campaign budget  
PAN and PKB Model 25a 
(152) 
Model 25b 
(152) 
Political parties with a 
small amount of 
campaign budget  
PPP and PKS Model 26a 
(152) 
Model 26b 
(152) 
P
P
G
 
Opposition parties 
during the second-
term of SBY’ 
government 
PDIP, Gerindra and 
Hanura  
Model 27a 
(184) 
Model 27b 
(184) 
Political parties, which 
shored up the second-
term of SBY’ 
government 
Democratic Party, 
Golkar, PAN, PKB, 
PKS and PPP 
Model 28a 
(461) 
Model 28b 
(461) 
Table 8.1: Total Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-
28b 
 
This work also evaluated Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) 
Common Factor and Composite values of these dummy models. 
According to Henseler et al. (2014), a structural model with SRMR 
Common Factor and Composite values less than 0.10 indicates that this 
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model is a good fit model and has statistical power. Table 8.2 shows that 
these Models are good fit models and have sufficient statistical powers.  
 Dummy 
Models 
SRMR 
Common 
Factor Model 
Confidential 
Interval of 95 
% 
SRMR 
Composite 
Model 
Confidential 
Interval of 95 % 
P
I 
Model 10a 0.069 (0.063, 0.076) 0.055 (0.049, 0.062) 
Model 10b 0.069 (0.063, 0.076) 0.055 (0.049, 0.062) 
Model 11a 0.090 (0.080, 0.102) 0.077 (0.067, 0.088) 
Model 11b 0.090 (0.080, 0.102) 0.077 (0.067, 0.088) 
Model 12a 0.118 (0.101, 0.139) 0.102 (0.087, 0.120) 
Model 12b 0.118 (0.101, 0.139) 0.102 (0.087, 0.120) 
P
A
C
 Model 13a 0.091 (0.080, 0.103) 0.053 (0.048, 0.058) 
Model 13b 0.091 (0.080, 0.103) 0.053 (0.048, 0.058) 
Model 14a 0.066 (0.061, 0.071) 0.076 (0.066, 0.088) 
Model 14b 0.066 (0.061, 0.071) 0.076 (0.066, 0.088) 
P
S
 
Model 15a 0.081 (0.071, 0.093) 0.067 (0.057, 0.079) 
Model 15b 0.081 (0.071, 0.093) 0.067 (0.057, 0.079) 
Model 16a 0.081 (0.073, 0.090) 0.067 (0.059, 0.079) 
Model 16b 0.081 (0.073, 0.090) 0.067 (0.059, 0.076) 
Model 17a 0.091 (0.080, 0.105) 0.079 (0.068, 0.092) 
Model 17b 0.091 (0.080, 0.105) 0.079 (0.068, 0.092) 
IS
 
Model 18a 0.073 (0.066, 0.081) 0.060 (0.054, 0.068) 
Model 18b 0.075 (0.068, 0.084) 0.062 (0.055, 0.071) 
Model 19a 0.072 (0.066, 0.080) 0.058 (0.052, 0.064) 
Model 19b 0.071 (0.065, 0.078) 0.056 (0.051, 0.063) 
E
S
 
Model 20a 0.095 (0.084, 0.109) 0.081 (0.071, 0.094) 
Model 20b 0.095 (0.095, 0.109) 0.081 (0.071, 0.094) 
Model 21a 0.089 (0.080, 0.101) 0.074 (0.065, 0.085) 
Model 21b 0.089 (0.080, 0.101) 0.074 (0.084, 0.115) 
Model 22a 0.097 (0.084, 0.115) 0.085 (0.072, 0.101) 
Model 22b 0.097 (0.081, 0.115) 0.085 (0.072, 0.101) 
Model 23a 0.091 (0.081, 0.104) 0.079 (0.069, 0.092) 
Model 23b 0.091 (0.081, 0.104) 0.079 (0.069, 0.092) 
P
C
R
 
Model 24a 0.068 (0.062, 0.074) 0.054 (0.048, 0.060) 
Model 24b 0.068 (0.062, 0.074) 0.054 (0.048, 0.060) 
Model 25a 0.095 (0.084, 0.109) 0.082 (0.071, 0.094) 
Model 25b 0.095 (0.084, 0.109) 0.082 (0.071, 0.094) 
Model 26a 0.118 (0.101, 0.139) 0.102 (0.087, 0.120) 
Model 26b 0.118 (0.101, 0.139) 0.102 (0.087, 0.120) 
P
P
G
 Model 27a 0.094 (0.082, 0.110) 0.080 (0.069, 0.094) 
Model 27b 0.094 (0.082, 0.110) 0.080 (0.069, 0.094) 
Model 28a 0.052 (0.047, 0.058) 0.067 (0.062, 0.073) 
Model 28b 0.052 (0.047, 0.058) 0.067 (0.062, 0.073) 
Table 8.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor and 
Composite Values of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-28b 
 
Table 8.3 displays a set of acronyms of variables that constitute the 
alternative structural model and are used in PLS-MGA reports of pairs of 
comparative dummy Models. In these reports, β (path coefficients) values 
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differences with ρ < 0.05, and ρ > 0.95 indicate that such differences are 
statistically significant120. 
Variables Acronyms 
Political Marketing-Orientation PMOa 
Political Market-Orientation PMOb 
Professional-Campaign Engagement PCE 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure PCS 
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy PATS 
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy PCS 
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy PCPS 
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy PNEMS 
Table 8.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and 
Used in the PLS-MGA reports of the Dummy Models 10a-28a and 10b-
28b 
 
8.2. The Quantitative Findings. 
Having evaluated these dummy models using PLS-MGA, this work 
revealed following findings.  
 
8.2.1. Party Ideology 
Party ideology generated significant effects of professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in Models 10a and 11a. As seen from table 8.4, this effect in 
Model 11a is significantly larger. It also produced significant effects of 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign 
personalisation strategy in Models 10a and 12a and this effect in Model 
12a is significantly larger. It also generated significant effects of 
professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-news and event 
management strategies in Models 11a and 12a. This effect in Model 11a is 
significantly larger. These demonstrate that within the specific context of 
the 2014 parliamentary election, the secular-nationalist parties were much 
more likely to advance a professionalized-campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to the secular-
                                                       
120 The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in 
the first dummy model is significantly smaller as compared to the structural path model 
value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural 
path model value in the first dummy model is significantly larger as compared to the 
structural path model value in the second dummy model. 
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Islamic parties. These parties were also much more likely to develop a 
professionalized-campaign structure and campaign personalization 
strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties.  The secular-Islamic parties 
were much more likely to implement a professionalized-news and event 
management strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties.  
Path Models Model 10a Vs. Model 
11a 
Model 10a Vs. Model 
12a 
Model 11a Vs. Model 
12a  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.020 0.385 0.134 0.082 0.114 0.142 
PMOaà PCE 0.028 0.379 0.104 0.864 0.132 0.889 
PMOaà PCS 0.105 0.889 0.117 0.887 0.012 0.544 
PMOaà PATS - 0.037 0.628 - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.031 0.638 - - 
PMObàPCS 0.054 0.284 0.134 0.074 0.081 0.230 
PCEà PCS 0.045 0.305 0.068 0.794 0.113 0.886 
PCEà PATS - 0.043 0.622 - 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.031 0.394 0.173 0.069 0.142 0.123 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.155 0.931 0.072 0.267 0.227 0.031 
PCSà PATS 0.287 0.985   
PCSà PNS 0.048 0.646 0.051 0.424 0.099 0.327 
PCSà PCPS 0.075 0.744 0.287 0.985 0.212 0.935 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.156 0.063 0.002 0.514 0.158 0.897 
Table 8.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 10a Vs. Model 11a, Model 10a Vs. 
Model 12a and Model 11a Vs. Model 12a 
 
Party ideology also produced significant effects of professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management 
strategy in Models 10b and 11b. As seen from table 8.5, this effect in 
Model 10b is significantly larger. It also led to significant effects of 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy in Model 10b and 12b. This effect in Model 10b is significantly 
larger. It also resulted in significant effects of political marketing-orientation 
on professional-campaign engagement in Models 11b and 12b. This effect 
in Model 11b is significantly smaller. It also produced significant effects of 
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professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy and professional-campaign 
engagement on professionalized-news and event management in these 
models. Such effects in Model 11b are significantly larger. These 
demonstrate that within the specific context of the 2014 presidential 
election: the secular-nationalist parties were much more likely to advance 
professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management 
strategy, as compared to the secular-Islamic parties; but, these parties 
were much less likely to advance a professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy, as compared to the Islamist parties. The secular-Islamic parties 
were much more likely to develop professionalized-news and event 
management and audiences/electorates targeting strategies, as compared 
to the Islamist parties.  
Path Models Model 10b Vs. Model 
11b 
Model 10b Vs. Model 
12b 
Model 11b Vs. Model 
12b  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Difference
s 
ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.064 0.173 0.130 0.054 0.066 0.250 
PMOaà PCE 0.056 0.275 0.123 0.917 0.179 0.955 
PMOaà PCS 0.034 0.654 0.100 0.850 0.066 0.727 
PMOaà PATS - - - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.016 0.574 - - 
PMObàPCS 0.011 0.543 0.025 0.616 0.014 0.548 
PCEà PCS 0.068 0.254 0.062 0.259 0.006 0.521 
PCEà PATS - 0.106 0.203 - 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.050 0.339 0.022 0.429 0.028 0.587 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.149 0.935 0.040 0.361 0.189 0.045 
PCSà PATS 0.269 0.982 0.063 0.326 0.332 0.018 
PCSà PNS 0.143 0.833 0.275 0.962 0.132 0.785 
PCSà PCPS 0.022 0.580 0.003 0.516 0.019 0.452 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.209 0.013 0.052 0.336 0.157 0.889 
Table 8.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 10b Vs. Model 11b, Model 10b Vs. 
Model 12b and Model 11b Vs. Model 12b 
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8.2.2. Party Age Category 
Party age category only resulted in significant effects of political 
marketing-orientation on political market-orientation in Models 13a and 
14a. As seen from table 8.6, this effect in Model 13a is significantly larger. 
This finding demonstrates that, within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election, the older political parties were much more likely to 
advance market-orientation, as compared to the younger political parties.  
Path Models Model 13a Vs. Model 14a Model 13b Vs. Model 14b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.130 0.972 0.096 0.934 
PMOaà PCE 0.041 0.686 0.071 0.803 
PMOaà PCS - 0.029 0.359 
PMOaà PATS 0.016 0.423 0.117 0.114 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.059 0.771 0.089 0.871 
PMObàPCS 0.095 0.883 0.045 0.734 
PCEà PCS 0.081 0.165 0.047 0.272 
PCEà PATS 0.039 0.626 0.111 0.849 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.099 0.808 0.126 0.879 
PCEà PNEMS 0.084 0.793 0.046 0.682 
PCSà PATS - 0.040 0.648 
PCSà PNS 0.006 0.510 0.031 0.400 
PCSà PCPS 0.009 0.463 0.081 0.223 
PCSà PNEMS 0.097 0.147 0.084 0.169 
Table 8.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 13a Vs. Model 14a and Model 13b 
Vs. Model 14b 
 
8.2.3. Party Size 
Party size generated significant effects of: a) political market-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event 
management strategy in Models 15a, 16a, 15b and 16b. As seen from 
tables 8.7 and 8.8, respectively, such effects in Model 15a and 15b are 
significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of political market-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 15a and 17a. 
This effect in Model 15a is significantly smaller. It also produced significant 
effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign 
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engagement in these Models. This effect in Model 15a is significantly 
larger. It also created significant effects of political market-orientation on 
professional-campaign engagement in Models 15b and 17b. This effect in 
Model 15b is significantly larger. It also carried significant effects of 
political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these 
Models. This effect in Model 15b is significantly smaller. It also caused 
significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 16b and 
17b. This effect in Model 17b is significantly larger. These, in general, 
demonstrate that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary 
election, the big-size political parties were much more likely to advance 
market-orientation, establish a professional-campaign and upgrade 
professionalized-campaign structure and news and event management 
strategy, as compared to either the medium- or the small-sized political 
parties. 
Path Models Model 15a Vs. Model 
16a 
Model 15a Vs. Model 
17a 
Model 16a Vs. Model 
17a  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.097 0.076 0.061 0.180 0.036 0.692 
PMOaà PCE 0.113 0.905 0.194 0.970 0.081 0.803 
PMOaà PCS - - - 
PMOaà PATS 0.038 0.353 0.081 0.758 0.118 0.849 
PMOaàPCPS - - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.173 0.019 0.187 0.028 0.014 0.445 
PMObàPCS 0.041 0.313 0.041 0.649 0.081 0.791 
PCEà PCS 0.049 0.708 0.028 0.397 0.078 0.201 
PCEà PATS 0.075 0.300 0.219 0.064 0.143 0.128 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.000 0.505 0.125 0.185 0.125 0.139 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.120 0.864 0.052 0.669 0.068 0.253 
PCSà PATS - - 0.151 0.869 
PCSà PNS 0.026 0.570 0.014 0.466 0.039 0.396 
PCSà PCPS 0.019 0.554 0.046 0.632 0.027 0.588 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.190 0.033 0.069 0.263 0.121 0.888 
Table 8.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 15a Vs. Model 16a, Model 15a Vs. 
Model 17a and Model 16a Vs. Model 17a  
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Path Models Model 15b Vs. Model 
16b 
Model 15b Vs. Model 
17b 
Model 16b Vs. Model 
17b  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.083 0.096 0.075 0.144 0.008 0.553 
PMOaà PCE 0.107 0.887 0.159 0.955 0.052 0.717 
PMOaà PCS - - 0.103 0.856 
PMOaà PATS - 0.054 0.698 - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.185 0.012 0.155 0.049 0.030 0.627 
PMObàPCS 0.042 0.704 0.091 0.837 0.049 0.703 
PCEà PCS 0.015 0.421 0.160 0.069 0.145 0.059 
PCEà PATS 0.126 0.185 0.158 0.118 0.032 0.378 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.084 0.746 0.029 0.578 0.054 0.326 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.043 0.648 0.057 0.320 0.100 0.162 
PCSà PATS 0.082 0.727 0.119 0.796 0.037 0.616 
PCSà PNS 0.202 0.907 0.059 0.628 0.144 0.182 
PCSà PCPS 0.144 0.107 0.086 0.241 0.058 0.696 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.170 0.043 0.008 0.466 0.163 0.957 
Table 8.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 15b Vs. Model 16b, Model 15b Vs. 
Model 17b and Model 16b Vs. Model 17b 
 
8.2.4. Party Experience with Internal Shock 
Party experience with internal shock generated significant effects of 
political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation, political 
market-orientation on professionalized-campaign structure, professional-
campaign engagement on professionalized-audiences/electorates 
targeting and professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
news and event management strategies in Models 18a and 19a. As seen 
from table 8.9, such effects in Model 18a are significantly larger. It also 
resulted in significant effects of political market-orientation on professional-
campaign engagement, professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management 
strategies in Models 18b and 19b. Such effects in Model 18b are 
significantly larger. These demonstrate that, within the specific contexts of 
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either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political 
parties, which were experienced with internal shock, were much more 
likely to advance market-orientation and upgrade a professionalized-
campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
and news and event management strategies, as compared to political 
parties, which lacked experience of internal shock.  
Path Models Model 18a Vs. Model 19a Model 18b Vs. Model 19b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.110 0.022 0.056 0.157 
PMOaà PCE 0.050 0.744 0.090 0.876 
PMOaà PCS -  0.054 
PMOaà PATS 0.033 0.648 0.055 0.727 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.112 0.060 0.158 0.016 
PMObàPCS 0.125 0.047 0.086 0.105 
PCEà PCS 0.128 0.962 0.102 0.910 
PCEà PATS 0.235 0.021 0.192 0.034 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.067 0.266 0.084 0.789 
PCEà PNEMS 0.075 0.789 0.143 0.938 
PCSà PATS - 0.028 0.610 
PCSà PNS 0.112 0.147 0.037 0.378 
PCSà PCPS 0.044 0.647 0.018 0.426 
PCSà PNEMS 0.162 0.027 0.175 0.017 
Table 8.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 18a Vs. Model 19a and Model 18 b 
Vs. Model 19b 
 
8.2.5. Party Experience with External Shock 
Party experience with external shock generated significant effects 
of: a) political marketing-orientation and market-orientation on 
professional-campaign engagement; and b) professional-campaign 
engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-news and event management strategy in Models 20a and 
21a. As seen from table 8.10, such effects in Model 20a are significantly 
larger. It also produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement; and b) professional-
campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign structure in Models 
20a and 22a. Such effects in Model 22a are significantly larger. It also 
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created significant effects of political marketing-orientation on 
professional-campaign engagement in Models 20a and 23a. This effect in 
Model 23a is significantly smaller. It also resulted in significant effects of 
political market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in these 
Models, but this effect in Model 20a is significantly larger. It also produced 
significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political market-
orientation; b) professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and c) professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-news and event management 
strategy in Models 21a and 22a. Such effects in Model 22a are 
significantly larger. It also led to significant effects of political engagement 
on professionalized-news and event management strategy in these 
Models, but this effect in Model 22a is significantly smaller. It also resulted 
in significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-news and event management strategy between Models 
21a and 23a. This effect in Model 21a is significantly larger. It also 
generated significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on 
market-orientation; and b) professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 22a 
and 23a. Such effects in Model 22a are significantly larger. Overall, these 
indicate that, though having no experience with external shock, political 
parties attempted to advance practices of market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 parliamentary 
election. However, political parties, which suffered from external shock 
moderately or extremely, favoured advancing such practices strategically 
much more. These parties were much more likely to upgrade market-
orientation and develop a professionalized-campaign structure and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and news and event 
management strategies, as compared to political parties, which suffered 
less from internal shock.  
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Party experience with external shock also led to significant effects 
of professional-campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign 
personalization strategy in Models 20b and 21b. This effect in Model 20b 
is significantly larger. As seen from table 8.11, it also created significant 
effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models, but this effect in 
Model 20b is significantly smaller. It resulted in significant effects of 
professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign 
structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in 
Models 21b and 22b. Such effects in Model 20b are significantly larger. It 
also produced significance effects of professional-campaign engagement 
on professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-news and 
event management strategy in Models 20b and 23b. Such effects in Model 
20b are significantly larger. It also resulted in significant effects of: a) 
political marketing-orientation on political market-orientation; and b) 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event 
management strategy in Models 21b and 22b. Such effects in Model 22b 
are significantly larger. It generated significant effects of professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 21b is significantly larger. It 
produced significant effects of: a) political market-orientation on 
professional-campaign engagement; and b) professionalized-campaign 
structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in 
Models 21b and 23b. Such effects in Model 21b are significantly larger. It 
created significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on political 
market-orientation; and b) professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 22b 
and 23b. Such effects in Model 22b are significantly larger. Overall, these 
indicate that, though having no experience with external shock, political 
parties attempt to advance practices of market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 presidential election. 
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However, political parties, which suffered from external shock moderately 
or extremely, they favoured advancing such practices strategically much 
more. In this respect, these parties are much more likely to develop 
market-orientation and upgrade professionalized-campaign structure and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalisation and news and event management strategies, as compared 
to political parties, which suffered less from external shock.   
Path Models Model 20a Vs. Model 
21a 
Model 20a Vs. Model 
22a 
Model 20a Vs. Model 
23a  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.117 0.102 0.110 0.922 0.013 0.430 
PMOaà PCE 0.252 0.992 0.225 0.964 0.293 0.995 
PMOaà PCS - - - 
PMOaà PATS - - - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.259 0.004 0.171 0.066 0.233 0.018 
PMObàPCS 0.040 0.330 0.019 0.568 0.057 0.698 
PCEà PCS 0.074 0.752 0.029 0.380 0.041 0.358 
PCEà PATS 0.022 0.573 0.319 0.962 0.019 0.472 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.019 0.472 0.102 0.735 0.066 0.355 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.223 0.021 0.002 0.517 0.042 0.632 
PCSà PATS - - 0.100 0.281 
PCSà PNS 0.023 0.433 0.170 0.822 0.021 0.442 
PCSà PCPS 0.012 0.450 0.044 0.583 0.025 0.538 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.301 0.010 0.033 0.388 0.080 0.249 
Path Models Model 21a Vs. Model 
22a 
Model 21a Vs. Model 
23a 
Model 22a Vs. Model 
23a 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.227 0.997 0.103 0.890 0.123 0.040 
PMOaà PCE 0.027 0.408 0.041 0.660 0.067 0.714 
PMOaà PCS - 0.064 0.734 - 
PMOaà PATS 0.015 0.446 0.030 0.587 0.046 0.639 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- 0.024 0.594 - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.088 0.800 0.026 0.602 0.062 0.300 
PMObàPCS 0.060 0.705 0.098 0.821 0.038 0.617 
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PCEà PCS 0.103 0.118 0.114 0.123 0.011 0.459 
PCEà PATS 0.297 0.982 0.041 0.373 0.338 0.010 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.121 0.823 0.047 0.348 0.168 0.116 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.221 0.037 0.181 0.056 0.040 0.622 
PCSà PATS - - - 
PCSà PNS 0.193 0.916 0.002 0.506 0.190 0.104 
PCSà PCPS 0.056 0.662 0.037 0.622 0.019 0.438 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.268 0.990 0.220 0.977 0.047 0.325 
Table 8.10: PLS-MGA Results of Model 20a Vs. Model 21a, Model 20a 
Vs. Model 22a, Model 20a Vs. Model 23a, Model 21a Vs. Model 22a, 
Model 21a Vs. Model 23a and Model 22a Vs. Model 23a 
  
Path Models Model 20b Vs. Model 
21b 
Model 20b Vs. Model 
22b 
Model 20b Vs. Model 
23b 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.098 0.118 0.077 0.843 0.047 0.286 
PMOaà PCE 0.141 0.095 0.010 0.532 0.079 0.768 
PMOaà PCS - - - 
PMOaà PATS - - - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.080 0.210 0.006 0.524 0.093 0.187 
PMObàPCS 0.013 0.452 0.054 0.685 0.072 0.730 
PCEà PCS 0.136 0.090 0.128 0.121 0.197 0.041 
PCEà PATS - 0.214 0.925 0.139 0.144 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.301 0.012 0.098 0.264 0.163 0.134 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.102 0.202 0.229 0.040 0.208 0.049 
PCSà PATS 0.209 0.925 0.071 0.318 0.138 0.820 
PCSà PNS 0.037 0.411 0.027 0.441 0.054 0.392 
PCSà PCPS 0.152 0.869 0.037 0.597 0.019 0.438 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.010 0.537 0.217 0.048 0.145 0.913 
Path Models Model 21b Vs. Model 
22b 
Model 21b Vs. Model 
23b 
Model 22b Vs. Model 
23b 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.174 0.991 0.050 0.735 0.124 0.048 
PMOaà PCE 0.151 0.918 0.220 0.989 0.069 0.739 
PMOaà PCS - - - 
PMOaà PATS - - - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà - - - 
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PNEMS 
PMObàPCE 0.087 0.801 0.013 0.447 0.100 0.179 
PMObàPCS 0.067 0.780 0.085 0.820 0.018 0.568 
PCEà PCS 0.008 0.530 0.061 0.279 0.069 0.266 
PCEà PATS - - 0.353 0.004 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.203 0.920 0.138 0.848 0.065 0.333 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.127 0.158 0.106 0.186 0.021 0.559 
PCSà PATS 0.280 0.015 0.071 0.296 0.209 0.935 
PCSà PNS 0.009 0.525 0.017 0.461 0.026 0.444 
PCSà PCPS 0.118 0.182 0.108 0.195 0.009 0.531 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.207 0.965 0.185 0.958 0.072 0.246 
Table 8.11: PLS-MGA Results of Model 20b Vs. Model 21b, Model 20b 
Vs. Model 22b, Model 20b Vs. Model 23b, Model 21b Vs. Model 22b, 
Model 21b Vs. Model 23b and Model 22b Vs. Model 23b 
 
8.2.6. Party Campaign Resources 
Party campaign resources led to significant effects of: a) political 
market-orientation on professionalized-campaign structure; and b) 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-news and event 
management strategy in Models 24a and 25a. As seen from table 8.12, 
such effects in Model 24a are significantly larger. It generated significant 
effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy in these Models, but this effect in 
Model 24a is significantly smaller. It also resulted in significant effects of 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign 
personalization strategy in Models 24a and 26a. This effect in Model 26a 
is significantly larger. It produced significant effects of: a) professional-
campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign personalization and 
professionalized-news and event management strategies; and b) 
professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-campaign 
personalization strategy in Models 25a and 26a. Such effects in Model 26a 
are significantly smaller. These demonstrate that political parties with a 
large amount of campaign funds were much more likely to advance 
market-orientation and develop a professionalized-campaign structure and 
news and event management strategy, as compared to political parties 
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with a medium amount of campaign funds. These parties were also much 
more likely to set up a professionalized-campaign structure and campaign 
personalisation strategy, as compared to political parties with a small 
amount of campaign funds. Political parties with a medium amount of 
campaign funds were much more likely to upgrade a professionalized-
campaign structure and professionalized-campaign personalization and 
news and event management strategies, as compared to political parties 
with a small amount of campaign funds.  
Party campaign resources also generated significant effects of 
professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign 
structure on professionalized-news and event management strategy in 
Models 24b and 25b. As seen from table 8.13, such effects in Model 24b 
are significantly larger. It produced significant effects of political market-
orientation and professional-campaign engagement in Models 24b and 
26b. This effect in Model 24b is significantly larger. It resulted in significant 
effects of professionalized-campaign structure on professionalized-
narrowcasting strategy in these Models. This effect in Model 24b is 
significantly smaller. It created significance effects of: a) political market-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement; b) professional 
campaign engagement and professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-news and event management; and c) professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in Models 25b and 26b. Such effects in Model 25b are 
significantly larger. These indicate that, within the specific context of the 
2014 presidential election, political parties with a large amount of 
campaign funds were much more likely to develop a professionalized- 
campaign structure and news and event management strategy, as 
compared to political parties with a medium amount of campaign funds. 
These parties were also much more likely to advance market-orientation, 
as compared to political parties with a small amount of campaign funds. 
Moreover, political parties with a medium amount of campaign funds were 
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much more likely to upgrade market-orientation and implement a 
professionalized-campaign structure and professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management 
strategies, as compared to political parties with a small amount of 
campaign funds.  
Path Models Model 24a Vs. Model 
25a 
Model 24a Vs. Model 
26a 
Model 25a Vs. Model 
26a  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.013 0.436 0.127 0.091 0.114 0.147 
PMOaà PCE 0.045 0.316 0.096 0.838 0.140 0.893 
PMOaà PCS - -   
PMOaà PATS - 0.018 0.563 - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.061 0.756 - - 
PMObàPCS 0.186 0.016 0.130 0.080 0.056 0.695 
PCEà PCS 0.099 0.890 0.091 0.863 0.008 0.467 
PCEà PATS 0.153 0.157 0.026 0.577 0.179 0.840 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.117 0.856 0.173 0.062 0.290 0.009 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.187 0.016 0.035 0.386 0.222 0.048 
PCSà PATS 0.262 0.957 - - 
PCSà PNS 0.010 0.541 0.079 0.354 0.089 0.349 
PCSà PCPS 0.079 0.247 0.275 0.985 0.353 0.033 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.232 0.016 0.051 0.330 0.181 0.907 
Table 8.12: PLS-MGA Results of Model 24a Vs. Model 25a, Model 24a 
Vs. Model 26a and Model 25a Vs. Model 26a 
 
Path Models Model 24b Vs. Model 
25b 
Model 24b Vs. Model 
26b 
Model 25b Vs. Model 
26b  
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
β 
Differences 
ρ 
value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.000 0.507 0.108 0.090 0.108 0.123 
PMOaà PCE 0.030 0.383 0.106 0.889 0.136 0.887 
PMOaà PCS 0.026 0.615 0.128 0.909 0.102 0.819 
PMOaà PATS - 0.005 0.514 - 
PMOaà 
PCPS 
- - - 
PMOaà PNS - - - 
PMOaà 
PNEMS 
- - - 
PMObàPCE 0.010 0.540 0.288 0.001 0.297 0.004 
PMObàPCS 0.097 0.159 0.001 0.502 0.097 0.816 
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PCEà PCS 0.066 0.747 0.066 0.248 0.131 0.133 
PCEà PATS - 0.107 0.183 - 
PCEà PNS - - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.019 0.561 0.047 0.343 0.067 0.307 
PCEà 
PNEMS 
0.221 0.032 0.036 0.371 0.257 0.011 
PCSà PATS 0.221 0.931 0.070 0.296 0.292 0.049 
PCSà PNS 0.094 0.709 0.235 0.951 0.141 0.766 
PCSà PCPS 0.009 0.474 0.031 0.602 0.039 0.608 
PCSà 
PNEMS 
0.286 0.002 0.056 0.314 0.230 0.026 
Table 8.13: PLS-MGA Results of Model 24b Vs. Model 25b, Model 24b 
Vs. Model 26b and Model 25b Vs. Model 26b 
 
8.2.7. Party Position in the Government 
Party position in the government led to significant effects of: a) 
political marketing-orientation on professional-campaign engagement and 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and b) political 
market-orientation on professional-campaign engagement in Models 27a 
and 28a. As seen from table 8.14, such effects in Model 27a are 
significantly larger. It also resulted significant effects of political marketing-
orientation on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in 
Models 27b and 28b. This effect in Model 27b is significantly larger. These 
indicate that, within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, 
the opposition parties of the SBY government were much more likely to 
advance a market-orientation and professionalized-campaign structure 
and audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to political 
parties that supported this government. Moreover, within the specific 
contexts of the 2014 presidential election, these parties were much more 
likely to advance a professionalized-campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting strategy, as compared to political parties 
that endorsed this government.  
Path Models Model 27a Vs. Model 28a Model 27b Vs. Model 28b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.037 0.277 0.015 0.401 
PMOaà PCE 0.187 0.008 0.117 0.067 
PMOaà PCS - - 
PMOaà PATS 0.240 0.017 0.213 0.029 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
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PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.032 0.647 0.007 0.524 
PMObàPCS 0.167 0.049 0.137 0.065 
PCEà PCS 0.054 0.718 0.087 0.825 
PCEà PATS 0.165 0.914 0.006 0.475 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.044 0.639 0.050 0.374 
PCEà PNEMS 0.020 0.578 0.077 0.761 
PCSà PATS - 0.131 0.878 
PCSà PNS 0.074 0.283 0.012 0.458 
PCSà PCPS 0.046 0.654 0.058 0.667 
PCSà PNEMS 0.090 0.169 0.108 0.121 
Table 8.14: PLS-MGA Results of Model 27a Vs. Model 28a and Model 27b 
Vs. Model 28b 
 
8.3. The Qualitative Findings 
8.3.1. Political and Election Regulations as Influential Factors. 
Articles No.1, Clauses No.1 and 2, No. 4, Clause 1 and No.10, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Indonesian National Constitution of 1945 
(amendment) constituted that Indonesia has to follow Republican-Unitary 
States and the presidential government systems. Being ruled under such 
systems, the elected-president took position as heads of the States and 
the government. Regarding this condition, most of these parties’ top-
leaders and public figures favoured running as a presidential candidate in 
the 2014 presidential election121. However, before they are allowed to step 
into this election race, legalities of political parties to which they are 
affiliated, as constituted by Law No.2/2011, have to be validated. These 
parties also have to comply with following regulations. 
Since the election system to vote MPs candidates of these parties 
was run based on a proportional representation system with the open-list 
candidates (as imposed by Article no.5 of Law No.8/2012), each of these 
MP candidates would have had a chance to get a parliamentary seat once 
the political party that nominated him/her for running in this election 
passed the minimum number of the parliamentary election threshold, 
which is 3.5 % of total popular votes (Article No.209). Moreover, following 
                                                       
121 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014, TR of a former General Secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and SM of PPP, 18 May 
2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014. 
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Articles No. 211 and 212 of this law, those who want to get elected in this 
election have to gain the minimum number of the ‘division number of 
voters’, which is equal with the total number of popular votes in a 
parliamentary constituency divided by the total number of parliamentary 
seats allocated in this parliamentary constituency (Article No.1, Clause 31 
of Law No.8/2012). Furthermore, Article No. 215 of this law constituted 
that any candidate who got a higher number of such votes above that 
‘division number of voters’ would automatically get a parliamentary seat. 
Additionally, the rest of the quota of parliamentary seats would be 
provided to the other MPs candidates based on a ranking of the total 
number of popular votes they collected in that parliamentary 
constituency122. 
These regulations carried consequences for the competitive 
chances of these parties and these parties’ MPs candidates in getting the 
parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary election. Such chances are 
defined by the capabilities of these parties, as an organisation, and these 
parties’ MPs candidates, as individual politicians, to gain popular votes in 
each of the parliamentary constituencies that not only pass the minimum 
number of the 2014 parliamentary threshold, but also turn into 
parliamentary seats as well. Most of the existing big-size political parties 
were commonly confident in developing such capabilities. In addressing 
this issue, AB of PDIP stated as follows. 
“We are quite sure of getting a large number of parliamentary seats 
in this election. (The main reason is) We have been supported by 
plenty of loyal and fanatical voters and activists and local leaders. 
(To accomplish this goal however) We indeed need to manage our 
resources strategically”123. 
 
                                                       
122 Article No.21 of this law stated that 560 parliamentary seats would be granted to the 
elected-MPs candidates that represented 77 parliamentary constituencies. Article No. 
215 of this law also regulated that those who got the first-largest number of votes in each 
of these parliamentary constituencies would be prioritized in getting a parliamentary seat. 
The vacant parliamentary seat would be provided to an MP candidate who obtained the 
second-largest number of votes that represent the most diverse sub-districts and/or 
villages of the parliamentary constituency. 
123 Personal interview, 11 June 2014 
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Similarly, the existing medium-size political parties, which were less 
experienced with internal and external shocks, were also quite optimistic 
of establishing such capabilities. In addressing this issue, VYM of PAN 
stated as follows. 
“This party’s leader and MPs candidates are quite sure that we 
could pass this threshold and obtain a larger number of 
parliamentary seats compared to the total number of such seats we 
achieved in the last parliamentary election ”124. 
 
In contrast, the existing medium-size political parties, which suffered from 
internal fragmentation, were quite pessimistic in advancing such 
capabilities. In addressing this issue, SM, a senior leader of PPP denoted 
as follows. 
“A few months before this election was held, some pollsters told me 
that this party would be likely to get more or less 3.5 % of popular 
votes in this parliamentary election. I personally believe that some 
of my fellows who run as MPs candidates could collect a substantial 
number of popular votes that can be turned into parliamentary 
seats. But, once this party failed in accomplishing the minimum 
number of the parliamentary threshold, they completely lost such 
seats. I therefore asked them to help this party to tackle this issue 
strategically”125. 
 
Despite developing such capabilities, political parties and these 
parties’ leaders who wanted to run as presidential candidates in the 2014 
presidential election had to deal with following regulations. Firstly, Articles 
No.1, 9 and 10 of No.8/2008 constituted that a political party or a coalition 
of political parties that want to nominate a pair of presidential candidates 
have to pass the minimum number of the 2014 presidential election 
threshold. Secondly, Articles No.2 and 3 of No.8/2008 constituted that the 
president and vice-president candidates should be elected directly by the 
Indonesian people. Following these Articles, each of these parties could 
nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential candidate for 
running in the 2014 presidential election once they had fulfilled the 
                                                       
124 Personal interview, 7 May 2014. 
125 Personal interview, 18 May 2014. 
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minimum number of this election threshold126. When failing to accomplish 
this number, each of these parties has to assemble a political coalition127.  
Such regulations systematically restrained the organizational 
resources and capabilities of the Indonesian political parties in advancing 
practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning. 
This condition led to the following party-specific and emerging factors 
determining the ways of and the degree to which these parties carried out 
such practices within and across these elections. This point is detailed as 
follows. 
 
8.3.2. The Effects of Party-Specific Factors on Marketization and 
Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political 
Parties Within and Across the 2014 Parliamentary and the 2014 
Presidential Elections. 
In facing the 2014 parliamentary election, most of these parties and 
these parties’ MPs candidates noticed that the Indonesian 
electorates/voters had been commonly associated with the secular-
nationalist or the secular-Islamic or the Islamist ideological orientations. 
PDIP, Golkar Party and Democratic Party and these parties’ MPs 
candidates exploited the first one when they developed campaign 
messages and strategies to capture the electorates that populated 
parliamentary constituencies. MPs candidates of these parties, who 
targeted large numbers of traditionalist and modernist Muslim electorates, 
also advocated moderate and tolerant Islamic values when they advanced 
the electorates targeting and campaign personalization strategies to 
persuade and capture these electorates 128 . Similarly, Gerindra Party, 
Hanura Party and Nasdem Party also undertook such efforts. However, 
while targeting these electorates, these parties and these parties’ MPs 
                                                       
126 As regulated by Article No.159 of Law No.8/2008, this number is equal with which is 
20 % of 560 parliamentary seats or 25 % of popular votes collected in the 2014 
parliamentary election 
127 Article No. 10 of Law No.8/2008 constitutes this condition. 
128 Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014. 
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candidates favoured offering populist political programmes and policies 
and advocating the importance of the establishment of a democratic social 
and economic system, which generated much more lucrative social and 
economic benefits to these electorates129. Slightly differently, PKB and 
PAN and these parties’ MPs candidates preferred advocating the second 
one to capture the electorates who believed strongly in moderate and 
tolerant Islamic values130. Since PDIP, Golkar Party, Democratic Party, 
Gerindra Party, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party and these parties’ MPs 
candidates also targeted those who accepted these values, they 
continuously advanced the electorate targeting, campaign personalization 
and news and event management strategies to approach and mobilize 
these electorates tactically131.  
Meanwhile, PKS and PPP favoured approaching and persuading 
various groups of Moslem electorates who disapproved of or were 
dissatisfied with political policies and programmes advocated by those 
who followed secular-nationalist or secular-Islamic ideological orientations. 
As the targeted modern Muslim electorates inhabited the urban areas, 
PKS and its MPs candidates developed a campaign structure and ran the 
news and event management and campaign personalisation and 
electorates/targeting strategies using the media outlets and direct 
communication method. However, while they approached modern and 
traditional Muslim electorates settled in the rural areas, PPP and its MPs 
candidates advanced such strategies using the direct communication 
technique132. 
                                                       
129 Personal interviews with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014, AM of Gerindra 
Party, 5 November 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014. 
130 Personal interview with IN, a former General Secretary of PKB, 14 May 2014. 
131 Personal interviews with IN a former General Secretary of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW, a 
Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014. 
132 Personal interviews with TR of a former General Secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014, DS 
of PKS, 12 November, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014. 
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Soon after the 2014 presidential election began, most of these 
parties realized the irrelevance of such ideological orientations133. Soon 
after they joined one of two political blocks set up by the secular-
nationalist parties (Gerindra Party and PDIP), the secular-Islamic parties 
(PAN and PKB), surprisingly, moved into the left side political spectrum. 
These parties even offered populist policies and programmes to target 
large numbers of electorates of those occupying the middle ground, 
especially, since the social and economic gaps were visible political issues 
in this election (Ambardi, TEMPO, 13 July 2014).  
Though the class-division remained in existence in Indonesian 
politics134, none of these secular-nationalist, secular-Islamic and Islamist 
parties exploited this issue strategically within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Regardless of this condition, the 
discordances of personal profiles and backgrounds of presidential 
candidates nominated by these secular-nationalist parties led, however, to 
class-sentiments taking shape within and across these electorates. For 
example, Prabowo Subijanto, a presidential candidate nominated by 
Gerindra Party and its coalition, was widely seen and labelled by these 
electorates as a representation of extraordinary, wealthy, noble and well -
educated and upper-class families. In contrast, Jokowi, a presidential 
candidate nominated by PDIP and its coalition, was widely recognized by 
these electorates as a representation of ordinary and lower middle-class 
                                                       
133 The main reason was none of these parties fulfilled the minimum number of the 
presidential election threshold. Instead of considering the similarity of ideological 
platform, they set up this coalition primarily based on political transactions with a short-
term purpose, which is to get a ticket for running as either president or a vice president 
candidates, and a long-term goal, which is to get a share of political positions in the 
executive branches of government (ministerial posts), once this coalition and its pair of 
presidential candidates won this election. Further information related with this issue would 
be discussed by point 9.3.3 of following chapter 9. 
134 Ambardi (2014) indicated that the social class sentiment was likely to exist during this 
election, but development of this sentiment was not actually triggered by the variability of 
the existing ideological orientations of and political policies and programmes offered by 
these parties and these parties’ presidential candidates. Instead, this sentiment was 
primarily prompted by awareness of the Indonesian electorates regarding the real 
existences of the social and economic disparities in the new democracy of Indonesia. 
Further discussion related to this issue, see Ambardi, TEMPO 13 July 2014. 
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families 135 . Even most of the marketers/campaigners and fanatical 
supporters of his rival disbelieved that he really came from a middle-class 
family and was not associated with the ruling elites/classes136.  
Such sentiments also took place alongside the following bigotry. 
Prabowo Subijanto was accused of having dual-citizenship, which has 
been considered illegal for Indonesian people (KOMPAS, 24 May 2014, 
Koran Tempo, 22 May 2014), while Jokowi was also negatively framed as 
a believer of Catholic principles, descended from a Singaporean-Chinese 
family (GATRA, 8 May, 2014, GATRA, 25 May 2014, KOMPAS, 28 May 
2014). In addressing such bigotry, JJ, one of leaders of Pro-Jokowi (Projo) 
voiced as follows. 
“Since Jokowi was accused of being Catholic and born from a 
Singaporean-Chinese family, some volatile Islamic electorates, 
especially inhabiting the urban West and East Java Provinces 
tended to be unlikely to cast their votes for him. Our team found this 
tendency. We got to work tactically and intensively to ensure these 
electorates that such accusations were totally invalid”137.  
 
Regardless of such developments, the Indonesian political parties, 
which were eager to nominate their top-leaders as a presidential candidate 
to run in the parliamentary election, were likely to invest their resources in 
addressing political sub-markets, especially the media competitors and 
electorates/voters and develop proficient campaign structure and 
strategies to persuade these electorates/voters. Such efforts were taken 
within more or less two years before the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. In facing these elections, Gerindra Party allocated a 
substantial amount of its funds and resources to hire political consultants, 
finance the survey research and develop and place political advertising 
programmes on the mainstream Indonesian TV Channels138. In following 
the top-down organisational approach, this party strived for managing its 
                                                       
135 Personal interview with BAS, a top-leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo),10 November 2014 
136 Personal interview with SH, an unofficial campaign team of Prabowo Subijanto 
137 Personal interview with JJ, a leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 18 November 2014. 
138 See figure 9.3 of following chapter 9, point 9.4 
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funds and resources to upgrade campaign structure and strategies, more 
specifically, the electorate targeting and campaign personalisation 
strategies139 . Similarly, Golkar Party also deployed this approach and 
developed a mechanism to finance what this party and its candidates 
called ‘an integrative marketing and campaigning programme140. However, 
although they followed this approach, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party 
lacked development this mechanism141.  
Slightly differently, PDIP favoured adopting the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches and establishing a subsequent mechanism, which 
is termed as ‘pendaan politik gotong royong’ (literally means ‘mutual aid 
funding efforts’). As regards this issue, AB, a vice-general secretary and 
an MP candidate of PDIP, voiced as follows. 
“This party favoured deploying both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches and intentionally using term ‘pendaan politik gotong 
royong’. This term, to some degree, was quite workable to ‘fire up’ 
collective efforts of its activists, officials and members in gathering 
and managing such funds and spending such funds strategically. 
Such funds were really helpful to finance marketing and campaign 
programmes of this party, its MPs and presidential candidates in 
facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections142.   
 
Like this party, PKB, PAN, PKS and PPP also adopted these approaches 
to collect campaign funds143. PKB and PAN allocated these funds to 
supporting the political advertising programmes of incumbent MPs 
candidates they nominated to target the safe seat and the non-incumbent 
                                                       
139 Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014and PL of Gerindra 
Party, 22 November 2014. 
140 Personal interview with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014. 
141 Personal interviews with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party, 
29 October 2014. 
142 Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014. 
143  Like the big-size nationalist parties (PDIP, Golkar Party, Democratic Party), the 
medium size secular-Islamic parties (PAN and PKB) also strongly favoured approaching 
political lobbyists and campaign donors as the secondary political sub-markets. Most of 
the top-leaders and senior politicians of these parties thrived on keeping stories related to 
this issue from junior politicians and ordinary MPs (candidates) of these parties, the 
media and electorates. It has been quite difficult to obtain and verify the validities of such 
stories. Regardless of this condition, point 9.4.3 of the following Chapter 9 will provide an 
example of how a secular-Islamic party, PKB, successfully persuaded campaign donors 
and professionals who had potential access to campaign donors.   
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MPs candidates they assigned to gain the marginal seats144. Despite 
intensively managing their funds to finance their marketing and campaign 
programmes, PKS and PPP approached political lobbyists and campaign 
donors to fund their marketing and campaign programmes. However, they 
lacked success in organising this effort. They were therefore reliant on 
their own resources145. 
As compared to either PKS or PPP, PAN and PKB in facing the 
2014 parliamentary and presidential elections were much more confident 
in advancing practices of market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning due to the following conditions. Not only large numbers of the 
Indonesian electorates, but also substantial numbers of political lobbyists 
and campaign donors were likely to favour accepting tolerant and 
moderate Islamic values advocated by these parties and their 
candidates146. As they believed in such values, large numbers of leaders 
of social, religious and cultural organizations endorsed these parties and 
their MPs candidates as well. These conditions, to some degree, reduced 
the total amount of campaign funds they actually needed to finance their 
marketing and campaign programmes147.  
Like these parties, the Democratic Party and Hanura Party also 
developed such practices. However, as they were supported less by these 
political sub-markets, these parties lacked success in running such 
practices. In contrast, Gerindra Party, Golkar Party and Nasdem Party 
were much more assertive in advancing such practices due to the 
                                                       
144 Personal interviews with HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July, 2015 and 
VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014. 
145  Personal interviews with DS of PKS, 12 November 2014 and ZR of PPP, 22 
September 2014. 
146 Having considered transformation of social and religious cleavages associated with 
the Indonesian political parties, Ambardi (2008: 313) positioned secular-Islamic parties 
(PKB and PAN) as a group of political parties, which have been ideologically located in 
between secular-nationalist and Islamist parties. Ideologically speaking, these parties had 
the second-largest number of the potential electoral market after the secular-nationalist 
parties and a larger number of the potential electoral market as compared to the Islamist 
parties. 
147 Personal interview with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW, a Deputy General Secretary of 
PKB, 24 July, 2015 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 
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following conditions. These parties have been strongly associated with 
various groups of political lobbyists and campaign donors. They also had 
various types and large numbers of officials and activists, who were 
experienced with the previous elections and developed a quite workable 
sharing mechanism to hire political consultants and finance marketing and 
campaign programmes to target substantial numbers of voters who settled 
in these constituencies148. 
Furthermore, the following factor also determined the ways of and 
the degree to which the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ 
candidates advanced such practices within and across these elections. 
Article No.134, point 1 of Law No.8/2012 and Article No.227 of Law 
No.42/2008 constituted that these parties and these parties’ candidates 
must report the total number of campaign funds they collected and spent 
during the elections to the Indonesian Election Commission. Regarding 
this regulation, most of these parties allocated ‘unofficial campaign funds’. 
Since these funds were not constrained by this regulation, most of these 
parties and these parties’ candidates robustly allocated such funds to 
finance ‘unofficial campaign teams’, which were commonly named as ‘tim 
sukses’  (the success team) or camouflaged as ‘relawan’ (campaign-
volunteers). Having deployed such teams, they targeted various groups of 
electorates and established proficient campaign structure and 
professionalized-electorate targeting and campaign personalisation 
strategies to capture these electorates. 
Regardless of sizes, age categories and ideological orientations of 
the political parties they affiliated, most of these parties’ candidates 
favoured deploying the clientelistic strategy in order to get substantial 
numbers of voters in the 2014 parliamentary election that could be 
extracted as parliamentary seats149. Those who had plenty of campaign 
                                                       
148 Personal interviews with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014, WA of Nasdem Party, 
29 October 2014 and AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 
149 The clientelistic strategy is widely recognized as a set of market-orientation and 
campaign strategies, which are specifically directed to persuade and capture a group of 
 
 
 
 
228 
resources employed professional consultants to target persuade and 
capture the clientelistic-voters’. However, those who had moderate 
amounts of campaign resources least preferred hiring these consultants to 
mobilize these voters. Regardless of this issue, they commonly developed 
a marketing and campaign method of what they called ‘a holistic personal-
attachment/connection approach’. This approach was actually a 
combination of competitor-orientation, voter-orientation and 
professionalized-campaign personalization and electorates targeting 
strategies directed to persuade and capture the individual local leaders 
and voters who had been strongly associated with these leaders150. Those 
who were assigned by younger parties to target the marginal seats 
harnessed this approach. In addressing this issue, PL of Gerindra party 
provided his personal testimony as follows. 
“Since 2009, this party has nominated me as an MP candidate to 
target a marginal parliamentary constituency. But, I faced the 
following problems. I am a Catholic. Also, I was not born in that 
constituency and did not have close relationships with voters and 
influential local leaders inhabiting that constituency who commonly 
followed either the Christian or the Islamic principles. Even though 
some of them were Catholic, their Catholic education system is 
really different with what I received. There were also influential 
incumbent MPs named by competitors of this party who strongly 
affiliated with such voters and leaders. Regarding such problems, 
my team and I strategically and intensively approached some of 
these voters and leaders who had been personally and emotionally 
disconnected from such MPs. I went to their houses and churches 
or mosques where they worship and chatted to each of them in 
person. I gave them my personal contact and address. I even often 
spent a few weeks in their towns or villages and immersed their 
                                                                                                                                                       
clientelistic-voters. Within the specific context of Indonesian politics, the clientelistic-
voters are widely recognized as a type of voters who have been strongly associated with 
the tribal, cultural and religious leaders who have commonly inhabited rural or remote 
districts. Extracted from personal Interview with, with AD, an activist and professional 
campaigner employed by an incumbent MP of Golkar Party 21 October 2014.  
150 This approach was specifically used to raise personal-political trust and approval of 
these leaders and voters and elevate approval of these voters for these parties’ 
candidates. This approach has been widely recognized as a workable method to collect 
substantial votes and parliamentary seats. Personal interviews with VYM of PAN, 7 May 
2014, SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 
2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 Nov 2014 and YC of Hanura 
Party, 14 May 2014. 
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conditions. I said to them that I am not a great politician; instead I 
am merely an ordinary person like them. However, I want to serve 
them and totally stand up for their interests regarding any public 
services they need once they cast their votes for me, or this party. 
This really helped me to get elected for both the first and second 
terms.”151. 
 
Further to taking such efforts, they also secretly advanced a vote-buying 
strategy and combined it with the pork-barrelling strategy to mobilize the 
‘undecided-voters and ‘reluctant’-voters’ 152.  
These parties and these parties’ leaders and candidates also 
learned from these parties’ experiences regarding internal and external 
shocks. Within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 
2014 presidential elections, the secular-nationalist parties’ leaders and 
candidates with plenty of campaign resources perceived the unimportance 
of a leadership change. Most of them, instead, favoured developing a 
workable organisational management to manage campaign resources in 
order to accomplish their goals in these elections much more153. Similarly, 
most of the secular-Islamic parties’ leaders and candidates realized that 
this change was not important since they were quite satisfied with the 
                                                       
151 Personal interview with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014. 
152 Vote-buying strategy is a set of voter-orientation and campaign strategies in which 
parties’ candidates, as supported by marketers/campaigners of these parties, secretly 
carried out political exchanges and transactions with and offered some enjoyments to the 
targeted voters with expectations that these voters cast their votes for them in these 
elections. Pork-barrelling strategy refers to a marketing and campaign strategy carried 
out by incumbent MPs candidates of political parties whereby they delivered various 
forms of social and economic incentives to diverse groups of voters. Most of these 
incumbent MPs candidates carried out this strategy to capture the ‘undecided- and 
reluctant-voters’, especially once their constituents turned into disloyal voters. The 
‘undecided-voters’ were widely recognized as a group of voters who had little trust in 
these parties and moderate trust in these parties’ candidates, but possibly cast their votes 
for these parties’ candidates during Election Day; while the ‘reluctant-voters’ were widely 
seen as a type of voters who remained uninterested in voting for these parties and these 
parties’ candidates. Personal interviews with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014, SM of PPP, 18 
May 2014, AT of PPP, 19 June 2014, DS of PKS, 12 November 2014, IN of PKB, 14 May 
2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 Nov 2014 and YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014. 
153 Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 
2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 
and YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014. 
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ways their top-leaders managed their parties154 . Most of the Islamist 
parties’ leaders and candidates, however, considered that this change is 
really important to enhance the organizational capabilities of their own 
parties in advancing market-orientation and implementing a proficient 
campaign structure and professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting, 
campaign personalization and news and event management strategies to 
achieve their goals in these elections155. 
Meanwhile, the ways these parties evaluated their experiences 
regarding the degree of external shock in the last parliamentary election 
quite varied. PDIP, Golkar Party, PKB and PAN were experienced with 
external shock. In contrast, the Democratic Party and PKS lacked any 
encounter with this external shock. Similarly, Gerindra Party Hanura Party 
and Nasdem Party lacked experience with external shock. Although they 
had diverse experiences regarding external shock, these parties in 
general, strongly considered the last parliamentary election result to 
develop such practices in facing the 2014 parliamentary election 156 . 
Surprisingly, although experienced with external shock, PPP considered 
this election result less; even though some of its MPs candidates, 
especially its incumbent MPs candidates, favoured considering this result 
to develop such practices in facing this election157. 
In facing the 2014 presidential election, most of these parties 
perceived the irrelevance of the 2009 parliamentary and presidential 
election results. The primary reason was that the patterns and degrees of 
inclinations of the electorates, the media, the media owners, campaign 
donors, political lobbyists and activists in supporting either these parties or 
                                                       
154 Personal interviews with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014, HW of PKB, 24 July 2015 and VYM 
of PAN, 7 May 2014. 
155 Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014, TR of PKS, 18 May 2014. 
156 Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 
2014, HW, a Deputy General Secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 
AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, WA of 
Nasdem Party 29 October, 2014. TR of PKS, 18 May 2014 and RP of Democratic Party, 
13 May 2014. 
157 Personal interview with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014. 
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these parties’ presidential candidates during the 2014 presidential 
election, were different compared to what they were during the 2009 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Most these political sub-markets 
considered public figures who potentially ran as presidential candidates as 
an individual person much more rather than political parties wherein such 
figures associated with as an organization158. 
Similarly, the ways these parties managed their positions in the 
government were also quite different. The ruling parties of this government 
(Democratic Party, Golkar Party, PKB, PAN, PPP and PKS) were likely to 
favour exploiting the budgetary and non-budgetary state funds. As they 
had direct access to manage these funds, these parties and these parties’ 
candidates robustly exploited these funds to create and deliver populist 
political programmes and policies directed to various groups of electorates 
they targeted159. While lacking such advantages, PDIP, Gerindra Party, 
Hanura Party and Nasdem Party had plenty of chances to evaluate and 
criticize the weaknesses of political policies and programmes carried out 
by this government. Most of the Indonesian media, political lobbyists and 
activists, campaign donors and the Internet and social media users were 
strongly aware of such weaknesses; but, most of the Indonesian 
electorates paid attention less to these weaknesses. Regarding such 
conditions, these parties exploited such weaknesses less when they 
addressed these electorates within and across these elections160. 
 
                                                       
158 Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 
2014 and PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 
159 Most of them developed the ‘clientelistic’ and ‘pork-barrelling’ strategies to capture 
these electorates. But, although they obtained such benefits, they still faced difficulties in 
fully addressing the dissatisfaction of substantial numbers of these electorates, especially 
the middle class and well-educated electorates, regarding political policies and 
programmes formulated and delivered by this government. This condition to some degree 
constrained their capabilities to strategically advance market-orientation and proficient 
campaign structures and strategies to persuade and mobilize the middle class 
electorates. Personal interviews with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014, SM of PPP, 
18 May 2014, TR of PKS, 18 May 2014 and VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 
160 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014 and YC of Hanura 
Party 14 May 2014. 
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8.3.3. The Emerging Factors 
A few months before the 2014 parliamentary election was held, the 
survey data released by prominent pollsters revealed that the electorates’ 
approval of PKB, PAN, PKS, Hanura Party and Nasdem Party and support 
of top-leaders/public figures of these parties who were running as a 
presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election had been under-
developed. Each of these parties attempted to develop market-orientation 
and upgrade campaign structure and strategies to manage this condition. 
The election result released by the Indonesian General Election 
Commissions indicated that none of these parties successfully tackled this 
condition. This commission reported that each of these parties failed in 
collecting more than 10 % of these electorates in this election. This 
commission also stated that although they obtained substantial numbers 
of popular votes and parliamentary seats, Democratic Party, Golkar Party, 
Gerindra Party and PDIP, individually, did not pass the minimum number 
of the 2014 presidential threshold (25 % of popular votes or 20 % of total 
parliamentary seats). Such developments forced them to assemble a 
political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates to run in 
the 2014 presidential election. As spelled out by following points, only 
Gerindra Party and PDIP succeeded in organizing such efforts161.  
Led by an influential top-leader, Prabowo Subijanto, Gerindra Party 
successfully persuaded the leaders of PKS, PAN and PPP to assemble a 
political coalition and nominate him as a presidential candidate for running 
in this election. Having selected Hatta Radjasa as a vice-presidential 
candidate, this party and its coalition intensively advanced market-
orientation and proficient campaign structures and strategies. Since this 
party ran such efforts strategically, the electorates’ approval of Prabowo 
                                                       
161 A full story related to the development of a political coalition established by either 
Gerindra Party or PDIP will be detailed by point 9.3.3 of following chapter 9 
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Subijanto within a few weeks before the 2014 presidential election was 
held, rocketed substantially162.  
Meanwhile, having nominated a marketable presidential candidate, 
Jokowi, PDIP approached Nasdem, PKB, Hanura Party and PKPI to 
establish a political coalition. Having successfully assembled this coalition 
and selected Jusuf Kalla as a vice presidential-candidate, this party and its 
coalition intensively persuaded and mobilized the electorates, the media 
and campaign donors163 and tactically allocated substantial amounts of 
such funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast through 
the mainstream TV Channels 164 . They also galvanised remarkable 
endorsements of campaign-volunteers, fanatical supporters, political 
lobbyists and campaign donors 165 , encouraged their members and 
activists and hired professionals to develop the ground, air and online 
wars marketing and campaign programmes strategically. Having run such 
efforts, they successfully upgraded levels of electorates’ support for Joko 
Widodo166. More importantly, they ultimately succeeded in getting him and 
his running mate elected in this election167.  
 
8.4. Conclusions and Discussions 
As stated at the outset, some authors proposed that party-specific 
factors influence a choice (that has to be) made by political parties to 
follow market-orientation and/or run professionalization of campaigning 
(Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 
2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, 
et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; 
Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, while they studied such issues 
                                                       
162 See figures 9.7 and 9.11. Further discussion about this issue will be displayed by point 
9.4.4 of following chapter 9.  
163 Further information related with this issue would be detailed by point 9.3.4 of following 
chapter 9. 
164 See figure 9.17 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4 
165 See figures 9.12, 9.13 and 9.14 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4 
166 See figures 9.11 and 9.18 of following chapter 9, point 9.3.4 
167 See figure 9.21. Point 9.4.3 of following chapter 9 would detail such issues. 
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separately, these authors lacked offering a workable conceptual 
framework to evaluate such issues holistically. Having developed this 
framework and used it to evaluate such issues within the specific context 
of the new democracy of Indonesia, this chapter reported the quantitative 
and qualitative findings, which are summarized as follows. 
The quantitative findings evidenced that the following trends take 
place in the new democracy of Indonesia. Firstly, the more secular the 
ideological orientation of political parties, the much more likely these 
parties tend to be professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure, 
audiences/electorates/targeting, campaign personalization and news and 
event management strategies within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and news and event 
management and audience/electorates targeting strategies within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election. Secondly, the older the 
ages of political parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be 
market-oriented within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary 
election. Thirdly, the bigger the size of political parties, the much more 
likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in 
terms of campaign structure and news and event management strategy 
within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 
presidential elections. Fourthly, political parties, which suffered from 
internal shock, incline to be much more market-oriented and 
professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, audiences/electorates 
targeting and news and event management strategies within these 
elections compared to political parties, which lacked suffering from this 
shock. Fifthly, as compared to political parties which suffered less from 
external shock, political parties which moderately or extremely suffered 
from external shock were much more likely to be market-oriented and 
professionalized, in terms of: campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management 
strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; 
 
 
 
 
235 
and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalisation and news and event management strategies within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election. Sixthly, the bigger the 
campaign resources of political parties, the much more likely these parties 
incline to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) 
campaign structure and news and event management and campaign 
personalization strategies within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, audiences/electorates 
targeting and news and event management strategies within the specific 
context of the 2014 presidential election. Finally, having a role as an 
opposition block to those ruled in government clearly stimulates political 
parties to be much more market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: 
a) audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of 
the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 
2014 presidential election. This indicates that magnitude and directions of 
the effects of party ideology, age category, campaign resources, position 
in the government and experience with external shock on marketization 
and professionalization of campaigning of these parties are likely to be 
determined by the type of the election. However, magnitude and direction 
of the effects of party size and experience with internal shock on 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties 
instead are unlikely to be influenced by the type of the election. These not 
only validate, but also substantiate the ideas of these authors.  
Meanwhile, the qualitative findings indicated that the existing 
political and election laws systematically restrained the organisational 
capabilities of the Indonesian political parties and personal abilities of 
these parties’ leaders and candidates in managing their own resources 
and conditions when they advanced market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning in facing the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. This condition led to party ideology, size, campaign 
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resources, position in the government and experience with internal shock 
resulting in much more visible effects on the ways of and the degree to 
which these parties advanced such practices within and across these 
elections, as compared to party age category and experience with internal 
shock. These findings demonstrated that the bigger the sizes and 
campaign resources of political parties and the more these parties 
suffered from external shock and preferred following secular ideological 
orientation and taking a role as opposition parties, the much more likely 
these parties tend to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of 
campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalization and news and event management strategies within and 
across the parliamentary and presidential elections. These clearly 
substantiate ideas of these authors as well. 
Further to this, these findings also revealed subsequent evidences 
that obviously go beyond these authors’ propositions. Firstly, the attitudes 
and behaviours of these political parties’ marketers/campaigners in 
considering the party-specific factors and running such practices, as 
displayed formerly by the quantitative findings, seem dissimilar to the 
attitudes and behaviours of these parties’ elites (leaders and candidates) 
in managing such factors and developing such practices, as exhibited 
previously by the qualitative findings. Secondly, developments of political 
marketability levels of presidential candidates nominated by these parties, 
took place as an emerging influential factor. This factor, as evidenced 
previously by the qualitative findings, was likely to determine the ways of 
and the degree to which these parties advanced such practices, especially 
in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election. Subsequently, Chapter 9 
will discuss this issue thoroughly. 
 
8.5. Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the effects of party-specific factors on 
modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and the 
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degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of the 
Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. An analytical framework was formulated and the 
survey and the in-depth interview data were extracted to explore this 
issue. The quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed, 
summarized and discussed. The party’ presidential candidate-specific 
factor, as one of emerging influential factors, was highlighted as well.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
PARTY’ PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MARKETIZATION AND 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CAMPAIGNING OF THE 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
Chapter Overview 
Some authors have proposed diverse factors that determine 
processes of marketization and (de-) professionalization of campaigning 
and levels of market-orientation and/or campaign professionalism of 
political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 2010: 28-29; 
Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 2009; 
Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher and 
Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, as they 
identified the party candidate-specific factors and components that 
construct these factors less, these authors lacked in proposing a workable 
conceptual framework needed to holistically evaluate formations of these 
factors and the effects of them on the ways of and the degree to which 
political parties in new democratic countries, those indicated by the 
candidate-centred system and ruled under the presidential government 
system, such as Indonesia, advanced such practices within and across the 
elections. Having regarded such issues, this work proposed this 
framework and deployed it to evaluate the effects of these factors on the 
ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian political parties developed 
such practices within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections (RO 6). Based on extracted survey data and in-depth interview 
data (derived from these parties’ leaders, candidates and professionals, 
campaign-volunteers and teams of and political lobbyists who worked for 
the presidential candidates), the existing political, media and election 
regulations and reports released by the Indonesian General Election and 
Broadcasting Commissions, pollsters, research centres and the media, 
especially KOMPAS and TEMPO, this work evaluated and validated 
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component that underlie such factors and explored such effects as well. 
Such efforts are detailed as follows. 
 
9.1. Formulation and Evaluation of Dummy Models As An 
Analytical Framework 
This work developed an analytical framework as follows. Firstly, the 
Indonesian political parties, which successfully nominated their top-leaders 
as a presidential candidate, are coded as 1, while the Indonesian political 
parties, which failed in accomplishing this goal, are coded as 0. Secondly, 
the Indonesian political parties, which succeeded in nominating their top-
leaders or public figures as a pair of presidential candidates, are coded as 
1, while the Indonesian political parties, which failed in achieving this goal 
are coded as 0. Finally, the Indonesian political parties, which had an 
influential presidential candidate, are coded as 1, while the Indonesian 
political parties, which lacked this candidate, are coded as 0168. Having 
undertaken such procedures and considered the type of the election 
wherein these data were collected; this work had 12 groups of samples. 
These groups are deployed to evaluate the following dummy models 
displayed by table 9.1169.  
The Party-Presidential 
Candidate-Specific 
Factors (PPSF) as 
Categorical Moderator-
Grouping Variables 
Samples in the 
Group/Unit Levels 
Dummy Models and Samples 
in the Individual Level 
The 2014 
Parliamentary 
Election 
The 2014 
Presidential 
Election 
P
P
C
S
F 
1 
Political party, which 
succeeded 
nominating its top 
leader as a 
presidential 
candidate 
PDIP and Gerindra Party  Model 29a 
(159) 
Model 29b 
(159) 
Political party, which Golkar Party, Democratic Model 30a Model 30b 
                                                       
168 An influential presidential candidate refers to a presidential candidate nominated by a 
political party, which has been highly approved of and supported by the Indonesian 
electorates within seven months before the 2014 presidential election was held. The 
survey data released by the Indonesian Circle Survey in December 2013 were used to 
determine this influential presidential candidate. 
169 This table displays that each of these dummy Models incorporates more than 180 
cases/samples, except for Model 1a and Model 1b. This condition, according to Hair et al. 
(2013: 2-3) and Hair (2014: 23-24) still meets the rule of thumb of the minimum sample 
size of PLS-SEM.  
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failed nominating its 
top leader as a 
presidential 
candidate 
Party, Nasdem Party, 
Hanura Party, PAN, PKB, 
PPP and PKS 
(558) (558) 
P
P
C
S
F 
2 
Political party, which 
succeeded 
nominating its top 
leader/public figure 
as a pair of 
presidential 
candidate 
PDIP, Gerindra Party and 
PAN 
Model 31a 
(232) 
Model 31b 
(232) 
Political party, which 
failed nominating its 
top leader/public 
figure as a pair of 
presidential 
candidate 
Golkar Party, Democratic 
Party, Nasdem Party, 
Hanura Party, PKB, PPP 
and PKS 
Model 32a 
(485) 
Model 32b 
(485) 
P
P
C
S
F 
3 
Political party that 
had an influential 
presidential 
candidate 
PDIP, Nasdem Party, 
PKB and Hanura Party 
Model 33a 
(250) 
Model 33b 
(250) 
Political party that 
lacked of having an 
influential 
presidential 
candidate 
Golkar, Democratic, 
Gerindra Party, PAN, PPP 
and PKS 
Model 34a 
(467) 
Model 34b 
(467) 
Table 9.1: Total of Samples Sizes of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 
29b-34b170 
 
This work evaluated Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) 
Common Factor Model and Composite Model of these Models. As seen 
from table 9.2, such values of Model 30a, 30b, 31a, 31b, 32a, 32b, 33a, 
33b, 34a and 34b are less than 0.10. Meanwhile, SRMR Common Factor 
Model values of Model 29a and Model 29b are slightly above 0.10 and 
SRMR Composite Model values of these models are less than 0.10. 
Based on ideas of Henseler et al. (2014), these values indicated that each 
of these models is a good fit model and has sufficient statistical power.  
Dummy 
Models 
SRMR Common 
Factor Model 
Confidence 
Interval of 95 
% 
SRMR Composite 
Model 
Confidence 
Interval of 95 
% 
Model 29a 0.102 (0.087, 0.120) 0.087 (0.074, 0.103) 
Model 29b 0.105 (0.091, 0.123) 0.090 (0.077, 0.106) 
Model 30a 0.063 (0.059, 0.068) 0.048 (0.044, 0.053) 
Model 30b 0.067 (0.062, 0.071) 0.051 (0.047, 0.056) 
Model 31a 0.091 (0.080, 0.104) 0.075 (0.065, 0.087) 
                                                       
170 PPSF 1, PPSF 2 and PPSF 3, respectively, are acronyms of the first, the second and 
the third party’ presidential candidate-specific factors.  
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Model 31b 0.092 (0.082, 0.104) 0.075 (0.066, 0.087) 
Model 32a 0.066 (0.061, 0.072) 0.052 (0.047, 0.058) 
Model 32b 0.069 (0.065, 0.075) 0.055 (0.050, 0.060) 
Model 33a 0.078 (0.070, 0.087) 0.065 (0.058, 0.073) 
Model 33b 0.087 (0.079, 0.097) 0.072 (0.065, 0.081) 
Model 34a 0.069 (0.064, 0.076) 0.055 (0.049, 0.061) 
Model 34b 0.069 (0.064, 0.075) 0.054 (0.049, 0.059) 
Table 9.2: Standard Mean Root Square (SRMR) Common Factor Model 
and Composite Model of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-34b 
 
Table 9.3 exhibits a set of acronyms of variables that construct the 
baseline model and are used in PLS-MGA reports. In these reports, β 
(path coefficients) values differences with ρ < 0.05, and ρ > 0.95 indicate 
that such differences are statistically significant171. 
Variables Acronyms 
Political Marketing-Orientation PMOa 
Political Market-Orientation PMOb 
Professional-Campaign Engagement PCE 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure PCS 
Professionalized-Audiences/Electorates Targeting Strategy PATS 
Professionalized-Narrowcasting Strategy PCS 
Professionalized-Campaign Personalization Strategy PCPS 
Professionalized-News and Event Management Strategy PNEMS 
Table 9.3: Acronyms of Variables that Construct the Baseline Model and 
Used in the PLS-MGA reports of the Dummy Models 29a-34a and 29b-
34b 
 
9.2. The Quantitative Findings. 
Having evaluated these dummy models using PLS-MGA, this work 
revealed following findings.  
 
9.2.1. The First Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor. 
The first party presidential-candidate specific factor generated 
significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professional-
campaign engagement and professionalized-audiences/electorates 
targeting strategy in Models 29a and 30a. As seen from table 9.4, such 
effects in Model 29a are significantly larger. This factor also led to 
                                                       
171 The first one demonstrates that the structural path model (β path coefficients) value in 
the first dummy model is significantly smaller as compared to the structural path model 
value in the second dummy model. In contrast, the second one shows that the structural 
path model value in the first dummy model is significantly larger, as compared to the 
structural path model value in the second dummy model. 
 
 
 
 
242 
significant effects of political marketing-orientation on professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 29b and 30b. This 
effect in Model 29b is significantly larger.  These demonstrate that within 
the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 
presidential election: political parties, which succeeded in nominating their 
top-leaders as a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 presidential 
election, favoured adopting political marketing-orientation and developing 
proficient audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more, as 
compared to political parties which failed in accomplishing this goal.  
Path Models Model 29a Vs. Model 30a Model 29b Vs. Model 30b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.029 0.322 0.062 0.182 
PMOaà PCE 0.177 0.012 0.097 0.116 
PMOaà PCS - - 
PMOaà PATS 0.154 0.047 0.170 0.048 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.007 0.464 0.014 0.435 
PMObàPCS 0.094 0.171 0.049 0.296 
PCEà PCS 0.039 0.337 0.003 0.510 
PCEà PATS 0.030 0.301 0.112 0.140 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.004 0.487 0.063 0.367 
PCEà PNEMS 0.007 0.470 0.057 0.686 
PCSà PATS - - 
PCSà PNS 0.027 0.422 0.034 0.579 
PCSà PCPS 0.143 0.100 0.077 0.281 
PCSà PNEMS 0.050 0.308 0.081 0.201 
Table 9.4: PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 30a and Model 29b 
Vs. Model 30b 
 
This factor also produced significant effects of professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in Models 30a and 30b. As displayed by table 9.5, this effect in 
Model 30a is significantly larger. This indicates that political parties, which 
lacked success in nominating their top-leaders as a presidential candidate 
to run in the 2014 presidential election, favoured advancing proficient 
campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the 
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specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election much more, as 
compared to within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.  
Path Models Model 29a Vs. Model 29b Model 30a Vs. Model 30b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.019 0.589 0.014 0.385 
PMOaà PCE 0.031 0.363 0.048 0.227 
PMOaà PCS - 0.039 0.244 
PMOaà PATS 0.011 0.475 0.026 0.346 
PMOaà PCPS - 0.014 0.589 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.005 0.522 0.002 0.486 
PMObàPCS 0.053 0.337 0.008 0.443 
PCEà PCS 0.055 0.338 0.013 0.412 
PCEà PATS 0.007 0.515 0.116 0.081 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.018 0.530 0.007 0.467 
PCEà PNEMS 0.076 0.622 0.011 0.440 
PCSà PATS - 0.153 0.046 
PCSà PNS 0.084 0.665 0.024 0.388 
PCSà PCPS 0.091 0.726 0.025 0.396 
PCSà PNEMS 0.054 0.673 0.023 0.369 
Table 9.5: PLS-MGA Results of Model 29a Vs. Model 29b and Model 30a 
Vs. Model 30b 
 
9.2.2. The Second Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor. 
The second party’ presidential candidate-specific factor generated 
significant effects of: a) political marketing-orientation on professional-
campaign engagement; and b) professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-campaign personalization and news and event 
management strategies in Models 31a and 32a. As seen from table 9.6, 
such effects in Model 31a are significantly larger. This factor also 
produced significant effects of professionalized-campaign structure on 
professionalized-narrowcasting, campaign personalization and news and 
event management strategies in Models 31b and 32b. Such effects in 
Model 31b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that compared to 
political parties, which lacked success in nominating their top-leaders or 
public figures as a pair of presidential candidates: political parties, which 
succeeded in achieving this goal, favoured advancing professionalized-
campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event 
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management strategies much more within the specific context of the 2014 
parliamentary election, and robustly upgraded a professionalized-
campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting and news and event 
management and narrowcasting strategies much more within the specific 
context of the 2014 presidential election.  
Path Models Model 31a Vs. Model 32a Model 31b Vs. Model 32b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.007 0.449 0.075 0.108 
PMOaà PCE 0.144 0.026 0.048 0.267 
PMOaà PCS - 0.017 0.421 
PMOaà PATS 0.104 0.161 0.055 0.301 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.024 0.371 0.026 0.365 
PMObàPCS 0.038 0.325 0.022 0.411 
PCEà PCS 0.028 0.362 0.023 0.397 
PCEà PATS 0.026 0.588 0.001 0.503 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.097 0.362 0.053 0.342 
PCEà PNEMS 0.055 0.343 0.076 0.238 
PCSà PATS - 0.101 0.078 
PCSà PNS 0.037 0.616 0.135 0.031 
PCSà PCPS 0.183 0.042 0.114 0.042 
PCSà PNEMS 0.161 0.048 0.121 0.038 
Table 9.6: PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 32a and Model 31b 
Vs. Model 32b 
 
This factor also generated significant effects of professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in Models 32a and Model 32b. As displayed by table 9.7, this 
effect in Model 32b is significantly larger. This finding indicates that 
political parties, which lacked success in nominating their top-leaders or 
public figures as a pair of presidential candidates for running in the 2014 
presidential election, favoured advancing a proficient campaign structure 
and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election, as compared to within 
the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election 
Path Models Model 31a Vs. Model 31b Model 32a Vs. Model 32b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.037 0.695 0.031 0.269 
PMOaà PCE 0.033 0.341 0.063 0.719 
 
 
 
 
245 
PMOaà PCS - 0.032 0.315 
PMOaà PATS 0.051 0.350 0.003 0.482 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.000 0.503 0.002 0.490 
PMObàPCS 0.050 0.317 0.010 0.432 
PCEà PCS 0.073 0.241 0.022 0.362 
PCEà PATS 0.073 0.280 0.098 0.132 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.028 0.419 0.016 0.434 
PCEà PNEMS 0.069 0.284 0.009 0.452 
PCSà PATS - 0.129 0.952 
PCSà PNS 0.103 0.746 0.005 0.475 
PCSà PCPS 0.072 0.730 0.003 0.487 
PCSà PNEMS 0.054 0.677 0.013 0.433 
Table 9.7: PLS-MGA Results of Model 31a Vs. Model 31b and Model 32a 
Vs. Model 32b 
 
9.2.3. The Third Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor. 
The third party’ presidential candidate-specific factor generated 
significant effects of professional-campaign engagement on 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy in Models 33a 
and 34b. As seen from table 9.8, this effect in model 34 is significantly 
larger. This factor produced significant effects of: a) political marketing-
orientation on professional-campaign engagement and 
audiences/electorates targeting strategy; and b) professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-campaign personalization strategy 
in Models 33b and 34b. Such effects in Model 33b are significantly larger. 
These demonstrate that as compared to political parties, which failed in 
having an influential presidential candidate: political parties, which had this 
candidate, were much less likely to advance professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election; but these parties are much more likely to 
advance and combine this strategy with a campaign personalisation 
strategy within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election.  
Path Models Model 33a Vs. Model 34a Model 33b Vs. Model 34b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.040 0.238 0.038 0.733 
PMOaà PCE 0.007 0.465 0.106 0.041 
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PMOaà PCS - - 
PMOaà PATS 0.040 0.330 0.113 0.038 
PMOaà PCPS 0.041 0.315 - 
PMOaà PNS - - 
PMOaà PNEMS - - 
PMObàPCE 0.024 0.380 0.011 0.561 
PMObàPCS 0.001 0.497 0.007 0.538 
PCEà PCS 0.053 0.248 0.065 0.207 
PCEà PATS 0.153 0.960 0.038 0.646 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.100 0.837 0.145 0.032 
PCEà PNEMS 0.100 0.858 0.014 0.660 
PCSà PATS 0.125 0.847 0.013 0.543 
PCSà PNS 0.082 0.787 0.019 0.572 
PCSà PCPS 0.032 0.395 0.010 0.462 
PCSà PNEMS 0.041 0.315 0.027 0.373 
Table 9.8: PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 34a and Model 33b 
Vs. Model 34b 
 
This factor also produced significant effects of professional-
campaign engagement on professionalized-campaign personalization 
strategy in Models 33a and 33b. As exhibited by table 9.9, this effect in 
Model 33b is significantly larger. This factor also resulted in significant 
effects of professional-campaign engagement and professionalized-
campaign structure on professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy in Models 34a and 34b. As charted by this table, such effects in 
Model 34b are significantly larger. These demonstrate that, across the 
2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, both of the political parties, 
which succeeded in having an influential presidential candidate (1) and 
political parties which lacked of success in having this candidate (2), 
strongly engaged in establishing elements of professionalization of 
campaigning. However, the ways of, and the degree to which, these 
parties prioritized and advanced such elements across these elections 
were quite dissimilar. In this respect, the first one favoured advancing a 
professionalized-campaign personalization strategy much more, while the 
second one preferred developing a professionalized-campaign structure 
and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more. 
Path Models Model 33a Vs. Model 33b Model 34a Vs. Model 34b 
β Differences ρ value β Differences ρ value 
PMOaàPMOb 0.059 0.179 0.004 0.529 
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PMOaà PCE 0.092 0.838 0.003 0.518 
PMOaà PCS - 0.061 0.834 
PMOaà PATS 0.015 0.560 0.063 0.190 
PMOaà PCPS - - 
PMOaà PNS - 0.045 0.711 
PMOaà PNEMS 0.053 0.256 - 
PMObàPCE 0.020 0.413 0.014 0.590 
PMObàPCS 0.021 0.411 0.022 0.351 
PCEà PCS 0.026 0.386 0.015 0.406 
PCEà PATS 0.047 0.340 0.159 0.955 
PCEà PNS - - 
PCEà PCPS 0.163 0.960 0.064 0.252 
PCEà PNEMS 0.039 0.661 0.036 0.341 
PCSà PATS 0.078 0.728 0.211 0.986 
PCSà PNS 0.001 0.503 0.067 0.742 
PCSà PCPS 0.027 0.399 0.039 0.349 
PCSà PNEMS 0.036 0.662 0.014 0.566 
Table 9.9: PLS-MGA Results of Model 33a Vs. Model 33b and Model 34a 
Vs. Model 34b 
 
9.3. The Qualitative Findings 
9.3.1. Structural Conditions that Led to Formations of the Party’ 
Presidential Candidate-Specific Factor. 
As stated previously in Chapter 4, the direct election systems to 
vote for MPs and a pair of presidential candidates, respectively, had been 
implemented in Indonesian politics since 2004 and 2009. Implementations 
of such systems led to the following developments taking place within and 
across the primary and secondary political sub-markets of these parties. 
As indicated by transformation of party ID charted by following figure 9.1, 
political partisanship of the electorates, as a primary political sub-market of 
political parties, had been declining constantly. Further to this, political 
trust and support of the electorates for these parties also shrunk 
substantially (KOMPAS, 5 January 2014; KOMPAS, 9 February 2014). 
Instead of paying close attention to the work performances of these parties 
as an organization, most of these electorates had been much more 
attentive to personal qualities and work performances of these parties’ 
prominent leaders, politicians and figures as individual politicians. These 
not only changed the roles of these parties in the Indonesian political 
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spheres172, but also transformed the relationships between and among the 
secondary political sub-markets of these parties (the media, the Internet 
and social media users, the media owners, political lobbyists, campaign 
donors, the affiliated and unaffiliated political leaders and activists and 
campaign-volunteers) and these parties’ leaders, politicians and figures, 
especially those who were eager to be or (potentially) being nominated as 
presidential candidates to run in the 2014 presidential election173.  
 
Source: Survey Data collected by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survey 
Indonesia) and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) in between May 2011 
and September 2013. 
 
These conditions led to the personal qualities and leadership styles 
of these parties’ leaders, politicians and figures taking shape as an 
influential factor. This factor determined inclinations of these political sub-
markets to either endorse or undermine of each of these parties’ leaders, 
politicians and figures, especially those who stepped into the presidential 
election race174. This factor paved the way for formations of personal 
                                                       
172 Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014, RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 
2014, AM of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014, YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014, SM of 
PPP, 18 May 2014, VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party 29 October, 
2014. 
173 Personal interviews with PSL of JSI, 12 October 2014, DBS of Berita Satu TV, 15 
October 2014, SP of METRO TV, 31 October 2014, MQ of Indo Barometer, 19 May 2014, 
AZ of TEMPO, 21 October 2014 and PS of Trans 7, 23 September 2014. 
174 Such predilections were quite predictable and assessable. The Indonesian political 
parties with plenty of robust organizational resources commonly hired political consultants 
and strategists to evaluate such predilections. Personal interviews with USB of LSN, 14 
May 2014, T of SMRC, 21 October 2014, EK of JSI, 13 October 2014, RK of Viva News, 
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Figure 9.1: Levels of Party ID of the Indonesian 
Electorates in Between May 2011 and September 2013 
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political gravitational and magnetism powers of each of these parties’ 
leaders, politicians to attract and capture these political sub-markets175. As 
detailed by following points, such powers constructed the political 
marketability level of each of these parties’ leaders, politicians and figures 
and carried consequences for the ways of and the degree to which these 
parties advanced market-orientation and campaign professionalism within 
and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
9.3.2. Formations of Political Marketability Levels of the Indonesian 
Political Parties’ Presidential Candidates and Their Effects on 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning of 
These Parties Within the Specific Context of the 2014 
Parliamentary Election.  
Two years before the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, a 
top-leader of Golkar Party, Aburizal Bakrie (ARB), decided to run in the 
2014 presidential election. This party organized a series of workshops to 
address the electorates/voters and the media and manage the competitors. 
This party intensively managed its members, activists and officials and 
approached political lobbyists and campaign donors as well176. This party 
also hired some political pollsters and consultants to advance its campaign 
structure and strategies. Supported by these pollsters and consultants, 
this party continuously marketed and promoted ARB as a presidential 
candidate. Together with its MPs candidates, this party advanced a 
proficient campaign structure and professionalized-electorate targeting, 
campaign personalisation and news and event management strategies to 
                                                                                                                                                       
26 September 2014, RB of KOMPAS, 12 November, 2014, SR of Okezone.com, 10 
October 2014 
175 Personal interviews with MQ of Indo Barometer, 19 May 2014, PSL of JSI, 12 October 
2014, AZ of TEMPO, 21 October 2014, UK of Media Indonesia, 20 October 2014 and 
YAN of KOMPAS TV, 6 November 2014 
176 Personal interview with IJP of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014 
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persuade the electorates, mobilize political leaders and activists and 
manage the media177.  
 Similarly, Gerindra Party also intensively addressed and managed 
these political sub-markets since its top-leader and founder, Prabowo 
Subijanto, to run as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential 
election 178 . Further to hiring some political consultants, this party 
organized training and meetings in a special place near Prabowo 
Subijanto’s house. Such efforts were directed to improve the political 
marketing management and campaigning knowledge and skills of its MPs 
candidates and local activists and officials (Hidayat and Widjaya, TEMPO, 
20 April 2014). This party also advanced a set of direct communication 
strategies to persuade and mobilize leaders of Islamic leaders who had 
been politically influential among a large number of Moslem electorates 
inhabiting the rural and urban areas of the Indonesian Provinces, 
especially those located on Java Island (Agustina, et al., TEMPO, 13 April, 
2014).  
 
Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014. 
                                                       
177 Personal interview with RCA, 16 December 2016 
178 Personal interview with AM of Gerindra Party, Personal interview, 5 November 2014 
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Source: The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, 2014179 
 
Each of these parties, as seen from figures 9.2 and 9.3, 
respectively, collected and spent substantial amounts of official campaign 
funds and allocated substantial funds to finance political advertising 
programmes broadcast through the Indonesian TV channels. Gerindra 
Party, between 15 March 2014 and 5 April 2014, put out the larger number 
of political advertising programmes. Golkar Party conversely, favoured 
developing the ground war marketing and campaigning programmes much 
more to persuade and capture the electorates populating the 
parliamentary constituencies180. As the political marketability levels of the 
presidential candidates of these parties remained under-developed, both 
of these parties succeeded less in accomplishing their goals in the 2014 
parliamentary election181.  
                                                       
179 11 Indonesian televisions include RCTI, SCTV, MNC TV, INDOSIAR, ANTV, TRANS 
TV, METRO TV, TRANS 7, GLOBAL TV, TV One and TVRI 
180 Personal interview with RCA of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014. 
181 While they targeted collecting 30 % of popular votes in this election (KOMPAS, 13 
April 2014), Golkar party only obtained 14.75 % of popular votes and 91 parliamentary 
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In a slightly similar way, the Democratic Party exploited the positive 
personal image of its populist leader, Susilo Bambambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) to captive these political sub-markets. As validated by most of the 
Indonesian pollsters, he still had substantial personal political gravitation 
and magnetism powers to attract the electorates, non-affiliated political 
activists, campaign donors and the media. However, as imposed by Law 
No.48/2008, he was prohibited from running as a presidential candidate, 
for the third-time. While this party lacked an influential and marketable 
presidential candidate, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), as 
displayed previously by point 7.3.2 of Chapter 7, suddenly named its 
prominent public figures of being involved in some mega corruption cases. 
This condition substantially deteriorated the levels of trust and support of 
political sub-markets, especially the electorates, the mainstream media 
and the Internet and social media users, for this party and its MPs 
candidates182.  
Regarding such conditions, between 22 September 2013 and the 
end of March 2014, this party had been organizing a presidential primary 
election. This party, as seen from figures 9.2 and 9.3, respectively, 
actually succeeded in collecting quite substantial amounts of campaign 
funds and allocated a considerable amount of these funds to finance 
political advertising programmes broadcast by Indonesian TV channels in 
between 15 March and 5 April 2014. Although they undertook such efforts, 
this party merely obtained 10.19 % of popular votes and 61 parliamentary 
seats in this election. These seats, as seen from figure 9.4, represented 
more than 60 % of parliamentary constituencies located in 33 Indonesian 
provinces. However, as charted by figures 9.5 and 9.6, such votes and 
seats are obviously smaller, as compared to the total number of popular 
votes and parliamentary seats this party gathered in the 2009 
                                                                                                                                                       
seats in this election. Similarly, whilst expected to get more than 20 % of popular votes 
and 100 parliamentary seats in this election (Personal interview with AM of Gerindra 
Party, 5 November 2014), Gerindra Party merely collected 11.81 % of popular votes and 
73 parliamentary seats in this election. 
182 Personal interview with RP of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 
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parliamentary election. Having regarded such conditions, this party did not 
assemble a political coalition and nominate a presidential candidate to run 
in the 2014 presidential election183.  
Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014.  
                                                       
183  In the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, prominent figures of this party 
gradually fragmented into two groups. The first group endorsed Jokowi of PDIP, while the 
second group supported Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party (Candra, TEMPO, 20 April 
2014). But, two weeks before the 2014 presidential election was conducted, this party 
officially joined a coalition established by Gerindra Party. Following point 9.4.2 will detail 
this issue. 
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Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2009 and 2014. 
 
 
Source: the Indonesian General Election Commission, 2009 and 2014. 
 
Meanwhile, Hanura Party took the following efforts. Personally 
directed by its top-leader, Wiranto, this party addressed campaign donors 
and the mainstream media (owners). Ten months before the 2014 
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Tanoesoedibyo (HT), a media baron who owned MNC Groups (RCTI, 
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Wiranto as a presidential candidate (KOMPAS, 3 July 2013). Supported by 
this media baron, this party intensively marketed Wiranto-Harry 
Tanoesoedibyo (Win-HT), as a pair of presidential candidates, and 
harnessed the mainstream media, especially MNC TV, RCTI and Global 
TV, a group of TV channels owned by HT to persuade and mobilize the 
electorates/voters. This party allocated substantial amounts of its 
campaign funds to finance political advertising programmes broadcast 
primarily by these TV channels. As showcased previously by figure 9.3, 
these TV channels, together with 8 Indonesian TV channels, had been 
placing substantial spots of political advertising programmes of this party 
in between 15 March and 5 April 2014.  
This party expected that such efforts could elevate not only the 
political marketability level of this pair of presidential candidates, but also 
the electorates’ approval of and support for this party and its MPs 
candidates184. Unfortunately, since such efforts had been less workable, 
this party, as seen from figures 9.5 and 9.6, merely got 5.26 % of popular 
votes and obtained only 16 parliamentary seats in this election. This 
condition completely diminished the competitive chance of its top-leader, 
Wiranto, to get a presidential ticket. In the aftermath of this election, this 
party was approached by Golkar Party to assemble a coalition and 
nominate Aburizal Bakrie as a presidential candidate to run in the 2014 
presidential election (Paraqbueq and Purnomo, TEMPO, 20 April 2014). 
However, this party ultimately joined a political block set up by PDIP. 
PDIP was much more concerned with evaluating the development 
of political marketability levels of its top-leader, Megawati Soekarnoputri, 
and its prominent public figure, Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Since they 
considered that levels of endorsement of the electorates, campaign-
volunteers, the mainstream media and the Internet and social media 
users, political lobbyists and campaign donors to this party had been 
strongly related to the degree of political marketability of Jokowi, most of 
                                                       
184 Personal interview with YC of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014 
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the influential leaders of this party favoured nominating him as its 
presidential candidate. Nonetheless, they carefully considered the right 
time to announce his candidacy to make sure that his personal political 
magnetism could fully generate the ‘spiralling electoral-effect’ that 
benefited this party and its MPs candidates who would run in the 2014 
parliamentary election185. As they noticed this ‘(Jokowi) effect’ existed, this 
party officially announced his presidential candidacy on 14 March 2014, 
four weeks before this election was being held on 9 July 2014186. 
Three months before Jokowi ran in this election, some pollsters had 
been very curious to detect whether this effect was real or merely existed 
as a political illusion187. A few weeks after he stepped into the presidential 
election race officially, two of these pollsters, Charta Politika and Indikator 
Politik Indonesia, validated that this effect was quite visible and likely to be 
elevating political support of the electorates for this party and its MPs 
candidates as well188. However, slightly differently from these pollsters, 
Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) revealed that this effect 
was less visible and unlikely to be upgrading such support189. While they 
                                                       
185 Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 
186 Personal interview with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 
187 One of them was Indo Barometer. As they carried out the multistage random sampling 
technique and ran the survey experimental procedure, this pollster had been collecting 
survey data in between 4 and 15 February 2014 drawn from 1200 respondents that 
represented electorates populated in 33 Indonesian Provinces. This pollster revealed that 
if this party did not name him as a presidential candidate before this election was held, 
this party was likely to get 28.8 % of popular votes. But, if this party nominated him as a 
presidential candidate, this party was likely to gather 25.8 % of popular votes (Indo 
Barometer, 2014). 
188 As they ran a survey using a multistage random sampling and a set of samples that 
represent the Indonesian electorates populated in 33 Indonesian Provinces, Charta 
Politika predicted that this effect was likely to elevate the levels of electorates’ approval of 
this party up to more or less 30 % (Sutrisno, DetikNews, 3 March 2014). Meanwhile, as 
they took that sampling technique and carried out an experimental survey procedure, 
Indikator Politik Indonesia (the Indonesian Political Indicator) and the Indonesian Institute 
uncovered that if this party did not officially announce him as a presidential candidate, 
this party was likely to get 14 % popular votes. But, if this party publicly named him as a 
presidential candidate, this party was likely to obtain 27 % of popular votes (Muhtadi, 
TEMPO, 20 April 2014). 
189 This pollster found evidences that indicated that the levels of electorates’ approval of 
this party slightly increased from 15 % in February 2014 to 21 % in the third week of 
March 2014 (KOMPAS, 3 April 2014). But, this pollster argued that it was not Jokowi’ 
candidacy that propelled this development. Instead, it was the decreasing number of the 
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expected that the Jokowi’ candidacy could upgrade such support, this 
party targeted collection of at least 27 % of popular votes in this election 
(Agustina, et al., TEMPO, 20 April 2014). Unfortunately, this party 
ultimately obtained 18.95 % of popular votes and 109 parliamentary seats 
in this election; such votes and seats, as seen from figures 9.5 and 9.6, 
were slightly larger, as compared to what this party obtained in the 2009 
parliamentary election190.  
Nasdem Party addressed fewer campaign donors and political 
lobbyists as secondary political sub-markets. This party, otherwise, 
primarily addressed the electorates, as a primary political sub-market and 
the media, the Internet and social media users and political leaders and 
activists, as secondary political sub-markets. This party favoured taking 
such efforts since its top-leader, Surya Paloh, one of the influential media 
barons, personally favoured securing its campaign resources and 
supporting its political advertising programmes191. As charted by figure 9.3, 
this TV channel, together with 10 Indonesian TV channels, placed a 
considerable number of political advertising programmes for this party 
between 15 March and 5 April 2014. While lacking a marketable 
presidential candidate, this party continuously encouraged its members, 
activists and officials, managed the voters, the media and its competitors 
and advanced a professionalized-campaign structure and proficient news 
and event management and electorates targeting strategies as well. Whilst 
combining such strategies with campaign personalisation strategy, some 
of this party’ MPs candidates, surprisingly, preferred exploiting the 
                                                                                                                                                       
non-voters and the increasing inclination of some of these voters to vote for this party and 
its MPs candidates that led this development to take place (the Jakarta Post, 4 April 
2014). 
190 Some argued that the ‘Jokowi effect’ actually took place in this election. But, its 
magnitude was quite small due to the following factors. Firstly, the implementation of the 
open list electoral system led to each of the MPs candidates of the Indonesian political 
parties, including this party, favouring developing their own campaign programmes and 
strategies rather than their parties’ marketing programmes and strategies. Secondly, this 
party lacked success in capitalizing power of the personal quality and leadership style of 
Jokowi (Aspinall, Newmandala, 10 April 2014; Fatah, KOMPAS, 9 April 2014). 
191 Personal interview with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 
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personal political gravitational and magnetism powers of Jokowi to attract, 
persuade and capture voters of those occupying in the middle ground192. 
In undertaking such efforts, this party and its MPs candidates successfully 
obtained 6.72 % of popular votes in this election. Under the Indonesian 
(extreme) multi-party system, these votes are actually quite substantial for 
a new political party. However, since a large number of these votes, as 
imposed by this election regulation, cannot be extracted as parliamentary 
seats, this party merely got 36 parliamentary seats. 
Meanwhile, PAN were much more engaged in targeting the 
electorates, especially the modern Moslem electorates who populated the 
urban areas, as a primary political sub-market and addressing the 
mainstream media and the Internet and social media users, political 
leaders and activists, campaign donors and lobbyists, as secondary 
political sub-markets. Since its top-leader, Hatta Radjasa expected to get 
a vice-presidential ticket this party hired professional consultants and 
pollsters to advance the campaign structure and strategies and called for 
its MPs candidates to strongly upgrade their own marketing and campaign 
programmes and strategies193. Since political marketability of its leader as 
either a president or vice-presidential candidate, as reported by such 
pollsters, remained under-developed, this party only collected 7.59 % of 
popular votes and 48 parliamentary seats in this election. In the wake of 
this election, this party approached the secular-nationalist parties with 
highly marketable presidential candidates, which are PDIP and Gerindra 
Party. However, since PDIP were unlikely to nominate its top-leader as a 
vice-presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election, this party 
finally joined a political coalition established by Gerindra Party, which 
offered its top-leader a vice-presidential ticket (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 25 
May 2014). 
                                                       
192 Personal interview with WA of Nasdem Party, 29 October 2014 
193 This party expected that as they got substantial numbers of these seats, this party 
would had a good standing position to join the right coalition set up by the other political 
parties, which was pleased to nominate its top-leader, as a vice presidential-candidate. 
Personal interview with VYM of PAN, 7 May 2014 
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In the meantime, PKB preferred addressing the electorates much 
more, especially traditional Moslem electorates populating the rural areas 
that were strongly associated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest 
Islamic organization in Indonesia, as a primary political sub-market. To this 
end, this party exploited the personal political magnetism power of 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), a former Indonesian President (1999-
2001), an influential leader of NU (1984-1999) and founder of this party, to 
persuade and capture these electorates194. This party also hired political 
consultants to supervise marketing and campaign programmes carried out 
by its MPs candidates. This effort was taken to help its MPs candidates in 
grasping support of various groups of electorates, especially those who 
were strongly appreciative of the outstanding ideas and personal character 
of Abdurrahman Wahid195.  
Instead of approaching the mainstream media owners and the 
Internet and social media users, this party prioritized addressing political 
lobbyists, professionals and campaign donors much more. This party 
successfully persuaded some businessmen, such as Eko Putro Sandjojo, 
a former executive director of HUMPUSS, a corporation owned by Tommy 
Soeharto, a son of President Soeharto, to join this party, and Rusdi 
Kirana, an owner of Lion Air, the biggest low-cost Indonesian airlines 
corporation, to take a position as a deputy chairman of this party. The last 
one, as reported by Septian, et al. (2014), donated 40 Milliard IDR to 
finance political advertising programmes of this party broadcast by some 
prominent Indonesian TV Channels, and spent 30 Milliard IDR to shore up 
campaign programmes carried out by its outstanding MPs candidates who 
wanted to win the marginal seats. After these efforts, this party ultimately 
got 9.04 % of popular votes and 47 parliamentary seats in this election. 
When compared to what this party gathered in the 2009 parliamentary 
election, such numbers of votes and seats, as seen from figures 9.5 and 
                                                       
194 Personal interview with IN of PKB, 14 May 2014 
195 Personal interviews with HW of PKB, 24 July, 2015 and T, a political consultant of 
SMRC hired by PKB, 21 October 2014 
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9.6, were substantially larger. Having realized that the political 
marketability level of Joko Widodo developed substantially, this party, in 
the wake of that election, joined a political coalition established by 
PDIP196.  
Unlike these parties, PPP addressed the media, campaign-
volunteers, mainstream media owners, campaign donors and lobbyists 
less as secondary political sub-markets. This party instead, merely 
focused on persuading Moslem electorates populating either the rural or 
urban areas197. A decision made by its top-leader, Surya Dharma Ali 
(SDA), to endorse Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party as a presidential 
candidate led to an internal-fragmentation taking place within this party. 
This fragmentation was unmanageable, especially since the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) named SDA as a suspect of corruption in 
the case of the state funds allocated to the hajj pilgrimage programme 
covering the financial years 2010-2013 (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 8 June 
2014).  
Similarly, PKS prioritized addressing the Moslem electorates as 
well. However, in a slight contrast to PPP, this party focused on targeting 
the Moslem electorates populated in the urban areas much more, as a 
primary political sub-market. Further, this party also intensively 
approached the mainstream media and Internet and social media users, 
as secondary political sub-markets. This party robustly carried out such 
efforts, especially since KPK named its top-leader on 29 January 2013 as 
being involved in the bribery case198.  
Both PKS and PPP suffered badly from increasing numbers of 
negative publications regarding the personal profiles of their top-leaders 
                                                       
196  This party expected PDIP to be pleased to nominate its top-leader, Muhaimin 
Iskandar, as a vice-presidential candidate, paired with Joko Widodo for running in the 
2014 presidential election. Unfortunately, this party failed accomplishing this goal 
(Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 27 April 2014). 
197 Personal interviews with SM of PPP, 18 May 2014 and ZR of PPP, 22 September 
2014 
198 Personal interviews with TR, a former general secretary of PKS, 18 May 2014 and DS, 
a leader of PKS, 12 November 2014 
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who had been accused of being involved in these corruption cases. As this 
revealed that such cases undermined levels of the electorates’ support of 
these parties, most of the prominent Indonesian pollsters predicted that 
each of these parties was unlikely pass the minimum number of the 2014 
parliamentary election threshold (3.5 % of popular votes collected in this 
election). Regarding this condition, each of them attempted to advance 
their campaign structure and strategies. After such efforts, PKS finally 
collected 6.79 % of popular votes and 40 parliamentary seats, while PPP 
ultimately gathered 6.53 % of popular votes and 39 parliamentary seats. 
Having regarded the numbers of these votes and seats, both of them 
decided on taking a coalition set up by Gerindra Party199. 
 
9.3.3. Transformations of Political Marketability Levels of the 
Indonesian Political Parties’ Presidential Candidates and Their 
Effects on Formation of Political Blocks and Nominations of 
Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Ran in the 2014 
Presidential Election. 
In the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, the Indonesian 
political parties gradually polarized into two political blocks: PDIP 
established the first one, while Gerindra Party organized the second one. 
Though they successfully assembled a political block, each of these 
parties encountered the following problems. The first one was how to 
develop a set of criteria to select the best vice-presidential candidate. The 
second one was how to define a mode of decision to fairly share a vice-
presidential ticket with its coalitions200. The following stories detail the 
ways these parties attempted to manage such problems tactically. 
As it was considered that the political marketability level of Prabowo 
Subijanto remained at a low level, Gerindra Party sought a marketable 
                                                       
199 Each of these parties actually expected to get a vice-presidential ticket. But, none of 
these parties got this ticket 
200 Personal interviews with PL of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2014, PLG, a political 
consultant of JSI hired by this party, 12 October 2014 and IB, a political strategist hired by 
PDIP, 30 October 2014 
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vice-presidential candidate. Leaders of this party took the following efforts 
to accomplish this goal. Firstly, Prabowo Subijanto, a top-leader and a 
presidential candidate of this party, really favoured nominating a prominent 
public figure of PDIP, Jokowi, as a vice-presidential candidate 201 . 
However, soon after its primary rival, PDIP, named him as its presidential 
candidate on 14 March 2014 and started approaching Nasdem Party and 
PKB to form a political coalition, this party sought and selected several 
popular and influential public figures and continuously evaluated the 
degree of the electorates’ approval and endorsement of these figures202.  
Secondly, Prabowo Subijanto also personally appointed Ahmad 
Muzani (AM) and Fadli Zon (FZ), a general secretary and deputy chairman 
of this party, respectively, to persuade top-leaders of the other political 
parties to formulate a political coalition and select and nominate a 
prospective vice-presidential candidate. They communicated intensively 
with Hatta Radjasa, Zulkifli Hasan and Taufik Kurniawan of PAN and 
strived to organize a special meeting with prominent leaders of PKS and 
PPP to make sure that these parties were pleased to join this coalition. 
Further, they also approached top-leaders of Golkar Party and the 
                                                       
201 This expectation was formulated due to the following historical reasons. Firstly, in the 
2009 presidential election, a top-leader of this party and a top-leader of PDIP signed the 
‘Batu Tulis Agreement’. As imposed by this agreement, Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra 
Party was pleased to run as a vice-presidential candidate, paired with Megawati 
Soekarnoputri of PDIP who ran as a presidential candidate in that election with the 
following ‘condition’. If these parties failed in that election, they would take a position as 
opposition parties of the second-term of SBY’ government and assemble a political 
coalition to nominate him as a presidential candidate for running in the 2014 presidential 
election. Secondly, three years later, he, together with some influential public figures, also 
ensured that Megawati Soekarnoputri nominated Jokowi, at that time, a Mayor of Solo 
Regency, Central Java, as a candidate for governor to run in the 2012 Gubernatorial 
Election of Jakarta. He totally supported Jokowi to win this election. Since being elected 
in this election, Jokowi gradually become a new political rising-star and received huge 
positive publication from large numbers of the Indonesian mainstream media and 
favourable mentions and sentiments from substantial numbers of the Internet and social 
media users. 
202 Among of those who were considered by this party were Burhanuddin Abdullah, a 
senior politician of this party, Tri Rismaharini, a politician of PDIP who took position as a 
Mayor of Surabaya, East Java, Abraham Samad, a Chairman of the Indonesian 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Ahmad Heryawan, Hidayat Nur Wahid and 
Anis Matta, senior politicians and public figures of PKS and Said Aqil Siradj, a chairman 
of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (Agustina, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 13 April 2014). 
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Democratic Party to discuss a potential vice-presidential candidate 
(Chandra, et al., TEMPO, 27 April 2014).  
Finally, Prabowo Subijanto also intensively persuaded top-leaders 
of Golkar Party and the Democratic Party to form a political coalition 
(Septian, et al., TEMPO, 18 May, 2014; Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 25 May 
2014). This party finally succeeded in persuading PAN, PKS, PPP, Golkar 
Party and the Democratic Party to join in and establish this coalition 
(KOMPAS, 30 June 2014; Sugiharto, et al., TEMPO, 13 July 2014). 
Having successfully managed this coalition, these parties selected him 
and Hatta Radjasa of PAN as a pair of presidential candidates203. 
Meanwhile, a presidential candidate of PDIP, Jokowi, supported by 
the top-leader and leaders of this party, took the subsequent steps. Firstly, 
two days after the 2014 parliamentary election was conducted, he 
personally approached Surya Paloh, an owner of the Media Group 
(METRO TV, Media Indonesia and Lampung Post) and a top-leader of 
Nasdem Party204. He carried out this strategy due to the following issues. 
Since his party publicly announced him as a presidential candidate on 14 
March 2014, the total number of political news stories that contained 
positive frames of his profile, activities and work performances produced 
and broadcast by the Indonesian TV Channels had been gradually 
declining. Some influential mainstream media, such as a News TV 
Channel owned by a top-leader of Golkar Party, not only intensively 
highlighted his poor performance as a governor of Jakarta, but also 
constantly undermined his personal character, capability and experiences 
                                                       
203 The most crucial issue, which had been intensively discussed by Gerindra Party and 
its coalition, was how to get a solid agreement regarding which one of the top-leaders or 
members of its coalition deserved a vice-presidential ticket. Golkar Party, PKS, PPP and 
Democratic Party were pleased not to ask for this ticket. Unlike these parties, PAN was 
very eager to get this ticket for its top-leader, Hatta Radjasa to running as a vice-
presidential candidate in this election.  
204 This effort was directed to accomplish the two following goals. The first one was to 
ensure that Nasdem Party preferred taking part in this coalition. The second one was to 
make sure that the mainstream media owned by Surya Paloh, especially METRO TV, the 
oldest and influential Indonesian news TV channel, totally promoted and endorsed him as 
a presidential candidate (Septian, et al., TEMPO, 13 April 2014). 
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in possibly taking a role as the next Indonesian president. Most of the 
Indonesian pollsters reported that he had a higher amount of electorates’ 
approval as a presidential candidate. But, he was quite worried that such 
conditions would reduce the electorates’ approval (Septian, et al., TEMPO, 
13 April 2014). 
Secondly, some influential leaders of this party organized meetings 
with leaders of the Democratic Party and Golkar Party. However, such 
meetings did not come up with a solid agreement regarding sharing the 
president and vice-presidential tickets (Septian, et al., TEMPO, 13 April 
2014). They dealt intensively with the top-leaders of Nasdem Party, PKB 
and Hanura Party to get a marketable vice-presidential candidate205.   
Finally, a top-leader of this party, Megawati Seokarnoputri, covertly 
organized two special teams named ‘Team 9’ and ‘Team 11’. Supported 
by the first team, the second team formulated a set of criteria to select 
potential vice-presidential candidates206. These teams set up 19 criterions 
to select potential vice presidential candidates. Based on these criteria, 
they got the top five vice-presidential candidates207. They hired Populi 
                                                       
205 Nasdem Party named several potential presidential candidates. They were Jusuf 
Kalla, a former top-leader of Golkar Party and a close friend of a top-leader of this party, 
Barnabas Suebu, a former Governor of Papua Province and Admiral (ret) Tedjo Edhy 
Purdijatno, a former top-leader of the Indonesian Navy and an influential leader of this 
party. Meanwhile, PKB named its top-leader, Muhaimin Iskandar, as a vice-presidential 
candidate (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 27 April, 2014). 
206 Members of this team consist of 2 senior politicians of PDIP, which are Prananda 
Prabowo, a son of a top-leader of this party and Hasto Kristiyanto, at that time, a vice 
general secretary of this party, and 9 professionals/experts, which are Dr. Cornelis Lay 
and Dr. Ari Dwipayana, political scientists of the University of Gadjah Mada, Hariadi, a 
political scientist of the Airlangga University, Muradi, a lecturer of Padjajaran University, 
Andi Widjayanto, a political scientist of the University of Indonesia, Jaleswari 
Pramodhawardhani, a political scientist of the Indonesian Science Institute, Alexander 
Retno Wulan and Sumaryo, marketing communication consultants and Teten Masdui, a 
senior activist of anti-corruption movement and a founder of the Indonesian Corruption 
Watch. They were recruited and directed personally by a top-leader of his party, 
Megawati Soekarno Putri (Septian, et al., TEMPO, 27 April 2014). 
207  These top-five vice presidential candidates are Abraham Samad, Head of KPK, 
Mahfud, MD of PKB, Agus Martowardjojo, a governor of the Indonesian Central Bank, 
Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, a former senior official of SBY’ Government, Darmin Nasution, a 
former governor of the Indonesian Central Bank. Some leaders of this party in the central 
office also selected following figures that as a potential vice presidential candidates as 
well. They are General (ret) Ryamizard Ryacudu and General (ret) Luhut B. Pandjaitan. 
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Centre, a pollster led by Nico Harjanto, PhD, a former researcher at the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 208 , to survey 
developments of the electorates’ approval of these vice-presidential 
candidates. Having considered the survey data collected by this pollster 
between February and March 2014, this team finally named Jusuf Kalla as 
a vice-presidential candidate due to the following reasons (Hidayat, et al., 
TEMPO, 27 April 2014). The survey data revealed that Jusuf Kalla has 
been strongly supported by substantial numbers of electorates. He had 
also been widely seen as a senior and proficient politician and closely 
associated with influential businesspersons, such as Sofjan Wanandi, one 
of the founders of CSIS and chairman of the Association of the Indonesian 
Entrepreneurs (ASMINDO), and Jacob Oetama, an owner of KOMPAS 
Media Group, a holding company of the following influential mainstream 
media, which are KOMPAS, the Jakarta Post and KOMPAS TV and Radio 
Sonora Networks209.  
 
9.3.4. Developments of Political Marketability Levels of the 
Indonesian Political Parties’ Presidential Candidates and Their 
Effects on Marketization and Professionalization of 
Campaigning of These Parties Within the Specific Context of 
The 2014 Presidential Election. 
A few months before this election was held, Gerindra Party and its 
coalition noticed that levels of the electorates’ endorsement of Prabowo 
                                                                                                                                                       
These influential and public figures were delivered to Megawati Soekarnoputri as well 
(Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 27 April 2014). 
208 It is an influential think tank established by political activists, business owners and 
politicians in the first decade of New Order Soeharto regime. Among those were Sofjan 
Wanandi, Jusuf Wanandi, Harry Tjan Silalahi and Mayor General (ret) Ali Murtopo, one of 
loyal supporters of President Soeharto. 
209 Jusuf Kalla and Sofjan Wanandi have been widely recognized as having personal and 
professional connections with various experts, professionals, lobbyists and 
conglomerates that have been institutionally or personally associated with founders of 
CSIS (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 27 April 2014). One of them was Jacob Soetojo, a 
member of CSIS Council and an owner of a House in South Jakarta wherein Jokowi on 
21 April 2014 dined and promoted his ideas and political programmes with influential 
ambassadors, such as the ambassadors of USA, Vatikan, Burma, Turki, Peru, Norway 
and United Kingdom for Indonesia (Agustina, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 27 April 2014). 
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Subijanto had been under-developed, but they still believed that they could 
manage this problem tactically. They also conjectured that as they 
successfully elevated the degree of electorates’ approval of Prabowo 
Subijanto, the electorates’ support of his competitor, which was Jokowi, 
would gradually decline210. As charted by figure 9.7, the survey data 
released by the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) 
partially validated their assumptions.  
 
Source: Survey Data Collected and Released by The Indonesian Circle Survey 
(Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) in Between September 2013 and May 2014. 
 
Following this assumption, Gerindra Party and its coalitions took the 
following steps. Firstly, as they had successfully assembled a political 
block and nominated Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa as a pair of 
presidential candidates, this party and its coalition appointed Mahfudz MD, 
a politician of PKB who personally endorsed Prabowo Subijanto, to lead 
‘Tim Pemenangan’ (the Winner Team). Three of the former top-leaders of 
the Indonesian Arm Force, General (ret) George Toisuta and Lieutenant 
General (ret) Burhanuddin and Admiral (ret) Moekhlash Sidik were 
designated as second commanders of this team, while Fadli Zon, a deputy 
chairman of this party was appointed as a general secretary of this team. 
                                                       
210 Personal interviews with AM of Gerindra party, 5 November 2014 and PL of Gerindra 
party, 22 November 2014 
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Leaders of this party and its coalition were also included in this team. This 
team also recruited some professionals, such as Budi Purnomo, a former 
media strategist hired by Jokowi during the 2012 gubernatorial election of 
Jakarta, and Arya Mahendra Sinulingga, a senior journalist of the MNC 
Group211.  
Led by Admiral (ret) Moeklas Siddik, a central campaign 
organisation of this party managed the local campaign organization to 
upgrade the electorates’ approval of Prabowo Subijanto 212 . This 
organization was structurally integrated with the ‘Winner Team’, but was 
detached from the central and local campaign organizations of this party 
and its MPs candidates who ran in the 2014 parliamentary election 
(Septian, et al., TEMPO, 4 May 2014). Further, this party also employed 
special confidential teams. These teams included: a) ‘Bidakara Team’ 
located in the Nusantara Energy Group, a corporation set up by Prabowo 
Subijanto and Widjono Harjanto, a deputy chairman of this party (Septian, 
et al., TEMPO, 4 May 2014); b) ‘Tunas Indonesia Raya’ (The Genesis of 
the Great Indonesia), a sub-organization of this party headed by 
Dirgayuza Setiawan, one of the best graduates of University of Melbourne, 
Australia; and c) ‘Sentra Strategi Indonesia’ (Centre for the Indonesian 
Strategy), directed by Sugiono, a senior politician of this party, a former 
                                                       
211 Two years before Jokowi stepped into the 2014 presidential race this party actually 
established some professional campaign teams to upgrade the political marketability level 
of Prabowo Subijanto. One of these teams was a sophisticated team composed from 30 
well-train marketers/campaigners, which were qualified as a group of cyber armies. As 
supported by Think Big, this team harnessed social media platforms, especially Facebook 
and twitter to frame and market the personal quality and professional performance of 
Prabowo Subijanto and responded to various forms of negative campaign messages that 
undermined his personal quality and professional performance as well (Septian, et al., 
TEMPO, 4 May 2014; Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July 2014). 
212 A local campaign coordinator managed each of these local campaign organizations. 
Those who ran these organizations were qualified as achieving a military rank as a 
general (ret) with at least one star. Most of them were fellows of or closely associated 
with Lieutenant General (ret) Glenny Kairupan, a senior politician of this party, former 
head of the Intelligence Strategic Unit of the Indonesian Arm Force and a close friend of 
Prabowo Subijanto. This coordinator continuously supervised the whole marketing and 
campaign programmes and activities carried out by marketers/campaigners of this party 
and its coalition in a group of parliamentary constituencies located in one of 33 
Indonesian Provinces (Septian, et al., TEMPO, 4 May 2014). 
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middle-rank leader of the Indonesian Arm Force and qualified from 
Norwich University, USA213.  
This party also deployed ‘clandestine campaign teams’. Being 
slightly different from these aforementioned teams, these teams deployed 
very confidential methods to persuade and mobilize the undecided-voters 
populating the prominent Indonesian provinces. The complete marketing 
and campaign activities carried out by members of these teams were 
nearly undetectable. Regardless of this, Hidayat (et al., 2014) reported 
that these teams consisted of former members of Prabowo Subijanto staff 
when he took position as a leader of Komando Pasukan Khusus 
(KOPASSUS), a ‘Special Forces Command’ of The Indonesian Arm Force. 
Col (ret) Chairawan Kadarsyah Nusyirwan, Lieutenant Col (ret) Fauka 
Noor Farid and Mayor (ret) Bambang Kristiono, were old friends of 
Prabowo Subijanto who joined this unit and intensively managed one of 
these teams (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July 2014). 
Secondly, this party and its coalition collected substantial amounts 
of campaign resources. This effort was carried out as follows. Hashim 
Djojohadikusumo, a younger brother of Prabowo Subijanto, has been 
widely acknowledged as a key person who managed various campaign 
funds needed by this party (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July 2014). Such 
funds were divided into two types. The first is the ‘official campaign 
fund’,214 while the second one is the ‘unofficial campaign fund’215. As 
reported by the Indonesian General Commission, this party and its 
coalition as charted by figure 9.8, collected and spent 101,7 Milliard IDR to 
                                                       
213  These teams deployed proficient military methods in running the marketing and 
campaign programmes. They also shared outstanding military knowledge and skills with 
their members to advance their own marketing and campaign knowledge and skills 
(Septian, et al., TEMPO, 4 May 2014). 
214 Members of these teams and total amounts of campaign funds collected by this party 
and its coalition and spent by these teams must be reported to the Indonesian General 
Election Commission. 
215 The campaign fund was allocated to support the whole marketing and campaign 
programmes of the ‘unofficial campaign teams’ and to hire political consultants, pollsters 
and strategists. According to Law No.48/2008, these teams had no an obligation to report 
the total amount of this fund and the ways they used this fund to this commission. 
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finance marketing and campaign programmes of Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta 
Radjasa. Moreover, leaders and founders of this party and its coalition 
developed a mechanism to manage this fund 216  and intensively 
approached diverse campaign donors. However, they got smaller amounts 
of campaign funds from corporations and individual persons, as compared 
to their competitors217.  
Thirdly, this party and its coalition appointed the following public 
figures and professionals as spokespersons of Prabowo Subijanto and his 
running mate, Hatta Radjasa. They include Major General (ret) Sudrajat, 
Sandiaga Uno, a young successful entrepreneur, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, 
PhD, a political communication expert, Tantowi Yahya and Nurul Arifin, 
MPs of Golkar Party (2009-2014), Prof. Didik J.Rachbini, PhD, an 
economist, and Rizal Mallarangeng, PhD, a leader of Golkar Party who 
graduated from The Ohio State University. They supported this pair of 
presidential candidates manage their own performances in a series of 
president and vice-presidential debates218.  
                                                       
216 Hidayat (et al., 2014) reported that in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary election, this 
party discussed total campaign funds with its coalition to finance the whole marketing and 
campaign programmes to get Prabowo Subijanto-Hatta Radjasa elected in the 2014 
presidential election. His report revealed that in order to proficiently run such programmes 
and successfully accomplish this goal, this party and its coalition needed at least 1.7 
Trillion IDR. According to his report, this party set up a political agreement with members 
of its coalition. This agreement constituted that political parties, which joined a coalition 
this party had to share their campaign funds and organizational resources and, more 
specifically, a political party, which want to get a vice-presidential ticket in this coalition 
had to deposit at 40 % of 1.7 Trillion IDR. Some leaders of political parties, which joined 
this coalition, affirmed the existence and validity of this agreement. But most of leaders of 
this party and its coalition were not happy to verify the degree to which a sharing-fund 
mechanism enacted this agreement was being fully implemented (Hidayat, et al., 
TEMPO, 25 May, 2014). 
217 Campaign teams of this party and its coalition did not directly receive these funds. 
Instead, campaign-volunteers of Prabowo Subijanto directly accepted these funds. This 
party also let members of its coalition manage their own campaign funds to support their 
own marketing and campaigning programmes, which were running in 33 Indonesian 
Provinces (Sufa, TEMPO, 3 August 2014). 
218 The Indonesian General Election Commissions organized a series of these debates. 
Following these TV channels broadcast a series of these debates. SCTV, INDOSIAR and 
Berita Satu TV broadcasted the first presidential candidate debate in 9 June 2014. TV 
One and ANTV aired the second presidential candidate debate on 22 June 2014. Metro 
TV and Bloomberg TV televised the first vice-presidential candidate debate on 15 June 
2014. RCTI, MNC TV and Global TV transmitted the second vice-presidential candidate 
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Sources: The Indonesian Election Commission, 2014  
 
 
Source: The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, 2014 
                                                                                                                                                       
debate on 29 June 2014. TVRI and KOMPAS TV reported the last president-vice-
presidential candidates debates in 5 July 2014. 
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Sources: The Indonesian Election Commission, 2014 
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support of him in between September 2013 and March 2014 had been 
declining slightly.  
They suggested that such developments had taken shape since 
Golkar Party, PAN, PPP and PKS formed a coalition with Gerindra Party 
and endorsed Prabowo Subijanto as a presidential candidate. They 
perceived that it would be quite difficult to address the electorates who had 
been strongly sympathetic to him or associated with (top-leaders of) these 
parties. Nonetheless, they believed that it would still be possible to 
persuade and mobilize swing/volatile voters and the undecided-voters 
(voters who were unlikely to vote for any of the presidential candidates 
and their running mates)219. The total number of the undecided-voters, 
according to a series of reports released by the Indonesian Circle Survey, 
increased from 31.60 % in April 2014 to 41.83 % in May 2015. Supported 
by the political pollsters and consultants they hired, they evaluated the 
psychological and sociological dimensions that determined the political 
attitudes and behaviours of these voters, robustly approached these 
voters and vigorously advanced the campaign structure and electorate 
targeting and campaign personalisation strategies to persuade and 
mobilize these voters.  
Secondly, this party and its coalition established the ‘official 
campaign team’. Likely their rivals, they also named this team as ‘Tim 
Pemenangan’ (the Winner Team). Tjahyo Kumolo, a senior politician of 
this party headed this team. Most of the influential leaders of political 
parties that joined a coalition with PDIP were teamed up in this team. 
Further, some professionals, political pollsters, consultants and media 
strategists were also included in this team220. This team recruited Saur 
                                                       
219 Personal interviews with AB of PDIP, 11 June 2014 and WA of Nasdem Party, 29 
October 2014 
220 Among those was Andi Widjajanto, alumnus of SOAS University of London and LSE, 
UK and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and an expert in the field of military and 
intelligence studies who was appointed as a secretary of this team. Sukardi Rinakit, PhD, 
alumni of NUS Singapore and an executive director of Sugeng Sarjadi Syndicate, a 
political pollster/consultant, Rizal Sukma, PhD, alumnus of LSE, UK and an executive 
director of the Centre for Strategies and International Studies (CSIS) and now the 
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Hutabarat, a senior journalist of METRO TV and Media Indonesia, and 
Romanus Surmayo and Triawan Munaf, digital strategists, to handle the 
mainstream media and the Internet and social media users. Members of 
this team were assigned not only to target potential Jokowi voters, but also 
to persuade various groups of the undecided-voters. As they considered 
that his personal quality and professional performance strongly attracted 
most of these voters, they highlighted his personal quality and professional 
performance as a core campaign message. As they also considered his 
personal political gravitational and magnetism powers to capture these 
voters, they strategically developed a proficient campaign personalisation 
strategy and combined this strategy with narrowcasting, electorates 
targeting and news and event management strategies to persuade and 
mobilize these voters.  
Source: Survey Data Collected and Produced by The Indonesian Circle Survey 
(Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) in Between May and the Last Week of June 2014. 
 
In between May 2014 and the last week of June 2014, this party 
and its coalition had encountered plenty of smear-campaigns that attacked 
the personal quality and leadership style of Jokowi; but, they succeeded 
quite well in handling this problem. The survey data of the Indonesian 
                                                                                                                                                       
Indonesian Ambassador to the UK and Republic of Ireland, were designated as members 
of a board of experts who supervised marketers/campaigners of this team. 
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Circle Survey confirmed this evidence. As seen from figure 9.11, the levels 
of electorates’ endorsement of Jokowi had been increasing moderately 
from 35.42 % in May 2014 to 45.00 % in the first week of June 2014. 
However, since there had been a large number of smear-campaigns in 
between the first week and the last week of June 2014, which had 
systematically denigrated the personal quality of Jokowi, the total number 
of those who endorsed his rival, Prabowo Subijanto, constantly increased.  
Regarding this development, a top-leader and leaders of this party 
and its coalition and the campaign teams of the presidential candidate of 
this party advanced the subsequent efforts. Firstly, Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, a top-leader of this party, intensively managed the 
coordinators of central campaign organizations of this party and its 
coalition. She personally called for them to develop more sophisticated 
campaign teams (Widiarsi and Nurul, TEMPO, 20 July 2014). Such teams 
incorporated the following teams. The first team was formulated and 
deployed to track the sources and messengers of these messages and the 
medium and platforms used by these messengers to spread these 
messages and investigate groups of electorates targeted by these 
messengers and the effects of these messages on these electorates. The 
second team was established and employed to counter and attack the 
whole campaign strategies and activities of these messengers. The last 
team was set up and directed to secure potential voters for Jokowi and 
ensure that the undecided-voters favoured casting their votes for Jokowi in 
this election221.  
                                                       
221 This team recruited more or less 72.000 well-trained marketers/campaigners. These 
marketers/campaigners intensively ran door-to-door campaign activities. Such efforts 
were directed to accomplish the following goals. The first one was to make sure that 
potential voters of Jokowi remained favourites to cast their vote for him in this election. 
The second one was to persuade and mobilize these undecided-voters to be happy to 
cast their votes for Jokowi in this election (Chandra, TEMPO, 13 July 2014). Such efforts, 
to some degree, were quite effective. The total numbers of these voters in between May 
and the last week of June 2014 had been substantially declining. The total number of 
these voters, as reported by this pollster, in the last week of June 2014 was 13.50 % of 
total Indonesian electorates. But, since the levels of electorates’ approval of these 
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Slightly differently from their rivals, this party and its coalition 
preferred using the term ‘campaign-volunteers’ to camouflage and/or label 
the following groups of marketers/campaigners. The first one is a group of 
well-trained marketers/campaigners organized formerly by MPs 
candidates of this party and its coalition in the 2014 parliamentary election. 
The second one is a group of well-trained marketers/campaigners 
recruited by this party and its coalition in the wake of this election and 
deployed in 77 parliamentary constituencies located in 33 Indonesian 
provinces. The third one is a group of marketers/campaigners of Jokowi 
organized either by political consultants or strategists employed by this 
party and its coalition; or the third parties of volunteers established of 
groups of people who completely lacked political association with either 
PDIP or its coalition, but were personally sympathetic to either Jokowi or 
his running mate, Jusuf Kalla222. 
As compared to the first and second groups, the third group was 
much larger and varied in terms of its characteristics and marketing and 
campaign programmes and activities. This group consisted of three sub-
groups of marketers/campaigners. The first one was those that used a 
name that related to Jokowi, such as Seknas Jokowi, Pro-Jokowi (Projo), 
Jokowi advanced social media volunteers (JASMEV) and Jokowi Mania. 
The second one was those that took a name, which is not associated with 
Jokowi223. The last one was unnamed and worked in a very confidential 
manner224.  
                                                                                                                                                       
presidential candidates gradually tied, these voters were a crucial factor that strongly 
determined the chance of Jokowi winning this election. 
222 Such as groups of campaign donors or close friends of Jokowi or his running mate, 
Jusuf Kalla. 
223 For example, “Relawan Gerak Cepat” (Fast Movement Volunteer), which comprised 
30.000 marketers/campaigners settled in all the Indonesian Districts/Municipalities and 
were managed by 30 well-trained marketers/campaigners. They used a house located in 
Jalan Brawijaya 30, Jakarta owned by a friend of Jusuf Kalla, as central headquarters. 
Chaerany Putri, an alumnus of Limkokwing University, Malaysia, organized them 
(Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 3 August 2014). 
224 For example, 9.000 marketers/campaigners managed by a business person, 32 years 
old, graduated from Ohio University, USA, were deployed to target potential voters of 
Prabowo Subijanto settled in 10 selected Indonesian Districts located on Java Islands 
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A staff of communication consultants associated with the ‘Winner 
Team’ formulated by this party and its coalition also advanced the 
electorates targeting, personalisation and narrowcasting strategies to 
target young voters and undecided voters. For example, Faizal Reza 
Iskandar, a member of staff of Narada Communication owned by Sony 
Subrata, a friend of Romanus Surmaryo, designed a populist tagline, 
which was widely used by marketers/campaigners of Jokowi: “I stand on 
the right side”225. Supported by JASMEV, he designed Jokowi’s avatar 
using this tagline and distributed it to wider campaign-volunteer networks 
through various platforms of social media (Paraqbueq, TEMPO, 3 Agustus 
2014). Diverse groups of owners of the media production houses 
associated with one of these groups of campaign-volunteers developed 
innovative marketing and campaign programmes226, while professional 
media practitioners associated with the political advisers/strategists of 
Jokowi also organized creative marketing and campaign programmes to 
persuade and mobilize young voters and undecided voters227.  
                                                                                                                                                       
and thousands of those who were organized by Yusuf Qudori, a leader of Tegal Redjo 
Islamic Boarding School, Magelang, Central Java Province and an influential leader of 
PKB in this province (Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 3 August 2014). 
225 The word ‘right’, in this sense, did not refer to the right-wing ideological orientation. 
This word instead, was tactically chosen due to the following reasons. The first one was 
the picture of Jokowi and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla printed in the ‘right part’ of the 
ballot card next to Prabowo and his running mate, Hatta Radjasa. The second reason 
was this word was intentionally used to highlight that Jokowi is a ‘good and right person’ 
for taking position as the next Indonesian president (Paraqbueq, TEMPO, 3 Agustus 
2014). 
226 For example, Shendy Abdi, an owner of Simulakrum Media Works, a production 
house and an activist of Pro-Jokowi, produced a video entitled “Siapa Pahwalan 
Indonesia Sebenarnya” (Who the Indonesian hero really is?). This video envisaged the 
condition of Indonesian people three years after Jokowi get elected as the Indonesian 
President. He also created the second video entitled “Indonesian Kita” (Our Indonesia). 
Together with some people such as, Syafiq Pontoh, a social media expert, Arief Widiasa, 
an expert in the development of creative games, Josephine Tanuwijaya and Beni 
Rahardian, well-known experts in developing creative comics, Shendy also joined in 
“Gerakan Optimis” (an Optimistic Movement), which as established by Marina Silvia 
Kusumawardhano who qualified from the Technical University of Vienna. The main 
purpose of this movement was to create a set of creative campaigns to elevate the trust 
of electorates, especially the young and undecided voters, in Jokowi (Paraqbueq, 
TEMPO, 3 August 2014). 
227 For example, in May 2014, Edward Suhadi, a media practitioner and comrade of Anies 
Baswedan, produced 50 videos of testimonial campaign style to promote Jokowi to 
various groups of these voters. Edward asked some celebrities and influential figures in 
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From the first week of May 2014 until the fourth week of May 2014, 
the total number of marketing and campaign programmes advanced by 
organizations and communities of marketers/campaigners associated with 
the third group had been increasing substantially. The types of such 
programmes and characteristics and backgrounds of organizers of such 
programmes had been varying as well. Having considered such 
developments, Jokowi, as supported by professionals and media 
strategists employed by this party and its coalition, undertook the following 
efforts. On 3 June 2014, Jokowi and Romanus Surmaryo had a special 
meeting with leaders of the marketers/campaigners who harnessed the 
Internet and social media platforms. The total of those who attended this 
meeting was more or less 20 persons. Some of them were Sony Subrata, 
a digital communication strategist and a President Director of Arwuda 
Communications, and Yose Rizal, a digital strategist and founder of 
Political Waves228 . These marketers/campaigners holistically evaluated 
the ways of and the degree to which the Indonesian mainstream media 
either positively or negatively framed the personal profile and leadership 
style of Jokowi; and how the Internet and social media users either 
positively or negatively mentioned his personal quality and performance 
(Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 6 July 2014). 
Further to this, Jokowi also deployed his personal liaison officers to 
support campaign strategies run by his marketers/campaigners and 
fanatical supporters. One of them was Eko Sulistyo, a former journalist 
and head of the Election Commission of Surakarta Regency, 2003-2008. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the film, music and media industries to make a unique testimony and endorsement 
delivered to the young voters and undecided voters. He distributed these videos through 
YouTube to target the young voters and undecided-voters as well (Paraqbueq, TEMPO, 3 
August 2014). 
228 Sony Subrata and Yose Rizal have been widely acknowledged as a founder of 
JASMEV, a group of marketers/campaigners, which intensively harnessed the Internet 
and social media users to promote Jokowi during the 2012 Gubernatorial Election of 
Jakarta. Soon after Jokowi was named by PDIP as a presidential candidate, Jokowi also 
personally asked them to manage various groups of social media users who favoured 
endorsing him during the 2014 presidential election (Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 6 July 
2014). 
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He was personally entrusted by Jokowi to manage such 
marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters. He robustly supported 
“Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Indonesian Hebat” (Association of Civil 
Society for a Great Indonesia). This is a group of marketers/campaigners 
for Jokowi set up by young activists of PDIP who had been associated 
with Repdem, a sub-organization of this party. He also intensively 
endorsed marketing and campaign programmes of Pro-Jokowi (Projo), 
which was organized by both the diehard activists of this party and 
fanatical supporters of Jokowi.  
Anggit Noegroho, Muhammad Isnaini and David, three comrades of 
Jokowi were deployed as well. Jokowi himself named these people as a 
‘clandestine team’ 229 . This team discussed various issues he should 
address and supplied sufficient data he needed to be familiar with. This 
team also evaluated political issues, which were related to and carried 
negative consequences for his personal brand-image and identity. This 
team sent more or less 30 types of merchandise comprising campaigns, 
flags, banners, stickers, pins and posters to the Pro Jokowi (Projo) office 
and intensively communicated with some leaders of the other groups of 
marketers/campaigners of Jokowi, such as Seknas Jokowi (a National 
Secretariat of Jokowi) (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July 2014). 
Secondly, this party and its coalition also set up the Jokowi-JK 
Centre. This centre was established not only to manage various groups of 
people who voluntarily took part as marketers/campaigners for Jokowi-JK, 
but also to attract, persuade and mobilize groups of activists, artists, 
celebrities, lecturers and young voters who were likely to take part as 
influential supporters of Jokowi. This party and its coalition expected that 
they could exploit this centre by creating and sharing the creative and 
                                                       
229 Anggit Noegroho led this team. He was a journalist of Joglosemar, an influential local 
newspaper in Central Java Province. He together with Muhammad Isnaini and David 
supported Jokowi when he decided to run as a mayor candidate in the 2005 Mayor 
Election of the Solo Regency, Central Java (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 6 July 2014). 
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novelty ideas of marketing and campaign programmes to get Jokowi-JK 
elected in this election. 
Thirdly, since they considered that campaign funds were a crucial 
element, this party and its coalition also approached political lobbyists to 
persuade and mobilize various groups of campaign donors strategically. 
To this end, they adopted some Machiavellian elements tactically. They 
even advanced a Machiavellian market-orientation approach 230 . This 
approach was carried out as follows. First at all, they exploited the ‘fears’ 
that had been lingering in the minds of campaign donors regarding the 
personal quality and leadership style of his rival, Prabowo Subijanto, and 
their consequences for formations of political and economic policies in 
Indonesia within the next five years once he won this election. In 
addressing this issue, A, a political lobbyist who has been associated with 
one of the influential campaign donors of Jokowi voiced as follows. 
“Most of the campaign donors, either individual persons or 
corporations, which directly or indirectly supported Jokowi, really 
worried about prospects for their businesses if Prabowo Subijanto 
won this election. They actually quite appreciated the political 
policies and programmes he proposed as a presidential candidate, 
but they were scared of his personal character and leadership style. 
They were much more confident with the personal quality, 
background and leadership style of Jokowi”231. 
 
Most of these donors disfavoured directly supporting the campaign team 
of Jokowi in the central office. Instead, they preferred delivering their 
resources to marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters of Jokowi 
                                                       
230 Following the ideas of Ormrod (2005: 56-60, 2007: 77-79, 2009: 209) and Hunt and 
Chonko (1984: 32) and John and Paulhus (2009: 97), this work, in this respect, defines 
this approach as a type of market-orientation approach in which the party and its 
candidates tactically and strategically addressed and exploited the ‘fears’ of the primary 
and the secondary political sub-markets regarding personal character and/or leadership 
style of a (presidential) candidate nominated by its competitors for running in the 
(presidential) election, especially once this candidate became elected in the election and 
ruled the government. 
231 Personal interview, 24 October 2014 
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who ran the online and the ground war marketing and campaigning in a 
confidential manner. 232  
Since they considered that the level of electorates’ approval of 
Jokowi and his competitor in the last week of June 2014 had been closely 
tied, most of these campaign donors tactically used their liquid resources 
to intensively support the marketers/campaigners of Jokowi. In addressing 
this issue, A, a political lobbyist who has been associated with one of the 
influential campaign donors to Jokowi stated as follows. 
“In the last week of June 2014, survey reports released by some 
prominent Indonesian pollsters revealed that the degree of 
electorates’ approval of Prabowo Subijanto and Jokowi was very 
close. As they considered that this condition could lead to Jokowi 
losing in this election, some influential campaign donors spent their 
liquid resources to hire political pollsters and consultants to 
evaluate, target and persuade the undecided-voters and deal with 
and mobilize the mainstream media and the Internet and social 
media users. They intensively mobilized a larger number of 
potential campaign donors and produced campaign materials, 
which were delivered to campaign-volunteers 
(marketers/campaigners and fanatical supporters) of Jokowi”233. 
 
Being driven by such fears, both individuals and owners of 
corporations who favoured taking part as campaign donors for Jokowi 
spent their money and resources to make sure that he and his running 
mate could win this election. As seen from figures 9.12 and 9.13, the total 
amounts of their donations between 6 June and 4 July 2014 had been 
escalating substantially. More importantly, the total amount of money they 
donated to 3 special bank accounts belonging to this pair of presidential 
candidates, as seen from figure 9.14, had also been rocketing 
substantially. Cumulative amounts of money collected by PDIP and its 
coalition between 30 May and 5 July 2014, as seen from figure 9.15, had 
been also increasing. The total amount of the ‘official campaign fund’ 
                                                       
232 Personal interview with A, an activist and political lobbyist who has been personally 
associated with one of the influential campaign donators of Jokowi. 
233 Personal interview, 24 October 2014 
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collected by this party and its coalition in between 30 May and 7 July 
2014, as seen from figure 9.16, had been also increasing significantly.  
 
Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the 
Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 
 
 
Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the 
Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 
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Figure 9.12: Total Numbers of Individual Campaign 
Donators Who Donated their Moneys to 3 Special Bank 
Accounts of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla in Between the First 
Week of June and the First Week of July 2014 
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Figure 9.13: Total Number of Corporations Which 
Contributed Their Moneys to 3 Special Bank Accounts of 
Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla In Between the First Week of 
June and the First Week of July 2014 
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Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the 
Winner Team of Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 
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Figure 9.15: Total Amount of Moneys Contributed by PDIP 
and its Coalition as an Organization (in Milliard IDR) in 
Between the Last Week of May and the First Week of July 
2014 
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Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission and Reports Released by the 
Winner Team of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla 
 
 
Source: Yayasan Satu Dunia (the One World Foundation), 2014 
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also to finance political advertising programmes of Joko Widodo-Jusuf 
Kalla broadcast by the Indonesian media. As seen from figure 9.17, the 
total amount of such funds they allocated to pay for such programmes in 
between the last week of May and the last week of June 2014 had been 
increasing substantially. Being supervised by professionals and media 
strategists, they formulated an impressive populist-campaign with a 
personalisation tagline, which is ‘Jokowi Adalah Kita’ (literary meaning 
Jokowi is Us). They highlighted this tagline as a primary campaign 
message to capture the Indonesian electorates who occupied the middle 
ground, but remained reluctant to vote for him in this election. 
Finally, this party and its coalition also employed professionals and 
hired senior journalists as media strategists to supervise and improve the 
ways Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla articulated and delivered their campaign 
messages and managed their personal communication styles to the 
electorates and the media, especially within in a series of presidential and 
vice-presidential debates234. They also asked members of ‘team 11’ to 
recruit some media strategists and prominent celebrities and public figures 
in the Indonesian film and music industries as campaign-endorsers of 
Jokowi. A following sub-story details this issue. 
Soon after being employed by this team, Romanus Sumaryono and 
Triawan Munaf developed campaign programmes, activities and events to 
attract the undecided voters. Teten Masduki, a member of this team also 
                                                       
234 Among those were Anies Baswedan, PhD, graduated from Northern Illinois University, 
USA and a Rector of Pamadina University, Andrinof Chaniago, a founder of Cirrus 
Network and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and Sukardi Rinakit, PhD. Together 
with some members of Team 11, they prepared scripts of speeches of Jokowi delivered 
on public stages. They also upgraded the ways Jokowi handled press conferences and 
engaged in presidential debates (Teresia, TEMPO, 17 August, 2016). Eep Saifullah 
Fatah, a political consultant and an executive director of PolMark, Riza Primadi, a senior 
journalist and former anchor of RCTI, Sandrina Malakiano, a former news 
anchor/presenter of METRO TV and Rosiana Silalahi, a former editor-in-chief and news 
anchor of SCTV, and now an editor-in-chief of KOMPAS TV were also employed to help 
Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla during these debates. Akbar Faisal, an MP of Nasdem Party, 
Maruarar Sirait, an MP of PDIP and Arya Bima, an MP of this party who took position as 
a head of Media Team of Jokowi were also deployed to improve performances of this pair 
of presidential candidates during these debates (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO 6 July 2014; 
Chandra, TEMPO, 13 July 2014; Teresia, TEMPO, 17 August 2014). 
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asked Slank, a group of musicians that was popular among non-voters, 
and Wali, a group of musicians that was famous among the young voters 
to endorse Jokowi. Even Jokowi, himself, organized a meeting with Sony 
Subrata, Director of Arwuda Communication, to manage the online and 
ground war marketing and campaign programmes strategically. Together 
with Joko Anwar, an activist of ‘Kawan Jokowi’ (Friend of Jokowi), Sony 
Subrata intensively approached some prominent Indonesian celebrities, 
film producers, celebrities, TV presenters, and comedians. They asked 
these public figures to harness their twitter accounts to exploit the most 
attractive personal profile and character of Jokowi to capture wider 
endorsements of the electorates and stimulate their followers to elevate 
such endorsements. They also designed a twitter Hashtag, which is 
#AkhirnyaMilihJokowi# (literarily meaning finally vote to Jokowi). They 
contacted some prominent public figures and celebrities to intensively 
share this Hashtag235. One of the groups of marketers/campaigners of 
Jokowi, the Fast Movement, also held a meeting on 4 July 2014, a day 
before the final stage of live music concerts organized by several groups 
of musicians such as Slank. This concert was named ‘Konser Salam Dua 
Jari’ (Two Thumb Salute Concert)236. In this meeting, Anies Baswedan, a 
spokesperson for Jokowi, intensively trained them to be much more skilful 
in ensuring and persuading the middle class electorates to cast their votes 
for Jokowi (Hidayat, et al., TEMPO, 3 August 2014).  
                                                       
235 Most of the influential celebrities approached by Sonny Subrata and Joko Anwar 
favoured writing their personal testimonies using social media platforms regarding the 
outstanding personal quality and leadership style of Jokowi and explained a set of 
reasons that made them vote for Jokowi. Two of them were Ringgo whose 1.8 Million 
followers and Sherina Munaf, a daughter of Triawan Munaf whose 8 Million followers. 
Ringgo created a set of testimonies and comments that highlighted the personal quality of 
Jokowi, which were intensively discussed and shared by his followers. Like Ringgo, 
Sherina harnessed her twitter account to formulate a set of endorsements of Jokowi. 
Such endorsements were widely re-tweeted by not only by her followers, but also by 
thousands of influential Indonesian celebrities (Hidayat, et al., 2014, TEMPO, 20 July 
2014).  
236 The word ‘two’, in this sense refers to the ‘official number’ of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla 
printed on the ballot card. 
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Since they carried out such efforts, the degree of electorates’ 
approval of Jokowi in between the last week of June and the first week of 
July 2014 has been gradually rebounding. The survey data released by 
the Indonesian Circle Survey confirmed this development. As seen from 
figure the 9.18, total number of electorates who preferred to vote for him 
had been gradually increasing from 43.50 % in the first week of June 2014 
to 47.80 % in the first week of July 2014.  
Source: Survey Data Collected by The Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey 
Indonesia) in The Last Week of June and the First Week of July 2014. 
 
Having considered such developments, Gerindra Party and its 
coalition organized the following efforts. Firstly, they managed their 
activists and members and officials to persuade and mobilize the 
Indonesian electorates who had already cast their votes for this party and 
its coalition and their MPs candidates in the 2014 parliamentary election 
(their constituents) strategically. As displayed by the following table 9.10, 
they succeeded quite well in persuading and mobilizing their own 
constituents.  
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 Times (Months) Likely to Vote 
Prabowo 
Subijanto-Hatta 
Radjasa 
Likely to Vote 
Joko Widodo-
Jusuf Kalla 
Being Stuck as 
the 
Undecided-
Voters 
PDIP  May 2014 10.64% 82.01% 7.35% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
11.10% 84.51% 4.39% 
Nasdem 
Party  
May 2014 20.48% 39.11% 40.41% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
38.80% 56.66% 4.54% 
PKB May 2014 19.11% 39.48% 41.41% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
37.80% 56.23% 5.97% 
Hanura Party May 2014 35.00% 25.48% 39.52% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
54.80% 34.46% 10.74% 
Gerindra 
Party  
May 2014 82.78% 12.18% 5.04% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
79.40% 17.82% 2.78% 
Golkar Party  May 2014 24.15% 32.34% 43.51% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
57.30% 37.02% 5.68% 
Democratic 
Party  
May 2014 26.25% 34.02% 39.73% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
51.93% 46.00% 2.07% 
PAN  May 2014 25.13% 41.30% 33.57% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
51.90% 45.45% 2.65% 
PPP May 2014 22.89% 30.03% 47.08% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
67.20% 23.90% 8.90% 
PKS  May 2014 32.69% 32.69% 34.62% 
The First Week 
of July 2014 
62.00% 27.74% 10.26% 
Table 9.10: Total Numbers of Voters/Constituents of the Indonesian 
Political Parties (in %) and Their Inclinations to Vote and Did Not Vote to 
One of Two Pairs of Presidential Candidates Who Run in the 2014 
Presidential Election.237.  
 
Secondly, they intensively upgraded their campaign structure and 
electorates targeting strategy and combined this strategy with the 
narrowcasting and news and event management strategies. Such efforts 
                                                       
237 Survey data of the Indonesian Circle Survey (Lingkaran Survey Indonesia) gathered in 
May and the first week of July 2014. The survey data were derived from 2.500 
respondents who were selected using the multistage random sampling. These 
respondents proportionally represented the Indonesian electorates populated in 33 
Indonesian Provinces. 
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were directed to capture more or less 8 % of the electorates who remained 
reluctant to cast their votes in this election. They identified both 
sociological and psychological characteristics of these voters, sought 
effective ways to address and deal with these voters and advanced the 
electorates targeting and campaign personalisation strategies to persuade 
and capture these voters238.  
 
Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014. 
                                                       
238 Personal interview with PLG of JSI, 12 October 2014 
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Source: The exit poll data of KOMPAS released in 11 July 2014.  
 
 
Source: The Indonesian General Election Commission, 2014 
 
Having undertaken such efforts, this party and its coalition 
successfully captured more than 50 % of voters who populated South 
Sumatera, West Sumatera, Aceh, West Nusa Tenggara, South 
Kalimantan, Gorontalo and North Maluku Provinces. However, as seen 
from figure 9.19, they lacked success in persuading more than 50 % of 
voters who occupied 21 Indonesian Provinces to vote for this pair of 
presidential candidates. More particularly, they failed in mobilizing more 
than 50 % of voters who were settled in 4 Indonesian Provinces located in 
Java Islands, which are East Java, Central Java, Special Region of 
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Jakarta and Yogyakarta Provinces, to cast their votes for this pair of this 
pair of presidential candidates 239. 
As compared to this party and its coalition, PDIP and its coalition 
had much more success in mobilizing their constituents to vote for Jokowi 
and his running mate on this Election Day. The exit poll data of KOMPAS 
displayed by figure 9.20 affirmed this evidence240. Although it looked as if 
it would be a hung parliament, he and his running mate, as charted by 
figure 9.21, finally collected 53.15 % of popular votes and won this 
election. 
 
9.4. Discussions and Conclusions 
As stated at the outset, some authors proposed diverse factors that 
determine practices of market-orientation and/or professionalization of 
campaigning of political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 60-63; Strömbäck, 
2010: 28-29; Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86; Gibson and Rommele, 2001, 
2009; Strömbäck, 2009; Tenscher, et al., 2012; Tenscher, 2013; Tenscher 
and Mykkanen, 2013, 2014; Tenscher, et al., 2015). However, as they 
offered a less applicable framework to examine such practices holistically, 
these authors lacked investigating the effects of the party candidate-
specific factors on how political parties in new democratic countries, that 
share characteristics with Indonesian politics, advance such practices 
strategically. In focusing on the new democracy of Indonesia, this work 
developed this framework, evaluated and explored such effects and 
reported the quantitative and the qualitative findings.  
                                                       
239 In this election, the West Java, Banten, East Java, Central Java, Special Region of 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta provinces took place as the main political battleground due to the 
following reasons. These provinces were populated by more or less 55 % of total 
Indonesian voters. As compared to voters inhabiting the other Indonesian provinces, 
voters populated in these provinces overall, had much better access to political 
information and were much more literate. These voters were much more volatile within 
the specific context of the 2014 presidential election as compared to how they were within 
the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. 
240 The exit poll data collected from 1.762 respondents who cast their votes in 2.000 the 
Indonesian Polling Stations located in 33 Indonesian Provinces in 9 July 2014. These 
respondents were drawn using the multi stage random sampling. 
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The quantitative findings indicated that these factors refer to the 
degree of success of the Indonesian political parties in nominating their 
top-leaders as a presidential candidate (1), promoting their top-
leaders/public figures for running as a pair of presidential candidates (2) 
and having an influential presidential candidate (3). These findings 
demonstrated that within the specific context of either the 2014 
parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties which 
succeeded in fulfilling both the first and second goals, were much more 
favoured in having a professional-campaign and advancing 
professionalized-campaign structures and audiences/electorates targeting, 
news and event management and narrowcasting strategies, as compared 
to political parties, which lacked achievement of such goals. Across these 
elections: political parties, which successfully achieved the first goal and/or 
did not accomplish the second goal, tended to be much more 
professionalized in terms of a campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting strategy. Within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election, political parties, which lacked 
accomplishment of the third goal, preferred developing a professionalized-
audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more. However, within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election, political parties, which 
succeeded in fulfilling the third goal, were much more attracted to upgrade 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and campaign 
personalization strategies. These findings also hinted that the degree of 
success political parties gained in achieving the third goal significantly 
determined the ways of and the degree to which these parties prioritized 
and advanced elements of professionalization of campaigning across 
these elections. Across these elections: political parties which succeed in 
accomplishing the third goal, were much more interested in upgrading the 
professionalized-campaign personalization strategy, while political parties 
which did not succeed in achieving the third goal were much more 
engaged in improving the professionalized-campaign structure and 
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audiences/electorates targeting strategy. This evidence validates that, 
within the specific context of Indonesian politics, the degree of the success 
of the party in having an influential presidential candidate was likely to 
comprise the most important element of the party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors and strongly to determine modes of professionalization of 
campaigning and the degree of campaign professionalism of the 
Indonesian political parties within and across these elections. 
Meanwhile, the qualitative findings visualized the elements that 
construct the party’ presidential candidate-specific factors. Such elements 
consist of personal political magnetism and gravitational powers of the 
party’ presidential candidate to attract and capture the primary and the 
secondary political sub-markets within and across the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential elections. These elements shaped developments of the 
political marketability levels of top-leaders/public figures of the Indonesian 
political parties who wanted to run as presidential candidates in the 2014 
presidential election and/or stepped into this election race. These 
developments determined not only modes of professionalization of 
campaigning and the degree of campaign professionalism of these parties 
within and across these elections, but also modes of marketization and 
levels of market-orientation of these parties within and across these 
elections. As seen from point 9.3, Both PDIP and Gerindra Party, as 
compared to their competitors, not only had much more marketable 
presidential candidates, but were also inclined to be more market-oriented 
and professionalized in campaigning. The ways of and the degree to 
which each of these parties and its coalition advanced market-orientation 
and prioritized elements of professionalization of campaigning in facing the 
2014 parliamentary election, however, were quite dissimilar. The first block 
formulated by PDIP and its coalition succeeded quite well in capturing the 
primary and secondary political sub-markets. But, the second block 
established by Gerindra party failed a little in persuading these political 
sub-markets. The first block was likely to favour and gain success in 
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establishing campaign personalization, narrowcasting, electorates 
targeting and news event management strategies; while the second block 
preferred prioritizing electorates targeting and news and event 
management strategies, but succeeded less in combining such strategies 
with narrowcasting and campaign personalisation strategies.  
These aforementioned findings not only substantiate the ideas of 
these authors, but also shed light on the following new knowledge 
contributions that go beyond what was posited by these authors. As seen 
from points 9.2 and 9.3, respectively, these findings hinted that these 
parties’ marketers/campaigners strongly accounted for these factors when 
they selected and upgraded elements that constitute practices of 
professionalization of campaigning; while these parties’ elites tactically 
exploited these factors when they prioritized and developed components 
that construct both practices of market-orientation and professionalization 
of campaigning. These indicate that political parties in democratic 
countries, which share similarities with the Indonesian politics, are likely to 
take shape as ‘a multitude of actors rather than as monolithic entities’ 
(Ormrod and Savigny, 2012: 487). 
 
9.5. Summary 
This chapter explored the effects of party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors on developments of marketization and professionalization 
of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 
2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. A new analytical framework 
was formulated. The structural conditions that led to such factors taking 
place and elements that construct these factors were examined. The 
effects of such factors on such developments were explored. The 
quantitative and qualitative findings were displayed, summarized and 
discussed. The research findings and its conclusion were highlighted as 
well. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND KNOWLEGDE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This dissertation is purposely directed to understand and explain 
the structural conditions and factors that determined the development of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian 
political parties Post-Soeharto New Order up to the 2014 parliamentary 
and presidential elections. This dissertation, as displayed previously from 
Chapters 2-9, respectively, has formulated an integrated conceptual 
framework, proposed the research philosophy, methodology, method and 
design, evaluated such issues and reported the research findings.  
In this this chapter, I will recapitulate these findings. More 
particularly, I will highlight their potential knowledge contributions to the 
existing political marketing and campaign literatures.  
 
10.1. Democratization of Politics and Development of Marketization 
and Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian 
Political Parties Post-Soeharto New Order 
Some authors have evaluated practices of political marketing of 
political parties in the Indonesian, Brazilian, Hungarian, Czech and Taiwan 
politics (Uffen, 2010a; Contrim-Macieira, 2005; Kiss and Mihalyffy, 2010; 
Matuskova, et.al, 2010; Fell and Cheng, 2010) and campaign 
professionalisms of political parties in the Portuguese, Czech, South 
Korean, Argentina, Chile and Uruguayan and Mexican politics (Lisi, 2013; 
Petrova, 2012; Lee, 2013; Espindola, 2002; Jimenez, 2012). However, 
while they studied such issues separately, these authors lacked 
exploration of the structural-systemic conditions that propelled political 
parties in the new democracies to take up such practices 
comprehensively. Chapter 5, alternatively, has adopted the ideas of 
Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. 
 
 
 
 
295 
(2012: 86) to evaluate the structural conditions that paved the way for the 
developments of marketization and professionalization of campaigning of 
Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order.  
This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. Firstly, 
the democratization of politics led to establishments of the democratic 
political, media and election systems taking shape. Such systems resulted 
in ‘structural conditions’, which stimulated both the existing political parties 
established during the Soeharto regime (Golkar Party, PDIP and PPP) and 
the new/emerging political parties founded in the aftermath of the downfall 
of this regime (PAN, PKB, PKS, Democratic Party, Hanura Party, Gerindra 
Party and Hanura Party) to adopt the marketing principles, procedures and 
techniques to advance market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning, especially in facing the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Each of these parties favoured adopting such practices 
strategically. However, none of these parties turned into either the market-
oriented or the sales-oriented parties, as posited by Lees-Marshment 
(2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 
17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9, 2014: 28-33) and Lilleker 
and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8, 2005b: 221-226). 
Secondly, Lees-Marshment (2004a: 231, 2004b: 12) voiced that 
practices of political marketing and market-orientation of political parties 
and organisations in the UK politics transformed political system. This 
chapter, conversely, revealed that within the specific context of the new 
democracy of Indonesia, it was not the development of such practices that 
transformed the political system: it was the establishments of the 
democratic political party, government, media and election systems that 
generated the structural conditions, which propelled this development.  
Based on such evidence, I formulate the following propositions. 
Firstly, in the Western-established democratic countries, such as the US 
and UK politics, development of such practices, as hinted by Lees-
Marshment (2004a: 231; 2004b: 12), not only influences the attitudes and 
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behaviours of political actors and organisations in the political sphere, but 
also transforms the nature of political system. Moreover, in the new 
democratic countries, establishments of the democratic political party, 
government, media and election systems determine this development. 
Instead of transforming these systems, this development other wise, is 
likely to be determined by the establishment of such systems and 
triggered by the existences of the structural-systemic conditions that result 
from such systems. Secondly, political parties in the democratic countries 
that share similarity with the Indonesian politics are likely to favour 
advancing such practices strategically: but, none of these parties is likely 
to form an ideal profile of either the sales or the market-oriented parties, 
as posited by Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 201d, 2003a, 2004a, 2008, 
2009, 2010) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b). 
 
10.2. Nomenclatures of Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-
Markets and the Effects of Party-Specific Factors on 
Perceptions of the Indonesian Political Parties’ 
Marketers/Campaigners Regarding the Importance of These 
Political Market Arenas and Political Sub-Markets. 
Chapter 5 has investigated the nomenclatures of political market 
arenas and political sub-markets that took shape in the new democracy of 
Indonesia and evaluated the effects of party-specific factors on 
perceptions of the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners 
regarding the importance of these political market arenas and political sub-
markets. Overall, this chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. 
Firstly, this chapter demonstrated that four types of political market arenas 
posited by Strömbäck (2007, 2010) and Strömbäck et al. (2012), which are 
the internal party, media, electoral and the parliamentary arenas, took 
shape in the new democracy of Indonesia. The Indonesian political parties’ 
leaders, politicians and marketers/campaigners, not only considered the 
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relative importance of these political market arenas, but also recognised 
the relative importance of the governmental arena.  
Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et 
al. (2012: 86) posited the party-specific factors, were likely to influence 
perceptions of the party regarding the relative importance of political 
market arenas. He also argued that ‘there is a need for an analytical 
framework that theoretically has the ability to outline an answer and 
testable hypotheses to the question: what are the factors, related to what 
arenas’ (Strömbäck, 2007: 64). Having proposed and applied this 
framework to evaluate such issues in the Indonesian politics, this chapter 
unveiled that within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election: 
marketers/campaigners of political parties, which took position as the 
opposition to the ruling government and moderately or extremely suffered 
from the internal and external shocks, were more in favour of considering 
the importance of the media, electoral, governmental and parliamentary 
arenas, as compared to marketers/campaigners of political parties that 
lacked of experience of these shocks and ruled in the government. 
Meanwhile, within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election: 
marketers/campaigners of political parties that had larger campaign 
resources, followed secular ideological orientation and moderately or 
extremely suffered from the internal and external shocks, preferred 
accounting for the importance of the governmental and parliamentary 
arenas much more, as compared to marketers/campaigners of political 
parties that had smaller campaign resources, were unlikely follow this 
ideological orientation and suffered less from these shocks. This indicates 
that the magnitudes and directions of the effects of party ideology, 
experience of the internal and external shocks and position in the 
government on such perceptions are determined by the type of the 
elections and are inseparable from the characteristics of these political 
market arenas as well. This not only really substantiates the ideas of 
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Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), 
but also quite fulfils the Strömbäck’s (2007: 64) expectation. 
Thirdly, Johansen (2012: 162) theorized three types of political sub-
markets that take shape in the party-centred democratic countries, while 
Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann 
(2009: 250, 2012: 1364) and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) highlighted 
diverse types of political sub-markets that are commonly addressed by 
political parties, which utilise political marketing and market-orientation. 
These authors lacked clarification of the ways of and the degrees to which 
these political sub-markets took shape in the new democracies, which 
were ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the 
candidate-centre system, such as Indonesia. This chapter conversely, 
demonstrated that the following political sub-markets, which are the 
parliamentary, governmental, internal party, electoral, the media and the 
non-electoral markets, took shape in the new democracy of Indonesia. 
This chapter also revealed that the Indonesian political parties’ leaders, 
candidates and marketers/campaigners perceived the importance of the 
following political sub-markets, which are the internal party members and 
activists, the media, campaign contributors, competitors and the 
electorates/voters. This considerably substantiates the ideas of these 
authors. 
Finally, these authors lacked exploration of the effects of party-
specific factors on perceptions of marketers/campaigners of political 
parties regarding the importance of these political sub-markets. This 
chapter alternatively, demonstrated that such effects took shape in the 
Indonesian politics within these elections. Within the specific context of the 
2014 parliamentary election: marketers/campaigners of political parties 
that followed secular ideological orientation, had larger campaign 
resources and were experienced with the internal shock, were much more 
in favour of considering the importance of campaign donors, party 
members and electorates as political sub-markets, as compared to 
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marketers/campaigners of political parties that were unlikely to follow this 
ideological orientation, had smaller campaign resources and lacked 
experience of the internal shock. Meanwhile, within the specific context of 
the 2014 presidential election: marketers/campaigners of political parties, 
that followed this ideological orientation, had larger campaign resources 
and moderately or extremely suffered from the internal and the external 
shocks, favoured considering the importance of competitors, electorates 
and the media as political sub-markets much more, as compared to 
marketers/campaigners of political parties that were unlikely to follow this 
ideological orientation, had smaller campaign resources and suffered from 
these shocks less. This demonstrates that the magnitudes and directions 
of the effects of party ideology, campaign resources and experience of the 
internal and external shocks on such perceptions are determined by the 
type of the elections and are inseparable from the characteristics of these 
political sub-markets as well. This substantially develops the ideas of 
these authors. 
Having reflected on such evidence, I offer the following propositions. 
Firstly, along with the internal party, electoral, the media, parliamentary 
and governmental arenas, the following political sub-markets are likely to 
take place in democratic countries, which share similarities with the 
Indonesian politics. They include the parliamentary, governmental, internal 
party, electoral, the media and the non-electoral markets. Secondly, in 
such countries, political parties’ leaders, candidates and 
marketers/campaigners are likely to consider not only the relative 
importance of these political market arenas, but also the relative 
importance of the party members, the media, electorates, competitors and 
campaign donors as political sub-markets. Thirdly, in such countries, 
party-specific factors and type of the election are unlikely to determine 
perceptions of political parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the 
importance of the internal party arena. Similarly, neither party size nor 
party age category is likely to influence perceptions of these parties’ 
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marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, electoral, 
parliamentary and governmental arenas. Conversely, such perceptions 
instead, are likely to be determined by party ideology, campaign resources, 
position in the government and experience of internal and external shocks. 
The magnitudes and directions of the effects of these factors on such 
perceptions, however, are controlled by the type of the elections and 
dependent on characteristics of these political market arenas as well. 
Fourthly, in such countries, party size, age category and position in the 
government are unlikely to control perceptions of political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners regarding the importance of the media, 
electorates, competitors, campaign donors and the party members, as 
political sub-markets. Such perceptions, however, are likely to be affected 
by party ideology, campaign resources and experience of the internal and 
external shocks. Magnitudes and directions of the effects of these factors 
on such perceptions are influenced by the type of the elections and not 
independent on characteristics of these political sub-markets.  
 
10.3. The Structural Elements that Constituted Marketization and 
Professionalization of Campaigning of the Indonesian Political 
Parties. 
Chapter 6 has evaluated the structural elements that construct 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of Indonesian 
political parties. This chapter indicated that these parties overall, were 
likely to favour adopting the marketing procedures and techniques to 
advance market-orientation strategically. Regardless of the party-specific 
factors, these parties overall, strongly addressed voters, competitors and 
the media, moderately accounted for the internal party members and 
activists, but considered less the campaign-contributors. These parties in 
general, also strongly preferred establishing a proficient campaign 
structure and robustly developed professionalized-audiences/electorates 
targeting, news and event management and campaign personalization 
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strategies, but prioritized advancing professionalized-narrowcasting 
strategy less.  
This chapter also uncovered the following evidences. Firstly, 
‘political marketing-orientation’ takes place as a crucial variable to predict 
practices of market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning of 
political parties. The use of the market intelligence is seen as a necessary 
condition for political parties not only to follow ‘market-orientation’, but also 
to develop campaign structure and strategies. This quite meets with the 
ideas of Lees-Marshment (2001a: 22; 2008:13; 2010: 1-2), Lilleker and 
Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8-10), Nord (2007: 88-92), Brants and Praag 
(2007: 107), Papathanassopoulos (2007: 129-132), Negrine (2007: 36), 
Mancini (2007: 122), Maarek (2007: 146-52), Strömbäck (2007: 62-64; 
2010: 18) and Strömbäck, et al. (2012: 85-86). Secondly, market-
orientation is actually a multidimensional concept and practice, which is 
constructed from the following concepts and practices, which are: the 
internal-orientation, voter-orientation, media-orientation, competitor-
orientation and campaign contributor-orientation. This quite substantiates 
the ideas of Lock and Harris (1996: 14), Lees-Marshment (2001a: 30; 
2004a: 18; 2010: 5-6) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 5) 
regarding the type of political sub-markets in which political parties that 
utilise a practice of market-orientation favour dealing with. This also fairly 
meets with Ormrod’ (2005: 57-60, 2007: 79, 2009: 97-96), Ormrod and 
Henneberg’ (2006a: 36-38), Ormrod and Henneberg’ (2008: 11-12), 
Ormrod and Henneberg’ (2010a: 299) and Ormrod and Savigny’ (2012: 
490) propositions regarding the diverse attitudinal dimensions commonly 
addressed by political parties, which follow market-orientation. Thirdly, 
‘professionalization of campaigning’, as a concept and practice, is really 
composed from concepts and practices of ‘professional-campaign 
engagement’, ‘professionalized-campaign structure’ and ‘professionalized-
campaign strategy’. This quite meets with Papathanassopoulos et al. 
(2007: 13) prediction. Fourthly, professionalized-campaign strategy is 
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likely to emerge as a multidimensional concept and practice and is 
constructed from ‘professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy’, ‘professionalized-narrowcasting strategy’, ‘professionalized-
campaign personalization strategy’ and ‘professionalized-news and event 
strategy. This not only goes beyond the ‘professional campaign index’ 
postulated by Gibson and Rommelle (2001: 39, 2009: 269) and advanced 
by Strömbäck (2009: 101-104), but also substantiates the ideas of 
Tenscher et al. (2012: 149), Tenscher (2013: 247), Tenscher and 
Mykkanen (2013: 174-176), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2014: 26-28). This 
also quite fulfils Tenscher’s et al. (2015: 14-15) suggestion regarding the 
need to explore the underlying factors/variables that systematically 
construct ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’. 
This chapter also revealed the subsequent evidences. Firstly, 
market-orientation and professionalization of campaigning are actually 
different concepts and practices, but, some elements that construct these 
concepts and practices are strongly, positively and significantly correlated 
to each other. This meets reasonably with the Lilleker and Lees-
Marshment’ (2005b: 209-210) proposition. Secondly, a choice (that has to 
be) made by political parties to advance market-orientation and/or run 
campaign structure and strategies is dependent on the types of structural 
elements that constitute such practices, which are prioritized by these 
parties. This somewhat substantiates the Strömbäck’ (2007: 58-59) 
arguments. Finally, following market-orientation does not dampen the 
organisational capabilities of these parties to utilise professionalization of 
campaigning. This quite fulfils Strömbäck’ (2007: 63) prediction.  
This evidences validates that a political marketing orientation 
emerges as the most influential campaign paradigm (Strömbäck, 2007: 
49) that determines the modes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and professionalized-
campaigning adopted by political parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62-63). This 
demonstrates that the political marketing orientation and market-
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orientation and professionalization of campaigning are not in reality 
separate concepts and practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 50); rather that there 
are interdependent relationships between the structural elements that 
constitute such concepts and practices. The data substantiates the 
arguments of Strömbäck (2007: 64), Mykkanen and Tenscher (2014: 25-
26) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 113). More importantly, it validates that 
integrating these concepts and practices into a single model allows us to 
holistically understand how political parties develop such practices within 
and across the elections. This model also helps us to systematically 
explore the effects of the micro/individual-specific factor, as postulated by 
Ormrod (2009: 102-105), the party-specific and the country-related factors, 
as proposed by some authors, such as Strömbäck (2010: 28-29), 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9), on the ways of 
and the degrees to which these parties advanced such practices within 
and across these elections.  
 
10.4. Influential Factors that Determined Modes of Marketization and 
Professionalization of Campaigning and Degrees of Market-
Orientation and Campaign Professionalisms of the Indonesian 
Political Parties Within and Across the 2014 Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections. 
Ø Perceptions of the Party Marketers/Campaigners, Leaders and 
Candidates Regarding the Relative Importance of Political 
Market Arenas. 
Chapter 7 has chronicled the effects of perceptions of Indonesian 
political parties’ marketers/campaigners, leaders and politicians regarding 
the relatives’ importance of the internal party, the media and electoral 
arenas on marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these 
parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. 
Firstly, Strömbäck (2007: 58-63, 2010: 21-27) and Strömbäck, et al. (2012: 
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83-84) argued that a choice (that has to be) made by the party to advance 
market-orientation and/or professionalization of campaigning is likely to be 
determined by the degree to which the party accounted for the relatives’ 
importance and relevance of political market arenas. This chapter 
revealed that within the specific context of the new democracy of 
Indonesia, this choice is unlikely to be determined by the party 
assessment as an organisation, but is likely to be affected by individual 
perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates 
regarding the relative importance and relevance of these political market 
arenas.  
Secondly, this author proposed that political parties are likely to 
have diverse political goals in the multiple political market arenas and 
perceive the relative importance and relevance of these political market 
arenas (Strömbäck, 2007: 60) and variations in such perceptions are likely 
to determine the degrees of market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning of these parties (Strömbäck, 2007: 62, 2010: 21-27; 
Strömbäck, et al. (2012: 83-84). While such prevailing propositions were 
speculative, this chapter, alternatively, revealed that the ways of and the 
degree to which the Indonesian political parties advanced 
professionalization of campaigning were likely to be determined by 
perceptions of these parties’ marketers/campaigners regarding the relative 
importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas. However, 
the ways of and the degree to which these parties developed both market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning are likely to be 
influenced by the perceptions of these parties’ leaders and candidates  
(elites) regarding the relative importance and relevance of these political 
market arenas. This chapter indicated that the more political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates perceived the importance 
of the internal party arena, the much more likely these parties tend to be 
market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, 
news and event management and audiences/electorates targeting 
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strategies within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary or 
the 2014 presidential elections. Moreover, the more political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners, leaders and candidates realized the importance 
of the electoral and media arenas, the much more likely these parties 
incline to be market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of: a) 
campaign structure, audiences/electorates targeting, news and event 
management and campaign personalisation strategies within the specific 
context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, 
audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign 
personalization and narrowcasting strategies within the specific context of 
the 2014 presidential election.  
Thirdly, this author also stated that ‘parties with weak internal 
arenas, or candidate-based rather than party-based campaigns, can be 
expected to be more dependent on success within the media arena in 
order to be successful in the electoral arena…. in such a case, running 
professional campaigns is of the utmost importance, but it does not mean 
that the party necessarily should adopt a market orientation’ (Strömbäck, 
2007: 61). This chapter revealed that, based on the Indonesian case, it 
was not the weak internal party arena that stimulated the party to prioritize 
the media arena and run professionalization of campaigning. Instead, it 
was the increasing number of negative publications of the media related to 
the party and its public figures and expectation of the party’ top-leader to 
pass the presidential election threshold and secure a presidential ticket to 
run in the presidential election that led to the party and its MPs candidates 
much more engaging in considering the importance of the media, the 
internal party, and electoral arenas arena, managing these arenas, 
advancing a market-orientation and developing a proficient campaign 
structure and strategies strategically. 
Fourthly, this author posited that ‘the strength of the internal arena 
and party organization, in particular, can be expected to be of decisive 
importance in understanding the degree of freedom the party leadership 
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enjoys in choosing what orientation to follow and what kind of campaigns 
to run’ (Strömbäck, 2007: 64). This chapter revealed that in the wake of 
the 2014 parliamentary election, a group of political parties that joined a 
coalition established by PDIP had a strong and solid internal arena and 
enjoyed much more freedom to advance not only market-orientation, but 
also campaign structure and strategies. In contrast, a group of political 
parties that joined a coalition arranged by Gerindra Party overall had a 
weak and fragmented internal arena and to some degree lost their 
freedoms to develop such practices; even though this party still strived to 
manage this arena and advance such practices. This quite affirms his 
proposition 
Based on such evidence, I formulate the following propositions. 
Firstly, in the new democratic countries wherein political parties, as an 
organisation, have been under-developed, such as Indonesia, a choice 
(that has to be) made by the party to develop practices of either market 
orientation or professionalization of campaigning is unlikely to be affected 
by the party’s assessment, as an organization, regarding the relatives’ 
importance and relevance of political market arenas, as predicted by 
Strömbäck (2007: 64). Instead, this choice is likely to be controlled by 
individual perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners, leaders and 
candidates (elites) regarding the relatives’ importance and relevance of 
the internal party, the media and electoral arenas.  
Secondly, in democratic countries that share similarities with the 
Indonesian politics, perceptions of the party marketers/campaigners 
regarding the relatives’ importance and relevance of these political market 
arenas are likely to generate significant effects on mode of 
professionalization of campaigning and the degree of campaign 
professionalism of the party; while perceptions of the party elites regarding 
the relatives’ importance and relevance of these political market arenas 
are likely to produce significant effects on modes of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning and levels of market-orientation and 
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campaign professionalism of the party. The directions and magnitudes of 
such effects are likely to be determined by the type of the election. 
Finally, in such countries, having a weak internal party arena is 
unlikely to take place as a necessary condition for the party to prioritize the 
media arena and run professionalization of campaigning rather than 
market-orientation. Conversely, suffering from an increasing number of 
negative publications in the media, and expectation of the party’ top-leader 
to pass the minimum number of the parliamentary threshold and get a 
presidential ticket significantly stimulates the party and its candidates to 
develop practices of market-orientation and professionalization of 
campaigning. In such countries, a political party, which suffered from 
negative publications in the media and gains competitive chances to meet 
this number, assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-
leader/public figure as a presidential candidate and successfully 
nominated a marketable presidential candidate, is likely to enjoy a much 
more freedom to advance such practices strategically.  
 
Ø The Party-Specific Factors. 
Chapter 8 has evaluated the effects of the party-specific factors on 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of the Indonesian 
political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This chapter gives us the following knowledge contributions. 
Firstly, Strömbäck (2007: 61, 2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) 
argued that a choice (that has to be) made by the party to advance 
practices of market-orientation and/or run professionalization of 
campaigning is likely to be determined by party size and campaign 
resources. This chapter indicated that this choice is likely to be affected 
not only by such factors, but also by party age category, ideology and 
position in the government. The type of the election controlled the 
directions and magnitudes of the effects of these factors on this choice. 
This chapter visualized that the bigger the sizes and campaign resources 
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of political parties and more secular the ideological orientation of these 
parties, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented and 
professionalized, in terms of: a) campaign structure and news and event 
management and campaign personalization strategies within the specific 
context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and b) campaign structure, 
audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management 
strategies within the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. The 
older the ages of political parties and the more these parties favoured 
taking a role as an opposition block against those who ruled the 
government, the much more likely these parties tend to be market-oriented 
and professionalized, in terms of: a) audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; and 
b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy within 
the specific context of the 2014 presidential election. This clearly 
substantiates the ideas of this author. 
Secondly, Strömbäck (2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) 
voiced that along with party size and campaign resources, party 
experiences of the internal and external shocks are likely to stimulate 
political parties to advance market-orientation, while Gibson and Rommele 
(2001: 36, 2009: 281), Strömbäck (2009: 101-104), Tenscher et al. (2012), 
Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 
9) proposed that such factors are likely to propel political parties to run 
professionalization of campaigning. Whilst these authors studied such 
issues separately, this chapter evaluated such issues holistically. This 
chapter demonstrated that within the specific contexts of either the 2014 
parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties, which 
suffered from the internal shock incline to be much more market-oriented 
and professionalized, in term of campaign structure, audiences/electorates 
targeting and news and event management strategies, as compared to 
political parties, which lacked experience of this shock. Additionally, as 
compared to political parties, which suffered less from the external shock: 
 
 
 
 
309 
political parties, which moderately or extremely suffered from the external 
shock, were much more likely to favour inclining to be market-oriented and 
professionalized, in terms of: campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting and news and event management 
strategies within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election; 
and b) campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting, campaign 
personalization and news and event management strategies within the 
specific context of the 2014 presidential election. This clearly substantiates 
the ideas of these authors. 
Based on such evidence, I argue that in democratic countries that 
share characteristics with the Indonesian politics, a choice (that has to be) 
taken by a political party to advance market-orientation and/or run 
professionalization of campaigning considered is likely to be determined 
not only by party size and campaign resources, as posited by Strömbäck 
(2007: 61, 2010: 28) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), but also by party 
age category, ideology and position in the government. Along with such 
factors, party experiences of the internal and external shocks are likely to 
determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of 
political parties. In this respect, the magnitudes and directions of the 
effects of: a) party ideology, age category, campaign resources, position in 
the government and experience of the external shock on the ways of and 
the degrees to which these parties advanced such practices are likely to 
be determined by the type of the election; and b) party size and 
experience of the internal shock on the ways of and the degrees to which 
these parties developed such practices are unlikely to be influenced by the 
type of the election. 
 
Ø The Emerging Factors 
Strömbäck (2007: 62) highlighted the need to examine diverse 
factors that influence levels of market-orientation and campaign 
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professionalisms of political parties. Strömbäck (2010: 28) and Strömbäck 
et al. (2012: 86) also argued that, alongside these aforementioned party-
specific factors, the party’s competitive chance of forming the next 
government is likely to take shape as an influential factor that determines 
the degrees of market-orientation of political parties. Chapters 7 and 8 
however, confirmed that this factor is unlikely exists in Indonesian politics. 
These chapters, alternatively, indicated that in the new democracy of 
Indonesia, the following emerging factors are likely to take shape as 
influential factors. They are: a) the party’s competitive chances to meet the 
minimum number of the 2014 presidential election threshold, assemble a 
political coalition and nominate its top-leader/public figure as a presidential 
candidate; and b) development of the political marketability level of the 
party’ presidential candidate. Together with party ideology, size, campaign 
resources and position in the government and experiences of internal and 
external shocks, these factors really influenced the ways of and the 
degrees to which the Indonesian political parties advanced such practices 
within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Within and across these elections, political parties that gained such 
chances and successfully nominated a highly or potential marketable pair 
of presidential candidates incline to be much more market-oriented and 
professionalized in campaigning, as compared to political parties, which 
lacked such chances or these candidates. 
Based on such evidence, I argue in democratic countries, which 
have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated 
by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party’s 
competitive chance of forming the next government is unlikely to take 
shape as an influential factor. In such countries, however, the party’s 
competitive chances to meet the minimum number of the presidential 
election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate its top-
leader/public figures as a pair of presidential candidates and the party’ 
presidential candidate-specific factors are likely to take place as prominent 
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factors. Along with these party-specific factors, such factors are likely to 
influence the ways of and the degrees to which these parties carried out 
such practices within and across the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. 
 
Ø The Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors 
Chapter 9 was specifically written to capture and understand the 
effects of the party’ presidential candidate-specific factors on modes of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of 
market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of Indonesian political 
parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This chapter offers the following knowledge contributions. 
Firstly, while proposed models of political marketing of political parties, 
Wring (2005: 4) and Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 
2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-
208, 2010: 4-9) theorized the party’ candidates as an element of the party’ 
political products. None of these authors however, evaluated the existence 
of the party’ (presidential) candidate-specific factors in the emerging 
democratic countries, such as Indonesia. This chapter, alternatively, 
demonstrated that these factors really took place in the new democracy of 
Indonesia. These factors are inseparable from the party-specific factors 
posited by Strömbäck (2007: 60-62; 2009: 101-104; 2010: 28-29), 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), Gibson and Rommele (2001: 36, 2009: 281), 
Tenscher, et al. (2012) Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) 
and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9). These factors instead, are associated with 
the degrees of success of the party in nominating its top-leader as a 
presidential candidate (1), promoting its top-leader/public figure to run as a 
pair of presidential candidates (2) and having an influential presidential 
candidate (3). Within the specific contexts of either the 2014 parliamentary 
or the 2014 presidential elections, political parties, which succeeded in 
fulfilling both the first and second goals, favoured having a professional-
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campaign and advancing professionalized-campaign structure and 
audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management and 
narrowcasting strategies much more, as compared to political parties, 
which lacked achievement of such goals. Political parties, which 
succeeded in fulfilling the third goal, were much more attracted to upgrade 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting and campaign 
personalization strategies within the specific context of the 2014 
presidential election; while political parties, which lacked accomplishment 
of the third goal, were much more engaged in developing a 
professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy within the 
specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election. Across these elections: 
political parties that successfully accomplished the first goal, but did not 
accomplish the second goal, tended to be much more professionalized in 
terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting strategy. 
From a slightly different view, political parties, which accomplished the 
third goal, preferred upgrading professionalized-campaign personalization 
strategy much more. In contrast, political parties, which lacked achieving 
the third goal, favoured improving professionalized-campaign structure 
and audiences/electorates targeting strategy much more. This evidence 
not only substantiates, but also goes beyond the ideas of these authors.  
Secondly, while he posited a conflated model of political marketing 
and campaigning of the party’ presidential candidate, Newman (1994: 12) 
theorized that the media and voters are likely to take shape as 
‘environmental forces’. Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) proposed five types of 
political markets addressed by the party’ presidential candidate. Whilst 
taking different perspectives, these authors, however, disregarded the 
elements that constitute the party’ presidential-candidate-specific factors 
and the effects of such elements on marketization and professionalization 
of campaigning of political parties within and across the elections. The 
qualitative findings displayed by this chapter visualized the structural 
conditions that paved the way for these factors take place and the 
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elements that construct these factors. Such elements consist of the 
personal political magnetism and gravitational powers of those who were 
(potentially) nominated as a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to run in the 
2014 presidential election to attract and captivate the electorates/voters, 
as a primary political sub-market and the internal party members, political 
leaders and activists, the media, the media owners, campaign-volunteers, 
campaign donors, political lobbyists and the Internet and social media 
users, as secondary political sub-markets. Such powers influenced modes 
of marketization and professionalization of campaigning and degrees of 
market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these parties within 
and across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 presidential elections. 
Within the specific context of the 2014 parliamentary election, political 
parties, which succeeded in having a highly marketable presidential 
candidate, were much more market-oriented and professionalized, in 
terms of campaign structure and audiences/electorates targeting and 
campaign personalization strategies. However, within the 2014 
presidential election and also across the 2014 parliamentary and the 2014 
presidential elections as well: political parties, which successfully 
nominated a highly marketable presidential candidate, were much more 
market-oriented and professionalized, in terms of campaign structure, 
audiences/electorates targeting, news and event management, campaign 
personalization and narrowcasting strategies.  
Based on this evidence, I posit the following propositions. Firstly, in 
democratic countries, which are ruled under the parliamentary government 
system and indicated by the party-centred system, the party candidate is 
likely to take shape as one of the elements of the party’ political products, 
as posited by Wring (2005) and Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2001d, 
2003a, 2004a, 2008, 2009, 2010). However, in emerging democratic 
countries, which followed the presidential government system and are 
characterized by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the 
party’ presidential candidate likely paves the way for the party’ presidential 
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candidate-specific factors to take shape. In such countries, having an 
influential presidential candidate with the following elements is widely seen 
as an essential condition for the party (and its coalition) to achieve 
success in the parliamentary and the presidential elections. Such 
elements include personal political magnetism and gravitational powers to 
attract and capture the primary and secondary political sub-markets. 
Transformations of such powers lead to the party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors evolving within and across the (primary, parliamentary and 
presidential) elections.  
Secondly, in such countries, the media and voters are unlikely to 
take place merely as ‘one of the environmental forces’, as theorized by 
Newman (1994: 12). Moreover, these political sub-markets together with 
the media owners, campaign-volunteers and donors, political lobbyists and 
the Internet and social media users are likely to take shape as influential 
political players that determine the political marketability levels of the party’ 
presidential candidate and presidential candidates nominated by its 
competitors. Within and across the parliamentary and presidential 
elections: political parties in such countries with highly or potential 
marketable presidential candidates are likely to incline to be much more 
market-oriented and professionalized in terms of campaign structures and 
campaign personalization, electorates targeting, narrowcasting and news 
and event management strategies.  
Finally, in such countries, having a holistic understanding regarding 
the characteristics of these political sub-markets, and addressing these 
political sub-markets strategically, as prescribed by Kotler and Kotler 
(1999: 5-6), is important for the party to get its presidential candidate 
elected in the presidential election. However, getting a better trade-off that 
meets with the latent and expressive needs and expectations of these 
political markets, as suggested by Henneberg (2003: 13), Henneberg 
(2006a: 32) and Henneberg (2006b: 21), is much more crucial for both the 
party and its presidential candidate, as they want to win in this election.  
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10.5. Conclusion 
Temple (2010: 274-275) argued that none of political parties that 
exist in the democratic countries purely performed as either product-
oriented or sales-oriented or market-oriented parties. From a different 
stance, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 211) highlighted that there 
have been ‘some element of inconsistency between the model and the 
practice’, while Lees-Marshment et al. (2010: 287) noted that political 
parties favoured developing ‘mixed trends in strategy and orientation’. 
Whilst she and her colleagues revealed that ‘significant barriers to 
adopting a marketing-oriented strategy or to become market-oriented 
party’ remained prevalent (Lees-Marshment, et al., 2010: 287-289), 
Ormrod (2009: 188) realized that the ideal profile of market oriented party’ 
is unlikely to exist in real politics (Ormrod, 2009: 188).  
Having considered such issues, I argue that the party’s orientation 
regarding practices of political marketing-orientation and market-
orientation, which take shape in democratic countries, are unlikely to take 
shape as either the matter of age, as posited by Wring (2005: 7) or the 
matter of type, as proposed by Lilleker (2006: 153), Lees-Marshment 
(2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 
17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 2010: 4-9) and Lilleker and Lees-
Marshment (2005a: 8-11, 2005b: 221-226). Instead, following Giasson’ et 
al. (2012: 6) and Strömbäck’ et al. (2012: 82) propositions, ’party 
orientation appears to be a matter of degree’. However, the degree to 
which the party orientated to the structural elements that construct such 
practices are likely to be determined by the structural-systemic conditions 
and factors that exist in such countries. 
My findings, as exhibited in Chapter 4, demonstrated that in the 
new democracy of Indonesia, such conditions result from the 
establishment of the democratic political party, government, media and 
election systems. My findings, as displayed in this chapter and Chapter 5, 
respectively, indicated that such conditions systematically encouraged 
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Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order to take up such 
practices strategically and shaped up nomenclatures of political market 
arenas and political sub-markets that took place in the Indonesia politics. 
As showcased in Chapter 6, these parties in general, favoured advancing 
the structural elements that constitute practices strategically. However, 
none of these parties fully manifested the ideal characteristics of either the 
sales- or the market-oriented parties, as imagined by Lees-Marshment 
(2001a: 28-31, 2001b: 695-696, 2004:18-20, 2008: 20-21, 2010: 5-9), 
Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8-11, 2005b: 221-226) or the 
professional-electoral party, as posited by Panebianco (1982: 481) and 
defined by Mancini (1999: 33). 
My findings, as exhibited in these chapters, indicated that adopting 
the ideas of Strömbäck (2007: 60-62), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and 
Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86) is really useful to evaluate the structural 
conditions that propel developments of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties in democratic 
countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics. Following the 
ideas of this author and refining the ideas of Lock and Harris (1996: 14), 
Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5), Hughes and Dann (2009: 250, 2012: 1364) 
and Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009) is likely to be helpful in capturing 
the existence of political market arenas and political sub-markets that take 
shape in such countries and evaluating the effects of the party-specific 
factors and the type of the elections on the ways of and the degree to 
which political parties in such countries perceived the relative importance 
and relevance of these political market-arenas and political sub-markets 
within and across the (parliamentary and presidential) elections. Using and 
reconstructing the ideas of Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 
2004a, 2008, 2010), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b), 
Ormrod’ (2005, 2007, 2009), Ormrod and Henneberg (2006a), Ormrod 
and Henneberg (2008), Ormrod and Henneberg (2010a), Tenscher et al. 
(2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen, (2013, 2014) and Tenscher et al. (2015) 
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is likely to be advantageous to integrating concepts and practices of 
political marketing-orientation, market-orientation and professionalization 
of campaigning into a single workable model, which is needed to generate 
new understandings regarding not only the structural relationships 
between the elements that construct such practices holistically, but also 
the ways of and the degree to which political parties in such countries 
prioritized and advanced such elements strategically.  
My findings, as displayed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, respectively, also 
demonstrated that using the alternative structural model, which was 
validated previously in Chapter 6, and adopting the ideas of Strömbäck 
(2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29), Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), Gibson 
and Rommele (2001: 36, 2009: 281), Tenscher, et al. (2012) Tenscher 
and Mykkanen (2013: 181, 2014: 24) and Tenscher et al. (2015: 9) seems 
really helpful to identify and delve deeper into the influential factors that 
determined modes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and degree of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalism of campaigning of Indonesian political parties within and 
across the parliamentary and presidential elections. Such factors include: 
a) perceptions of the party’s marketers/campaigners, leaders and 
candidates regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the 
media and electoral arenas; b) the party-specific factors (especially party 
ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experience 
of internal and external shocks); c) the party’s competitive chances to pass 
the parliamentary election threshold, assemble a coalition and nominate a 
(pair of) presidential candidates; and d) the party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors.  
Nonetheless, my findings, as showcased in these chapters, also 
indicated that the Indonesian political parties’ marketers/campaigners and 
elites (leaders and candidates) realized and attempted to manage such 
factors strategically when they took part in the whole processes of 
marketization and professionalization of campaigning of these parties 
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within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections; but 
the ways these parties’ marketers/campaigners carried out such practices, 
on the one hand, and these parties’ elites advanced such practices, on the 
other, seem quite different. This indicates that political parties are likely to 
exist as what Ormrod and Savigny (2012: 487) defined as ‘a multitude of 
actors rather than as monolithic entities’. However, unlike these authors, 
my findings hinted that the main issue is actually not whether political 
parties are likely to take shape as a multitude of actors or monolithic 
entities. The primary issue is, instead, to what extent the inherent 
character of the party, as a multitude of actors, took shape within and 
across these parties and determined the ways of and the degrees to which 
these parties developed such practices within and across the elections. 
This is one of my findings that deserve a deeper discussion. 
Based on such evidence, I argue that Giasson’ et al. (2012: 6) and 
Strömbäck’ et al. (2012: 82) propositions are likely to be helpful to 
evaluate the degree of party orientation regarding such practices. Their 
propositions are likely to help us to avoid what Savigny (2007: 43) called a 
‘conflation of prescription and prediction in the use of models and 
frameworks within the mainstream political marketing literature’. Their 
propositions, however, seem to be less workable, as we want to capture 
the ways political parties advanced practices of market-orientation, as 
theorized by Ormrod (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011), Henneberg (2006b) 
and Ormrod and Henneberg (2008, 2009, 2011) and understand the ways 
political parties developed practices of (de-) professionalization of 
campaigning, as predicted by Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and 
Mykkanen (2013, 2014) and Tenscher et al. (2015).  
Having considered such issues, I propose that party orientation 
regarding such practices not merely appears to be the matter of the 
degree, as proposed by Giasson et al. (2012: 6) and Strömbäck et al. 
(2012: 82); more than that, this orientation seems to be the matter of 
mode. Following this proposition allows us to holistically capture and 
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understand: a) the structural elements and the leading and following 
elements of market-orientation prioritized and advanced by political 
parties, as suggested by Henneberg (2006a, 2006b); b) the structural 
elements that constitute and factors that influence practices of (de-) 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties, as posited by 
Tenscher et al. (2012), Tenscher and Mykkanen (2013, 2014) and 
Tenscher, et al. (2015); and, more importantly, c) structural conditions and 
factors that determine the ways of and the degree to which political parties 
within and across democratic countries advance such elements, as 
advocated by Strömbäck (2007: 60-62, 2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. 
(2012: 82), within and across elections. To do so however, we need to 
take into account both wide and narrow interpretations of political 
marketing perspectives and develop better and workable methodological 
approaches and theoretical frameworks, as suggested by Henneberg 
(2002: 94-95), Hennerberg (2004a: 16), Henneberg (2008: 159-161), 
Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy (2007: 12), Ormrod (2012: 12-13) and 
Ormrod et al. (2013: 13).  
Managing such efforts strenuously would help us, as political 
marketing scholars, to holistically capture and explore the ways of and the 
degrees to which developments of the inherent character of the party as a 
multitude of actors (Ormrod and Savigny (2012: 487) took shape within 
and across political parties and influenced modes of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and 
campaign professionalism of these parties within and across the elections. 
Organizing such efforts effectively seems really helpful to keep us a way 
from the danger of what Henneberg (2004b: 236) labelled as ‘the static 
nature of research in political marketing’ and ensure that political 
marketing research we organize is always improving, innovative and 
generating invaluable novelty conceptual, practical and managerial 
knowledge contributions.  
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CHAPTER 11 
 
PROPOSED THEORETICAL AND PRESCRIPTIVE MODELS 
AND THEIR KNOWLEGDE AND PRACTICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Chapter 10 highlighted the main findings of this dissertation and 
displayed the research conclusion and knowledge contributions. In this 
chapter, I will propose the three theoretical models extracted from such 
findings and spotlight their potential contributions to the existing political 
marketing and campaign literature. I will also underline both theoretical 
and managerial benefits offered by the second and third proposed models, 
explain the ways we could possibly transform the second and the third 
proposals into some prescriptive models and generate practical benefits of 
adopting and using these models; as we want to manage the existing 
structural problems of the liberal democratic system that endanger the 
sustainability of the liberal democracy and society—in general—and keep 
the mainstream centre-left or centre-right parties surviving in the Western 
democracy—in particular.  
11.1. The Structural Conditions and Factors that Determine Modes 
of Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and 
Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism 
of Political Parties in the New Democratic Countries: The First 
Proposed Theoretical Model. 
As reflected in the main findings of this dissertation and their 
knowledge contributions summarized previously in Chapter 10, I posit a 
set of theoretical propositions visualized by the subsequent figure 11.1. 
Firstly, the following ‘structural conditions’ are likely to take place in the 
new democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics. 
They consist of: 1) establishment of the multi-party and the candidate-
centred systems; 2) the low level of partisanship of the electorates to 
political parties; 3) soaring numbers of disloyal voters and non-voters; 4) 
 
 
 
 
321 
increasing numbers of new and young electorates who participated in the 
elections; 5) emergence of ticket-splitting phenomena in the elections; 6) 
development of rational voters and rational voting behaviour; 7) a highly 
commercialized political journalism—in general—and political news 
programmes—in particular; 8) existence of moderate partisanship and 
polarisation of political news coverage and the media agenda regarding 
marketing and campaign activities and programmes of political parties and 
these parties’ candidates who run in these elections; 9) robust ICT 
developments, followed by increasing uses of the Internet and social 
media as political communication, marketing and campaign platforms and 
tools; 10) rises of political consumerism and political activism; and 11) 
expanding roles of spin-doctors, media strategists, political consultants 
and pollsters in political spheres and affairs.  
Secondly, once they have taken place in such countries, these 
‘conditions’ shape political marketing exchanges, interactions and 
transactions carried out by political parties and these parties’ leaders and 
candidates and political sub-markets within and across political market 
arenas. Such ‘conditions’ influence perceptions of these parties’ leaders, 
candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance 
and relevance of these political market arenas and political sub-markets 
and determine the magnitude of the effects of the party-specific factors on 
such perceptions as well. These ‘conditions’ stimulate these parties to use 
marketing principles, procedures and techniques as an organisational 
strategy to advance market-orientation and develop proficient campaign 
structure and strategies in facing the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. However, although they advanced such practices, none of these 
parties were likely to turn into either product-oriented or market- oriented 
or sales-oriented parties.  
Thirdly, in such countries, the following factors are likely to 
determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of 
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political parties within and across the parliamentary and presidential 
elections.  
 
Figure 11.1: The First Proposed Theoretical Model 
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They include: a) perceptions of the party leaders, candidates and 
marketer/campaigner regarding the relative importance and relevance of 
political market arenas, especially the internal party, electoral, and the 
media arenas; b) the party-specific factors, especially the party ideology, 
size, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences of 
internal and the external shocks; c) the party’s competitive chances to 
meet the minimum number of the presidential election threshold, assemble 
a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates for 
running in the presidential election; and d) party’ presidential candidate-
specific factors.  
Finally, in such countries, these ‘conditions’ are likely to be shaped 
by the structures, mechanisms and elements, which result from the 
establishment of the democratic political party, government, the media and 
election systems. Such structures, mechanisms and elements are likely to 
construct the characteristics of political market arenas and political sub-
markets, influence the whole processes of political marketing exchanges, 
interactions and transactions that take place within and across these 
political market arenas and determine the magnitude of effects of these 
factors on the ways of and the degree to which these parties advanced the 
structural elements that constitute practices of market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning within and across these elections.  
 
11.2. The Party’ Presidential Candidate-Specific Factors as an 
Exploratory Factor to Explore Modes of Marketization and 
Professionalization of Campaigning and the Degree of Market-
Orientation and Campaign Professionalism of Political Parties 
in the Democratic Countries That Share Similarities with 
Indonesian Politics: The Second Proposed Theoretical Model. 
As visualized by figure 11.1, I have proposed that in democratic 
countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, the party’ 
presidential candidate-specific factors are likely to take place and 
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determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
and the degree of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of 
political parties within and across the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This proposition is actually extracted from the findings reported 
in Chapter 9. Points 9.4.2-9.4.4 of this chapter indicated that within and 
across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, both Gerindra 
Party and PDIP, as compared to these parties’ competitors, had a highly 
marketable presidential candidate. As showcased by figures 9.7, 9.11 and 
9.18 of point 9.4.4 of this chapter, the electoral marketability level of 
Prabowo Subijanto of Gerindra Party had been continuously increasing 
from 11.10 % in September 2013 to 44.20 % in the first week of July 2014. 
Nonetheless, his rival, Jokowi of PDIP, had been much more acceptable 
within and across the primary political sub-markets (the electorates/voters 
and the secondary political sub-markets (the media, the media owners, 
campaign-volunteers, political lobbyists, campaign donators, political 
leaders and the Internet and social media users). Moreover, as indicated 
by figures 9.12-9.17 of that point, the degree of endorsement of these 
political sub-markets (especially campaign donors), to his rival between 
the last weeks of May and first week of July 2014 had been increasing 
substantially. Since they realized his personal quality and leadership style 
and feared his chance of getting elected in the 2014 presidential election, 
these political sub-markets enthusiastically endorsed his rival to win this 
election.  
Having reflected on such evidence, I posit the following 
propositions. In democratic countries, which have been ruled under the 
presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred 
system, such as Indonesia, top-leaders/public figures of political parties 
who stepped into the presidential election race or were being nominated 
as a presidential candidate to run in this election are likely to have 
personal political gravitational and magnetism powers to attract, pull in and 
capture the primary and secondary political sub-markets. Such powers are 
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nearly invisible and unobservable; but, the ‘real consequences’ of such 
powers on the development of political marketability levels of the party’ 
presidential candidate and presidential candidates nominated by its 
competitors are quite observable and measurable within all the stages of 
these elections.  
The following two-fold dimensions determine formations and 
transformations of such powers within and across these elections. The first 
one is the internal dimension, which is related to the personal qualities 
(political identity, charisma, credibility, integrity and leadership style) and 
performance of the party’ presidential candidate and presidential 
candidates nominated by its competitors. The second one is the external 
dimension, which is associated with the degree of recognition, 
appreciation, support and endorsement of the primary and the secondary 
political sub-markets of this party’ presidential candidate, on the one hand, 
and (potential) presidential candidates nominated by its competitors, on 
the other.  
Transformations of these dimensions are likely to pave the way for 
the party’ presidential candidate-specific factors taking shape. These 
factors refer to the development of political marketability level of the party’ 
presidential candidate. This development is likely to take place as follows. 
The more the personal quality and leadership style of this party’ 
presidential candidate is recognized, appreciated, supported and 
endorsed by these political sub-markets, the much more likely the political 
marketability level of this party’ presidential candidate is highly marketable. 
The more the personal qualities and leadership styles of presidential 
candidates named by its competitors are undermined and rejected by 
these political sub-markets, the more likely the political marketability level 
of this party’ presidential candidate increases substantially.  
Based on such propositions, I formulate the second theoretical 
model, which is visualized by figure 11.2. This model is actually a basic, 
but a quite nested theoretical model. We could transform this model or use 
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it as either a descriptive or exploratory/predictive or prescriptive model to 
achieve particular objectives once we adopted a critical realism of Bhaskar 
(1975, 1998, 2008) as a research philosophy. This point is shortly spelled 
out as follows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.2: The Second Proposed Theoretical Model 
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Firstly, we could deploy this model as a descriptive model to 
investigate the following questions. How have political parties, in facing the 
parliamentary and presidential elections, identified and selected the best 
presidential candidate who was, either explicitly or implicitly, expected and 
needed by the primary and/or the secondary political sub-markets? How 
and to what extent have these parties, within and across these elections, 
attempted to meet such needs and/or expectations? What has really an 
ideal personal profile of a presidential candidate mostly been expected by 
either the primary or the secondary political sub-markets? How has each 
of these political sub-markets defined and constructed this profile? What 
kinds of political sub-market have been much more influential in defining 
and constructing this profile? How has each of these political sub-markets 
approved and endorsed a presidential candidate who met with this profile, 
and disregarded and undermined the other presidential candidates who 
did not meet with this profile? How have the endorsements of these 
political sub-markets for a presidential candidate who fulfilled this profile 
on the one hand, and the disapproval of these political sub-markets for the 
other presidential candidates who lacked fulfilment of this profile, on the 
other, influenced the ways political parties selected and nominated them 
as a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to run in the presidential election? 
How have such endorsements and disapproval carried consequences for 
developments of marketization and professionalization of these parties 
within and across the primary, parliamentary and presidential elections? 
Secondly, we also could use this model as an exploratory or a 
predictive model to evaluate the following questions. How did and the 
degree to which political marketability levels of political parties’ presidential 
candidates take place and transform within all the stages of these 
elections? How did and the degree to which these political sub-markets 
influence this transformation? How has each of these parties considered 
this transformation? How and the degree to which this transformation 
determined modes of marketization and professionalization of 
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campaigning and the degree of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalism of these parties within and across these elections? We 
could use this model to evaluate the first, second and third questions, but, 
as we want to address the last question, we need not only this model, but 
also the baseline structural model. The following point 11.3 will detail this 
point.  
Finally, we also could transform this model into a prescriptive model 
that specifically offers a set of actions and directions to help political 
parties once these parties want to accomplish their goals, especially, to 
win elections (O’ Shaughnessy, 2001: 1047). This prescriptive model 
provides a set of practical guidance and managerial directions needed by 
both those who run as a presidential candidate and a political party (and 
its coalition), which attempted to select and get a potential marketable 
presidential candidate and/or elevate the political marketability of a 
presidential candidate who this party (and its coalition) nominated to run in 
the presidential election. To do so however, we have to employ the 
following strategies and use the elements that constitute the baseline 
structural model.  
First at all, we have to cautiously evaluate the personal qualities 
and leadership styles of those who (potentially) run or were being 
nominated as a presidential candidate or a pair of presidential candidates 
to run in the presidential election and holistically examine the degree of 
recognition, endorsement and support they achieved from the primary and 
secondary political sub-markets. Secondly, we should evaluate 
transformations of such elements within all the stages of these elections 
and assess the degree to which such transformations shaped their political 
marketability level as (a pair of) presidential candidates. Thirdly, we need 
to assess the following circumstances that likely determine the 
organisational capabilities of the party (and its coalition) in elevating the 
political marketability level of its presidential candidate and endorsing and 
backing its presidential candidate to win in the presidential election. Such 
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circumstances incorporate the condition of the internal arena of this party 
(and its coalition), levels of support for the existing social and political 
cleavages of this party (and its coalition) and campaign funds, resources, 
ideological orientation and position in the government of this party (and its 
coalition). Finally, while formulating this model into a particular prescriptive 
model that meets with such circumstances, we need to consider 
developments in: a) political marketability levels of the party’ presidential 
candidate and also presidential candidates nominated by its competitors; 
and b) organisational capabilities of this party (and its coalition) in 
endorsing and getting this party’ presidential candidate elected in the 
presidential election.  
As displayed in Appendix C, I provide a set of examples of 
prescriptive models derived from the Indonesian specific case and 
formulated based on reflection of the quantitative and qualitative findings 
reported in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. In this appendix, I also outline a set of 
terms and conditions regarding adaptation of each of these models.  
 
11.3. The Third Proposed Theoretical Model to Explore Modes of 
Marketization and Professionalization of Campaigning and the 
Degree of Market-Orientation and Campaign Professionalism 
of Political Parties. 
As seen from Chapter 6, I evaluated the baseline structural model 
using the survey data collected from the Indonesian political parties’ 
marketers/campaigners. The following figure 11.3 re-displays this model. 
Since this model is actually a good fit model with sufficient statistical 
power, this model is statistically plausible and practically workable to 
capture and understand the ways of and the degree to which political 
parties, especially in democratic countries, which shared characteristics 
with Indonesian politics, adopted political marketing orientation, advanced 
market-orientation and ran professionalization of campaigning within and 
across the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
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Figure 11.3: The Third Proposed Theoretical Model 
 
Having considered its statistical power, I argue that this model 
would be helpful to investigate the ways of and the degree to which 
political parties in such countries addressed either the latent and/or the 
expressive needs and expectations of these political sub-markets and 
advanced campaign structure and strategies to persuade and capture 
these political sub-markets within and across these elections. Using this 
model allows us to holistically explore diverse factors that significantly 
determine modes of marketization and professionalization of campaigning 
and degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these 
parties within and across these elections.  
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11.4. Theoretical, Practical and Managerial Contributions of the 
Proposed Models. 
11.4.1. Theoretical Contributions of the First Proposed Model. 
The first proposed model charted by figure 11.1 offers the following 
theoretical contributions. Firstly, Butler and Collins (1994: 21, 1999: 57) 
formulated a descriptive framework that underpins the structural and 
process characteristics of political marketing. But, they considered various 
types of political sub-markets and political market arenas less. This model 
proposed diverse nomenclatures of these political market arenas and 
political sub-markets that take shape in emerging democratic countries, 
which share characteristics with Indonesian politics.  
Secondly, Henneberg (2002) proposed ‘a structural model of 
political exchange’ and theorized its relationships with ‘political markets’ 
(the electoral, governmental and political activism markets). Having 
realized its innate weakness, Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 93-94) and 
Ormrod et al. (2013: 18) also posited a triadic interaction model of political 
marketing exchange. Such models underpin multi-layered dimensions and 
circuits of political marketing exchange and interaction processes wherein 
political parties/candidates deal with the primary political markets (voters 
and citizens) within the contexts of either the elections or in between the 
elections. The first proposed model conversely, conceptualized such 
dimensions and processes less. However, this model took into account 
formations of political market arenas and political sub-markets in 
democratic countries that shared similarities with Indonesian politics and 
visualized the effects of such formations on political marketing exchanges, 
interactions and transactions carried out by political parties and these 
parties’ leaders and candidates in such countries when they dealt with 
these political sub-markets. More importantly, this model considered the 
structural conditions and factors that determine modes of marketization 
and professionalization of campaigning and the degree of market-
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orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within and 
across the (primary, parliamentary and presidential) elections.  
Thirdly, O’ Cass (2009: 195-197), having followed a resource-based 
view of the political marketing perspective, introduced a conceptual lens 
that underpins the relationships between political marketing of the party 
and its political markets (voters and stakeholders) in competitive 
environments. He also conceptualized the effects of the party resources 
on the party’s capability in addressing these political markets and 
managing value creation (O’ Cass, 2009: 201-203). He and his colleague 
also formulated the following three models, which are the proactive 
political market orientation (PPMO), reactive political market orientation 
(RPMO), and political brand orientation (PBO) and theorized the 
relationships between and among these orientations with political markets 
(voters and stakeholders) and political market-environments (O’ Cass and 
Voola, 2011: 633-638). These models, however, lacked consideration of 
the nature and structure of political marketing exchanges and interactions 
(Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013: 91; Ormrod, et al., 2013: 18) and 
conceptualisation of the nomenclatures of political sub-markets and 
political market arenas wherein such exchanges and interactions take 
place. Unlike these models, the first proposed model accounted for such 
issues holistically. More importantly, it also offered a workable framework 
that allows us to holistically capture and understand such exchanges and 
interactions and explore diverse factors that determine the degree of 
market-orientation and campaign professionalism of these parties within 
and across the elections.  
Finally, Lees-Marshment (2001a: 16-35, 2001b: 696-702; 2001d: 
1074-1081, 2003a: 16-26, 2004a: 17-20; 2008: 16-35; 2009: 207-208, 
2010: 4-9) and Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a: 8; 2005b: 221-226) 
formulated the product-oriented party (POP), the sales-oriented party 
(SOP) and the market-oriented party (MOP). However, her models 
conflated the normative and prescriptive logics in underpinning practices 
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of political marketing orientations of political parties (Savigny, 2004, 
2007b, 2008) and did not fully separate practices of political marketing-
orientation and market-orientation (Ormrod, 2006, 2007, 2011a, 2011b). 
Her models considered various types of political markets and political 
market arenas that take place within and across democratic countries less 
(Ormrod, 2006, 2007; Ormrod, 2009: 80; Ormrod, 2011a: 5-7; Ormrod, 
2011b: 396-402) and accounted less for the characteristics and conditions 
that determine parties to follow one of those models (Strömbäck, 
2010:18). Having regarded such issues, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
(2005a: 8; 2005b: 221-226) and Lilleker (2006: 154) revised her models, 
while Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 89) formulated 
some additional propositions to enhance the robustness of her models. 
Reflecting on the applicability, strengths and weaknesses of her models, 
he stated that ’party orientation appears to be a matter of degree rather 
than of type’ (Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 82). As considered that his 
proposition seems less helpful to evaluate modes of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of political parties, I, as highlighted in 
Chapter 10, point 10.5, favoured proposing that party’ orientation not only 
appears to be the matter of the degree, but also seems to be the matter of 
mode. Following this argument, I argue that compared to her models, the 
first proposed model is much more likely to be helpful in holistically 
capturing and understanding the structural conditions and diverse factors 
that influence both modes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalism of these parties within and across these elections.  
 
11.4.2. Theoretical Contributions of the Second Proposed Model.  
The second proposed model charted by figure 11.2 offers the 
following theoretical contributions. Firstly, Savigny (2007b: 42) voiced that 
‘a conflation of prescription and prediction in the use of models and 
frameworks’ remained as a crucial problem. Moreover, Lock and Harris 
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(1996: 23), O’ Cass (1996: 59) and Lees-Marshment (2001a: 706) 
advocated the need to develop better and workable models to help 
marketization of political parties. Such issues, so far, have been not 
resolved properly. As stated previously by point 11.2, I argue that having 
followed a critical realism of Bhaskar (19975, 1998, 2008) as a research 
philosophy, we could deploy this model as either a descriptive or a 
predictive/exploratory model and transform this model into a prescriptive 
model as well241. Taking such efforts allows us to resolve that problem and 
fulfil that need. 
Secondly, Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy (2007: 17), Henneberg 
(2008: 161, 171) and Hennerberg and Ormrod (2013: 97) suggested 
applying the relational and network perspectives to understand political 
marketing phenomena. This model incorporates such perspectives and 
considers political exchanges, interactions, and transactions between and 
among the political party, the party’ presidential candidate and the primary 
and secondary political sub-markets. Using this model allows us to 
evaluate such exchanges, interactions and transactions and explore 
transformations of two-fold dimensions that construct development of the 
political marketability level of the party’ presidential candidate holistically.  
Thirdly, Newman (1994: 12) posited a (descriptive) model that 
underpins political marketing of the party’ presidential candidate. However, 
while lacking consideration of political exchanges, interactions and 
transactions between and among the party, the party’ presidential 
candidate, the media, voters and interest groups, he theorised such 
                                                       
241 A predictive or an explanatory model of political marketing, in this sense, is defined as 
a type of theoretical model that offers a realistic, lucrative and nested conceptual 
framework to capture and understand complex processes and dimensions of political 
marketing phenomena. Slightly differently, a prescriptive model of political marketing is a 
type of ideal framework that implicitly or explicitly prescribes a set of actions and 
directions that have to be carried out by political parties since these parties expect to ‘fulfil 
their mission of winning elections’ (O’ Shaughnessy, 2001: 1047). Once we followed a 
critical realism of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008), the main issue is no longer related to the 
model itself. Instead, the most crucial issue is a type of logic we want to follow when we 
want to deploy this model to address particular types of political marketing and 
campaigning issues. 
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media, voters and interest groups merely as elements of what he called 
the ‘environmental forces’. Unlike his model, this model places the 
voters/electorates, as primary political sub-markets, while the media, 
interest groups, which manifest as either campaign- volunteers or political 
lobbyists or campaign donors, comprise secondary political sub-markets. 
This model considers transformations of support and endorsement of 
these political sub-markets, either of the party’ presidential candidate or 
the presidential candidates nominated by its competitors within and across 
the (primary, parliamentary and presidential) elections. Using this model 
allows us to be much more capable of capturing and understanding such 
transformations and their effects on developments of marketization and 
professionalization of campaigning of the party and its competitors within 
and across these elections. 
Fourthly, Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) introduced a conceptual 
framework to understand political market places and the marketing 
strategy of the party candidate. This framework however, lacked 
consideration of what Henneberg and Ormrod (2013: 91) called ‘the 
complex linkages and interdependencies between actors and structures in 
political exchanges’. This model considers the primary and the secondary 
political markets as inter-related and interdependent actors and placed 
them within the multi-layered structure of political exchanges, interactions 
and transactions. This model therefore would be much more useful as we 
want to capture and understand the ‘real consequences’ of the inclinations 
of these political sub-markets to either endorse the party’ presidential 
candidate or undermine the presidential candidates nominated by its 
competitors on the ways of and the degree to which this party and its 
competitors advanced market-orientation and campaign professionalism 
within and across these elections.  
 Finally, Butler and Collins (1994, 1999), Lees-Marshment (2001a, 
2001b, 2004, 2008) and Wring (2005) conceptualized the party candidates 
as one of the party political products. However, these authors lacked in 
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theorizing and exploring the relationships between the party, the party 
candidates and political sub-markets. Within the specific context of 
democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, the 
ideas of these authors seem less applicable. Due to the following reasons, 
this model is, otherwise, likely to be workable in evaluating such issues in 
these countries. In such countries, institutionalisation of political parties is 
still under-developed. The personal profiles and leadership styles of these 
parties’ candidates as individual politicians are much more visible, as 
compared to these parties as an organisation. As compared to these 
parties, these parties’ presidential candidates commonly have larger 
capabilities to create their own markets. Using this model allows us to be 
much more capable of not only capturing developments of political 
marketability levels of these parties’ presidential candidates, but also 
exploring the ways of and the degree to which such developments 
determined modes of marketization and professionalization of 
campaigning and degrees of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalism of these parties within and across these elections.  
 
11.4.3. Theoretical Contributions of the Third Proposed Model. 
Likewise Lees-Marshment’ (2001a, 2001b; 2001d, 2003a, 2004a; 
2008; 2009, 2010) models, the third proposed model displayed previously 
by figure 11.3, entails some weaknesses. For example, this model 
considered less not only the whole stages that have to be carried out by 
either MOP or SOP, as posited by Lees- Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 
2004a, 2008, 2010), Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005a, 2005b) and 
Lilleker (2006), but also the behavioural dimensions of market- orientation 
and strategic postures of political parties, as theorized by Ormrod (2005: 
51-56, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138), Ormrod and Henneberg 
(2008: 10-12, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), Ormrod and Savigny (2011: 490) and 
Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6). Regardless of such issues, this model offers the 
following unique knowledge and practical contributions.  
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Firstly, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b) and Lees-Marshment 
(2010b) reported that Lees-Marshment’ models, especially SOP and MOP, 
have been widely adopted by political parties across the globe. Temple 
(2010: 274-275) however, argued that the purely and/or the perfectly MOP 
or SOP are unlikely to exist in the real world. Similarly, Ormrod, (2009: 
188) voiced that the perfectly market-oriented party is unlikely to take 
shape in real politics. This model is not actually intentionally directed to 
address the existence of ideal profiles of either MOP or SOP; but, it seems 
realistic for us to deploy this model in order to detect the inclinations of 
political parties, especially in the new democratic countries, to follow either 
MOP or SOP and evaluate the degree to which these parties favoured 
performing what Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005: 201) called a hybrid 
model that incorporates elements of MOP and SOP.  
Secondly, Strömbäck (2007: 59-63) theorized the relationships 
between concepts and practices of political marketing, market-orientation 
and professionalization of campaigning. However, while identifying diverse 
factors that influence the ways of and the degree to which political parties 
advanced such practices (Strömbäck, 2007: 64; Strömbäck, 2010:28-29; 
Strömbäck, et al., 2012: 86), he lacked proposition of an applicable 
framework to evaluate such issues holistically. This model, instead, 
offered this framework.  
Finally, Henneberg (2006a: 33), Henneberg (2006b: 18), Ormrod 
(2009: 137-138), Ormrod and Henneberg (2010: 32-33), Ormrod et al. 
(2013: 3-6) proposed the convinced ideologist, the tactical populist, the 
relationship builder and the political lightweight models of market- 
orientation of political parties. However, while Henneberg (2006a: 33) and 
Henneberg (2006b: 18) suggested evaluating each of these models based 
on the primary priority made by the party in fulfilling either the latent or the 
expressive needs of political sub-markets, Ormrod (2005: 51-56, 2007: 77- 
78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) otherwise 
examined these models based on the primary concern undertaken by the 
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party in selecting and running such orientations242. Having regarded this 
condition, I argue that the primary concern that needs to be considered in 
evaluating the existence of these models is actually not whether and to 
what extent the party favours running such orientations, as Ormrod (2005, 
2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) did. 
Instead, the most important issue to do so is whether and the degree to 
which the party accounted for the latent and the expressive needs of these 
political sub-markets when they advanced such orientations243. Following 
such propositions, I argue that this model can be considered as an 
alternative, baseline and nested structural model to evaluate how and the 
degree to which political parties in democratic countries, especially, those 
sharing similarities with Indonesian politics, practiced these 
aforementioned models. Moreover, to this specific end, we need to include 
a set of behavioural dimensions of market-orientation of the party 
theorized by Ormrod (2005: 51-56, 2007: 77-78, 2009: 93-96, 137-138), 
Ormrod and Savigny (2011: 490), Ormrod and Henneberg (2008: 10-12, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011) and Ormrod et al. (2013: 3-6) in this model.  
 
11.4.4. Managerial Contributions of the Second and the Third 
Proposed Models.  
O’ Shaughnessy (2001: 1052) highlighted the need to generate 
political marketing knowledge that offers not only ‘an analytic framework’, 
                                                       
242 These authors posited that a political party performed the first model when this party 
prioritized the internal-orientation and societal orientation, but lacked in advancing the 
voters-orientation and competitor-orientation. Moreover, they proposed that a political 
party took up the second model when this party preferred prioritizing the voters-
orientation and competitor-orientation and lacked running the internal-orientation and 
societal orientation. Furthermore, they postulated that a political party advanced the third 
model when this party accounted for not only the internal-orientation and societal 
orientation, but also voters-orientation and competitor-orientation. Additionally, they 
conceptualized that a political party carried out the fourth model when this party lacked in 
accounting such orientations. 
243 For example, we could label a political party that leads these political sub-markets and 
takes up the convince ideologist model, as this party is much more engaged in 
addressing the latent needs rather than the expressive needs of these political sub-
markets. In contrast, we could call a political party that follows these political sub-markets 
and runs the tactical populist model, as this party preferred dealing with the manifest 
needs rather than the latent needs of these political sub-markets much more. 
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but also ‘a problem-solving tool’. Most political communication and 
marketing scholars succeeded less in fulfilling his expectation however. 
For example, theoretical models proposed by Henneberg (2006a: 33; 
2006b: 18), O’ Cass and Voola (2011: 633-638), Newman (1994: 12), 
Kotler and Kotler (1999: 5) and Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b, 2004a, 
2008, 2010) are actually descriptive-exploratory models. These models 
therefore lacked in offering effective and practical ways regarding market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning of political parties that 
could help these parties to successfully accomplish their goals, either 
within the specific contexts of the elections or in between the elections. 
The second proposed model offers the following potential managerial and 
practical contributions once this model is transformed into the prescriptive 
models.  
As seen from point 11.2, I argued that the second and the third 
proposed models could be transformed into and spelled out the way to 
transform such models into prescriptive models. We could to do so once 
we followed the critical realism perspective of Bhaskar (1975, 1998, 2008). 
I, as detailed in Appendix C, also proposed 8 prescriptive models. As 
compared to the models proposed by these aforementioned authors, 
these prescriptive models seem much more realistic and applicable to help 
political parties, especially, in democratic countries that share similarities 
with Indonesian politics, due to the following reasons. Each of these 
models provides a set of orientations regarding such practices that could 
be prioritized and advanced by these parties when they want to 
successfully address and meet the latent and expressive needs and 
expectations of political sub-markets, especially within the specific 
contexts of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Each of these 
models also has a set of terms and conditions that incorporates influential 
factors, which are likely to constrain and/or determine the organisational 
capability of each of these parties in developing such practices and 
achieving their goals in these elections.  
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In such countries, these models seem much more workable to help 
the big-size secular-nationalist parties rather than to assist either the 
small- or the medium-sized parties with either secular-Islamic or Islamist 
ideological orientations in achieving their goals in the parliamentary and 
presidential election. Nonetheless, these small- or medium-sized parties, 
which adopt these models, still possibly gain success in these elections. 
Each of these parties, however, has to develop a solid internal 
organization and robust organisational capability to collect sufficient 
campaign resources, obtain parliamentary seats that pass or are close to 
the presidential election threshold, assemble a solid political coalition (if 
needed) and nominate highly marketable MPs and presidential candidates 
successfully.  
Meanwhile, in Western established democratic countries, these 
models seem much more applicable to help the mainstream centre-right or 
centre- left parties rather than to assist the small- or the medium-sized 
centre-right or centre-left parties to win the elections. Nonetheless, these 
small- or medium-sized centre-right or centre-left parties that adopt these 
models also still get a chance to achieve their goals in these elections. 
Each of these parties, however, has to establish a solid internal 
organisation, select influential and highly marketable (MPs and 
presidential) candidates and develop a robust organisational capability to 
collect sufficient campaign resources, assemble a solid political coalition (if 
needed) and capture political sub-markets (especially the electorates, the 
media and campaign donors) successfully.  
 
11.5. Potential Contributions of the Second and Third Proposed 
Models and the Prescriptive Models for the Survivability of the 
Mainstream Centre-Left or Centre-Right Parties and the 
Sustainability of the (Existing) Liberal Democratic System and 
Society in Western Democratic Countries. 
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Some authors voiced that once political parties in democratic 
countries intensively adopted political marketing and advanced market-
orientation and professionalization of campaigning, the ideal roles of 
political parties, the media and voters in political spheres and affairs in 
such countries were likely decline substantially (Lilleker, 2005a, 2005b; 
Savigny, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2008; Coleman, 2007; Savigny and Wring, 
2009; Savigny and Temple, 2010; Temple, 2010, 2013). The following 
authors instead, argued that adaptation of such practices is likely to 
facilitate such voters in gaining a greater opportunity to articulate their 
political interests (Scammell, 1995) and obtain various information related 
to the work performances of political parties and these parties’ leaders and 
candidates (Harrop, 1990), pave the way for developments of much more 
dynamic relationships between political parties and voters (Shama, 1976; 
O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001c, 2010a, 2010b, 
2012; Lilleker, 2005a) and between political parties, politicians and their 
publics/stakeholders (Lees-Marshment and Winter, 2009; Henneberg and 
O’Shaughnessy, 2009), enhance ‘the representative function of a political 
system and democracy as a whole’ (Lees-Marshment, 2004a: 239-240, 
2004b: 12) and ‘tackle increasing disengagement of the electorate and 
voters in politics and political participation and a high distrust of the 
electorates of  political actors and organizations’ (Henneberg, et al., 2009: 
116). Having taken a different stance, subsequent authors, conversely, 
highlighted that adaptation of such practices carried out both positive and 
negative consequences for the media, electorates/voters political parties—
in particular—and politics, political systems and democracy—in general 
(Giasson, et al., 2012: 18-19; Lees-Marshment, 2012: 373-378) 
While controversial debates related to such issues remained 
prevail, Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005b: 219) and Lees- Marshment 
et al. (2010b: 294-295) suggested delving deeper into the nature of 
democracy and democratic political systems that take place within and 
across democratic countries. Slightly differently, Henneberg et al. (2009: 
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180-181) formulated the selling-oriented, the instrumentally and the 
relational models of political marketing managements (PPM) and 
displayed the compatibilities of these models with either competitive 
elitism or deliberative democracies. While offering invaluable thoughts, 
none of these authors, however, developed the (prescriptive) models 
needed to help the established political parties when they had to deal with 
what Foa and Mounk (2016: 7) labelled as ‘the structural problems in the 
functioning of liberal democracy’244 and tackle the emergences of what 
Schedler (1996) named as the ‘anti-political-establishment parties’ and 
some authors (such as Rydgre, 2004, 2005; Zaslove, 2004, 2008; Keman 
and Krouwel, 2005; Eremina and Sedenko, 2015) called as ‘radical right-
wing populist parties’245. 
During the last two decades, such problems have been taking place 
in Western democratic countries. They have been much more visible since 
those who voted for Brexit won in the 2016 UK EU referendum, Donald 
Trump was elected in the 2016 US presidential election, Mateo Renzi lost 
in the 2016 Italian Referendum and the mainstream centre-left and centre-
right French parties collapsed in the 2017 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. Being led by populist leaders, some far-right populist parties in 
                                                       
244 Such problems, according to Foa and Mounk (2015: 6-7) consist of: a) the increasing 
cynicism in the value of democracy as a political system; b) the declining 
public/electorates’ trust in political institutions such political parties, parliaments and the 
government; and c) the soaring willingness of the publics/electorates to support either the 
populist candidates or the new authoritarian alternatives parties that define themselves in 
opposition to the established political parties. 
245 Mudde (2004: 543) defined populism as an ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
general will of the people. Political parties that followed this ideology are strongly 
opposed to what he called ‘elitism’ and ‘pluralism’ and stuck to a Manichean perspective 
that differentiates people/electorates into two groups, which are friends and enemies. He 
stated that as ‘a thin-centred ideology, populism can be easily combined with very 
different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or 
socialism’ (Mudde, 2004: 544). Having had capability to mix and attract to those who 
followed one of these ideologies, this ideology has been widely seen as a threat to the 
established political parties, which commonly stick to either the centre-left or the centre-
right ideological orientations and the liberal society. The primary reason is those who 
followed this ideology, according to Engesser et al. (2016: 3-5), favoured promoting the 
following issues: the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the 
elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the ‘heartland’. 
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European politics, such as FN, FPO, AfD, Podemos, Syriza, the Italian 
Northern League and the Five Star Movement have been marching from 
the ‘margins’ to the ‘mainstream’ politics. Most of these parties advocated 
xenophobic and the ultra-nationalist/Nazism ideological orientations and 
poisoned European societies with racism and anti-globalisation, 
immigrants and Muslims intensively. However, whilst such trends 
jeopardized the sustainability of the (liberal) democracy246, especially, in 
Western democratic countries, none of political marketing scholars 
formulated prescriptive models of political marketing and professionalized 
campaign to help either the existing centre-right or centre-left parties in 
such countries to handle such trends effectively.  
As regards to such conditions, I propose the following arguments. 
Katz (2001: 278) voiced that the ways political parties selected, nominated 
marketed and sold candidates for running in elections and managed public 
offices would define not only the organizational traits of these parties, but 
also the degree of support of the peoples/electorates’ for these parties—in 
particular—and the political and government systems—in general. 
Following his proposition, I argue that the mainstream centre-left or centre-
right parties in such countries have to select and nominate qualified and 
proper candidates for running in elections, market and sell them effectively 
to get them elected in the elections.  
Winning and gaining parliamentary seats in such elections is very 
important for these parties to secure their ‘roles and privileges’ of what 
Mair (1995) called ‘representative agencies’ and ‘public office holders’. 
Once they have successfully maintained and improved such ‘roles and 
privileges’, these parties would have had plenty of chances not only to 
tackle the decline of political partisanship and people’s/electorates’ trust in 
                                                       
246 There have been diverse types of the normative and practical models of democracies. 
As compared to the other variants of democracies, the liberal democracy has been much 
more widely accepted across the globe. Regardless of its weaknesses, this liberal 
democracy, according to Diamond (1999: 18) is much more capable in offering ‘the best 
long-run prospects for reducing social injustices and correcting mistaken policies and 
corrupt practices’. 
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these parties, but also to manage the structural problems in the 
functioning of liberal democracy and democratic political and government 
systems247 . To achieve such goals, these parties could consider the 
second and the third proposed models charted previously by figures 11.2 
and 11.3 and a set of examples of the prescriptive models displayed in 
Appendix C.  
Though being derived from the very specific context of the new 
democracy of Indonesia, which actually had a limited fertile political 
foreground for development of either the radical-right or the radical-left 
wing populist parties (Ambardi, 2008) or the populist Islamist parties (see 
Hadiz, 2011, 2014), these models offer the following benefits. The second 
proposed model could help these parties to maximize their roles in 
nurturing and selecting qualified populist-leaders and/or hunting and 
nominating (populist presidential) candidates, whose strong personal 
political gravitational and magnetic powers to attract, pull in and capture 
the primary and secondary political sub-markets. This model would also 
be helpful to counter the increasing personal political gravitational and 
magnetic powers of leaders of the far-right populist parties and 
movements. Moreover, the third proposed model could assist these 
parties to strategically develop a set of attitudinal and behavioural 
orientations to address and mobilize these political sub-markets and deal 
with primary political actors who have been influential in the political 
market arenas within the specific contexts of either the elections or in 
between the elections. Additionally, the prescriptive models would be 
useful for these parties, as they want to develop market-orientation and 
professionalization of campaigning effectively in order to gain substantial 
                                                       
247 Such problems already took shape in US and the European politics (Foa and Mounk, 
2015: 7-14). Within the specific context of the European politics, such problems paved 
the way for the increasing chances and powers of the radical-right wing populist parties 
and movements to attract and capture various groups of peoples/electorates who are 
heavily dissatisfied with these parties and, more specifically, the roles of these parties in 
the national and European parliament and government (Zaslove, 2004; Keman and 
Krouwel, 2005; Eremina and Sedenko, 2015).  
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parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election and/or win the 
presidential election.  
Once ruling the parliament/government, these parties would have 
had plenty of chances to secure their roles and privileges as 
‘representative agencies’ and ‘public office holders’ strategically (Mair, 
1995). Having attained such roles and privileges, these parties could 
upgrade their organisational capabilities to manage what Mair (2005: 24-
25) labelled as the ‘popular’ and the ‘constitutional’ elements of democracy 
effectively 248. If these parties successfully managed such elements, these 
parties either individually or collectively would have had robust 
organisational capabilities to tackle the existing structural problems of the 
(liberal) democratic system and improve the workability and serviceability 
of existing political and government systems to generate many more real 
benefits to individual citizens and electorates and the people/society as a 
whole.  
Does using these proposed models carry negative consequences 
for democracy? Savigny (2004) stated that the increasing applications of 
marketing principles, techniques and procedures in political spheres would 
undermine democratic ideals, especially once the ‘elites/political actors 
seek to shape the preferences of the electorates for their own ends’ 
(Savigny, 2004: 275). She also stated that ‘increasing use of marketing in 
politics is contributing to a depoliticisation of the political process, inhibiting 
democratic debate, expression and choice’ (Savigny, 2007a: 134). 
Similarly, Lilleker (2005a, 2005b) hinted that political parties that run such 
practices are likely to be incapable of fulfilling the latent and expressive 
needs and expectations of political sub-markets, especially the voters and 
their constituents and members inclusively. I totally agree with the ideas of 
these authors. However, unlike these authors, I favour advocating that the 
                                                       
248  The ‘popular’ elements refer to the political trust of the peoples/electorates in 
individual politicians of the party and to political institutions, particularly the parliaments 
and government, while the ‘constitutional’ elements relate to the party membership and 
levels of political partisanship and participation, especially in the elections (Mair, 2005: 
24-25). 
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main issue for us, as either political marketing scholars or practitioners, is 
actually not whether the uses of marketing principles, techniques and 
procedures in political spheres generate negative consequences for either 
the democracy, as posited by Savigny (2004, 2007) or the capabilities of 
political parties to meet the diverse needs and expectations of political 
sub-markets, as highlighted by Lilleker (2005a, 2005b). Giasson, et al. 
(2012: 18-19) and Lees-Marshment (2012: 373-378) already offered quite 
fair assessments regarding this issue. The primary issue is instead, how 
can we ensure that the adaptations of such principles, techniques and 
procedures in the political spheres not only could improve ‘the 
representative function of a political system and democracy as a whole’ 
(Lees-Marshment, 2004a: 239-240, 2004b: 12) and upgrade the quality 
and levels of political engagement of the electorates and voters and their 
trust in political actors and organizations (Henneberg, et al., 2009: 116), 
but also could secure the sustainability of the existing democratic political 
and government systems and institutions—in particular—and the 
survivability of the (liberal) democratic citizen and society as a whole—in 
general.  
From a different stance, Hamelink (2007: 185) voiced that within the 
framework of the ‘limited democracy model’, adaptation of practices of 
professionalization of political communication and campaigning by political 
parties could improve the ways these parties formulated and offered 
political products and policies to the peoples/citizens/electorates. While 
fully realizing that such adaptations would not totally resolve the innate 
problems of the current liberal democratic system in Western democratic 
countries (such as little or no civic confidence and little or no civic 
engagement), he, however, believed that such adaptations are likely to 
generate a crucial contribution to what he highlighted as ‘the functioning 
and the legitimation of liberal representative democracy’ (Hamelink, 2007: 
185). Having adopted the ideas of this author, I argue that adopting such 
practices is likely to stimulate political parties not only to manage their 
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interests effectively, but also to address and fulfil the needs and 
expectations of common people strategically. Once advancing such 
practices strategically, these parties would have had robust organizational 
capabilities in developing and delivering better political policies and 
products to these common people, offering these people what Hamelink 
(2007: 186) called ‘real choices’ and ‘participation in real choice making’ 
and more importantly, encouraging these people to get involved in what 
Hamelink (2007: 187) named the ‘democratic minds’.  
These aforementioned proposed models are indeed not silver 
bullets to secure the (existing) liberal democratic, political party and 
government systems and political institutions in Western democratic 
countries. Nonetheless, I am quite confident that once the 
mainstream/established political parties in such countries adopted and 
advanced these models strategically and effectively, these parties would 
have plenty of chances to improve the functionality and serviceability of 
these systems and institutions for the people/society as a whole. However, 
while adopting and developing these models, these parties have to realize 
that taking power in the parliament/government is merely a necessary 
political means to accomplish the most important political end, which is to 
get more strategic roles and privileges as ‘representative agencies’ and 
‘public office holders’. Gaining such roles and privileges and keeping such 
roles and privileges publicly accountable and workable are necessary for 
these parties as an organisation and these parties’ leaders and candidates 
as individual politicians, as they want to increase these people’s/societies’ 
trust in these systems and institutions, keep such systems and institutions 
surviving and become much more serviceable to these people and secure 
the survivability of liberal democratic society.  
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APPENDIX A 
Interview and Personal Correspondence 
 
The Indonesian Political Parties’ Leaders/Secretaries, Candidates, 
Politicians and Activists 
1. Ahmad Basyarah, MP of PDIP, 11 June 2014 
2. Ahmad Farhan, an activist of PKS, 18 May 2014. 
3. Ahmad Haerul Amri, a leader and an activist of Nasdem Party, 26 
October 2014 
4. Ahmad Muzani, MP of Gerindra Party, 5 November 2014 
5. Dedi Supriadi, a leader of PKS, 18 May 2014, 24 April 2014 and 12 
November 2014. 
6. Elnino Mohi, MP of Gerindra Party, 18 December 2014. 
7. Hasan Wahid, a vice general secretary of PKB, 24 July 2015. 
8. Indra J.Pilliang, a leader of Golkar Party, 28 October 2014 
9. Imam Nahrowi, a former general secretary of PKB—now as Minister of 
Youth and Sport, 14 May 2014 
10. M. Arwani Thomafy, MP of PPP, 26 May 2014. 
11. Pius Lustrilanang, MP of Gerindra Party, 22 November 2015 
12. Ramadhan Pohan, a leader of Democratic Party, 13 May 2014 
13. Rully C. Azwar, a leader of Golkar Party, 13 May 2014 and 16 
December 2014. 
14. Suharso Monoarfa, a leader of PPP—now a member of Presidential 
Privy Council, 18 May 2014. 
15. Taufik Ridha, a former general secretary of PKS, 5 November 2014 
16. Viva Yoga Mauladi, MP of PAN, 7 May 2014 
17. Willy Aditya, a vice general secretary of Nasdem Party, 30 April 2014 
and 29 October 2014 
18. Yudhi Chrisnandi, a leader of Hanura Party, 14 May 2014. 
19. Zaini Rahman, a former MP of PPP, 22 September 2014. 
 
Senior Editors/Journalists of the Indonesian Media 
1. Ahmad Khusaini, an editor-in-chief of ANTARA, 21 September 2013. 
2. Arif Zulkifly, an editor-in-chief of TEMPO Magazine, 21 October 2014 
3. Don Bosco Selamun, an editor-in-chief of Berita Satu TV—now being 
appointed as an editor-in-chief of METRO TV, 15 October 2014 
4. Pasaoran Simandjutak, senior journalist of Trans 7, 23 September 
2014 
5. Rene Kawilarang, an editor-in-chief of VIVA NEWS, 26 September 
2014 
6. Richard Bagun, an editor-in-chief of KOMPAS, 12 November 2014 
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7. Sukri Rahmatullah, an editor-in-chief of Okezone.com, 10 October 
2014 
8. Suryo Pratomo, an editor-in-chief of Metro TV, 31 October 2014 
9. Usman Kasong, an editor-in-chief of Media Indonesia, 31 October 
2014 
10. Yadi Endriana, an editor-in-chief of MNC TV, 13 November 2014 
11. Yogie Arief Nugraha, a vice editor-in-chief of KOMPAS TV, 6 
November 2014 
 
The Indonesian Political Pollsters and Consultants 
1. Ari, a Head of Media Centre of Gerindra Party, 28 October 2014 
2. Akhmad Danial, a political consultant hired by a former MP of Golkar 
Party, 15 July 2014  
3. Budi Purnomo, a media strategist hired by Gerindra Party/Prabowo 
Subijanto, 23 October 2014 
4. Dewi Rahmawati, a media strategist hired by Nasdem Party, 4 
November 2014. 
5. Eka Kusmayadi, Director of Jaringan Suara Indonesia/The Indonesian 
Voice Network, 13 October 2014 
6. Hanggoro D.P, Director of Citra Publik Indonesia, a pollster and 
political consultant, 17 November 2014. 
7. Imam Brotoseno, a social media strategist, hired by PDIP/Puan 
Maharani, an influential leader of PDIP, 30 October 2014 
8. M. Qodari, Executive Director of Indo Barometer, a pollster and political 
consultant, 19 May 2014 
9. Popon S.G, Director of Jaringan Suara Indonesia/the Indonesian Voice 
Network, 12 October 2014 
10. Sunarto Ciptohardjono, one of directors of the Indonesian Circle 
Survey, 12 September 2014. 
11. Taftazani, a political consultant, affiliated with Saiful Mujani Research 
and Consulting (SMRC), 21 October 2014. 
12. Totok Izzul Fatah, Director of Citra Komunikasi, 17 November 2014 
13. Umar Bakrie, Executive Director of Lembaga Survey Nusantara/the 
Nusantara Survey Institute, 14 May 2014. 
 
Campaign-Volunteers and Political Lobbyists 
1. A, an activist and political lobbyist who supported one of influential 
campaign donators of Jokowi, 24 October 2014. 
2. B.A.S., a top-leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 10 November 2014. 
3. J.J, a leader of Pro Jokowi (Projo), 10 November 2014. 
4. SH, a political activist and an unofficial campaign team/volunteer of 
Prabowo Subijanto, 24 October 2014. 
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APPENDIX B 
Evaluations Results of the Measurements and Structural Elements 
that Construct the Baseline Structural Model 
 
This work deployed the following statistical approaches to evaluate 
both the measurements and structural elements that construct the 
baseline structural model and reported the subsequent findings. 
 
2.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) Results of Indicators of Variables that 
Construct the Baseline Structural Model 
Evaluations of indicators of variables that construct the baseline 
structural model using EFA and PCA of SPSS 23 generated the following 
statistical findings. Firstly, EFA and PCA results confirmed that PMO 1-8 
seems fairly workable to explain variable ‘political marketing-orientation’. 
PCA results indicated PMO 1-3 and PMO 6-8, as factors’ components of 
this variable, have sufficient loadings values, while PMO 3-5 have 
insufficient loading values. Total variance of this variable explained by its 
indicators (PMO 1-8) is 48.48 %. This total variance is sufficient for 
formulation a formative variable, but it is seen as being less sufficient for 
formulation of a reflective variable. Each of these factors has Cronbach’s 
alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Table B.1 illustrates the 
pattern matrix of the indicators underlying variable PMO, its scree plot and 
% of variance of this variable explained by its indicators (PMO 1-8).  
N
o 
Indicators of PMOa Factor Scree Plot 
1 PMO 1 0.746 
 
2 PMO 2 0.753 
3 PMO 3 0.653 
4 PMO 4 0.596 
5 PMO 5 0.622 
6 PMO 6 0.702 
7 PMO 7 0.750 
8 PMO 8 0.729 
% of Variance Explained 48.48 % 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) 0.844 
Table B.1: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Political Marketing-
Orientation’ (PMO) and Its Scree Plot 
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No Indicators  Factor Scree Plot 
1 2 3 4 
1 VO 1 0.799    
 
2 VO 2 0.807    
3 VO 3 0.835    
4 CO 1  -0.891   
5 CO 2  -0.825   
6 MO 1   0.545  
7 MO 2   0.706  
8 MO 3   0.864  
9 MO 4   0.746  
10 MO 5   0.692  
11 MO 6   0.680  
12 MO 7   0.726  
13 MO 8   0.864  
14 MO 9   0.883  
15 CCO 1    0.782 
16 CCO 1    0.827 
17 CCO 3    0.910 
18 CCO 4    0.882 
% of Variance 
Explained 
10.33 
% 
5.65 
% 
35.83
% 
15.03 
% 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
0.778 0.803 0.909 0.874 
Table B.2: Pattern Matrix of Indicators of Low-Level Variables Underlying 
A High-Level Variable of ‘Political Market-Orientation’ and Its Scree Plot 
With the Exclusion of indicator of IO 
 
Secondly, EFA and PCA results also indicated that all indicators 
that underlay variable ‘political market-orientation’ seem applicable to 
explain this variable. Based on the EFA results: IO 1 and VO 1-3 seem to 
hang into the first factor, CO 1-3 belong to the second factor, MO 1-9 are 
associated with the third factors and CCO 1-4 are linked with the fourth 
factor. A single indicator underlying IO (IO 1) was then excluded when 
PCA analysis was carried out. The main reason was Internal Orientation 
(IO) is theoretically different from voter-orientation (VO). PCA analysis 
results indicated that indicators of VO 1-3, CO 1-2, MO 1-9 and CCO 1-4, 
respectively, belong to 4 following variables, which are voter-orientation, 
competitor-orientation, media-orientation and campaign contributor-
orientation. PCA results uncovered that: a) total variance of VO, explained 
by its indicators (VO 1-3) is 10.33 %; b) total variance of CO, explained by 
its indicators (CO 1-2) is 5.65 %; c) total variance of MO, explained by its 
indicators (MO 1-9) is 35.83 %; and d) total variance of CCO, explained by 
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its indicators (CCO 1-4) is 15.03 %. All indicators underlying these 
variables have positive values, except for indicators underlying variable 
‘campaigning-contributor’. Nonetheless, overall, these indicators have 
sufficient communalities values. Each of these variables has Cronbach’s 
alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Cumulative total variance 
of low-level variables of VO, MO, CCO and CO explained by indicators of 
these variables was 66.84 %. This total variance is above 50 % and 
statistically substantial. Table B.2 indicates that pattern matrixes of 
indicators underlying these variables are slightly clear-cut.  
Thirdly, EFA and PCA results affirmed that PCE 1 – 11 belong to 
one variable, which is professional-campaign engagement. PCA results 
indicated that total variance of this variable explained by its indicators was 
64.15 %. This total variance is fairly high and statistically relevant. This 
variable has Cronbach’s alpha (α) of 0.944, which is above the minimal 
threshold (0.708) and indicators of this variable have sufficient 
communalities values, which stretch out from 0.521 (PCE 9) to 0.710  
(PCE 4 and PCE 8). Table B.3 charts the pattern matrix of the indicators 
underlying this variable, its scree plot and total variance of this variable 
explained by its indicators.  
No Indicators  Factor 1 Scree Plot 
1 PCE 1 0.773 
 
2 PCE 2 0.792 
3 PCE 3 0.822 
4 PCE 4 0.843 
5 PCE 5 0.816 
6 PCE 6 0.842 
7 PCE 7 0.830 
8 PCE 8 0.842 
9 PCE 9 0.722 
10 PCE 10 0.773 
11 PCE 11 0.738 
% of Variance 
Explained 
64.15 % 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) 0.944 
Table B.3: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Professional-Campaign 
Engagement’ and Its Scree Plot 
 
Fourthly, EFA and PCA results confirmed that PCS 1-11 belong to 
one variable, which is professionalized-campaign structure. PCA results 
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indicated that total variance of this variable explained by its indicators was 
little bit low, which was only 42.39 %. This total variance is sufficient for a 
formative variable, but it is insufficient for a reflective variable. This 
variable has Cronbach’s alpha (α) value of 0.859, which is above the 
minimal threshold (0.708). These indicators have quite low commonalities 
values ranging from 0.219 (PCS 2) to 0.496 (PCS 4). However, since this 
variable was formulated as a formative variable, indicators of this variable 
do not need high communality values. Tenscher et.al, (2015: 13-14) 
indicated that professionalized-campaign structure seems likely to contain 
3 factors/variables that consist of: a) organizational tasks of campaigning; 
b) campaign resources; and b) mobilizing and coordinating the campaign. 
Using a quite dissimilar set of indicators from those formulated by 
Tenscher (et.al, 2015), this work produced PCA results, which are slightly 
different with what was revealed by this author. Table B.4 summarizes 
PCA results and exhibits the pattern matrix of indicators underlying this 
variable and its scree plot and illuminates that these indicators are 
associated with one variable, which is ‘professionalized-campaign 
structure’.  
No Indicators Factor Scree Plot 
 PCS 1 0.723 
 
 PCS 2 0.526 
 PCS 3 0.686 
 PCS 4  0.673 
 PCS 5 0.729 
 PCS 6 0.723 
 PCS 7 0.735 
 PCS 8 0.475 
 PCS 9 0.711 
 PCS 10 0.577 
 PCS 11 0.612 
% of Variance Explained 42.39 % 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) 0.859 
Table B.4: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Professionalized-
Campaign Structure and Its Scree Plot 
 
Finally, EFA and PCA results uncovered that indicators underlying 
professionalized-campaign strategy seem associated with 3 variables. 
These results confirmed that PATS 1-4 belong to the first variable, PNS 1-
4 are linked with the second variable, PNEMS 1-4 and PCPS 1 and 2 are 
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closely connected with the third variable. As I considered this to be 
theoretically different with PNEMS 1-4, this work excluded PCPS 1 and 2 
and run subsequent EFA and PCA. PCA results revealed PATS 1-3, PNS 
1-5 and PNEMS 1-4, respectively, seem associated with 3 following 
variables, which are: a) ‘professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy’; b) ‘professionalized-narrow campaign strategy’; and c) 
‘professionalized-news and event strategy’. PCA results displayed that: a) 
total variance of variable PATS explained by its indicators (PATS 1-3) is 
9.78 %; b) total variance of variable PNS explained by its indicators (PNS 
1-5) is 15.40 %; and c) total variance of variable PNEMS explained by its 
indicators (PNEMS 1-4) is 38.77 %. Indicators of these variables also have 
sufficient communalities values, which range from 0.540 (PNS 1) to 0.755 
(PNS 3). These results also affirmed that each of these variables have 
Cronbach’s alpha (α) above the minimal threshold (0.708). Table B.5 
shows the pattern matrix of the indicators underlying these variables and 
its scree plot that indicate that that these indicators are associated with 3 
variables. 
N
o 
Indicators Factor Scree Plot 
1 2 3 
1 PATS 1 0.786   
 
2 PATS 2 0.815   
3 PATS 3 0.828   
8 PATS 4 0.582   
4 PNS 1  0.860  
5 PNS 2  0.703  
6 PNS 3  0.832  
7 PNS 4  0.843  
9 PNEMS 1   0.805 
10 PNEMS 2   0.837 
11 PNEMS 3   0.837 
12 PNEMS 4   0.820 
13 PCPS 1   0.540 
14 PCPS 2   0.583 
% of Variance 
Explained 
9.78 % 15.40% 38.77 % 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) 0.830 0.807 0.863 
Table B.5: Pattern Matrix of Indicators underlying ‘Professionalized-
Campaign Strategy (PATS 1-5, PNS 1-4, PNEMS 1-4 and PCPS 1-2) and 
Its Scree Plot 
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Overall, PCA results uncovered that there are three factors, which 
constitute professionalized-campaign strategy. These results are slightly 
different from reports released by Tenscher (et.al, 2015). Tenscher (et.al, 
2015: 14-15) exposing that professionalized-campaign strategy is 
composed from four factors/variables, which are: a) the strategic use of 
information; b) campaign publicity; c) contacting and sharing information 
with voters; d) personal contact with voters and campaigning planning. As 
I used a dissimilar set of questioners and the extraction method of PCA 
analysis, this work revealed different statistical findings, as compared to 
PCA results presented by this author1. Regardless of this issue, these 
findings to some degree confirmed the evidence uncovered by this author 
however. In this respect, ‘campaign publicity’ and ‘campaigning planning’ 
seem quite similar to ‘professionalized-news and event management and 
campaign personalisation strategy’. ‘Contacting and sharing information 
and personal contact with voters’ seem to share similarity with 
‘professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting strategy’ and 
‘professionalized-narrowcasting strategy’.  
Nonetheless, since I considered that variable ‘professionalized-
campaign personalisation strategy’ (PCPS) is theoretically different from 
variable ‘professionalized-news and event management strategy’ 
(PNEMS), this work conducted second principal component analysis. As I 
excluded indicators of PCPS 1 and 2, the second PCA results revealed 
that total variances of variables of PATS, PNS and PNEM that constitute a 
high-level variable ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’ were slightly 
higher. In this respect, total variance of variable PATS explained by its 
indicator (PATS 1-4) is 11.26 %, total variance of variable PNS explained 
by its indicator (PNS 1-4) is 17.15 % and total variance of variable PNEMS 
explained by its indicators (PNEMS 1-4) is 39.58 %. Each of these 
variables has Cronbach’s alpha (α) value above the minimal threshold 
(0.708) with a cumulative total variance that is slightly higher, which is 
                                                       
1 For example, unlike Tenscher (et.al, 2015), this work deployed indicators of the uses of 
polls and focus group discussion as elements of political marketing-orientation and did 
not include components of professionalized-campaign strategy. 
 
 
 
 
393 
67.99 %. Meanwhile, variable PCPS explained by its indicators (PCPS 1 
and 2) has total variance of 74.37 %. This variance is statistically 
substantial for this variable, which is formulated as a reflective variable. 
Indicators of PCS (PCPS 1 and 2) are significantly correlated (Pearson’ 
correlation 0.488 with ρ value < 0.0001). As components of variable 
PCPS, each of PCPS 1 and 2 has factor’ loadings of 0.862. This variable 
has Cronbach’s alpha (α) value of 0.655, which is little bit lower as 
compared to the minimal threshold (0.708). As a reflective variable, PCPS 
however, can be used as a workable lower-level variable of a high-level 
variable ‘professionalized-campaign strategy’. 
 
2.2. Evaluation Results of Measurements Elements of The 
Reflective Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural 
Model 
Evaluations of measurements of the reflective variables that 
constitute the baseline structural were run to examine the internal 
consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity, as 
suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 101-107). Based on Fornell-Larcker 
criterion, this work confirmed that the reflective variables that compose this 
model seem reliable and valid and concluded that these variables were 
sufficiently convergent. As seen from table B.6, each of these variables 
has an Average Variance Extracted (AVE) value that is more than the 
minimum threshold, which is 0.50.  
Table B.7 shows that each of these variables has Chronbach’s 
alpha, which is higher than 0.70. Thus, they were internally and 
consistently valid. Indicator's outer loadings values of each of these 
variables were higher than 0.70, except for two indicators of variable 
media-orientation (MO), which are MO 1 and MO 8 and one indicator’s 
outer loading of variable professionalized-audiences/electorates targeting 
strategy (PATS), which is PATS 4. The loading values of indicator s of MO 
1, MO 8 and PNS 5 were 0.695, 0.662 and 0.539, respectively. This work 
favoured retaining these variables since they were theoretically important 
to evaluate this variable.  
 
 
 
 
394 
This work also confirmed that each of these variables has no 
substantial issues regarding the cross factor loading values. More 
importantly, as carried out the discriminant validity of the heterotrait-
monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) approach as suggested by 
Henseller (et.al, 2014: 116-128), this work also revealed that the higher 
HTMT values and HTMT invariance values of these variables were less 
than 0.85 (for the most conservative validity criterion) and significantly 
different from 1. This assessment indicated that these variables were 
internally and consistently reliable and convergent and having no 
substantial issue regarding the discriminant validity 
 
Table B.6: Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
 
Latent 
Variable 
Indicator Loading IR CR AVE DV? 
VO VO 1 0.835 0.697 0.869 0.688 Yes 
VO 2 0.812 0.659 
VO 3 0.842 0.709 
CO CO 1 0.904 0.817 0.908 0.831 Yes 
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CO 2 0.920 0.846 
MO MO 1 0.695 0.483 0.927 0.587 Yes 
MO 2 0.749 0.561 
MO 3 0.841 0.707 
MO 4 0.833 0.694 
MO 5 0.809 0.654 
MO 6 0.815 0.664 
MO 7 0.730 0.532 
MO 8 0.662 0.438 
MO 9 0.741 0.549 
CCO CCO 1 0.791 0.625 0.912 0.722 Yes 
CCO 2 0.828 0.685 
CCO 3 0.897 0.805 
CCO 4 0.880 0.774 
PCE PCE 1 0.774 0.599 0.951 0.638 Yes 
PCE 2 0.792 0.627 
PCE 3 0.823 0.677 
PCE 4 0.841 0.707 
PCE 5 0.814 0.662 
PCE 6 0.840 0.705 
PCE 7 0.826 0.682 
PCE 8 0.839 0.704 
PCE 9 0.713 0.508 
PCE 10 0.778 0.605 
PCE 11 0.735 0.540 
PATS PATS 1 0.822 0.675 0.862 0.618 Yes 
PATS 2 0.870 0.756 
PATS 3 0.864 0.646 
PATS 4 0.539 0.290 
PNS PNS 1 0.785 0.616 0.895 0.682 Yes 
PNS 2 0.832 0.692 
PNS 3 0.856 0.732 
PNS 4 0.829 0.687 
PNEMS PNEMS 1 0.789 0.622 0.908 0.713 Yes 
PNEMS 2 0.871 0.759 
PNEMS 3 0.839 0.704 
PNEMS 4 0.876 0.767 
PCPS PCPS 1 0.889 0.790 0.878 0.783 Yes 
PCPS 2 0.881 0.776 
Table B.7: Results Summary for Reflective Measurement Models2 
 
2.3. Evaluation Results of Measurement Elements of the Formative 
Variables that Construct the Baseline Structural Model 
Having followed the ideas of Hair (e.at, 2014: 118-129), 
assessments of convergence validity, collinearity issues and the 
significance and relevance of indicators of the formative variables, were 
conducted as follows. Firstly, the convergence validity of these variables 
                                                       
2 IR is an acronym of Indicator Reliability. CR is an acronym of Composite Reliability. 
AVE is an acronym of Average Variance Extracted. DV is an acronym of Discriminant 
Validity. 
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was assessed through the redundancy analysis. Following the ideas of 
Hair (et.al, 2014: 121-122), this analysis was carried out using the two 
following methods. The first one was conducted by employing PMO 1 as a 
global item that represents the variable PMO as an endogenous reflective 
variable of PMO and PMO 2-8 as exogenous formative variable of PMO. 
The second one was undertaken by employing PCS 1-5 as an 
endogenous formative variable of PCS and PCS 6-11 as exogenous 
variable.  
As seen from table B.8, PMO produces path coefficient (β) value of 
0.754 and coefficient determination (R2) value of 0.568, while PCS 
generates path coefficient (β) value of 0.798 and coefficient determination 
(R2) value of 0.636. According to Hair (et.al, 2014: 121), the redundancy 
analyses of formative variables that produce path coefficient value (β) 
more than 0.81 and R2 values more than 0.64 indicate that these 
variables have no convergence validity issue. The path coefficient value 
(β) values of PMO and PCS were still below these thresholds, but they 
were still close to these thresholds.  
Formative Variables Path Coefficients (β) and R2 values 
Political Marketing-
Orientation 
 
Professionalized-
Campaign Structure 
 
Table B.8: Redundancy Analysis of Formative Variables 
 
Secondly, the evaluations of the formative variables regarding the 
collinearity issues were also carried out to make sure that there were no 
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high correlations between indicators of these variables. This work 
uncovered that these variables have not suffered from collinearity issues. 
As seen from table B.9, indicators of these variables were having Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF), which were above 0.20 and below 5. Following the 
ideas of Hair (et.al, 2014: 125-127), this condition indicates that these 
indicators are not highly correlated and did not suffer from the collinearity 
issues.  
Finally, evaluations of the outer weights significance of the 
indicators of these variables were also conducted. As charted by table 
B.10, all indicators of PMO have outer weights, which are statistically 
significant and most of the indicators of PCS have outer weights that are 
statistically significant. Two indicators of PCS, which are PCS 2 and 3, 
have outer weights, which are statistically insignificant. PCS 3 has outer 
loading values above 0.50, while PCS 2 has outer loading close to 0.50. 
This work, as suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 131), favoured retaining 
these indicators since these indicators are theoretically seen of being 
important to evaluate professionalized-campaign structure. 
Political Marketing-Orientation 
(PMO) 
Professionalized-Campaign Structure 
(PCS) 
Indicators VIF Indicators VIF 
PMO 1 2.316 PCS 1 1.524 
PMO 2 2.399 PCS 2 1.301 
PMO 3 1.462 PCS 3 1.616 
PMO 4 2.027 PCS 4 1.678 
PMO 5 2.086 PCS 5 1.877 
PMO 6 1.775 PCS 6 2.054 
PMO 7 2.454 PCS 7 1.932 
PMO 8 2.163 PCS 8 1.328 
  PCS 9 1.819 
  PCS 10 1.391 
  PCS 11 1.269 
Table B.9: Variance Inflation Factor Results of Formative Variables 
 
Formative 
Variables 
Indicators OW (OL) t Value SL ρ Value Confidence 
Intervals of 90 % 
PMO PMO 1 0.131 (0.687) 2.422 ** 0.016 (0.028, 0.225) 
PMO 2 0.137 (0.699) 2.414 ** 0.016 (0.036, 0.241) 
PMO 3 0.152 (0.633) 4.159 *** <0.001 (0.074, 0.220) 
PMO 4 0.093 (0.556) 2.114 ** 0.035 (0.007, 0.180) 
PMO 5 0.218 (0.622) 5.032 *** <0.001 (0.134, 0.305) 
PMO 6 0.172 (0.708) 3.887 *** <0.001 (0.081, 0.254) 
PMO 7 0.156 (0.767) 2.959 *** 0.003 (0.051, 0.251) 
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PMO 8 0.348 (0.806) 7.595 *** <0.001 (0.251, 0.434) 
PCS PCS 1 0.113 (0.606) 3.846 *** <0.001 (0.057, 0.179) 
PCS 2 0.023 (0.450) 0.961 NS 0.337 (-0.022, 0.070) 
PCS 3 0.039 (0.595) 1.557 NS 0.120 (-0.013, 0.087) 
PCS 4 0.064 (0.592) 2.482 ** 0.013 (0.014, 0.127) 
PCS 5 0.281 (0.737) 9.324 *** <0.001 (0.226, 0.354) 
PCS 6 0.068 (0.641) 2.002 ** 0.046 (0.004, 0.131) 
PCS 7 0.094 (0.627) 2.914 *** 0.004 (0.028, 0.159) 
PCS 8 0.080 (0.462) 3.359 *** 0.001 (0.030, 0.125) 
PCS 9 0.181 (0.673) 5.648 *** <0.001 (0.120, 0.244) 
PCS 10 0.262 (0.690) 10.485 *** <0.001 (0.211, 0.309) 
PCS 11 0.313 (0.659) 12.222 *** <0.001 (0.253, 0.359) 
Table B.10: Assessment of Outer Weights Significance Testing Results of 
Indicators of Formative Variables3 
 
2.4. Collinearity Assessments of Variables that Construct the 
Baseline Structural Model 
Collinearity assessments of variables that construct the model 
(inner model) were conducted using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
method of Smart-PLS 3.0. Such assessments indicated that there was no 
substantial collinearity issue. Table B.11 displays that Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) between these variables, were above 0.20 and bellow 5. This 
condition met with the criteria suggested by Hair (et.al, 2014: 107-116) 
and indicated that variables that constitute the baseline structural model 
did not suffer from collinearity issues.  
 PCE PATS PCPS PCS PNS PNEMS 
CCO 1.084 - - 1.085 - - 
CO 1.505 - - 1.516 - - 
IO 1.282 - - 1.292 - - 
MO 1.460 - - 1.585 - - 
PMO 1.605 1.604 1.604 1.837 1.604 1.604 
PCE - 2.261 2.261 1.791 2.261 2.261 
PCS - 2.135 2.135 - 2.135 2.135 
VP 1.530 - - 1.580 - - 
Table B.11: The Collinearity Assessments of the Variables Used in the 
Baseline Structural Model4 
 
                                                       
3  OW = Outer Weights; OL = Outer Loadings; SL= Significance Level NS= Not 
Significant; Bootstrap confidence intervals for 10 % probability of error (α = 0.10); ** ρ < 
0.05, *** ρ < 0.01 
4 A symbol (-) indicates that there is no path relationship between the variables of the 
model. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) between PMO and IO, between PMO and VO, 
between PMO and CO, between PMO and MO, between PMO and CCO are 1.000, 
1.000, 1.000, 1.000 and 1.000, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C 
The Proposed Prescriptive Models with Their Terms and Conditions 
 
I propose the following prescriptive models, which are charted by 
the subsequent figures C.1-C.8, based on the extractions of the second 
and third theoretical models and the reflections on the quantitative findings 
exhibited in Chapter 6 and the quantitative and qualitative findings 
reported in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. These models were specifically directed 
to help political parties in the democratic countries, which are ruled under 
the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-
centred system, such as Indonesia, and these parties’ presidential 
candidates, leaders, consultants, strategists and marketers to accomplish 
their own goals in the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Each of these models, as displayed in such figures, is developed 
through the following five stages. The first, the second and the third stages 
respectively, are organising a research to collect the market intelligence 
data and using these data strategically to develop a market-orientation 
and establish a professional-campaign engagement and a proficient 
campaign structure. The fourth stage is advancing professionalized-
narrowcasting, news and event management and campaign 
personalisation strategies. The last stage is managing and maximizing 
such strategies to upgrade a professionalized-electorate targeting strategy 
to persuade and capture the electorates/voters in these elections. 
As exhibited in these figures, I also use the black arrow in each of 
these models to visualise a set of prescriptive directions regarding the 
elements of that construct such practices, which need to be utilised 
structurally by the party and a (pair of) presidential candidate(s) of this 
party and this party’ leaders, consultants, strategists and marketers who 
ultimately preferred adopting each of these models. I also deploy the blue 
arrow in each of these models to indicate a set of prescriptive guidance 
regarding political marketability level of the party presidential candidate 
nominated by this party (and its coalition). Except for the symbols of the 
elements of ‘collect and use the market intelligence data’, ‘political 
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lobbyists-orientation’ and ‘professionalized-electorates targeting strategy’, 
the symbols of the elements that construct these models are slightly 
similar with the acronyms of the elements that form the baseline structural 
model charted previously by figure 11.3 of Chapter 11. However, 
formations of the elements that construct these models are slightly 
dissimilar with the constructions of the elements that form that model. 
I also formulate a set of acronyms used in these models, which is 
detailed by table C.1, and proposes a set of terms and conditions, which is 
displayed by table C.2, for these parties and these parties’ leaders, 
consultants and strategists who want to take up these models, as they 
want to achieve their goals in the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
A (pair of) presidential candidate(s) and professionals, strategists and 
marketers/campaigners hired by this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) 
who favour adopting these models also need to consider this set of terms 
and conditions, as they want to help political parties, which nominated A 
(pair of) presidential candidate(s), in getting the maximum number of 
parliamentary seats in the parliamentary election and get this (pair of) 
presidential candidate(s) elected in the presidential election.  
Elements Acronym 
Collect and Use the Market Intelligence Data CUMID 
Internal-orientation IO 
Media-orientation MO5 
Competitors-orientation CO 
Campaign contributor and political lobbyists orientations CCO & PLO 
Professional-campaign engagement  PCE 
Professionalized-campaign structure PCS 
Professionalized-campaign personalization strategy PCPS 
Professionalized-narrowcasting strategy PNS 
Professionalized-news event and management strategy PNEMS 
Professionalized-electorates targeting strategy PETS 
Table C.1: Acronyms of the Structural Elements that Construct the 
Prescriptive Models 
 
Term and Condition Models and Figures 
Political party, which ruled or took 
part in the government and had a 
solid internal arena and plenty of 
A highly 
marketable 
(pair of) 
The First Prescriptive 
Model (Figure 1) 
                                                       
5 Media-Orientation in the prescriptive models include the attitudinal and behavioural 
orientations to the Internet and social media users 
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campaign resources  presidential 
candidate(s)  Political party, which ruled or took 
part in the government and had a 
less solid internal arena and 
sufficient campaign funds and 
resources  
The Third Prescriptive 
Model (Figure 3) 
The opposition party with a solid 
internal arena and plenty of 
campaign resources 
The Fifth Prescriptive 
Model (Figure 5) 
The opposition party with a less 
solid internal arena and sufficient 
campaign resources 
The Seventh Prescriptive 
Model 
(Figure 7) 
Political party, which ruled or took 
part in the government and had a 
solid internal arena and plenty of 
campaign resources  
A less or 
moderately 
marketable 
(pair of) 
presidential 
candidate(s)  
The Second Prescriptive 
Model  
(Figure 2) 
Political party, which ruled or took 
part in the government and had a 
less solid internal arena and 
sufficient campaign resources  
The Fourth Prescriptive 
Model  
(Figure 4) 
The opposition party with a solid 
internal arena and plenty of 
campaign resources. 
The Sixth Prescriptive 
Model (Figure 6) 
The opposition party with a less 
solid internal arena and sufficient 
campaign resources. 
The Eighth Prescriptive 
Model  
(Figure 8) 
Table C.2: Terms and Conditions for Political Parties and These Parties’ 
Presidential Candidates, Leaders, Consultants, Strategists and Marketers 
Who Want to Adopt the Proposed Prescriptive Models 
 
Stages Elements 
1   CUMID   
      
      
 
2 
 
 
VO 
 
IO 
 
 
MO 
 
CO 
 
CCO & PLO 
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PCE 
 
  
PCS 
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PCPS 
  
PNEMS 
      
 
5 
   
PETS 
  
   Figure C.1: The First Prescriptive Model 
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Stages Elements 
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Figure C.2: The Second Prescriptive Model 
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 Figure C.3: The Third Prescriptive Model 
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Figure C.4: The Fourth Prescriptive Model 
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  Figure C.5: The Fifth Prescriptive Model 
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  Figure 6: The Sixth Prescriptive Model 
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Figure 7: The Seventh Prescriptive Model 
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 Figure 8: The Eighth Prescriptive Model 
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APENDIX D 
The Interview Guides 
Appendix D.1: The Interview Guides For Interviewing the Indonesian 
Political Parties’ Leaders/Secretaries, Politicians, Candidates and 
Activists 
Theme 1: 
Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their 
consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political marketing 
and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto regime 
Questions: 
1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics led 
the structural systemic changes taking shape in the Indonesian politics Post-
Authoritarian Soeharto regime? If so, how did you assess such changes?  
2. Do you notice that the following developments (2.1-2.8)…. took place in the 
new democracy of Indonesia? If so, how did you assess such developments?  
2.1. The re-formulations of the political, election and media regulations. 
2.2. Formations of the new political, media and election systems. 
2.3. Transformations of political participation, political alignment and the 
attitudes and behaviours of the Indonesian electorates and social and 
political cleavages and their associations with political parties and 
organisations. 
2.4. Increasing roles of the commercial/private media in the Indonesian 
politics. 
2.5. Ascendancy of domination of the media agenda over the political 
agenda. 
2.6. Reorganization of the ways the media organisations formulated their 
agenda and framed political agenda setting and journalists of the media 
covered and packaged political events and discourses. 
2.7. Increasing numbers of the citizens/peoples—in general and 
electorates/voters—in particular—who took part and engaged in political 
events and discourses and interested in evaluating political products and 
policies designed and delivered by the government. 
2.8. The increasing uses of the Internet and social media by the Indonesian 
citizens/peoples and electorates/voters in the political spheres 
3. What kinds of efforts did the party you associated with take for managing 
these developments? How did you and the party affiliated organize such 
efforts? 
4. Did you and your fellows feel the need to adopt the market intelligence 
research, such as survey and the focus group discussion, used commonly by 
the business organisations to evaluate and manage such developments? If so, 
how did you and your fellows organize this market intelligence research and 
for what purposes?  
5. Did you and your fellows feel the need to establish a professional campaigning 
and hire political pollsters, consultants and media strategists to manage such 
development? If so, how did you and your fellows develop such efforts? 
6. Did you and your fellows deal with some challenges when running such 
efforts? If so, how did you and your fellows handle such challenges? 
Theme 2:  
Formations of political market arenas and political markets and perceptions of 
political parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the relative 
importance of these political market arenas within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
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Questions: 
7. How did you and your fellows categorize various types political market 
arenas and political markets, which have been taking shape in the new 
democracy of Indonesia? 
8. Did you and your fellows consider the internal party organisation, the 
electorates, the media, the government and the parliament as political market 
arenas? Did you and your fellows consider the party’ members, the 
electorates/voters, the media, competitors and campaign-donators as political 
markets? If so, how did you and your fellows see changes in the natures and 
structures of these political market arenas and political markets?  
9. Did you and your fellows notice the primary actors and organisations that 
have been politically influential within each of these political market arenas? If 
so, which of these actors and organisations were you and your fellows 
perceiving as being politically much more influential? Why did you and your 
fellows see that such actors and organisations were being much more 
influential? How did you and your fellows manage such actors and 
organisations and for what purposes?  
10. How did you and your fellows see positions and roles of political 
pollsters/consultants, commentators and strategists and their roles in the 
Indonesian politics, especially within the specific contexts of the 
parliamentary and presidential elections? Based on your knowledge and 
experience, how and to what extent did these pollsters, consultants and 
strategists determine the attitudes and behaviours of these political markets?  
11. Did you and your fellows notice characteristics of political actors and 
organisations that exist in these political markets? If so, which of these actors 
and organisations were you and your fellows perceiving as being politically 
much more influential? Why did you and your fellows see that these actors 
and organisations were being much more influential? How did you and they 
manage such actors and organisations and for what purposes?  
12. How did you and your fellows who run as candidates in either the 2014 
parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported these 
candidates perceive the relative importance of these political market arenas? 
How did you and your fellows address and prioritize these political market 
arenas and for what purposes? What types of political market arenas were 
you and your fellows prioritizing? Why did you and your fellows prioritize 
these political market arenas?  
13. How did you and your fellows, especially those who run as candidates in 
either the 2014 parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported 
these candidates, perceive the relative importance of these political markets? 
How did you and they address and prioritize these political markets and for 
what purposes? What types of political markets were you and they 
prioritizing? Why did you and they prioritize these political markets?  
Theme 3:  
Political, election and media regulations, perceptions regarding the relative 
Importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas and their 
consequences for developments of marketisation and professionalisation of 
campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
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Questions: 
14. Did you and your fellows realize that enactments of Laws No.40/1999, 
No.32/2002, No.2/2011, No.15/2011, No.8/2012 and No.42/2008 carried out 
impacts on formations of the political, media and election systems? If so, how 
and to what extent did such systems determine the natures of these political 
market arenas and political markets within and across the 2014 parliamentary 
elections? How did formations of such systems influence your and your 
fellows’ perceptions regarding the relative importance of these political 
market arenas within and across these elections?  
15. Did you and your fellows see that the implementation of presidential 
government system, as imposed by imposed by Articles No.1, Clauses No.1 
and 2, No. 4, Clause 1 and No.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the 
Indonesian National Constitution of 1945 (amendment), shaped up and 
transformed configurations of these political market arenas and political 
markets within and across these elections? If so, how and to what extent did 
such configurations carry out impacts on the marketing and campaign 
organisations of the party you and your fellows associated with within and 
across these elections?  
16. What types of political market arenas and political markets were you and your 
fellows, especially those who run as candidates in either the 2014 
parliamentary or the 2014 presidential elections or supported these 
candidates, perceiving as being important within and across these elections? 
Why did you and your fellows perceive that these political market arenas and 
political markets were being important?  
17. How did you and your fellows manage and address each of these political 
market arenas and political markets within and across these elections? What 
marketing and campaign efforts were you and your fellows advancing when 
running such efforts? Why did you and your fellows carry out such efforts and 
for what purposes? 
18. In facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections, were you and 
your fellows being interested in hiring political pollsters/consultants and 
media strategies to manage and address the internal party, the media and 
electoral arenas? If so, how long did you and your fellows hire them, how did 
you employ them and for what purses? Did you feel that they were really 
helping you and your fellows to address political markets, especially 
competitors, the media and the electorates/voters you prioritized and targeted 
within and across these elections effectively? If so, to what extent have they 
helped you and your fellows in running such practices? 
19. When advancing such practices, was a top-leader/public figure nominated by 
the party you affiliated for running as a presidential or a vice presidential 
candidates in the 2014 presidential election interested in employing such 
pollsters/consultants and media strategies? If so, why was this leader/figure 
interested in doing so? How long did this leader/figure hire them, how did this 
leader/figure manage them and for what purposes? How and to what extent 
did these pollsters/consultants and media strategies help this leader/figure 
and his campaign-teams and volunteers to achieve his goal in this election? 
Theme 4: 
The party-specific factors and their effects on developments of marketisation and 
professionalisation of campaigning of the Indonesian political parties within and 
across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections 
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Questions: 
20. Did you see that the existing election regulations, especially Laws No.8/2008 
and No.8/2012, likely constrain capability of the party you affiliated to address 
the internal party’ members, the electorates/voters, the media, competitors 
and campaign-donors as political markets and develop campaign structure 
and strategies to persuade and mobilize these political markets within and 
across these elections? If so, how and to what extent did these regulations 
limit the party’ capability to develop such practices? How did the party and its 
leaders, politicians and candidates strive for managing such practices? 
21. Did you and your fellows notice that party age category (a), size (b), ideology 
(c), position in the government (d), campaign resources (e) and experiences 
with internal shock/leadership change (f) and external shock (g) likely carry 
out impacts on your and their capabilities in developing such practices within 
and across these elections? If so, how did you and your fellows manage such 
factors? Which of these factors that within and across these elections 
strongly affected your and their capabilities to advance such practices? How 
did these factors determine your and their capabilities to develop such 
practices? 
22. Were you and your fellows been interested in exploiting some of these 
factors for developing workable models of marketisation and 
professionalisation of campaign to achieve in these elections? If so, which of 
these factors were you exploiting when advanced such models? How did you 
and your fellows manage such factors and for what purposes?  
23. What type of challenges, which were related to the party’ campaign 
resources and imposed by the campaign finance regulations (Article No.134, 
point 1 of Law No.8/2012 and Article No.227 of Law No.42/2008) did you and 
your fellows deal with when developing such models? How did you and your 
fellows tackle such challenges 
24. Did you and your fellows within and across these elections exploit the party’ 
ideology, size, position in the government and experiences with internal and 
external shocks when addressing the internal party’ members, the media, 
electorates, competitors and campaign-donors and persuading and 
mobilizing these political markets? If so, how and to what extent did you and 
your fellows carry such efforts? Could you please tell me your stories 
regarding such efforts little bit further? 
25. How did you and your fellows identify and target diverse voters populated in 
the parliamentary constituencies and manage competitors who strived for 
captivating these voters? Did you and your fellows develop marketing and 
campaign approaches to do so? If so, how did you and your fellows advance 
such approaches? What types of socio-demographic factors and cultural 
conditions were you and your fellows considering when advancing such 
approaches 
Theme 5: 
Formations of the party’ presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on 
developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the 
Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections 
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Questions: 
26. How did the party you associated with select a potential president or vice 
president candidates?  
27. Did the party consider developments of the levels of the electorates’ approval 
and positive media coverage of and endorsements of campaign donors and 
the Internet and social media users to these candidates? If so, how did the 
party carry out such efforts?  
28. How did the party manage the consequences of such developments on the 
party’ chances to get the targeted number of parliamentary seats in the 2014 
parliamentary election, assemble a political coalition with the other political 
parties in the wake of this election and nominate a pair of presidential 
candidate for running in the 2014 presidential election? 
29. Did the party in facing the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections 
consider such developments when addressing political markets and 
developing campaign structure and strategies to persuade and mobilize 
these political markets within and across these elections? If so, how did they 
manage such efforts? 
30. Did the party take special efforts to increase the degrees of endorsements of 
these political markets to the party’ top-leader and public figure who want to 
step in the 2014 presidential election race? If so, what type of marketing and 
campaign models they developed to achieve this goal? How did they 
advance such models? What challenges did they face in doing so? How did 
they manage such challenges? To what extent did they success in tackling 
such challenges? 
31. Did the party in facing these elections recruit particular media strategies and 
consultants and organize its campaign-team and professionals strategically? 
Did the party manage political lobbyists who work for, campaign-teams 
organized by and the campaign-volunteers of the party’ presidential 
candidate and the relationships between and among these lobbyists, 
campaign-teams and volunteers to get the party’ presidential candidate 
elected in the 2014 presidential election? If so, how and to what extent did 
the party carry out such efforts? What type of challenges did the party face in 
running such efforts? How did they tackle such challenges? 
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Appendix D.2: The Interview Guides For Interviewing Senior 
Editors/Journalists of the Indonesian Media 
Questions 
Theme 1: 
Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their 
consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political 
marketing and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto 
regime 
Questions: 
1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics 
paved the way for establishments of democratic political and media 
systems in the new democracy of Indonesia? If so, how and to what extent 
did such systems have impacts on the Indonesian media organisations and 
management and political journalists? How and to what extent did such 
systems influence modes of productions, packaging and broadcasting 
political news and programs carried out by the media you and your fellow 
affiliated?  
2. Did you see that establishments of such systems determined the attitudes 
and behaviours of the Indonesian political parties’ leaders and politicians, 
especially those who run as candidates in the parliamentary and 
presidential elections? If so, how and to what extent did installations of 
such systems transform the attitudes and behaviours of these parties’ 
leaders and politicians? Did formations of such systems cause changes in 
the ways you and your fellows cover and frame the attitudes and 
behaviours of and political events and discourses formulated by these 
parties’ leaders, candidates and politicians in political spheres? If so, how 
and why did such changes take place? 
3. Did you realize that establishments of such systems transformed the ways 
the media formulate their agenda setting and construct political agenda 
setting? If so, how did these media organize such practices? How did the 
media you and your fellows associated with develop such practices? 
4. Did you notice transformations of practices of the media management and 
media relations advanced by these parties and these parties’ leaders, and 
politicians? If so, how did you assess such transformations? Were they 
interested in hiring political consultants, spin-doctors and media strategists? 
If so, how did they employ these consultants, spin-doctors and media 
strategists and for what purposes?  
Themes 2 and 3: 
Formations of political market arenas and political markets, perceptions of the 
Indonesian political parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the 
relative importance of these political market arenas and their consequences for 
developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of these 
parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections 
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Questions: 
5. Did you agree with an argument that sees that the Indonesian political 
parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates likely consider 
the internal party’ organisation, the media, the electoral, the parliament/the 
legislative body of government and the executive body of government as 
political market arenas? If so, how did you assess the ways they perceive 
the relatives’ importance of these political market arenas and address and 
manage these political market arenas within and across the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections?  
6. Did you see that these parties and these parties’ leaders politicians and 
candidates realized the media as a primary organisation and the journalists 
as a primary actor in the media arena? Did you notice that they recognized 
the Internet and social media users as a primary actor in the media and 
electoral arenas? If so, how did you evaluate the ways they in facing these 
elections address and manage such actors?  
7. Within and across these elections, did these parties and these parties’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates consider particular type of the media as 
an influential political market arena? If so, why did they do so? What factors 
were really driving them for doing so? How did these factors stimulate them 
to do so? 
8. Did you agree with an argument that sees that these parties and these 
parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates likely account for the internal 
party’ member, the media, journalists the Internet and social media 
platforms users, the electorates, competitors, political lobbyists and 
campaign-donors as political markets? If so, how did you assess their 
perceptions they made regarding the relatives’ importance and relevance of 
these political markets? How did you evaluate practices of political 
marketing-orientation, market-orientation and professionalisation of 
campaigning they carried out within and across these elections?  Did you 
see that such perceptions carried out effects on the ways and the degree to 
which they advanced such practices? If so, how did you examine such 
effects? 
9. Within and across these elections, did these parties and these parties’ 
leaders and politicians consider the media as a unique political market? If 
so, what type of the media were they prioritizing and considering as 
influential political markets? What kind of efforts have they advanced to 
address and manage such political markets? Why did they carry out such 
efforts and for what purposes? What really were factors that driving them 
for developing such efforts? 
10. Did you see transformations of these political market arenas and political 
markets that took shape within and across these elections? Did you see 
changes in the ways these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians 
and candidates managed these political market arenas and the degrees to 
which they addressed, targeted and persuaded these political markets that 
took place within and across these elections? If so, how did the media you 
and your fellows are associated with report such transformations? How did 
the media you and your fellows affiliated frame such changes? How did 
such transformations and changes shape up modes of marketisation and 
professionalisation of campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation 
and campaign professionalisms of these parties within and across these 
elections? 
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Themes 4 and 5: 
The party- and party’ presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on 
developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the 
Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections 
Questions: 
11. Did you notice the ways these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians 
and candidates managed and exploited the party’ age category, size, 
ideology, campaign resources, position in the government and experiences 
with the internal and external shocks when they carried out such practices 
within and across these elections? If so, how did you assess the effects of 
these factors on the ways and the degrees to which they advanced these 
practices within and across these elections? 
12. Based on your assessments, which of these factors were really shaping up 
modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning and the 
degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of these 
parties within and across these elections? Why were these factors being 
influential? Could you please share your opinion regarding such issues little 
bit further? 
13. Did you agree with an argument that sees that within and across these 
elections, developments of political marketability levels of these parties’ 
leaders, politicians and figures, especially those who were run as a 
president or a vice president candidates in the 2014 presidential election, 
likely take shape as influential factor? If so, what kinds of elements were 
strongly shaping up this factor? How and the degree to which did these 
elements shape up this factor?  
14. How and to what extent did this factor determine each of these parties’ 
chances to get substantial number of parliamentary seats in the 2014 
parliamentary election, assemble a political coalition and nominate a (pair 
of) presidential candidate(s) in the wake of this election and get elected this 
(pair of) presidential candidate(s) in the 2014 presidential elections? How 
and the extent to which did this factor determine the successes of each of 
these parties in collecting campaign fund, approaching and mobilizing 
various group political markets and establish professionalized-campaign 
structure and strategies to accomplish their goals within and across these 
elections?  
15. Did you notice that these parties in facing these elections inclined to 
improve political marketability of their leaders and figures or select a 
potential presidential and/or vice presidential candidates who have been 
marketable within and across these political markets? If so, how did you 
assess such trends? Based on your knowledge and experiences, why did 
such trends take shape? How and to what extent did such trends have 
impacts on modes of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning 
and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign professionalisms of 
these parties within and across these elections? 
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Appendix D.3: The Interview Guides For Interviewing the Indonesian 
Political Pollsters and Consultants 
Theme 1: 
Democratization of politics and structural systemic changes and their 
consequences for the Indonesian politics and developments of political marketing 
and campaigning of political parties post-authoritarian Soeharto regime 
Questions: 
1. Did you agree with an argument that sees that democratisation of politics led 
to establishments of democratic political and media systems taking shape in 
the Indonesian politics? If so, how and to what extent did such systems pave 
the ways for the emergences and developments of political pollsters and 
consultants in the new democracy of Indonesia? How did such developments 
take place? How and to what extent did such developments carry out impacts 
on the Indonesian politics and transform the attitudes and behaviours of the 
Indonesian political parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and 
candidates?  
2. Based on your knowledge and experiences, how did these parties and these’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates perceive positions and roles of political 
pollsters and consultants in the Indonesian politics? Were they interested in 
hiring political consultants and pollsters? If so, under what conditions were 
they interested in doing so? What factors were really stimulating them to do 
so? How did they do so and for what purposes? 
3. Did these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates, 
especially in facing the parliamentary and presidential elections, favoured 
employing political pollsters/consultants? If so, how, to what extent and why 
did they favour doing so? What kinds of factors were really driving them to do 
so? How and the extent to which did these factors drive them to do so? 
4. How did you develop political product and services and offer such products 
and services to these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and 
candidates? What types of political products and services have you been 
offering to them so far? Were they interested in getting such products and 
services? How many of them were really interested in obtaining such 
products and services? Why did they need such products and services and 
for what purposes? Could you please tell me your assessments and stories 
regarding such issues little bit further? 
5. Did some of these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and 
candidates ever hire you or ask your helps to accomplish their goals in either 
the parliamentary or the presidential elections? How long and why did they do 
so? What types of political products and services were you offering to these 
parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates? Did you see 
that such products and services really could help them in achieving their 
goals in these elections? If so, how and to what extent could such products 
and services help them in accomplishing their goals in these elections? 
6. Did you agree with an argument that the emergence and development of 
political pollsters and consultants in the post-authoritarian Soeharto regime 
have impacts on practices of political marketing-orientation, market-
orientation and campaign professionalisms of the Indonesian political parties? 
If so, how did you assess the roles of such pollsters and consultants in the 
new democracy of Indonesia? How and to what extent did such pollsters and 
consultants have capabilities in transforming modes of marketisation and 
professionalisation of campaigning of these parties and these parties’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates? 
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Themes 2 and 3: 
Formations of political market arenas and political markets, perceptions of the 
Indonesian political parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates regarding the 
relative importance of these political market arenas and their consequences for 
developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of these 
parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections 
Questions: 
7. How did you see the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates categorize political market arenas? What 
indicators did they commonly use to identify and classify these political 
market arenas? Did they commonly realize the internal party organisations, 
the media, the electorates, the Internet and social media platforms, the 
parliament and government as a political market arena? If so, how did you 
assess the ways they perceive the relatives’ importance and relevance of 
these political market arenas and manage these political market arenas within 
and across the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections?  
8. How did you evaluate the ways these parties and these parties’ leaders, 
politicians and candidates categorize political markets? What indicators did 
they commonly use to classify these political markets? Did they commonly 
consider the internal party’ member, the media, journalists the Internet and 
social media platforms users, the electorates, competitors, and campaign-
donors as political markets? Did they categorize the Internet and social media 
users, the media owners, political lobbyists, the affiliated and unaffiliated 
political leaders and activists and campaign-volunteers as political markets? If 
so, how did you assess their perceptions regarding the relatives’ importance 
and relevance of these political markets and the ways they addressed and 
prioritized these political markets and persuade and mobilized these political 
markets within and across these elections? 
9. Base on your knowledge and experiences, were these parties and these 
parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates in facing these elections interested 
in hiring political pollsters and consultants to manage these political market 
arenas strategically and address, target persuade and mobilize these political 
markets effectively? If so, how did they employ such pollsters and consultants 
to do so? What type of political products and services were you providing to 
them in doing so? How did you develop such products and services to help 
them in achieving their goals in these elections? 
10. Did one or some of them in facing these elections hire you? If so, how did you 
see your positions and roles in the structure of these political market arenas? 
How did you manage your positions and roles as professionals when 
addressing these political markets? Did you face some problems in doing so? 
How did you tackle such problems? 
11. Did you see transformations of these political market arenas and political 
markets within and across these elections? If so, how did you perceive and 
evaluate such transformations? How did you evaluate the effects of such 
transformations on perceptions of these parties’ leaders, politicians and 
candidates regarding the relative importance of these political market arenas?  
12. Did you take such transformations into account when helping those who hired 
you to develop workable models of market-orientation and professionalisation 
of campaigning within and across these elections? If so, how did you manage 
such efforts? 
Themes 4 and 5: 
The party- and party’ presidential candidate-specific factors and their effects on 
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developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of the 
Indonesian political parties within and across the 2014 parliamentary and 
presidential elections 
Questions: 
13. Did you notice the ways the Indonesian political parties and these parties’ 
leaders, politicians and candidates in facing these elections realized, 
managed and exploited the party’ age category, size, ideology, campaign 
resources, position in the government and experiences with the internal and 
external shocks? If so, how did you evaluate such developments and their 
consequences on modes of marketisation and professionalisation of 
campaigning and the degrees of market-orientation and campaign 
professionalisms of these parties within and across these elections?  
14. Based on your assessments, which of these factors were really influencing 
the ways these parties and these parties’ leaders, politicians and candidates 
advanced market-orientation and professionalized-campaign structure and 
strategies within and across these elections? How did such factors shape up 
the ways and the degrees to which they performed such practices?  
15. Did you agree with an argument that sees that the successes of the party in 
promoting its top-leader as a presidential candidate, nominating its top leader 
as a pair of presidential candidates and having an influential presidential 
candidate likely take shape as influential factors? If so, how and the extent to 
which did such factors take shape within and across these elections?  
16. How and the extent to which did such factors determine the party’ chances to 
get substantial numbers of parliamentary seats in the 2014 parliamentary 
election, assemble a solid political coalition in the wake of this election and 
accomplish its goal in the 2014 presidential election? Which of these factors 
were really determining such party’ changes? Why and to what extent did 
they determine such party’ chances?  
17. How and the extent to which did such factors influence practices of market-
orientation and professionalisation of campaigning of these parties within and 
across these elections? Which of these factors were really influencing the 
ways these parties as an organization and these parties’ leaders, politicians 
and candidates as individual advanced such practices successfully within and 
across these elections? 
18. Did you agree with an argument that sees that most of these parties in facing 
these elections strived for improving political marketability levels of their top-
leaders and public figures or inclined to select a potential president and/or 
vice president candidates who have been politically marketable? If so, how 
did you assess such tendencies? Why did such tendencies take shape? How 
and to what extent did such tendencies influence orientations of these parties 
as an organisation and these parties’ leaders, activists and officials as 
individual politician regarding such practices within and across these 
elections?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
417 
Appendix D.4: The Interview Guides For Interviewing Campaign-
Volunteers and Political Lobbyists  
1. Why did you favour endorsing this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)?  What 
personal reasons and feeling, which have been really motivating you to do 
so?  
2. Did you organize campaign-volunteers to support to this (pair of) presidential 
candidate(s) and get this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) elected in the 
2014 presidential election? If so, what types of and how many campaign-
volunteers were you organizing? When did you start to organize these 
campaign-volunteers? How did you manage these campaign-volunteers and 
for what purposes?  
3. What types of voters, the media and the Internet and social media users were 
targeted, persuaded and mobilized by the campaign-volunteers you 
organized? How did they target, persuade and mobilize these voters, media 
and Internet and social media users? Did you evaluate and supervise them 
intensively? How did you manage such efforts effectively?  
4. How did you manage the relationships between and among these campaign-
volunteers? How did you organize the relationships between and among 
these campaign-volunteers and the official and unofficial campaign-teams 
established by either this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) or a coalition of 
political parties that nominated this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)? Did 
you face some challenges when running such efforts? If so, how did you 
resolve such challenges? Could you please share with me your stories 
regarding such issues little bit further? 
5. How did you manage the relationships between and among these campaign-
volunteers, campaign-teams and potential campaign donors? Did you face 
some challenges when running such efforts? If so, how did you tackle such 
challenges? Would you please share with me your stories regarding such 
issues little bit further? 
6. Did you raise some funds to finance marketing and campaign events and 
programs carried out by these campaign-volunteers in facing the 2014 
presidential election? If so, how did you do so? What types of challenges did 
you face in doing so? How did you manage such challenges? Would you 
please share with me your stories regarding such issues little bit further? 
7. Did you intensively approach campaign-donors to support such events and 
programs and help this (pair of) presidential candidate(s) to win this election? 
If so, what types of campaign-donors were interested in doing so? Why were 
they interested in doing so? How did you approach, persuade and mobilize 
these campaign-donors tactically? How did you collect and spend fund or 
resources provided by these campaign donors effectively? Could you please 
share with me your stories regarding such points little bit further?  
8. How did you deal with the other campaign-volunteers and political lobbyists 
who endorsed the competitor of this (pair of) presidential candidate(s)? Did 
you face some problems in doing so? If so, how did you handle such 
problems? What type of problem was really making to trouble you most in 
doing so? How did you tackle this problem? Could you please share with me 
your stories regarding such points little bit further?  
9. Did the existing presidential election regulation—in general—and campaign 
fund regulation—in particular—dampen your capabilities to raise campaign 
funds and spend such funds to finance these campaign-volunteers? If so, 
how did you deal with such regulations? Would you please share with me 
your opinions and stories regarding such issues little bit further? 
